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PREFACE
This study originated in work I did for The Black Country Museum in
1991. In the course of this research my attention was drawn to the
Wright Hingley Collection of business records. These records, covering
the period from 1890 to the 1970s, appear to be the sole surviving
business papers of N. Hingley & Sons Limited.	 They are held by the
Archives & Local History Service of the Metropolitan Borough of Dudley.
The material was gifted to the Borough in October 1974 by F H Lloyd
Limited, another Black Country firm, that had acquired Hingleys in its
dying days in 1966. Dr Charles Jones, my friend and academic mentor,
had included a reference to newly acquired material on Noah Hingley's
firm in his 'Britain and the Dominions, a guide to business and selected
records' published in 1978. It was, however, July 1991 before the
Dudley archivist was able to allow public examination of the Hingley
papers, mainly due to the massive task of sorting that was required.
Even now the records of Hingleys' twenty three associated and subsidiary
companies are not available for examination. Charles Jones and I were
allowed a one day preview of the records and we were able to establish
that there was sufficient primary source material now available to
permit a worthwhile study of this remarkable firm.
The name 'Noah Hingley' is part of the heritage, and is written large in
the folklore, of the Black Country. Although all trace is now lost of
the famous ironworks where the anchors and cables for the navies of the
world were made, the abiding memory of the awful fate of the S S Titanic
in 1912 guarantees that the name of Hingley is not forgotten. This is
because the anchors for this vessel were made in Netherton and the town
turned out 'en fete' when the principal 15.5 ton anchor was drawn on a
20 horse dray from the works to the Dudley Port railway station.
Pictures of that great day figure in every local library, and a
photograph of the event is included in the pictorial records included in
this study.
During my research for my booklet I discovered that nothing of any
consequence had ever been written about this famous firm. Apart from a
reference in the Victoria County History for Staffordshire, and short
paragraphs in various local publications, there is absolutely nothing of
substance about the Hingley firm or the Hingleys themselves on the
written record. Indeed, Neil McKendrick must have had families like the
Hingleys in mind when he wrote: 'In their search for a usable past, few
historians have thought to make heroes of British businessmen'.' It is
the aim of this study to show that the three generations of Hingleys
were industrial heroes of the first rank in the Black Country and in the
industrial economy of Britain of the time.
Noah Hingley worked for his father as a journeyman ironworker before
founding his own business with a substantial workforce in 1838. In its
heyday the firm provided a livelihood for 3000 people. It became the
No. 1 producer of large size ships' cables and anchors for the navies of
the world. My study covers the unique period of the 'Belle Epoque' from
1890 to 1918 during which this medium size provincial firm established a
position of virtual hegemony in a wrought iron trade that was already in
terminal decline. It will examine the almost providential way in which
the firm found a channel through the shoals of the new imperialism, the
second industrial revolution, extensive national industrial and economic
strife, major social change, and finally a world war from 1914 to 1918.
C Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers Armaments and Enterprise 
1854-1914 (London : Europa Publications, 1977), ix of General
Introduction.
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ABSTRACT
The principal objective of this dissertation is to position the firm of
N Hingley & Sons Limited in its rightful place in the economic history
of the Black Country and of Britain in the period 1890 to 1918.
As an original contribution to knowledge of the subject, the study
focuses on a modestly sized firm of ironmakers in the Black Country that
achieved a position of almost total hegemony in the provision of anchors
and ships cables to the navies and merchant fleets of the world. This
was at a time when 90 per cent of all chain manufactured in Britain came
from the Black Country and when the bulk of the ships of the world were
constructed in British yards. The success of the firm was based on the
solid foundation built by Noah Hingley in harnessing natural resources
to a cooperative labour force under the direction of a paternalistic
family of marked goodwill.
Chapters two and three place the Hingley firm in the economic context of
the times. Particular attention is given to how well the enterprise
conforms to NrCloskey's analysis that in this period British industry
did well and did all that could have been reasonably expected of it.
Chapter four draws heavily on the Hingley archival material to establish
an outline of the firm's trading activities during the period under
review. This process is extended to the limits of the files in chapters
five, six and seven. Chapter five examines the evolution from a family
partnership to a closely held family company to a broadly held private
company demonstrating the continuing ability of the Hingley family to
adapt, developing an appropriate structure at each stage. Chapter six
examines the basis of Hingleys' hegemonic position : the excellence of
its wrought iron, its ability to fashion large diameter cable (up to
6"), and its state-of-the-art anchors. Chapter seven examines the form
and development of Hingleys' highly efficient method of marketing. This
was a method that ensured that the entirety of its production was always
sold year on year and regardless of the fluctuations of business
activity.
Chapter eight is supplementary to chapter seven and examines Hingleys'
greatest achievement. This was the firm's ability to create
combinations of manufacturers and mini-cartels in order to capture the
lion's share of the production of large diameter ships' cables and
anchors for a selected list of firms. This was not a simple rigging of
the market.	 Rather, it was a precondition of sustained high quality
that provided a first class product at a fair price. The navies of the
world benefited from this strategy. The provision of first class
products allied to excellent marketing was the key to Hingleys status in
the industry.
Chapter nine, dealing with relations with governments, examines the
growing levels of state control in the period under review. Beginning
with the unstoppable momentum for social and political change, the
emergence of the military-industrial complex world wide ensured a
greater degree of involvement by the state in matters of business and
commerce. In the latter stages of the chapter, the way in which the
Board coped with the command economy of the Great War is examined in the
context of the resilience of the firm in adapting to the economic and
cultural changes of the first quarter of the current century. It was
this ability that enabled it to trade on successfully for a further
fifty years after the end of this story.
My dissertation endeavours to show that Noah Hingley's firm was a fine
example of solid achievement within the parameters of what was sensible
and economically achievable in Britain at that time.
A/1
NOAH HINGLEN
PART ONE :	 THE FIRM IN CONTEXT
CHAPTER ONE :	 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study
The objective of this study is to guarantee a place in the economic
history of this country for the Black Country firm of wrought iron
manufacturers known as N Hingley & Sons Limited. Hingleys traded as a
firm between 1838 and 1965, having been developed from a colony of
workman built up by Noah Hingley and his father Isaac Hingley in Cradley
in the early 1800s. In 1852 the firm moved to Netherton. This move
proved extremely providential as, by a distance measured in furlongs
rather than miles, the firm was able to separate itself from the
dreadful practices of sweated labour and generally curmudgeonly
industrial attitudes that had given the Cradley area a bad name by the
end of the century.
The underlying strength and the fundamental soundness of Noah Hingley's
enterprise lay in the judicious mix of activities in which he took part.
In this he achieved vertical integration years before the phase entered
general usage. After beginning as a worker in iron, he then went on to
lease mining areas from the Earl of Dudley in order to raise his own
coal, limestone, and iron ore. He then went into the production of pig
iron, in the process producing the first class pig on which his world
class wrought iron depended. He was thus able to deal in coal, ores,
pig iron, wrought iron, and finished iron in all its forms.' This
integration was to help him ride out successive business depressions.
The period under study, from 1890 to 1918, is the one in which the third
and final generation of Hingleys managed the firm.	 It is also the
1	 Dudley Herald, 28 February 1891.
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period in which the Hingley firm established a hegemonic position among
the anchor and cable makers of Britain, and indeed of the world. This
period was one in which a quantum leap took place in the size of ships.
Vessels of unprecedented displacement appeared on the drawing boards.
Examples include White Star's SS Olympic at 45 000 tons and SS Britannic
at 52 000 tons; the SS Aquitania at 50 000 tons and the SS Lusitania and
the SS Mauretania, both at 30 000 tons, built for Cunard; and Hamburg
Amerika's SS Imperator and SS Bismarck both at 50 000 tons. All of
these vessels, and many more, had massive anchors often weighing up to
15.5 tons and all were manufactured by Hingleys. 2 In addition, the
Hingley hegemony extended to the production of outfits for these
vessels, comprising the set of cables required for mooring, steering,
and manoeuvring.
The dissertation will examine and analyse the way in which a medium size
provincial firm with a core payroll of some 700 workers, supplemented by
up to 2 300 outworkers, was able to achieve its hegemonic position in
the provision of outfits and anchors for all the navies and merchant
fleets of the world, save that of the United States of America.
The study will further examine how this hegemonic position was achieved
during a period when the international wrought iron trade was
effectively in terminal decline from 1896 onwards, and when Britain lost
its world lead in the new industrial era of the 1890s and 1900s.
The study will demonstrate how Hingleys was able to make the transition
from the iron masters' traditional 'man to man' style of management on
the workshop floor to the professional management style of outsiders
specifically recruited for that purpose. This transition enabled the
company to trade effectively for a further forty-five years after the
2	 Hingley's Catalogue, circa 1910.
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death of the last managing Hingley, and for thirty-three years after the
'official' demise of the international wrought iron trade.
The study will look at the firm's distinctive marketing techniques,
based on the traditional British method at the time of doing business
through merchants, together with the more modern practice of placing
official agents in various places in the world, after personal
exploration by one or other of the Hingleys. The Germanic method of
controlling the market through cartels, and the American method of
effecting this through vertical integration, were not highly developed
in Britain in the early years of this study and will only be looked at
in passing.
Method
In writing about a firm that figures so strongly in the folklore of the
Black Country, yet about which so little has been written, much
dependence has had to be placed on the Wright Hingley Collection as the
principal primary source of information on the Hingley firm. The
high-mindedness of the directors of F H Lloyd Ltd, in ensuring that all
business records that came into their possession on the acquisition of
companies should be offered to Local History archives, was in marked
contrast to the many acts of archival vandalism that were committed over
the municipal records of the many small local authorities that
disappeared in the local government reorganisation of 1972-74. It also
compares well with Hingleys' own act, on moving to new offices on the
same site in 1904, of consigning all of the company records from 1852 to
1890 to the refuse tip.
Those parts of the Wright Hingley Collection used in this study are
shown in the bibliography.	 The collection is extensive, but very
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incomplete. For instance, no in-coming letters have been kept. So, for
the period from 1895 when the directors' letter books begin, until 1934
when they cease, all dialogues are one sided. Also, there are no
accounts or production records of any note. In the case of the company
accounts, recourse to the successors of Messrs A J Williams and to
Messrs G C T Parsons, who acted as auditors to the company, for relevant
documents has drawn a blank. The same applies with the Registrar of
Companies, and with the Inland Revenue, with neither body being able to
assist with individual company accounts from the period under review.
Likewise the successor firm to William Shakespeare, solicitors, has been
unable to help.
Of all the material in the collection, the most valuable proved to be
Sections 2, 3, and 8, in Part I.
Section 2: Articles of Association and Shares, gives a very clear
picture of how the company was formed, and of how the Hingleys kept a
close control through their shareholdings right up to 1918.
Section 3: Inventory and Valuation, 1890, provides an extremely
detailed picture of the business built up by Noah Hingley in a long life
from 1795 to 1877. It shows a solidly based business, free from debt or
encumbrance of any kind. It will be reviewed in detail in Part 3:
Chapter 5, on the ownership and control of the company formed in 1890.
Section 8: Correspondence and Papers, provides copious information on
the life of the company, and on how its business was conducted. The
directors' letter books were begun in 1894, coincident with the
emergence of George Benjamin Hingley and his brother Henry Montagu
Hingley as the day to day operators of the company. These letter books
number sixteen in all from 1894 to 1934 of which twelve cover the period
1/4
magistrate, as a county
They also provide an
to 1918 with 500 folios in each book, and, until 1910 were monitored by
Alfred Hilton Legge, the long serving accountant and company secretary.
In 1902 George Benjamin Hingley began his private letter books. These
with his death in
the long serving
They contain a
a useful insight
ran to five volumes each with 1 000 folios, finishing
1918, and were monitored by George Blakey Rumford,
assistant accountant and Hingley's personal clerk.
wealth of business correspondence, but also provide
into G B Hingley's other activities as a
councillor, and with the Territorial Army.
intimate picture of G B Hingley's role in providing a home for his
mother, brother, three sisters, and himself. The third set of letter
books of 500 folios each in five volumes was begun by A H Legge in 1909
towards the end of a long career in Hingleys that went back to 1862. He
probably decided to split all the files in the interest of
confidentiality as he knew that his successor would have to be a
complete outsider. As it happened, George Cyril Edwards, who took over
from Legge, was a model professional company secretary. His keeping of
the secretary's letter books, and as continued during his wartime
absence, provides the only coherent picture of the international
portfolio of agents and representatives who acted for Hingleys.
Sections 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, are in the main working papers without
summaries, such as profit and loss accounts or balance sheets. Sections
9 and 10 are miscellaneous in nature and of no value to the study,
Section 9 being mainly twentieth century catalogues and Section 10 a
portrait of Noah Hingley.
Part II of the Collection comprises a mass of papers to do with some
twenty-three subsidiary or associated companies after 1920. Access to
these papers is not allowed until they have been properly sorted and
classified.
1/5
Secondary sources vital to this study fall into two distinct groups.
The first group comprises material that is directly relevant to the
wrought iron industry in the Black Country. The second group comprises
relevant literature on the economic, industrial, social, and welfare
developments of the period that determined the context in which the
Hingley firm worked and prospered.
In the first group, the transcript of the lecture given at the
University of Birmingham on 30 October 1902 by Daniel Jones, the
employers' secretary to the Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board, has
provided a penetrating insight into why Hingleys enjoyed industrial
peace for fifty years at a time when labour relations often verged on
open warfare in industry at large. This insight was supplemented by the
records of the Board held at the Modern Records Centre, University of
Warwick. S Blackburn has provided a fascinating study of the chain
masters who gave the Black Country a bad name, and at the same time
highlighting how the Hingley firm set itself above the low benchmark of
the time.3
In the second group, the general economic context of the period from
1890 to 1918 has been examined by reference to R S Sayers, Peter
Mathias, and to Frank B Tipton and Robert Aldrich.' These writers'
works have been supplemented by the extremely informative histories of
Vickers and John Brown. 5 The position of Hingleys during the period
3	 S Blackburn 'Employers and Social Policy : Black Country Chain
Masters, the Minimum Wage Campaign and the Cradley Heath strike of
1910,' Midland History 12 (1987).
4	 R S Sayers, A History of Economic Change in England, 1880-1939 
(London : Oxford University Press, 1967).
Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation. An Economic History 
of Britain 1700-1914 (London : Methuen, 1969).
Frank B Tipton & Robert Aldrich, An Economic and Social History of
Europe, 1890-1939 (London : Macmillan, 1987).
5	 Sir Allan Grant, Steel and Ships The History of John Brown's 
(London : Michael Joseph, 1950).
C Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers Armaments and Enterprise 
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that saw the final decline of whole sections of British industry, as the
first Industrial Revolution ran its course, is examined in the context
of comparatively recent economic and historical studies of that period.
Especially useful in this process have been the works of N F R Crafts, D
N McCloskey, D H Aldcroft, M Edelstein, C K Harley, R C Allen, P Berck,
S Webb, Asa Briggs, W P Kennedy, and H Pelling.6
The unique achievement of Hingleys in surviving and prospering against
the tide of world events in the wrought iron industry has been examined
against the background of T H Burnham and G D Hoskins, supplemented by
Geoffrey Tweedale. 7	This achievement has also been examined in the
1854-1914 (London : Europa Publications, 1977).
J D Scott, Vickers A History (London : Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
1962).
6	 N F R Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1985).
D N McCloskey, 'Did Victorian Britain fail?', Economic History 
Review, 2nd ser., (23 1970).
D H Aldcroft, 'The Entrepreneur and the British Economy,
1870-1914', Economic History Review, 2nd ser., (17 1964).
D N McCloskey, Enterprise and Trade in Victorian Britain, (London
: Allen & Unwin, 1981).
M Edelstein, 'Realised Rates of Return on UK Home and Foreign
Investment in the Age of High Imperialism, 'Explorations in 
Economic History, (13 1976).
C K Harley and D N McCloskey, 'Foreign Trade : Competition and the
Expanding Economy', in R C Floud and D N McCloskey (eds.), The
Economic History of Britain since 1700, vol. 2 (Cambridge
Cambridge University Press 1981).
R C Allen, 'International Competition in Iron and Steel,
1850-1913', Journal of Economic History, (39 1979).
R C Allen, 'Entrepreneurship and Technical Progress in the
Northeast Coast Pigiron Industry : 1850-1913', Research in 
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context of the general fortunes of the iron and steel trades in the West
Midlands, as seen in the unpublished theses of D B Evans, M Le Guillou,
and G R W Medley. 8 Reference has also been made to the various
histories of Vickers, John Brown, and the like, companies that formed
part of the industrial environment in which Hingleys was placed. 8 The
area of labour relations in this period, during which Hingleys led a
charmed life, has been examined by reference to E H Phelps Brown, George
Dangerfield, J E Vichniac, and C Behagg. 10
By way of redressing the inevitable tendency to concentrate on the
demise of British manufacturing industry when considering the period
1870-1914, particular attention has been paid to the studies of M J
Wiener, W D Rubinstein and Corelli Barnett." Wiener from America and
Geoffrey Tweedale, Sheffield Steel and America : A Century of 
Commercial and Technological Interdependence, 1830-1930 (Cambridge
: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
8	 D B Evans, 'The Iron and Steel Industry of South Staffordshire',
University of Birmingham, 1951.
M Le Guillou, 'Developments in the South Staffordshire Iron and
Steel Industry, 1850-1913, in the Light of Home and Foreign
Competition', University of Keele, 1972.
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Country Iron and Steel Industry, 1850-1900', University of London
(external), 1982.
9	 Sir Allan Grant, Steel & Ships The History of John Brown's (London
: Michael Joseph, 1950).
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1914 (London : Europa Publications, 1977).
J D Scott, Vickers A History (London : Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
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(London : Macmillan, 1965).
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Iron Industries, 1860-1918 (Greenwich, Conn. : JAI Press Inc.,
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Rubinstein from Australia have brought a measure of perspective to the
whole issue of Britain's apparent decline. This, is with particular
reference to the fact that during the period covered by this study, and
for half a century afterwards, Britain's real hegemonic influence lay in
international commerce and international finance.
Especially useful in assessing the significance of the incorporation of
the firm in the style of N Hingley and Sons Limited in 1890 were works
by Lloyd Bonfield, P L Payne, and H A Shannon. 12 Studies by G Carpenter
and Bentley B Gilbert on changing attitudes and policies on unemployment
and sickness clarified the broad social context within which Hingleys
operated.13
A source of particular interest in this study was the specifications
forming part of the patents taken out by the British anchor makers in
the early 1900s. At a time when Germany and the USA were leading
developments in the new industries, British innovative designs still led
the world in solving problems, the outcome of which were critical for
the safety of the massive ships that were constructed in that era.
Examples of these specifications are contained in Appendix 3.
12	 Lloyd Bonfield 'Affective Families Open Elites and Family
Settlements in Early Modern England', Economic History Review, 2nd
ser., 39 (3 1986).
P L Payne 'The Emergence of the Large-scale Company in Great
Britain, 1870-1914', Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 20.
H A Shannon 'The coming of general limited liability', Economic 
History, (2 1931).
13	 G Carpenter 'National Health Insurance 1911-1948 : a case study in
the use of non-profit organisations in the provision of welfare
benefits, Public Administration 62, (1 1984).
Bentley B Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance in Great 
Britain (London : Michael Joseph, 1966).
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The period under study ended with the traumas and changes imposed by the
need to adopt industry for The Great War from 1914-1918. Here,
extensive reference has been made to Gerry R Rubin".
An original contribution to knowledge
The Black Country passed a milestone in the production of chain and
chain cable in the year 1909. In that year some 90 per cent of all
Britain's production of chain took place in some two or three square
miles of the North Worcestershire enclave in the South Staffordshire
region, encompassing Netherton and Cradley. 15
 Thus the region not only
held a world monopoly in the production of chain cables, it also held an
hegemonic position in the production of the ships' anchors that were
manufactured in Hingleys' works. This study, therefore, has as a
principal objective the development of a clear understanding and
appreciation of how one firm above all the others came to be the world
leader in this field of endeavour.
The leading characters
The leading family characters in this study are Noah Hingley, the
founder of the firm, Benjamin Hingley, his youngest son, who took over
direction of the family firm from his father in 1877, and George
Benjamin Hingley and Henry Montagu Hingley, Noah's grandsons by his
Liverpool based son, Hezekiah. Lesser but vital figures are Alfred
Hilton Legge, the redoubtable company secretary who served the Hingleys
from 1862 to 1910, and William Blakey Rumford, the assistant company
14 Gerry R Rubin, War, Law, and Labour. The Munitions Acts, State 
Regulation, and the Unions, 1915-1921 (Oxford : Clarendon Press,
1987).
15	 S Blackburn, 'Employers and Social Policy : Black Country
Chain-Masters, the Minimum Wage Campaign and the Cradley Heath
strike of 1910,' Midland History 12 (1987) : 87.
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secretary who served from about 1884 to 1918; in reality Rumford was
personal assistant to George Benjamin Hingley and a life long confidant.
George Cyril Edwards was the first professional administrator to be
appointed by the Hingleys, joining the firm in 1910. His major roles
were to manage the mass of administration stemming from the financial,
social, and industrial legislation brought in by the Liberal government
and to control the wide proliferation of agents used by Hingleys.
Last but certainly not least is Cyril Edward Lloyd, brought in as a
director in 1908. Lloyd was a civil engineer who became an ironmaster
of equal standing with the Hingleys. Within two years of becoming a
director Lloyd had a hands-on involvement in every aspect of the
business. He became indispensable and was the obvious choice as
chairman of the company when Sir George died in 1918.
Figure 1.1 provides an abbreviated family tree based on one prepared in
1952 by Colonel G P L Weston at a time when descendants of the Hingleys
were endeavouring to sort out a complicated legacy. The family tree
shows that few of Noah Hingley's sons were permitted to join him in the
business.	 Eli, James, and John do not appear again in this study.
Likewise, Joseph Hingley although a minor shareholder from 1890 until
his death in 1900, certainly took no part in the business during the
period covered. The three brothers who were involved in the family
business were Hezekiah, Samuel, and Benjamin. Hezekiah died while Noah
Hingley was still in his prime, but he left two sons. These were George
Benjamin Hingley and Henry Montagu Hingley. Together with their uncle
Benjamin Hingley they became the principal shareholders in the company
that was formed in 1890. 	 This study is focused on George Benjamin
16	 Colonel G P L Weston, DSO, OBE, (later Major-General Weston) to
five close relatives, 1 April 1952, personal files of Mr C P
Harris.
Hingley and Henry Montagu Hingley, the third and last generation to
manage the firm and who took it to its pre-eminent position in the
market for anchors and ships' cables.
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Noah Hingley's son Samuel Hingley was the one who missed out. He was
totally devastated in the 1860s by the death of his first wife, followed
by the death of his young daughter following a ducking in the sea by a
bathing attendant at Bognor.° He suffered a breakdown and was sent to
the south of France to recover. There he met his second wife by whom he
had six children who in turn produced a dazzling array of descendants.
Samuel was never given any great responsibility or any significant
equity stake in the firm. He was installed at Harts Hill Iron Works in
Brierley Hill under the direction of his brother Benjamin, as was his
own son Harry Bertram Hingley after him. This was an arrangement made
within the family to provide a livelihood for one of its weaker members.
For all practical purposes Noah Hingley's business on his death passed
to Benjamin Hingley, his youngest son, and to Hezekiah Hingley's sons,
George Benjamin Hingley and Henry Montagu Hingley. The actual
dispositions would appear to have been made under the 'Noah Hingley
Family Settlement'. This was made before his death and no trace has
been found despite enquiries to solicitors and the public record
offices. Indeed its very existence only came to light from a passing
reference to it in 1910 by Sir George Benjamin when clearing up the
affairs of a female relative. However, Noah Hingley's last will and
testament as proved on 29 November 1877 left an estate worth less than
£2 000. The legatees were Benjamin, Samuel, the two sons of Hezekiah,
and Noah's daughters Leah and Mary.	 The estate consisted of purely
domestic items and his famous ironworks were not included. At that
time, as long as the contents of the settlement were open knowledge,
there was no need even for formal written registration. This probably
accounts for the fact that the original document drawn up by A Humfrey,
a solicitor in Halesowen, has not come to light.
Rumer Godden writing to Rita (Hingley) Harris, 29 January 1986,
personal files of Mr C P Harris.
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Further reference to settlements has been made in the chapter on the
structure of the company incorporated in 1890. There, attention has
been drawn to Lloyd Bonfield's article on family settlements with
particular reference to the distribution of wealth as effected by Noah
Hingley."
Noah Hingley was born on the 7 March 1796, the son of Isaac Hingley and
his wife Esther. With his father he set up a forge and small
chainmaking factory on the banks of the River Stour in Cradley, North
Worcestershire, in the early 1800s. The key to their early success lay
in developing a colony of skilled Cradley men and women on which the
enterprise was based. By 1845 the Cradley workshops were too small and
new commodious purpose built works were erected at Netherton on the
banks of the Birmingham Canal at the location shown on the map that
follows this page. These were opened in 1852. Having established his
reputation with chains and anchors, Noah Hingley then set about making
the pig iron required in the manufacture of wrought iron. He also
raised his own coal, leasing properties from Lord Ward of Dudley. His
activities encompassed the Netherton Ironworks, The Harts Hill Iron
Works, The Old Hill Furnaces, and various collieries. Until 1820 Noah
Hingley was a nail master and maker of small chains. It was during his
regular trade visits to Liverpool that he accepted an initial order to
make ships' cables. This work had been pioneered on Tyneside, where the
manufacture of wrought iron cables had begun in or about 1808. Hingley
had no knowledge of cable making techniques, but he and his workers made
the cable to the satisfaction of the Liverpool merchant. This first
cable was 1.5" in diameter, the size of a cable being the diameter of
the wrought iron rod from which it was fashioned. 19 In 1848 Hingley
18	 Bonfield, '...Settlements...', 341-354.
n	 Charles Fogg, Chain & Chainmakers (n. p., Shire Publications Ltd,
1981), 3, 6, 8.
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introduced the making of anchors to the Black Country and within fifty
years the area was the world centre for the manufacture of anchors and
cables. Under the Acts of Parliament making the testing of cables and
anchors compulsory, where they were to be used on British ships, testing
machines were established at Netherton and at Tipton.2°
Although very much against the incorporation of Netherton into Dudley in
1865, Noah Hingley became Mayor of Dudley in 1869 at the age of 74•11
He died in 1877, full of years, but not before standing as a
Parliamentary Candidate in 1874 at the age of 79, using as his manifesto
the Contract of Employment he had with his work force as a proof of his
fair play and open dealings. His candidature arose from the
cancellation of the General Election victory of H H Sheridan over F S
Shenstone because of riots and intimidation!
Benjamin Hingley was the most prominent of Noah Hingley's sons. He was
born in 1830 and died in 1905. He succeeded his father as the head of
business in 1877 when he was 47 years of age and he was sole manager
until 1890. He was a prime mover in the formation in 1890 of the
private limited company of N Hingley & Sons Limited, which effectively
placed ownership, control, and operation of his father's chain and
anchor business in his hands and those of the two sons of his older
brother Hezekiah. Hezekiah was born in 1825 and died in 1865 at the
early age of 40 years. He was based in Liverpool and on his death his
widow Fanny Georgina together with their children George Benjamin
Hingley, Henry Montagu Hingley, Alice Linton Hingley, Emily Georgina
Hingley, and Lucy Miller Hingley came to live in North Worcestershire.
20	 F H Hackwood, Oldbury and Round About (Birmingham : Cornish Bros,
1915), 267.
21	 Dudley Herald, 28 February 1891.
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Benjamin Hingley belonged to that first generation in the gentrification
of the manufacturing classes. He was essentially an ironmaster of
international repute, responsible for the business ethics and the
quality of product for which his firm was renowned. He never married
and nor did any of the children of his brother Hezekiah. Indeed, Cyril
Peter Harris, who is descended from Benjamin's brother Samuel Hingley,
tells of his mother's recollection that the three redoubtable Hingley
girls would not let any girl near their two brothers! Here one has to
speculate which was the sadder aspect of the gentrification process
the fear of marrying beneath or the inability to marry above one's
station. This did not appear to affect Samuel Hingley who, through a
Merseyside marriage, gave rise to a large group of middle class
descendants, among them solicitors, a much decorated general, and the
author Rumer Godden. As for Hezekiah, his line died out as none of his
five children married and with it the management of the Hingley firm
passed out of the family. Benjamin Hingley, in addition to his work as
an ironmaster, was also active in public life. He was a Justice of the
Peace in Worcestershire, Staffordshire, and the County Borough of
Dudley. He joined in the successful resistance to the incorporation of
Dudley into Staffordshire, thus maintaining its status as an island of
Worcestershire. He was Mayor of Dudley in 1887 and 1888 and he became
the High Sheriff of Worcestershire in 1900.
	 He was also a Deputy
Lieutenant of that County. He was created a Baronet on the
recommendation of Gladstone in 1893 and was Member of Parliament for
North Worcestershire from 1885 to 1895, when he was compelled to retire
from public life and from active management of the business by a serious
illness. 22
 At this point, effective control passed to Benjamin's
nephews, the two grandsons of Noah Hingley, forty-five year old George
Benjamin Hingley and forty year old Henry Montagu Hingley.
22	 E Blocksidge's, Dudley Almanac, (n.p., 1906), 87-115.
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George Benjamin Hingley, later Sir George Benjamin Hingley Bt., is the
principal player in this study. He was involved on a day to day basis
in the top level management of N Hingley & Sons Limited from the day of
its incorporation in 1890 until his death, worn out by his efforts in
the Great War, in August 1918. Under his uncle, Benjamin, he was
effectively managing director of the company by 1895, becoming chairman
in 1905. He must have been very highly regarded by his bachelor uncle,
who arranged that George should succeed to the baronetcy under a
remainder.
George Benjamin Hingley, known in the business as 'Ben' Hingley, was
born in 1850, and lost his father Hezekiah in 1865 when he was 15 years
of age. Following the move to Worcestershire in 1865 he attended the
Halesowen Grammer School. He travelled extensively on behalf of the
firm and was responsible for setting up the network of agents in the
Orient and in Australasia. 23
 Without doubt George Benjamin Hingley was
a workaholic and as this study will show there was no aspect of the
business in which he was not involved. He took very short holidays and
was perpetually involved in short distance travel to London, Liverpool,
Glasgow, and other British cities on behalf of the business, while
depending on his brother Henry Montagu to undertake much of the
necessary continental and intercontinental travel. The year after
becoming chairman in 1905, he had a resolution passed ensuring the
concentration of the share ownership into the hands of his brother and
himself. This matter is referred to in detail in a later chapter, but
the effect of the manoeuvre was dramatic. Both brothers were bachelors
and Henry Montagu did not enjoy good health. Before the latter's death
in 1909, at the age of 54, George Benjamin Hingley was compelled to
bring in competent ironmasters from outside the family. With his own
death in 1918 management of the company passed out of the family on an
23	 WHC : Sec. 8 : Newscuttings, vol. 1.
1/18
amicable basis, the once tight shareholding having been dispersed in his
later years among dozens of holders.
'Ben' Hingley was a Victorian entrepreneur of the highest reputation and
standing. His dedication to his enterprise, workforce, and region was
exemplary. Unlike his uncle and grandfather he took no part in
political activities at representational level, reserving his spare
energies for trade associations. An obituary in 'The Dudley Telegraph'
of 21 August 1918 noted his long membership of the Midland Iron and
Steel Wages Board. He also served as vice-chairman of the South
Staffordshire Ironmasters' Association. This Board secured industrial
peace in the trade for fifty years, while the Association inculcated
fair play in industrial relations."
'Ben' Hingley died on 19 August 1918 at a time when the British nation
was locked in the trauma of the great and final counter-offensive that
ended the Great War.
	 This continuous counter-offensive lasted from
April to October 1918 and totally dominated the year. However, the
entire national press ran obituaries to mark his remarkable career. In
addition the whole of the provincial press in the West Midlands joined
the tribute, together with the local papers in Liverpool, Glasgow, the
north east, etc., where he was particularly well known. 25 Inside and
outside of the trade he was known as the man who made the anchors and
cables for the navies of the world. In this study, George Benjamin
Hingley is referred to as 'Ben' Hingley until he succeeded to the
baronetcy in 1905. Thereafter, he is referred to as Sir George Hingley,
as was the custom in his firm.
24	 Ibid.
25	 Ibid.
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Henry Montagu Hingley was born in 1855 and he died in 1909 at the early
age of 54. Like his brother he remained unmarried and was dedicated to
the business. Whereas his brother had a particular interest in
Australia, the Far East and Italy, Henry Montagu covered South Africa
and Northern Europe in a harmonious and complementary approach to their
world marketing activities. The files show that Henry Montagu had a
very profound grasp of the finer techniques of making their world famous
wrought iron.	 Although anchors and cables were the high profile
products of N Hingley & Sons Limited, Netherton bar iron was an original
and major item in the export portfolio of the firm. Many of the
technical innovations in the firm were due to him as later sections in
the study will show. His premature death left his brother with no
alternative but to bring in outsiders to help in the running of the
firm.
Of the outsiders, four stand out for their contribution to the business.
Alfred Hilton Legge served the firm from 1862 to 1910, acting as company
secretary from its incorporation in 1890 and no doubt in a similar
capacity well before 1890. He was particularly well informed on all
aspects of the business and he had the standing and the authority to
represent the Hingleys on most trade matters. His control over the
reporting of weekly production provided the key to the reliability with
which the Hingleys could enter into their contractual obligations.
George Blakey Rumford, whose name first appears in the records in 1895
was assistant company secretary and personal assistant to 'Ben' Hingley.
He appears to have been passed over in the appointment of the new
company secretary in 1910, but in August 1914, when G C Edwards went to
the War, it was left to Rumford to carry out both sets of duties. The
files show that by 1917 his health too was completely shattered and he
died in December 1918.
	 George Cyril Edwards, appointed company
secretary in 1910 on the retirement of Alfred Hilton Legge, soon
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acquainted himself with the intricacies of the business. He had the
clearest view of the Hingley network of agents and marketing techniques,
but as an officer in the territorial army, he left the firm on the
outbreak of war in 1914 and did not return until 1919.
However, the most important of all the outsiders was Cyril Edward Lloyd.
Only 32 years of age when brought into the firm by Sir George Hingley on
30 January 1908, he went on to become the grand old man of the
enterprise, dying in harness as president of the company in 1963 after
fifty five years service. Lloyd was a member of the well known banking
family, but instead of going into banking he had qualified as a
chartered civil engineer. Within two years of joining Hingleys he
became the de facto managing director with a personal involvement in
every aspect of the company's marketing and sales activities. In this
he enjoyed the support of the technical directors in the works
namely G F Simms, E H Smith, and C E Howell. As Sir George's right hand
man he quickly developed into one of the leading ironmasters in the West
Midlands. Later he served as a Conservative MP for Dudley in the years
1922-29 and 1941-45. He was a member of the Birmingham Committee of
Lloyds Bank and a director of the Great Western Railway.
The central argument
The main thrust of the dissertation will be to demonstrate that, during
the whole of the period under review, the firm of N Hingley & Sons
Limited was an industrial anachronism harnessed to a paradox. Hingleys
was an anachronism because its basic product, high quality wrought iron,
was in terminal decline as an industrial metal from 1886 when world
production of steel first exceeded that of wrought iron. By 1930,
wrought iron was no longer considered to be a commercially significant
metal. The changing fortunes of the two products are discussed in more
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detail in chapter two, but a general indication may be shown as
follows26.
Table 1.1 : World production of wrought iron and steel between 1885 and
1930
World production of
wrought iron in tons
World production of
steel in tons
1885 7 110 000 6 190 000
1890 8 560 000 12 280 000
1920 2 310 000 71 120 000
1930 500 000 93 330 000
The Hingley works consistently produced some 20 to 25 per cent of the
British output of wrought iron and the paradox arose from the fact that,
against the general trend, steel was no match for the finest wrought
iron for the manufacture of large size ships' cables and anchors. This
paradox enabled Hingleys to target and then to dominate this market by
the skilful blending of several critical factors.
The first three of these factors were the basic product itself, the
workforce, and the business ethics of the proprietors. Hingleys
produced wrought iron of the highest quality, a fact that gave them
benchmark status in specifications. Excellent labour relations
prevailed in the workplace, based on the mutual accords reached in the
Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board. Third came an absence of greed on
the part of the owners, whose business ethics were based on the notion
of a good product at a fair price.
The fourth factor was the ability of Sir George Hingley, in particular,
to form trade combinations involving many of his British competitors
working in tandem with his own firm in order to balance the market,
especially in times of boom.
	 The outstanding achievement in trade
26	 Burnham & Hoskins, Iron & Steel in Britain 1870-1930, 26-27.
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combinations, that of the clandestine commercial alliances with German
firms, belongs however to Sir George's brother, H M Hingley. The way in
which those German alliances featured in the well being of the firm will
be examined in detail later in the text. The fifth factor was the
system of world wide marketing, developed initially by 'Ben' Hingley and
his brother H M Hingley, and further extended by C E Lloyd. This system
took the Hingley products to the heart of the shipbuilding industry in
northern Europe; and also to the mining and industrial areas of the
Colonies and Dominions and to the new States in South America, as well
as Japan.
The study will also demonstrate how a family firm that converted to
company status in 1890, after an existence of more than seventy years,
was able to effect a transformation from management by the gaffer, to
management by a professional board. This transformation enabled it to
survive the virtual extinction of wrought iron as a world metal, and
continue to trade successfully for a further half century after the
death of Sir George, the last Hingley to manage the company, in 1918.
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PART ONE : THE FIRM IN CONTEXT
CHAPTER TWO : THE BROAD ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, 1890-1920
A general overview
The years covered by the study have often been referred to as the 'Belle
Epoque'. They were years during which the elites of Europe lived in a
style that was in marked contrast to that endured by the working
populations on which industrial prosperity relied. It was a period of
constant social turmoil, but it was also one in which the Hingley firm
enjoyed a charmed existence. This was due to the presence of two
critical factors. The first was the long term industrial harmony in the
works stemming from Benjamin Hingley's promotion of The Midland Iron and
Steel Wages Board from the 1870s onwards. The second was a set of
circumstances that allowed Hingleys' part of the wrought iron trade to
flourish, when the industry as a whole was in terminal decline. Both of
these factors are examined later.
It was also a new age of imperialism. Britain and France extended their
existing overseas dominions. Portugal and the Netherlands held on to
their long-established empires. Belgium, Italy, and Germany, as
newcomers in the European state system, hurried to stake their claims.
Only Spain lost ground, in the war of 1898, to an expansionist United
States. Economically, too, an unprecedentedly integrated world economy
was dominated by Western Europe and the United States as the century
drew to a close. Yet by this date, a second industrial revolution was
already under way that was to bring marked changes in the balance of
power. The new growth industries were steel, machine tools, chemicals,
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and electrical engineering. These were fields in which Germany and the
USA were to take the leading positions.'
In a general overview of the period, Peter Mathias has highlighted the
various factors that led to the shifts in balance among the world
leaders in the various economic activities of the era. By 1.890 Europe
was emerging from the long period of stagnation, also known as the Great
Depression, that lasted from 1873 to 1896.
	 It had been a period of
doubt, self-questioning, and disenchantment.
	 During the next thirty
years Britain still dominated certain of the old heavy industries, but
it lost its general position of world hegemony. Shipbuilding, so
central to this dissertation, was the one area in which Britain
maintained a world wide hegemonic position. As shipping adopted steam
power, Britain established coaling stations all over the world. Exports
of Welsh steam coal rose from 36 million tons in 1890 to 100 million
tons in 1913. Heavy engineering prospered, as did the armament trade,
food processing, and brewing. Large companies producing branded
consumer goods for a newly emerging mass market, such as Beecham, Lever,
Cadbury, Fry, Guinness, and Bass, flourished, demonstrating that Britain
did have a capacity for entrepreneurship. Many of these activities,
however, had a downside in that they were there to satisfy the growing
purchasing power of the more affluent of the working classes. As a
result, these major economic activities did not initially contribute
significantly to exports.
	 In the newer industries of the second
industrial revolution Britain did not fare as well. Relative to the
USA, Britain fell away in the world competition for machine tools and
motor cars in the period from 1890 to 1900. While leading Germany in
the production of motor cars, Britain trailed in dye-stuffs and cameras.
Indeed, by 1900 world leadership in metals technology, mining,
1	 Tipton & Aldrich, History of Europe, 1890-1939, 1-5.
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electrical engineering, optics, chemicals and chemical engineering, had
passed to Germany.
When looking at reasons for the relative deterioration of Britain's
position in the world economic league, Mathias identified three critical
factors. The first was that a relative failure by Britain to maintain
innovation and development allowed the newly industrialised nations in
Europe and the USA to catch up. The second was the management structure
in British Industry where the prevailing pattern was the family firm or
partnership, or the public company where the family held most of the
controlling shares. This gave rise to the well known commercial
phenomenon where by the third generation an enterprise was regarded more
often as a source of income for a landed gentleman than as a continuing
source of working capital. The third, and perhaps the most significant
factor, was the issue of higher education. Neither Germany nor the USA
encouraged a retreat from business among those blessed with higher
education.
	 By 1870, the USA had 70 universities that were actually
sponsored by local businessmen and agriculture.
	 Likewise, Germany
developed a nationwide system of higher education.2
Viewed in relation to the technologically innovative leaders of the
second industrial revolution, Hingleys initially appeared to be
something of an anachronism. Such innovation as took place was
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. It was, however, an anachronism
that was particularly well suited to take advantage of its position. As
an industrial activity the manufacture of large scale ships' anchors and
large size ships' cables was one of the few fields in which top class
wrought iron was far superior to the best of the mild steels on offer at
the time. Additionally, the best anchors and cables had to be fashioned
mainly by hand.
2	 Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, 395-423.
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Within the limits of its operations, and throughout the whole of the
period under review, Hingleys was a significant force in the economic
life of Britain. The firm gave employment to between 2500 and 3000
people. Its role was played out in two associated but parallel fields.
The first was in its production of top class wrought iron. At this time
the three top producers were Hingleys with its Netherton Crown Special
Best Best Iron, Henry Wood of Chester with its Snedshill Extra Best
Best, and Barrows & Hall of Tipton with its BBH Special Best Best.
After the demise of Barrows & Hall in 1906 Hingleys became the leading
producer of top class wrought iron. In 1909 it was producing 1000 tons
per week. 3
 The second was its commanding presence in the field of
ships' anchors and in the fabrication of large diameter (up to 6")
ships' chains and cables.
Hingleys in the context of debate on the Industrial Decline of Britain
Earlier in this study particular reference was made to the economic
histories of T H Burnham and G D Hoskins, R S Sayers, F B Tipton and R
Aldrich, and P Mathias. This section now draws heavily on N F R Crafts
for his work on bringing together the strands of the debate on
industrial decline, on Derek Aldcroft for his indictment of British
entrepreneurial endeavour, on D N McCloskey for his spirited defence of
the late Victorian and Edwardian businessmen, and on R C Allen, P Berck,
and S Webb for their particular studies of total factor productivity in
the context of industrial decline. Other writers are also introduced to
illuminate the text.
In order to redress the inevitable tendency to concentrate on industrial
decline when discussing Hingleys' place in the economic order, especial
reference has been made to the works of M J Wiener and W D Rubinstein.
3	 WHC : Sec. 8; GBHLB, 3 : 25 October 1909, 40.
2/4
Wiener addresses the place of elitism in the sphere of secondary
education, an elitism that contributed to the north south divide in
Britain, especially over the status of industry as a proper occupation
for the newly gentrified classes. Rubinstein brings some much needed
realism to the whole debate by demonstrating that Britain's industrial
pre-eminence was a relatively short lived fact of economic history when
compared with its much longer domination of world commerce and finance.
Crafts, dealing with some of the legacies of Britain's early start in
the first Industrial revolution, highlights the extent of the
controversy surrounding Britain's alleged decline in this period.'
Essentially the controversies revolve around the very differing opinions
of Derek Aldcroft writing in 1964 and D N McCloskey's major responses in
1970 and 1981. Aldcroft's indictment, spelled out without equivocation,
stated that British entrepreneurs:
• failed to adopt the best available techniques of
production
• under-estimated the growing importance of science,
investing little in laboratories or research
• over-invested in the old staples of cotton and iron,
ignoring chemicals,
	 automobiles and electrical
engineering
• were bad salesmen, especially abroad
• were insufficiently aggressive in organising cartels
to extract monopoly profits from the world at large5
4	 Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution,
155.
5	 Aldcroft, 'The Entrepreneur and the British Economy, 1870-1914',
113-134.
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Hingleys' defence against these charges will shortly be discussed. More
generally, a rebuttal exists for each, supported by empirical evidence.
The strong move by neo-classical economic historians to defend the
performance of the British economy during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, has among its strongest supporters D N McCloskey
whose paper of 1970 contributed a very robust defence. McCloskey's main
thrust was that the economy was not stagnating during this period, but
was growing as rapidly as was permitted by the growth of resources and
the effective exploitation of available technology. He also endeavoured
to show that at the macro-economic level, productivity growth was
creditable compared with other advanced economies. He also contended
that no gains would have resulted from redirecting Britain's large
foreign investment into the domestic economy.° The significance of
Britain's large foreign investments, as the backcloth against which her
manufacturing sector must of necessity be viewed, is treated more fully
a little later in the text.
As Aldcroft admitted when commentating by invitation in McCloskey's
book, McCloskey's opinions rejected the conventional history of
climacteric or retardation being the norm for the late Victorian and
Edwardian economies.' Indeed, McCloskey reiterated his earlier view
that the growth performance of the British economy was reasonably
satisfactory, stating that there was little potential for further growth
through either home demand or exports because of the inelastic supplies
of labour and growth capital. He further stated that as total growth
was fixed by the availability of resources and productivity gains, that
faster growth was inhibited by the rate of productivity growth.°
6	 McCloskey, 'Did Victorian Britain fail?', 451-459.
7	 McCloskey, Enterprise and Trade in Victorian Britain, 111.
Ibid., 111.
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McCloskey's view that Britain did not over-invest overseas at the
expense of the domestic economy, receives support from M Edelstein whose
view was that the London capital market generally allocated funds
efficiently and did not exhibit a tendency to invest too much abroad.9
In addition McCloskey, writing with Harley, agreed that Britain was
correct to continue to exploit her comparative advantage in the old
industries right up to the Great War in 1914. He argued further that
her relative slowness to expand new industries was in line with her
skills and factor endowments. H
 The matter of factor endowments will be
considered when considering certain of the dissenting views from
McCloskey's defence of the late Victorians and the Edwardians.
Crafts, in his analysis of comparative manufacturing advantages in the
last year before the outbreak of war in 1914, schedules the status of
the four principal manufacturing countries in accordance with Table
2.1"
Table 2.1 : The status of four principal manufacturing countries in 1914
United Kingdom Germany France United States
Rail and Shipping
Textiles
Iron and Steel
Spirits/Tobacco
Electricals
Cameras
Leather
Industrial equipment
Chemicals
Metal manufacturers
Iron and Steel
Non-metal materials
Apparel
Spirits/Tobacco
Motor Cars
Apparel
Cameras
Leather
Textiles
Chemicals
Non-ferrous metal
Agricultural equipment
Industrial equipment
Motor Cars
Electricals
Metal manufacturers
Leather
Rail and Shipping
Iron and Steel
Cameras
9	 Edelstein, 'Realised Rates of Return on UK Home and Foreign
Investment', 283.
10	 Harley and McCloskey, 'Foreign Trade : Competition and the
Expanding Economy', 68-69.
11	 Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution,
162.
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The table, which in turn was based on research by Tysznski in 1951,
would appear to add weight to McCloskey's view that Britain was right to
concentrate on the manufacturing industries where it held an advantage
right up to the Great War in 1914. This is of particular relevance to
Hingleys' activities that were focused on the shipbuilding and iron
trade. The table appears to show that Britain was wholly neglectful of
the manufacturing industries dominated by Germany, France, and the
United States. This, however, overlooks the tremendous advances in new
industries that were a feature of the Second Industrial Revolution in
Britain. These advances are considered later.
Total factor productivity
Turning now to the dissenters from McCloskey's defence of British
economic performance in the period under review. Without exception, all
of McCloskey's critics were writing with the 20 : 20 vision that comes
with the benefit of hindsight some 70 years later, or two generations
after the event. Allen, Berck, and Webb, have demonstrated that total
factor productivity (or the way in which the resources of land, capital
and labour were utilised) was lower in Edwardian Britain than in the
United States or in Germany. Kennedy in two different views on
investment strategy, cites mis-direction, while Richardson maintains
that something close to a sclerosis of the economic arteries or
constitutional inertia prevented Britain from accommodating change.
In developing his total factor productivity hypothesis in 1979, Allen
was able to show that, while Britain had the most efficient iron
industry in the world in 1850 by 1913 it had been overtaken by the
United States and by Germany. 12
	However, in 1981 he conceded that
British firms in the north east of England had acted rationally, but may
12	 Allen, 'International Competition in Iron and Steel', 911-937.
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have been held back by entrepreneurial failure. 13 Berck's main thrust
was that Britain fell behind the United States in terms of total factor
productivity in the iron and steel trades due to its non-acceptance of
the hard driving techniques pioneered by US firms. Hard driving is the
technique of virtually doubling output from the furnaces by blowing hot
air at nine pounds per square inch, as against the UK usage of five
pounds per square inch. 14 Having pioneered the technique, the US had a
marked advantage as UK firms could not afford the capital outlay that
was required for the higher pressure working. 15 This was of particular
relevance to the Hingley enterprise. Much of its furnace equipment
dated back to the middle of the century. Although a private limited
company, it was still until 1908 a family partnership that financed all
development out of revenue. Debt or commercial borrowing was contrary
to the culture of the enterprise, and was never used as a means of
replacing equipment.	 Webb's emphasis is rather different from the
studies of Allen and Berck, in that he concentrated on Britain's failure
to control the market. Indeed, Webb stressed that total factor
productivity was influenced by the working of tariffs and cartels. A
marked feature of the growth of German manufacturing industry after 1870
was the use of the cartel and the tariff to restrain competition. 16 For
the British manufacturer, the cartel was often pictured as part of a
foreign and often distasteful alien culture. Hingleys was wedded as a
firm to free trade and Sir George Hingley had the gravest doubts about
the great movement for tariff reform that was launched by Joseph
Chamberlain on 15 May 1903. Chamberlain, who had been a free trader in
the 1880s, used the clamour for an answer to German tariffs dating back
13	 Allen, 'Entrepreneurship ... in the Northeast Coast Region
Industry,' 35-71.
Berck, 'Hard Driving and Efficiency', 879.
Ibid., 883.
Webb, 'Tariffs, Cartels, . . in the German Steel Industry', 309.
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to 1870 and 1876, together with the McKinley tariffs of 1890 and 1897
that enshrined protectionism in the US, to advance his ideas on the
Empire. His Tariff Reform Commission, when reporting in July 1904,
recommended a tariff of 5 per cent on pig iron, 61/4 per cent on partly
manufactured iron and steel; 71/2 per cent on wire rods and plates; and
10 per cent on sheet iron and steel." These were very significant
tariff proposals, the essence of which only saw the light in 1914 when,
following the outbreak of war, the McKenna tariffs were introduced to
protect British industry. Sir George, with his extensive trade in
Germany and Italy was quite content to fight his own battles over
tariffs. Indeed, he conceded defeat over the US market as will be shown
in greater detail later, but after 1914 the penetration of that market
by his colleague C E Lloyd with the Hingleys' vastly superior ships
cables and anchors, more than justified Sir George's belief that the
market would sort out its priorities if left free from controls.
In addition to dissenting from McCloskey's view on total factor
productivity, Kennedy provides a more conventional dissent with his
views on the way in which resources were deployed in this period, and
also on the question of attitude. Kennedy argues that the problem in
the period 1870 to 1913 was not that British resources were incapable of
more rapid growth, but that these resources were not deployed to exploit
the opportunities that were there." He also identified an attitude or
structural problem that tilted Britain away from modern technologically
orientated manufacturing, when compared with the United States. In
particular he cited the vigorous developments there in electrical
engineering, organic chemicals, and telecommunication equipment."
17	 Briggs, History of Birmingham, 33-36.
18	 Kennedy 'Foreign Investments ... 1870-1913', Explorations in 
Economic History, 440.
19	 Kennedy 'Economic Growth ... 1870-1914', Journal of Economic 
History, 105.
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Aldcroft's five indictments and the Hingley defence
Returning now to the defence of Hingleys' endeavours in the light of the
five indictments of Aldcroft's analysis of 1964. The first of these was
that British entrepreneurs failed to adopt the best available techniques
of production. In Hingleys' case this was probably true, but neither
more sophisticated furnaces, nor hard driving, could have improved the
fact that Hingleys produced perhaps the finest wrought iron in the
world. Also, its optimum production over two decades was 1000 tons of
iron per week. The firm could use or sell that quantity, but it could
not exceed that figure until the extraordinary demands of the Great War
intervened. Insofar as the manufacture of large diameter (4") cables
was concerned, the firm did invest heavily in the 1900s in state of the
art Belgian manufacturing equipment. This investment arose from a panic
reaction by Hingleys to the news that John Brown, to whom it was the
major supplier of ships' cables, had decided on a policy of direct
manufacture. Fearful of losing the sub-contracts, Hingleys persuaded
John Brown to form a joint venture for the express intention of
manufacture of ships' cables by machine. The firm that was formed,
British Machine Made Cables, achieved great success on paper, even
obtaining the orders for the cables for ships such as White Star's
'Olympic' and 'Titanic'. However, in the event the machinery could only
handle metal up to 2" diameter and the enterprise was wound up as will
be described later in the text. The fact remains however that Hingleys
did make a major commitment to modernisation.
The second of Aldcroft's indictments concerns the under-estimate of the
growing importance of science, with too little investment in
laboratories or research. On the face of it, this indictment is hard to
refute when considered against the tremendous emphasis placed by the
United States on its A & M (agricultural and mechanical) Universities at
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this time, and on technical education in Germany. Within the trade,
however, Hingleys were not laggards. Apprenticeships and on-the-job
training ensured a highly skilled core workforce. Development played a
major role in its activities, especially in connection with anchor
design.
	 The patents that are included in Appendix Three give ample
proof of the professional design expertise that was part of the firm's
strength. In the wider public domain Hingleys was the captive of a
culture in which education was, and remains, a political football.
Consider the Education Act of 1902 that opened up the expansion of
secondary education with state assistance. Under this Act a national
system of Grammar Schools and Technical Schools was created that enabled
Britain to produce moderately well educated boys and girls for two
generations. At the time, it gave rise to a furore of opposition and
wrath from the non-conformists who saw it as a way of providing
financial assistance to the hard pressed Church of England schools."
The system was virtually abolished in the 1960s, and the debate still
continues as to whether the importance of education in national
prosperity is fully understood. The Hingley boys were educated at the
highly regarded Halesowen Grammar School and would have had a knowledge
of science commensurate with the School Certificate of that time. Sir
George Hingley was sufficiently aware of the value of scientific methods
to recruit J E Fletcher, who was a mechanical engineer, in the 1900s to
ensure that the Hall's Patent Anchor represented the state of the art.
This was proved by its enormous success among the shipping lines of the
world. Sir George's protégé and successor, C E Lloyd, was educated at a
public school (Uppingham) and qualified as a chartered civil engineer
before joining Hingleys. He saw to it that Sir George's endeavours in
professional management and design skills were continued.
20	 H Pelling, Modern Britain 1885-1955, 47.
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Concerning Aldcroft's third indictment that British entrepreneurs
over-invested in the old staple industries, this was not generally true
in the Birmingham and Black Country areas as will be demonstrated later.
It would have been irrational for Hingleys to have done otherwise. Over
the course of a hundred years the firm had developed the production of a
particularly fine class of wrought iron that remained in great demand,
notwithstanding the fact that the wrought iron industry was in decline.
Using its own iron, Hingleys created a position of hegemony and
profitability in the cable trade serving the great ships of the world in
the 1900s and 1910s.
Aldcroft's fourth indictment, that British entrepreneurs were bad
salesmen, especially abroad, does not hold water as far as Hingleys was
concerned. As will be demonstrated later, Hingleys had a sales
organisation that conformed to and was probably in excess of the best
standards of the times.
	 It had progressed from mercantile houses to
dedicated agents and its agents were located in every key location where
wrought iron, ships' cables and ships' anchors were required. The
entirety of its overseas sales organisation was under the day to day
control and supervision of the Hingley brothers, and later by C E Lloyd.
Aldcroft's fifth and final indictment was that Britain was
insufficiently aggressive in organising cartels to extract monopoly
profits from the consumer. However, Hingleys' business ethic of a good
product at a fair price did not prevent it from operating within the
cartel principle. This topic is addressed at greater length in chapter
eight. Comment is restricted here to a brief reference to the marked
bar association and the cable makers' collaboratives that operated
throughout the 1900s. In all things Hingleys was always concerned with
a fair price. Indeed, one of the more serious quarrels that the firm
had with Hochfelder Walzwerk during their highly successful albeit
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clandestine commercial arrangements, was over the latter's propensity to
use the alliance to overcharge the German customers.
New enterprises of the Second Industrial Revolution
Turning now to the region of Birmingham and the Black Country in which
the Hingley enterprise was based : the works were located in the Black
Country, while the Hingley men transacted their business on the
Birmingham Exchange. The massive decline in the industries and
activities of the first Industrial Revolution is an economic fact.
However, the region was well represented in the new industries of the
second Industrial Revolution. As Briggs has pointed out in his history
of the region, following the evolution of manganese steel in 1888 and
silicon steel in the 1890s, factories were developed to use manganese
steel with its remarkable tensile strength and hardness for the
machinery and the machine tools on which the new industries depended.
Silicon steel was a vital component for the new electrical engineering
industry. Although this latter industry does not even figure in Craft's
table (see Table 2.1) the General Electric Company that was set up in
Witton, north Birmingham, in 1901 had 7 000 employees in 1914. Its
production alone was one third of that of Germany. While admittedly
France had a head start in motor cars with a production of 500 in 1893,
the region had Wolseley in 1895 and soon afterwards Lanchester in 1896.
The Wolseley story is one of striking innovative diversification. The
Wolseley Sheep Shearing Machine Company went into motor cars in 1895 and
led the market in its class for two generations. The major event,
however, was the opening of Herbert Austin's Longbridge works in 1905.
By 1910 production of Austin cars was 576 per year, rising to 1 500 in
1914. Also, it is often overlooked that the cycle trade alone employed
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no less than 10 000 workers in Birmingham and neighbouring Aston in
1914.2'
These industrial activities, along with many others, gave rise to
hundreds of smaller support operations for the manufacture of wheels, of
braking systems, of suspensions, of lighting systems, etc. and give the
lie to the rather general condemnation by Aldcroft whose focus was on
the past. Certainly, the West Midlands was not in a state of stagnation
as it had the key industrial asset of skilled craftsmen and small
masters. Its greater social mobility as some went up and some went down
meant it could adapt faster than most to the needs of the time.
For Hingleys, the period from 1890 to 1914 was one in which profound
structural change took place around it as the second Industrial
Revolution took over from the first.
	 The company itself remained,
however, an industrial anachronism rooted in the declining industry
based on the manufacture and use of wrought iron. However, by the very
excellence of its product it maintained its hegemonic position in the
market for ships' cables and anchors. It was an efficient company both
in its acceptable level of profitability and in its employment ethos.
Modernisation, although sought in the 1900s, was frustrated by two
separate factors. The first was the premature acclaim given to the much
vaunted Belgian technology for the manufacture of large ships' cables
that proved insufficiently developed for the big league in which
Hingleys played. The second was the total intransigence of a work force
in the face of mechanisation of a trade in which they had no equals in
the world. This intransigence was only hardened by the long established
culture of a forum of collective bargaining that sought to achieve a
consensus acceptable to both sides in the use of land, labour, and
capital, the essential factors of production.
21	 Briggs, History of Birmingham, 38-46.
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The Industrial decline of Britain in the wider context of Britain's
continuing commercial and financial power
Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, entire academic careers
have been built on the study of Britain's industrial decline after 1870.
While the decline did in fact take place relative to the growing
economies of the United States and Germany in particular, it has fallen
to authors writing since 1980 such as Corelli Barnett, M J Wiener, and W
D Rubinstein to focus attention on the specific matter of the British
culture as a key determinant and explanation for this decline. Barnett
and Wiener have stressed the part played by an elitist public school
system in creating an anti-industrial ethos in British society. On the
other hand Rubinstein has speculated that, apart from the years 1760 to
1850 when Britain was the premier industrial nation, Britain's real
place in the world was that of a leader in international commerce and
finance. Thus, against a background of nearly two centuries of
pre-eminence in this field, Britain's rise and fall from industrial
domination can be seen from a different perspective.
As Barnett has reminded us, dire warnings of the consequences of
inadequate technical and scientific education were given as early as
1835 by Richard Cobden after his visit to early industrial America.22
From more or less the same period, and from the 1820s onwards, Germany
had paid particular attention to the establishment of technical high
schools and to university courses with a particular relevance to
chemistry, metallurgy, and engineering. Britain did not match these
developments notwithstanding the excellence of its crafts and artisans
systems that were based on apprenticeships. Even the great Henry
Bessemer, who revolutionised the production of steel in the mid 19th
century, was more a practical man than a scientist. Thus in most steel
22	 Barnett, Audit of War, 205.
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works, as late as the 1890s, a chemist was rarely a development
specialist and more often a routine tester." By adding chemistry and
metallurgy to the process of mass steel-making, the Americans and
Germans were able to overtake Britain in the quarter century before the
Great War of 1914-18.
Wiener, writing in the 1980s and finding a ready audience in the
Thatcher following, has been especially critical of Britain's education
system for its monied classes as a main contributory factor in its
industrial decline. Wiener's view was that, although less than one boy
in twenty attended a public school, the cultural emphasis that school
was not a preparation for a career in business, had the effect of
creating an ethos in which manufacturing was for the separated brethren
in the Midlands and the North. He notes that the whole late Victorian
system of public school education militated against the study of
scientific subjects." Barnett has endorsed this view by quoting from a
book written by the headmaster of Harrow in 1929 no less, in which Dr
Norwood extols the ideals of chivalry and service and on an education
based on religion, games, and out-door prowess."
Thus it was probably inevitable, that when the red brick universities of
Birmingham, Leeds, and Sheffield were created at the turn of the
century, with the expectation of a strong technical basis, that London
University should insist on literature and classics being a vital part
of the curriculum." Wiener sees the style of English education, with
its emphasis on forming policy formers, as being the root cause for the
desire to work for production's sake, for the desire to drive for
Ibid., 97-98.
Wiener, English Culture, 21-23.
Barnett, Audit of War, 218.
26	 Ibid., 222.
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profits, and for the desire to be innovative, to become increasingly
regarded as being less important. This style, with its inculcation of
aristocratic, religious, professional, and bureaucratic values, was seen
as the major inhibiting factor in the quest for expansion, productivity
and profit." The result of this educational conditioning of the monied
and policy making classes was, in Wiener's opinion, the root cause of
the emergence of two nations, the commercial and financial grouping
based on London, and the manufacturing grouping based on the Midlands
and the North."
This polarisation goes a long way in explaining Britain's inability to
improve on total factor productivity. Wiener has highlighted the fact
that the critical factors of capital, labour, and natural resources in
Britain were more than adequate for a hundred years from 1850 to 1950,
but the inclination to increase domestic investment was just not there.
In commentating on Eric Hobsbawn's view that capitalism by its very
nature was self-defeating because it was only concerned with profit,
Wiener makes the crucial point that as long as satisfactory profits were
being made, there was no incentive to modernise."
This disinclination to increase domestic investment fits quite well with
McCloskey's various analyses that industry did as well as it could have
done. The economy was never actually stagnating, rather it was growing
as rapidly as the economic system into which it was locked would permit.
Thus, the issue of where and why the great City of London invested its
funds leads naturally to Rubinstein's analysis of the situation. He
takes note of the conventional view of Britain's decline from 1870 to
1914 citing the failure of British business to invest in the new
Wiener, English Culture, 24, 127.
Ibid., 128.
29	 Ibid., 167-168.
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technology of the Second Industrial Revolution, coupled with the
increasing tendency for British investment funds to be directed
overseas. These funds were aimed at the development of primary
industries such as minerals, rubber, gold, diamonds, etc., and also in
civil engineering infrastructure works in the Empire, the United States,
and Argentina. n As far as the City was concerned a correct balance had
been struck. The domestic economy had all the funds it could absorb as
is supported by the earlier account of new industries in the Midlands.
Thus, the dominant part of the economy remained as it had always been
that of invisible earnings emanating from London.
Rubinstein takes note of the extraordinary economic growth of the United
States between 1870 and 1913. By that year she outpaced Britain and
Germany combined in the production of pig iron and was the world leader
in coal production and in cotton consumption. n During these years it
was the United States economy that determined the ebbs and flows of the
world's economic activities. Although still full of memories of past
grandeur there was little that Britain could do at the time but go along
with the moods of the new economic superpower. Thus, the gentrification
of the Victorian entrepreneurs and businessmen through the medium of the
public school ethos had two consequences. The first was the development
of an anti-industrial and anti-urban prejudice among the monied elite.
The second was that the enormous funds held by this elite were
increasingly invested in lucrative overseas ventures. As Rubinstein has
it, the concept of an Industrial Britain in decline after 1870 is a
distortion. Britain always was, in its pomp, a commercial, financial,
and service based economy. Its long term comparative advantage always
lay in commerce and finance and did so for two hundred years.32
30	 Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture, and Decline, 4.
31	 Ibid., 9.
32	 Ibid., 21-24.
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Britain's decline from 1870 to 1913 was simply a working out of the
first industrial revolution. Notwithstanding the general decline of
parts of British manufacturing industry when compared to the United
States, this period saw the maintenance of the hegemonic position of
British ship building for the whole period between 1889 and 1914. This
hegemonic period had its day just as did the participants in the first
industrial revolution in the period from the 1780s to the 1850s.
	 In
both cases Britain was initially first in the field and its superiority
merely ran a normal course. However, the City of London was the
pre-eminent financial capital of the world in 1860. It still had that
position in 1914 and even in 1990 it was in the first three along with
the United States and Japan.” Considerable support for the view taken
by Rubinstein was given in a paper presented by Charles Jones in 1994.
Although the thrust of the paper is directed at the re-appraisal of the
traditional split between overseas portfolio investment and direct
investment, the actual sums involved in the period from 1875 to 1913 not
only supported the scenario drawn by Rubinstein on the real economic
influence of Britain, they also give the lie to the charge that Britain
was slothful relative to the United States in the development of
opportunities in Latin America in particular. In 1913 Britain had total
worldwide investments in the order of E4 000 000 000. Of this, some
£546 400 000 was in foreign direct investment in Latin America alone.
In 1905 the figure had been E328 800 000, and in 1875 it was £41 500
000.	 These last three sums were in direct investments mainly in
railways and manufacturing. Of particular relevance to question of
British decline, these figures show that Britain was not the laggard so
often depicted in comparisons with the managerial sophistication of the
United States and to that country's penetration of the Latin American
market. 34
 Martin Kitchen, in his study of the German economy for the
33	 Ibid., 36.
34	 C A Jones 'The Origins of Modern Multi-National Corporations
British Firms in Latin America, 1850-1930', in Carlos Marichal,
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parallel period, has recorded that during the period 1904 to 1914
Britain doubled its foreign investments to the extent of half of its
national savings. At the same time, Germany that had suffered a chronic
shortage of investment capital from 1873 onwards, had to re-invest
almost the entirety of its national savings at home.35
Within the context of the consequences for British industry of the
gentrification through education of its leaders, the Hingley firm in
this period provides a useful vignette. Noah Hingley in his early days
worked on the anvil with the other smiths. His son Benjamin, and his
nephews George Benjamin and Henry Montagu, certainly attended the
independent fee paying Halesowen Grammar School. All three looked and
acted as minor gentry, filling public offices and acting as natural
chairmen. They took their holidays in fashionable German spa towns and
on the Italian Riviera. C E Lloyd was schooled at Uppingham and G C
Edwards and J S Trinham, a lieutenant and a colonel respectively in the
militia must have been appropriately educated to hold these ranks pre
1914. Further details of these key men are given in chapter four, but
none was averse to wearing the mantle of an ironmaster. They remained
true to the Midlands tradition; what spare money they had they invested
outside the enterprise; and true to McCloskey's assessment they did as
well as they possibly could have in the economic system of the time.
ed., Foreign Investment in Latin America : Impact of Economic 
Development, 1850-1930. Proceedings of the Eleventh International
History Conference, Bio, Universita Bocconi Milan, September 1994.
35	 Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914 (London
: Croom Helm, 1978) 273.
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Germany in the parallel period
Much of the unfavourable comment on Britain's performance, during the
early years of the Second Industrial Revolution, focuses on the
achievements of Germany. However, a degree of perspective should be
applied as we are dealing with two very different cultures.
In the period under review Britain had a stable and long standing
political union and was on the way to becoming a full liberal democracy.
It had a broad-based economy, it enjoyed extensive international trade,
and it created capital surpluses that were used domestically and
overseas in the development of commercial enterprises. Germany on the
other hand, as created by Bismarck under Wilhelm I, was a relatively new
state that was born in war, consolidated in war, and seemingly dedicated
to war. It was a latecomer to the Industrial Revolution and was not
burdened by a manufacturing infrastructure that could not be easily
modernised. More significantly, in the latter part of the nineteenth
century Germany never did have sufficient funds and was always in thrall
to its moneylenders. The new state was born in debt in 1866 following
its war with Austria-Hungary over, among other things, the division of
spoils arising from the 1864 war with Denmark over the duchies of
Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg. Its contrived war with France in 1871
resulted in reparations of five billion gold francs alone in addition to
the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. 36
 However, from 1864 until his
overthrow in 1890 by Wilhelm II, Bismarck was always in serious
financial trouble due to the legacies of war and the costs of entering
the industrial world. For the whole of this period he depended largely
on Bleichrtider, his Jewish financier, to keep the state afloat. This
36	 Kitchen, Germany, 132.
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BleichrOder, by a succession of highly imaginative schemes, ensured
himself a favoured place in the corridors of power."
However, although Bleichrtider could produce loans, create banks, and
finance railroads, he could not create surpluses in industry and
commerce. Thus, from 1873 onwards Germany was not producing surpluses
of any magnitude, and a shortage of capital was the principal
characteristic of its economy." The accession of Wilhelm II at the age
of 29 in succession to Wilhelm I and Frederick III, who died within
three months of each other, only worsened Germany's financial problems.
Obsessed with delusions of grandeur, Wilhelm II was determined to
achieve a 2 : 3 ratio with Britain in naval power. The provisions of
the German Navy Act of 1898 were largely funded by loans from France."
The Act created a climate of fear. Indeed, in 1903 'Ben' Hingley wrote
that : 'This country is being bled financially by the fear of war'.
Thus, at a time when Britain and France were each investing half of
national savings abroad between 1900 and 1914, Germany had to re-invest
virtually the entirety of its national savings at home." It can be
suggested, therefore, that the domestic reinvestment of national
savings plus huge foreign loans were the base from which Germany's
apparent economic miracle was created. High tariffs and cartels were
necessary to project industry and commerce from competition. At the
same time the German manufacturers had no qualms about attacking the
domestic markets of no or low tariff countries such as Britain.
Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron (London : Allen & Unwin, 1977) 38-126.
Kitchen, Germany, 227.
Kitchen, Germany, 176.
Ibid., 228.
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It could be argued therefore that any comparison between the apparent
dynamism of the German economy, as contrasted with the comparative
sluggishness of Britain's performance, is based on a false premise.
Britain was at all times genuinely interested in world trade. The sum
of its overseas investment strategies, when coupled with its impressive
record in imports as well as exports clearly demonstrates this. As for
the German economy, this would seem to have been based on two basic
concepts. The first was the maintenance of the lifestyle of the Junkers
in Prussia, requiring as it did protectionism for the agrarian way of
life. The second was the naked pursuit of militarism, especially in
search of parity with the British Navy. 91 It was this militarism, more
than entrepreneurial vigour, that seems to have been the motor for the
German economic achievements of this period.
It would seem therefore that the British and German economies were
playing totally different games under totally different rules. Thus,
the achievements of Britain as summarised by McCloskey should be more a
source of pride than of denigration.
91	 Ibid., 237.
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A summary
During the period under review Britain lived through the age of new
imperialism. The colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South
Africa all achieved Dominion status. Britain's position as the foremost
industrial nation, a consequence of the first industrial revolution, was
eroded by the competition of the newly industrialised Germany and the
United States. However, notwithstanding the erosion of its overall
industrial status, Britain maintained its leading role as the
shipbuilder to the world throughout this period. It also began a
diversification into the newer industrial activities of the second
industrial revolution.
An examination of the various assessments of Britain's industrial
decline points to the conclusion that the public school system by which
the sons of the monied elite were educated did result in a north versus
south divide. In spite of this, the industrialists of the Midlands and
the North did as well as could reasonably be expected. It is evident,
however, that the divide did guarantee for the South and London in
particular a continued concentration on Commerce and Internationsl
Finance, fields in which it was and remained a world leader.
In all this Hingleys led a useful and effective commercial life. It
managed its factors of production to optimum effect. It occupied a
niche position in the world market for large anchors and ships' cables.
Its management moved from the self educated through those educated at
the smarter schools without detriment to its ability to remain
consummate ironmasters. Here, the directors were in line with the
marked distinction that characterised the Midlands and the North in
contrast with the South of Britain. North of Watford, almost all the
great manufacturing concerns were run by men of considerable education.
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In the West Midlands one calls to mind the Cadburys, the Chamberlains,
Nettlefold, Herbert Austin, Dunlop, etc. In the last thirty years of
wrought iron, as a metal superior to steel, Hingleys maintained its
position as a premier user of this very fine metal.
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PART ONE :
	 THE FIRM IN CONTEXT
CHAPTER THREE : THE NARROWER ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, 1890 - 1920
A general overview
The preceding chapter was concerned with the broader economic patterns
of which neither the Hingley family nor C E Lloyd need have been fully
aware. They must, however, have been very aware of the economic events
and forces that impinged directly on their business. Chief among these
were the factors of rapid social change and the emergence of the
military-industrial complex a half century before the phrase achieved
currency in the United States.
In this period unskilled labour became properly organised for the first
time in a confrontational mode, with consequences that were to last for
three generations. There was a total change in the attitudes towards
social welfare. There was a complete overhaul of the system for
secondary education with the creation of municipal Grammar Schools,
together with the new red brick universities of the industrial towns.
There was extreme volatility in business arising from the influence of
the United States, as the new economic superpower, on the affairs of
Britain and Europe. Britain's shipbuilding industry, in which Hingleys
had a particular interest, was subject to violent swings. In this, the
vacillations of government in connection with its naval programme caused
endless problems for the members of the new military-industrial complex.
This was also the period in which interference from government became a
marked feature of business life for all those engaged in manufacturing.
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It was also the period when the Great War of 1914-18 resulted in the
Hingley enterprise becoming a part of Britain's vast government
controlled munitions industry. During the second half of this period
management by Hingleys of the Hingley family firm was phased out, to be
replaced by a company with a broad shareholding that was dominated by a
professional management.
The birth of the military-industrial complex
In 1882 Vickers took the decision to trade itself out of the depression
of the 1870s and 1880s by creating a completely new business focused on
armaments. From a capitalisation of £750 000 in 1886, the firm grew to
a capitalised value of £7 million by 1914. The commercial success of
this move can be seen from average dividend figures of 9.1 per cent
between 1863 to 1888, rising to 12.23 per cent between 1888 and 1914.1
By the end of the century there were three British firms in an elite
military-industrial complex. They were Vickers, John Brown, and
Armstrong Whitworth. These were the three companies to which George
Benjamin Hingley hitched the firm's star as will be seen in greater
detail in chapter four. As these firms increasingly took over the work
of the government ordnance factories and dockyards, they were in the
position of creating their own booms and slumps.
The decision by Vickers to focus on the armaments trade was fully
vindicated by the furore that followed Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee
naval review in 1887. The review highlighted the inferiority of the
British Navy relative to the combined fleets of Russia and France and
resulted in the Naval Defence Act 1889. This Act was aimed at restoring
the Navy's superiority over all other fleets in the ratio of 5 : 3. £16
million was allocated for the construction of ten battleships and sixty
Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers, 29-30.
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other vessels within four and a half years. This was an unheard of
timetable, when construction time for a battleship was usually six
years. £15 million alone was to be spent in the private sector. 2
 There
then followed successive drives to update the Navy right up to 1913 and,
despite the often erratic nature of the programme, military-industrial
work was a key feature of the domestic economy from 1890 to 1920 the
period under review.
The emergence of the military-industrial complex in the 1890s was one of
two key economic determinants that influenced the fame and fortune of
the Hingley firm. The second determinant was the dramatic appearance in
the 1900s of the leviathans of the seas, those passenger liners for the
north Atlantic passenger trade with displacements up to 50 000 tons.
Hingleys' domestic programme from 1890 was, therefore, dominated by its
participation in the activities of the military-industrial complex
headed by Vickers, John Brown, and Armstrong Whitworth, together with
the construction of the new breed of enormous liner in the shipyards of
Belfast, the Mersey, and the Clyde. A list of these liners follows this
page.
Although the naval programme for procurement from 1889 to 1913 was often
erratic it was always there. Whenever cutbacks were in prospect, an
international factor would invariably arise to guarantee further
enormous expenditure. Prime examples of these were the French naval
estimates of 1893 that provoked panic; as did the German Navy Act of
1898 and 1900 envisaging the creation of the Imperial Navy. 3 The
British naval estimates for 1896/97 had swelled to £21 823 000 as the
result of the decision to lay down a whole new fleet of five
battleships, thirteen cruisers, and twenty eight destroyers, all to be
2	 Ibid., 52.
3	 Ibid., 56.
3/3
H
	 S4 /NS (Tn., N wrimeroN I RON WORKS. DUDLEY, ENC.
..-.•••••••••
all conditions in every sea. Gradually, even trifling points of difficulty have
been 61iminated, till it may safely be claimed that this type is practically perfect.
Its best recommendation is the appreciation shown for it by the finest seamen,
and the most experienced owners throughout the world.
The Hall's Latest Improved Patent Anchor is now hi use in at least twelve
of the great Navies of the World. It is exclusively adopted by the principal
Mail and other Steamship lines, including among its adherents the four largest
fleets of to-day. Perhaps the finest tribute to its reliability is to name the
ten largest vessels built or building, every one of which is fitted out with this
pattern anchor.
The ve-Ssels are :—
•	 S.S. Olympic •••• White Star Line	 •••	 •••• 45,000 tons.
S.S. Britannic •• • Pi	 I) 52,000
S.S. Aquitania Cunard Line ... 	 ••• 50,000 1/
A 6.8. Imperator •	 •• Hamburg-American Line	 ••n • 50,000 *1
•	 S.S. Vaterland ••• •••37 50,000 fl
SS. 13 ism arck 50,000 so
S.S. Columbus ••• North German Lloyd Line. 35,000
•	 S.S. Statendam ••• Holland-American Line	 ... 35,000 OP
S.S. Lusitania ••• Cunard Line ... 	 •••	 ••• 30,000
S.S. Mauretania • • •	 •••ft 30,000 Pi
There can be no higher recommendation for the anchor than this.
It should be noted here that the steel used in the manufacture of these
anchors is not the common steel of English or Continental make used in cheap
stockless anchors, which is a frequent cause of fractures. The Hall's Latest
Improved Patent Anchor is made of the highest quality of steel precisely a..;1
used, by the British Admiralty, and with this type trouble with breakages is
unknown.
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built in private yards. The estimates for 1897/98 provided for a
further four battleships and three cruisers. 6
 This programme was one in
which Hingleys participated as a supplier of ships' cables for mooring,
steering, etc., and of the anchors vital to the safety of a ship not
under way. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Hingleys' trading
fortunes became inextricably linked to the three firms that emerged as
the dominant members of the military-industrial complex. These were
Vickers that had in 1897 acquired The Naval Construction and Armaments
Company of Barrow, and also the Maxim Nordenfelt weapons business. The
second was John Brown that had acquired the Clydebank Engineering and
Shipbuilding Company in 1898, Thomas Firth (a producer of very high
quality steel) in 1902, and a half share in 1905 in the Coventry
Ordnance Works that had been set up by a consortium involving Cammell
Laird and Fairfield. In 1906 a controlling interest was acquired by
John Brown in Harland & Wolff of Belfast. 6
 The third firm was Armstrong
Whitworth that had been created by the merger of the two famous firms in
1897.6
The significance of these three firms to Hingleys came first through the
naval work from Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth. Secondly, from John
Brown's subsidiaries came all the work on the Cunard and White Star
fleets that ensured the hegemonic position of Hingleys as the major
anchor smith and cable maker in the world. This theme is developed more
fully in chapter four. In addition, the mere association of Hingleys
with firms of this calibre ensured its own commitment to technical
development. This was particularly so in the design of its anchors that
reached an ultimate state of excellence by 1906. Vickers certainly
would have been a source of inspiration in the early 1900s, with its
4	 Scott, Vickers, 47.
5	 Grant, John Brown's, 38-58.
6	 Scott, Vickers, 46.
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8 000 ton presses that were capable of squeezing 36 inch ingots into 6
inch thick ships' plates. And with its 90 feet long lathes for the
preparation of heavy gun barrels.'
New developments in the Labour market
In the preceding chapter reference was made to American pride in hard
driving, especially in the iron and steel industry. It is perhaps as
well to note that the United States had a growing pool of immigrant
labour in the last part of the 19th century. Furthermore this
work-force was grateful for work and was not organised. In Britain, the
unskilled work-force was two generations into urbanisation and by the
1870s it was beginning to organise itself more or less along the lines
of the artisans' unions that had been established a generation before.
There was a vital difference, however. The craft unions depended on the
control of skills for their industrial muscle. The new unskilled unions
depended on the power of numbers.
In the labour market, as in its position in wrought iron, Hingleys was
something of a happy anachronism in an industrial area not known for
work place harmony. The infamy achieved by the chainmakers in
neighbouring Cradley Heath has become part of the folklore of industrial
strife, and will be examined later in this section. On the other hand
the good working relations that existed in the Hingley works had their
origins in two significant actions on the part of the Hingley family.
The first was the promotion by Noah Hingley himself of his famous
'Conditions for Fair Employment'. This document was his sole manifesto
when standing in the re-run of the Parliamentary Election of 1874. The
second was his son Benjamin's role in the establishment of The Midland
7	 Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers, 8.
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Iron and Steel Wages Board, an organisation that guaranteed fair play
for workers based on the success of the firms in which they worked, and
which kept the participating members free from strikes for more than
fifty years up to the end of this study in 1918. Again, the work of
this board will be examined later in this section.
On the wider labour front circumstances were a lot less happy, with the
growth of an urbanised workforce having marked divisions between the
skilled artisans and the broader mass of unskilled workers. The skilled
working classes had long been able to look after their own through the
medium of their trades unions. Behagg cites the classic example of the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers formed in 1851. This was one of the
New Model unions and had a nationwide membership. These unions for the
highly skilled had a high weekly subscription of around one shilling.
This enabled the unions to build up large funds from which its members
could draw sickness and unemployment benefits as well as strike pay if
necessary. Indeed, between 1875 and 1879 the ASE paid out £350 000 in
unemployment benefit alone.'
However, by the 1880s there was a large demand among the unskilled
working classes for unionisation, and in the period between 1889 and
1891 the total membership of trades unions doubled notwithstanding a
subsequent rapid falling away. These new unions were very different
from the New Model unions. They recruited from among the less skilled
in the workforce, the subscriptions were lower, often in the order of
one penny per week, and even more significantly they tended to be led by
people whose style was confrontational. A major commitment of these
latter day unions was that of taking strike action.' The period from
1890 to 1920 saw major industrial confrontations, with industrial unrest
8	 Behagg, Labour and Reform, 81-82.
9	 Ibid., 106.
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in the ports, in the mines, and on the railways, becoming almost normal
feature of industrial life.
Significantly for the future of unrest on the railways, and for its
impact on the movement of Hingleys' products, the railway companies
consistently refused to recognise the Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants formed as long ago as 1871. This was part of the employers'
reaction after 1890 to mass unionisation, resulting in an era of
extensive industrial unrest that was exacerbated by the volatility of
the economy right up to the outbreak of war in 1914. The Shipping
Federation of 1890 was created by the employers to fight the new Dock,
Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' Union in the ports and it
largely succeeded. The Federation of Master Cotton Spinners was formed
in 1891 to confront the workers in the cotton industry. The lock-outs
in 1892-93 resulted in the Brooklands Agreement that established a
process of collective bargaining for the cotton industry.
	 This
agreement survived until 1908 when the employers arbitrarily lowered
wages at a time of dramatic slump. The Miners' Federation was
confronted in an unprecedented show of unity by the mine owners. The
lock-out of 1893 led eventually to interventions by the Government and a
Conciliation Board was created, but the miners' demand for a minimum
wage was not conceded. These boards were formalised by the Conciliation
Act of 1896 that enabled the Board of Trade to appoint conciliators, but
the efforts depended on the goodwill of both sides. Also in 1896, the
Engineering Employers' Federation was formed with the specific intent of
reducing the controls over production exercised by the skilled workers
in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. In the lock-out of 1897 that
lasted for six months the union was beaten and was forced to concede
that it could not interfere with the management of business.
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Then, following the Taff Vale case of 1901 when the Taff Vale Railway
Company successfully sued the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants
for damages caused to its business during a strike, the whole status of
trades unions was dramatically changed. Unions were now considered to
be corporate bodies that could be sued. At a stroke, on the exhaustion
of all appeals, the unions lost all the gains of the 1860s and 1870s
over status and were back in the era before the repeal of The
Combination Acts in 1824. 1° Nevertheless the Trades Disputes Act of
1906 gave back to the unions the anomalous indemnity from actions in
tort that had been removed by the Taff Vale judgement of 1901. With
this came the right, and greater inclination, to strike, bringing with
it a decade of confrontation between employers and employees. This led
to the politicisation of the union movement, resulting eventually in the
formation of the Labour Party from its origins in the Independent Labour
Party. Especially serious were the rail strikes of 1907 and 1911. The
strike in 1907 resulted in a quite extraordinary intervention by Lloyd
George, who imposed conciliation boards on the industry notwithstanding
the fact that the railway companies steadfastly refused to recognise
unions. These boards, however, did not prevent the Liverpool railway
strike of 1911 with its threat of escalation into a national strike.11
It was a strike that had crippling effects on the movement of goods and
materials, and for Hingleys it was the first time that their entire
manufacturing output was compromised.
Notwithstanding the emphasis that has been put on the confrontational
style of the trades unions catering for the unskilled workers, studies
of that era carried out in more recent times have shown that the years
from 1899 to 1907 were in fact the quietest in terms of industrial peace
from 1891 onwards. John Lovell, quoting H A Clegg, put this down to
10	 Ibid., 108-113.
11	 Phelps Brown, The Growth of British Industrial Relations, 328-329.
3/8
collective bargaining in the well organised trades. 12
 Certainly, the
form of collective bargaining sponsored by the Hingley family ensured
industrial peace for the whole of the period under review.
Later in this study the dramatic economic collapse of 1908 will be
examined in greater detail. However, the resulting ups and downs in the
economic fortunes of the country led to unprecedented levels of
industrial unrest in the years from 1908 to 1914. In 1908 the cotton
textile industry, after years of relative industrial harmony from the
Brooklands Agreement of 1893, suffered a seven week strike over the
arbitrary reduction of wages. Then in 1910 a strike wave broke over
British industry. Beginning in South Wales the miners went on strike
over an employers' attempt to reduce wages. In June 1911 there was a
seamen's strike that led to dockworkers coming out in sympathy. In 1912
there occurred the first ever pit strike on a national basis; and there
were strikes in the London docks and among transport workers. In 1913
the Midlands metal working industries suffered strikes with the early
years of George V's reign being disfigured by much violence, deaths, and
soldiers on the streets. The spectre of Syndicalism, or the control of
industry by the workers, raised its head once more, and the sheer scale
of numbers involved in industrial disputes was quite remarkable, rising
to 1 233 016 in 1912.'3
Although in the next paragraph the alternative views of Dangerfield and
Behagg are contrasted on the significance of organised unskilled labour,
the sheer numbers involved deserve mention. An example is the Workers'
Union, an important but neglected body. Formed in 1898 its membership
12	 J Lovell, British Trade Unions 1975-1933 (London : Macmillan,
1977), 41.
13	 Ibid., 130-131.
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by 1910 was a mere 4 500. By 1914 it had increased to 143 000 and to
495 000 by 1919:4
Much has been made of the level of strikes in Britain during the period
1910 to 1914. George Edward Dangerfield argued in 1936 that only the
outbreak of war in 1914 saved Britain from revolution: 5 He saw the
combined efforts of massive labour unrest, the suffragette movement, and
Home Rule for Ireland, as threatening the very stability of the state.
Behagg in 1991 took a very different view, arguing that by 1914 strikes
were on the wane, with strikers down to 326 000, and with the level of
suffragette militancy having peaked. He does, however, stress that the
welfare reforms following the return to power of the Liberal Party in
1906 had not prevented the growing alienation between the various social
classes. Full male suffrage came with the Representation of the People
Act of 1918, and by 1922 the Labour Party had displaced the Liberal
Party:5
In the midst of all the industrial turmoil in the period under study
from 1890 to 1920, Hingleys' various works were havens of relative peace
and harmony notwithstanding their proximity to Cradley Heath and the
notorious sweated labour conditions that existed in much of the general
chainmaking activities of the Black Country. These conditions were so
notorious that out of only four trades made subject to the working of
the Trades Board Act of 1909, one was the domestic chain trade with the
Black Country particularly in mind.
Lovell, British Trade Unions, 46.
Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, 178.
Behagg, Labour and Reform 1815-1914, 136.
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Labour in the particular environment of Hingleys' ironworks
In marked contrast to the troubled industrial relations scene generally,
few problems existed in the Hingleys' works. This was due largely to
the policy of fair play begun in his lifetime by Noah Hingley, and
continued by his son Benjamin Hingley. The axis on which Hingleys'
industrial policy rested was The Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board.
Modelled on The North of England Board of Conciliation, founded in 1869
following a strike of six months' duration, it became the forum at which
masters and men came together for the mutual benefit of themselves and
their industry.
The ethos of the Board, its mode of operation, and its success in
guaranteeing industrial peace in its participating firms since 1870, was
detailed in a lecture given by Daniel Jones, the Secretary of The South
Staffordshire Ironmasters' Association and employers' Secretary of The
Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board, at the University of Birmingham on
30 October 1902. The main thrust of his lecture was that thirty years
of industrial peace in his industry were due to the workings of the
Board. He stressed that the ethos behind the Board's work was the
avoidance of the destitution for the workers that was often the only
tangible result of strikes or of lock-outs."
The Midland Board covered South Staffordshire, North Staffordshire,
Shropshire, Lancashire, South Yorkshire, Derbyshire, and South Wales.
The key to its success lay in the complementary action of two very
different factors. The first was the requirement that every workman
should be a fee paying member of the Board, paying a levy of up to four
17	 Recorded in W J Ashley, ed., British Industries, A Series of 
General Reviews for Businessmen and Students, (London : Longman,
Green & Co., 1903) 38-40.
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pennies per quarter towards the running costs, thus inculcating a
loyalty to the Board in preference to a trade union. The second factor
was that, in addition to the basic rate, wages were settled on a sliding
scale based entirely on the selling price of the iron produced. The
selling prices were verified by a public accountant of the operatives'
choosing who was given full access to the employers' accounting records.
The sliding scale had its origins in the work of G B Thorneycroft of
Wolverhampton who had formulated this method of payment by giving a
share of his prosperity as early as the 1840s. The basis of the
arrangement was that marked bars, or those of the best quality of
wrought iron, had a uniform selling price among the combination of
ironmasters. The ironworkers' wages were then based on a scale that
rose or fell in line with the selling price of the iron. As far as the
ironworkers in South Staffordshire and Shropshire were concerned they
also accepted a Sheet Mill Wages Schedule that was binding on all
operatives, thus establishing uniform rates of pay between firms. As
Jones emphasised, the whole operation depended on the suppression of
self interest and the exercise of common sense. In the Midlands the
working of the Board was enhanced by the respect and standing in the
industry held by Sir Benjamin Hingley as an arbitrator and unbiased
chairman. His efforts, and those of both sides to the card, avoided
the fearful antagonisms between masters and men in this period.n
Some rather sketchy records of the working of the Midland Board are held
at the Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick. One file
contains information on sliding scales between 1906 and 1940. The
Sliding Scale for the Regulation of Ironworkers Wages adopted on 14 June
1906, is of particular interest on two counts. First, it demonstrates
the exclusive nature of the participating firms in the agreement.
18	 Ibid., 43-61.
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Second, the composition of the membership was in marked contrast to that
of the wider membership of the Chain Makers' Association that was the
source of much aggravation for Sir George Hingley, both in the operation
of the test houses and in general business ethics. The Chain Makers'
Association, based in neighbouring Cradley Heath, although including
many members of the Board, had twice the membership, many of them not
being genuine cable makers in that their products were less than 1.25"
in diameter. The constituent members of the Board in 1906 are shown in
Table 3.1.
By reference to the audit reports on selling prices, as prepared by
B Smith, Son & Wilkie, chartered accountants, it was seen that the
membership of the Board was still fourteen in 1940, although numbers had
risen to nineteen in 1933.19
Table 3.1 : Members of the Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board in 1906
1 George Adams & Sons Ltd
2 John Bradley & Co
3 Jno. Bagnall & Sons Ltd
4 B Bunch & Sons
5 The Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Steel Works Ltd
6 N Hingley & Sons Ltd
7 The Harts Hall Iron Co Ltd
8 Robert Heath & Sons Ltd
9 JB&SLees
10 The Lilleshall Co Ltd
11 The Patent Shaft & Axletree Co Ltd
12 E Parkes & Co
13 Roberts & Cooper
14 The Shropshire Iron Co Ltd
Within the same file there is a series of Agreements including one dated
May 1911 and signed by J S Trinham for the company and by Benjamin
19	 MRC : mss. 36 ; S37 : Sliding Scales 1906-1940.
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Westwood and William Henry Holloway for the men. The essentials of the
Agreement were that bar weighers and bundlers were to receive 10 pennies
per ton plus the sliding scale payment, that rollers and coggers were to
receive 10.5 pennies per ton plus the sliding scale payment, that
heaters were to receive 1/11d per ton plus the sliding scale payment,
and that labourers were to be provided free of charge.
This emphasis on a person to person management style, in an era when
negotiations between masters and men moved to outside negotiating bodies
such as trades unions and employers organisations, was a key factor in
the harmony achieved in the Hingley work place. This harmony was in
marked contrast to the conditions prevailing in the domestic chain trade
as practised in the neighbourhoods immediately adjoining Netherton.
Writing in 1891, the economist J A Hobson classed chain making as among
the most sweated and degraded occupations in Britain, a conclusion
endorsed by local historian S Blackburn.20
In essence, light domestic chain was made by females in forges attached
to the family dwelling houses. The monies earned were regarded as a
supplement to the earnings elsewhere of their menfolk. Large chains and
cables, those over 1.25" in diameter, were made entirely in factory
workshops that were largely free from sweating. Where skilled workers
were concentrated in large work units, collective bargaining or
agreements reached through the MISWB resulted in good wages and
industrial harmony. In the 1900s about 1400 hands were in such an
arrangement concentrated in thirty factories. In addition, there were
another dozen small factories outside these arrangements where some 200
hands were poorly paid. The activities that gave chain making in the
area such a bad name were those of some 140 middlemen who took iron to
20	 Blackburn, 'Black Country Chain Masters', 87.
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the home forge operations and then bought the finished products.'
These were the men who sweated the female ironworkers and who were
targeted by the Trades Board Act of 1909 under which the domestic chain
trade was classed with other notorious occupations including tailoring,
paper box making, and the finishing of machine made lace.
Of greater significance, however, for the industry in the Black Country
were the activities of the Chain Makers' Association after the setting
up of the Trade Board for chainmaking. Its actions were invariably in
line with the curmudgeonly way in which its members had treated Sir
George Hingley after he had set up a test house in Cradley Heath
especially for their benefit, as is described later in the text.
Initially, the CMA welcomed and supported the Chain Trade Board, but
once the Board was established it sabotaged its workings by refusing to
settle on the minimum wage that was one of the key principles of the
Board's activities. The year 1908 had seen the worst depression in the
chain trade for 30 years. The era of the new big ships had resulted
paradoxically in fewer cables being required overall. At the same time
the Admiralty had reduced its specification for the lengths of ships'
cables. The result was that the large chain trade attacked the markets
of the small chain trade as a way of keeping busy. The advent of the
CTB appeared to be an opportunity for the CMA to drive out competition
from the smaller firms. In this it overlooked one key feature of the
new legislation where, unlike all the recent welfare provisions of the
Liberal Government, the entire financial cost of introducing the minimum
wage fell on the employers. So, the CMA through its protracted
prevarications caused the Cradley Heath strike of 1910 that led to the
exposure of, and the national awareness of, the grotesque conditions in
which the domestic chain makers worked and the squalor in which they
lived. When the minimum wage was eventually agreed in March 1910 it
21	 Ibid., 89.
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provided for the female workers to be paid 2.5 pennies per hour for a 54
hour week, or 11/3d per week. This was an increase of almost 100 per
cent over the prevailing rates. 22 Blackburn noted that the avarice of
the CMA continued long after 1910 and was particularly evident between
the two world wars.
The total change in attitudes towards social welfare in this period
The Hingley method of management involved a mix of benevolent
paternalism, the provision of fair wages, and a requirement to maintain
a strict adherence to the weekly production targets set for the works.
The skilled workforce was well placed to look after itself through the
medium of the Friendly Societies, and unemployment was virtually unheard
of in the Hingley workshops. Although the Hingley family had close ties
with the Liberal Party, Sir George Hingley was totally unprepared for
the scale of social welfare legislation that followed the return to
power of that party in 1906. Fortunately, the new generation of
non-family directors proved invaluable in coming to terms with the new
order, in which the welfare of the workforce was to be regulated by
statute rather than conferred by benevolence.
Throughout the whole of the period under review there was a growing
awareness of the need to do something about the general health and
stamina of the British workforce, especially when compared with those of
its continental competitors. This was also the era in which the state
led a determined onslaught on pauperism following the realisation that
poverty was not necessarily the result of fecklessness, but more often
the result of sickness, old age, or the workings of the free market.
22	 Ibid., 91-99.
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G Carpenter has stressed the view held by Lloyd George that 30 per cent
of all pauperism stemmed from the inability to earn through sickness.
The National Insurance Act of 1911 provided the famous panel doctor
system as the key feature of the service, coupled with the sickness
benefits they could authorise." This was a direct challenge to a root
cause of destitution.
Other social blights that were addressed in this period were the
destitution that often followed cyclical unemployment and that
occasioned by old age. Regarding the latter problem, Asquith's
graduated income tax legislation of 1907 laid the foundations for the
non-contributory old age pension scheme of 1908. In achieving these
reforms Lloyd George succeeded in breaking down the implacable hostility
of the Friendly Societies to any form of state pension for sickness, old
age, and unemployment, other than that provided under the Poor Laws.
His success rested on two factors : first he knew that the Friendly
Societies were compromised financially by the growing longevity of their
older members who were bleeding the funds dry; second he harnessed the
Friendly Society movement to the task of managing the new sickness
provisions. In an unprecedented show of co-operation between state,
employer, and employee, the health insurance provisions of 1911
immediately covered 11 million members in 10 000 separate Friendly
Societies. Before, 1911, the well known Manchester Unity of Oddfellows
and the Ancient Order of Foresters could not achieve a membership of
three quarters of a million, while the Hearts of Oak could not achieve a
quarter of a million. 24 Once the breakthrough had been made, the
principle of state intervention was to become a feature of the British
way of life.
23	 Carpenter, 'National Health Insurance 1911-1948', 71-87.
24	 Ibid.
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During this period of reform, the benevolent paternalism of Hingleys
became increasingly out of line with events in the outside world. The
wider picture was well drawn by Bentley B Gilbert in his analysis of the
areas of concern for the social welfare of the British people in the
Edwardian era. These were four in number. First was the poor physical
shape of the working classes as evidenced by the results of the physical
examinations of volunteers for the Boer War. The second was the urgent
need to provide a source of income to cover the non-wage earning years
after retirement. This was needed to eliminate the spectre of the
workhouse and to protect the friendly societies from ruin. The third
was the problem of unemployment and its direct consequence of
destitution for many in the work force. The fourth was the problem of
pauperism, when stemming directly from sickness and ill health.
Efforts to address these areas of concern resulted in the first steps
towards the eventual creation of the Welfare State. Government began to
assume responsibility for matters that had heretofore been the
responsibility of the individual. The drive for greater national
efficiency, or a higher level of physical fitness, was addressed by the
Education (Provision of Meals) Act of 1906, together with the
introduction of medical examinations in state schools under the
provisions of the Education (Administrative Provisions) Act 1907. A
source of income in retirement for those without means was provided for
by the Old Age Pension Act of 1908. The spectre of unemployment had
already been addressed on the initiative of Joseph Chamberlain as long
ago as 1886 with his encouragement of municipal work schemes. Then,
under the Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905 the government took
responsibility for the welfare of the unemployed in a form other than
the Poor Law. This Act was followed by the Labour Exchanges Act of 1909
under which the Board of Trade at the centre of government took over
from the local authorities their role in unemployment provisions. The
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crowning achievement of the proponents of social welfare by direct
government action was the National Insurance Act of 1911 that directly
addressed in its Part I the problem of destitution through incapacity.25
The end result of these initiatives was that a culture was established
in which government assumed the right to care for the citizens of the
country to the displacement of the old order where, to the extent that
they were able, family, employer, or charity had exercised this function
of care. His files reveal that Sir George Hingley was baffled by the
social legislation of this period, especially that dealing with
unemployment insurance. This was because unemployment was virtually
unheard of in the Hingley works. However, the new professional managers
recruited after 1908 had no problems in accepting the new order. The
most marked effect, especially after Cyril Lloyd had assumed control as
managing director was that the firm that had once been an extended
family providing a protected living for several thousands was now
converted into a fully commercial enterprise in which the issue of care
was transferred to the organisations of state funded by taxation and the
contributions of employer and workers.
Lloyd brought a new pragmatism to the enterprise and in 1913 the firm
joined the new Midland Employers' Federation, later to become the
National Employers Federation in 1917, before emerging as the
Engineering Employers' Federation in 1918. Thus Hingleys joined the
confrontational blocs that were to dominate the industrial scene in
Britain for the next sixty years.
25	 Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance, 39-349.
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Volatility in business and economic activity in the period from 1890 to
1920
Sayers's analysis of the period between 1879-1920 provides an uncanny
parallel with Hingleys' own experiences. The fluctuations in industrial
activity shown in Table 3.2 mirror almost exactly the fortunes of the
Hingley firm in this period. The accompanying graph, Figure 3.1, shows
the violent changes in industrial activity with which the Hingleys were
compelled to cope.
Thus, the major problem confronting Hingleys and indeed all other forms
of business in this period was the phenomenon of violent swings in
business activity.
	 These swings were a particular feature of the
period. The shipping boom of 1881-83, in the wake of the mania for
joint stock company formations, quickly faded into the shipbuilding
depression of 1884-86. Likewise the spurt in railway construction in
the United States tailed off and 1886 saw the lowest point in industrial
activity in that decade. A new dawn appeared in prospect in late 1887
with a slight revival in the demand for new ships. In 1888 output in
shipbuilding was 50 per cent up on 1887, and by 1889 shipbuilding was
forging ahead with one third of all production being for foreign owners.
Exports in 1890 were 25 per cent higher than in 1886, and British
capital was flooding into Australia and South America. Such frenetic
activity could not and did not last. A situation of over investment
became evident in both Australia and South America. In the last quarter
of 1890, when the Hingley company was formed, over exposure in South
America led the great house of Baring Brothers to the brink of disaster.
In 1892 the railway boom in South America came to a virtual full stop.
With it Hingleys' export of railway iron also ceased. A similar
situation obtained in Australia where the financial crisis that peaked
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in 1893 effectively crippled development for years.
	 By 1893
shipbuilders in Britain were using at best two thirds of their
production capacity. 26
Table 3.2 : Fluctuations in industrial activity from 1879 to 1920, from
a base line of 100 in 1880.
1879 91.0
1882 110.2
1883 110.6
1886 89.2
1889 107.5
1893 88.9
1899 104.4
1903 95.2
1904 94.7
1906 104.9
1907 106.1
1908 93.5
1909 94.7
1913 108.5
1920 118.9
Figure 3.1 : Graph showing the volatility in industrial activity from
1879 to 1920 from a base line of 100 in 1880
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26	 Sayers, A History of Economic Change, 32-36.
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In the five years to the end of the 19th century shipbuilding and its
allied trades did quite well from a combination of pressure to use more
efficiently powered and sized ships. This was coupled with the domestic
growth in naval construction as international rivalries sharpened. This
matter has been treated in more detail in chapter two, as naval
construction formed an important part of Hingleys' fortunes from 1890
onwards. Additionally, the Boer War that began in September 1899
brought phenomenal activity to the iron trade. This activity began to
slow in 1900 when the boom in America collapsed. This, together with
the end of the Boer War in May 1902 led to a collapse in freight traffic
with a knock-on effect on shipbuilding. The fall off in industrial
activity after 1900 brought a growing awareness of how the British
economy was affected by ebbs and flows in the economy of the United
States, even where these activities were not apparently in competition
with each other. Thus economic activity in the period from 1900 to 1914
was essentially a continuation of the swings that were a feature of the
late Victorian era. There was, however, a fundamental difference. The
1890s had seen a long interruption in the flow of investment funds to
the developing countries beyond the seas.
	 The 1900s saw a renewed
impetus in overseas development fuelled by an unprecedented flow of
capital from Britain as has been discussed in chapter two.
Factors often overlooked when examining the depressed state of business
activity in the early 1900s was the financial cost of the Boer War from
1899-1902. This war involved 300 000 British troops and cost £250
million. The National Debt rose by £160 million, bank rate fluctuated
as dramatically as it had done during the Baring crisis, and taxes
rose. 27
27	 Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers, 65.
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However, a recovery in economic activity had begun in 1905 and from then
until the middle of 1907 Britain joined in to the full in what was
essentially an international boom. When this boom petered out in the
catastrophic collapse of 1908, the dramatic downturn began in the United
States. This again confirmed the growing economic reality that all
peaks and troughs in British economic activity had become closely tied
to events in America. So, when the United States recovered from its
financial problems in mid 1909 the revival of export orders from there
triggered another and sustained revival. The British boom from
1910-1913 was the more remarkable because ups and downs in United States
and German economic activity did not deflate it. The reasons for this
were two fold. First, there was the concentration on British shipyards
of the construction of vessels to carry the rising volume of world
trade. Second, there was the continued flood of lending overseas to
finance development in India, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and South
America, much of which was actually spent in Britain on equipment and
services. Shipbuilding in 1911 surpassed the record outputs of 1906.
Then in the years 1911 to 1913, the total of new ships constructed was
greater than that of the boom years of 1899 to 1902. Every major nation
had embarked on naval construction projects in addition to the demands
of the international merchant marine. Inevitably this international
boom faltered, and mid way through 1913 when freights collapsed shipping
orders were curtailed.28
At the end of July 1914 events took place leading to the Great War of
1914 to 1918.
	 The expectations of peace by Christmas 1914 came to
nothing. In the five years that followed, the Hingley firm was totally
caught up in the demands of the war machine. From the passing of the
Defence of the Realm Act in 1914, right through the various wartime Acts
that put the industrial might of country under government control,
28	 Ibid., 40-42.
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Hingleys was subjected to the rigours of a command economy every bit as
demanding as the regimes that emerged in Russia and in Germany in the
1920s and 1930s. Every facet of Hingleys' activities, whether it was
labour relations, nature of products, destination of products,
non-military production, etc., etc., was subject to the approval of a
growing bureaucracy centred on Whitehall. Sir George Hingley died in
August 1918 worn out by his efforts for the war effort, and totally
exhausted by his crusade to maintain the quality of his Netherton iron
against the dilutive effects of wartime expediencies.
Shipbuilding : Hingleys' immediate environment
By the time Noah Hingley took up the manufacture of cables (1820) and
anchors (1848), the transition from sail to steam was under way. Though
sailing ships would continue to enjoy an advantage in the carriage of
bulk goods up to the end of the century, the balance tipped decisively
with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the development of the
compound marine steam engine in the 1860s, which reduced the space
occupied by coal relative to cargo. The greater ability of steam liners
to work to a schedule gave them an especially strong advantage over
sailing ships in the carriage of mails and troops. Government subsidies
given to British steamship companies for these services, coupled with
the imperial support of secure coaling stations such as Gibraltar and
Aden, and a good global network of telegraphic communication effectively
cross-subsidised their general freight activities. This helped them to
dominate the competition from sail ships and foreign steamship
companies.
The development of the reciprocating engine for marine work, followed by
the steam turbine, has to be seen as two of the major British
achievements of the second half of the 19 th
 century. Beginning with the
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32
33
work of John Elder that culminated in his marine engine of 1854, and
right through to 1912, British steam engines were a major factor in the
dominance of the seas. By 1874, A C Kirk had designed a triple
expansion engine using cylindrical Scotch boilers instead of the square
box used by Elder. Seven years later in 1881, Kirk's engine had become
the standard marine engine." In parallel with the steady development
of the expansion engine, C A Parsons had devised the basic concept of
the steam turbine as early as 1884. The first steam turbine in a marine
application was the 100 ton experimental ship the 'Turbinia' in 1897."
The last passenger liner to be powered by the expansion engine was the
'Asturias' constructed by Harland and Wolff in Belfast in 1907.
However, merchant ships up to 7 760 gross tonnage were still powered by
the quadruple expansion engine right up to 1912.' By the early 1900s
all British naval vessels were powered by steam turbines, and all the
magnificent British and German liners of the 45 000 tons plus
classification of the 1910s were similarly powered. 32 Aided by its
domination of steam engine technology, British ships had more than 60
per cent of the world's steam tonnage in the period under review. The
fleet carried 92 per cent of Empire trade, 63 per cent of trade with
foreign countries, and 30 per cent of foreign to foreign trade. British
powered ships also carried the millions of souls who emigrated from
Britain and Europe to America from 1865 onwards."
By 1880 some 54 000 people were directly employed in Britain's
shipyards.	 In that year 983 ships were completed, 822 of them for
29
30
31
Encyclopedia Britannica, 13th ed., s.v. 'Steam Engine'.
Ibid.
Ronald Hope, A new history of British Shipping (London : John
Murray, 1990), 334.
Ibid., 340.
Ibid., 307-309.
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British owners. At the beginning of the 1890s new steamships were
averaging 1600 tons as against 1000 tons for sailing ships. Indeed, in
the ten years from 1880 the average size of freighters had risen from
500 tons to 1600 tons. With this came the need for larger ships' cables
and more sophisticated anchors. Hingleys was well placed to meet both
of these demands. After 1900 the size of ships again rose rapidly and
by the middle of the 20th century the average freighter was in the range
of 8000 to 12 000 tons. The 1900s was the era of the big liners. An
indication of ships' sizes is given in Table 3.3 on the following page.
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In the period from 1870 to 1910 the world supply of shipping increased
from 16.8 million net tons to 34.6 million net tons. Great Britain had
about one third of this shipping. 34
	Hingleys had shared in this
phenomenal growth as suppliers of anchors and cables. Britain's
dominant position in the supply of financial services and capital to the
world depended on its international earning power. In turn this earning
power depended on its merchant navy.
However, in parallel with the general trade swings that were a feature
of the years from 1880 to 1914, shipbuilding was affected by a variety
of other factors and circumstances. Chief among these was that long
lead times did not allow the industry to react quickly to the violent
swings in business activity. Booming trade increased the demand for
shipping space, as did the need to import food during poor harvests.
Often the market swung too far and too many ships were produced in the
short term. Thus in the 1880s, the last decade before the quantum leap
in the size of ships, construction in one year was as high as 1 300 000
tons. In a bad year it could be one third of that. The years 1899 to
1902 were particularly good for shipbuilding. Record output was
achieved in 1906 only to be surpassed in 1911. Then the three years
1911 to 1913 outpaced the boom years of 1899 to 1902. Th
 There were,
however, years of underemployment and Hingleys looked increasingly to
Germany and Italy to fill these voids. The period also saw
shipbuilding playing a part in the emergence of large scale companies in
the industry. Driven by uncertainties in the demand for ships, which
took a long time to construct and even longer to wear out, and coupled
with the multitudinous specifications of vacillating officials at the
War Office and Admiralty, by 1905 certain of the major players in
34	 Ashworth, An Economic History, 154.
35	 Ibid., 94-95.
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shipbuilding had merged to provide the vital naval shipbuilding capacity
required by the British government. 36
 Rated as large in 1905, were:
Vickers, Sons & Maxim with a capitalisation of £7 440 000
Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., with £5 316 000
John Brown, with £2 947 000
Cammell Laird, with £2 623 000
British shipbuilders remained at the forefront of construction activity
through technical innovation, especially in warship design in the 1900s
as will be examined further in chapter four. Speed as well as tonnage
was the key to success. In the early 1880s the triple expansion engine
made its appearance, followed by the quadruple and quintuple expansion
engines in the late 1890s. These were all reciprocating engines fuelled
by coal. Further advances came with the introduction of the steam
turbine in 1897, a move that by 1907 had displaced the reciprocating
engine in the fastest passenger ships. By 1910 the geared turbine
engine had been introduced, and in 1907 the internal combustion engine
began its competition with the steam turbine, realising its full
potential after the Great War. All this change and innovation was but
part of the story of the fight by British shipyards to maintain market
share. In many ways they were too successful, for in 1913 practically
all British ships and one quarter of all foreign tonnage was under
construction in British yards for the simple reason that the British
yards had the capabilities for construction and the prices that ensured
sales. Easy access to cheap steel led to the Clyde, the Tyne, the Wear,
the Mersey, and Belfast, becoming the dominating shipbuilding locations
in the world. Collectively they had some 580 berths and 200 000 people
36	 Payne, The Emergence of the Large Scale Company, 533 -539.
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were employed. 37	For the Hingley firm the natural sources of work
tended to be the Clyde, the Mersey, and Belfast.
During the entirety of the period under review Hingleys maintained a
continual search for market share on a world basis. This was in order
to even out the highs and lows of the business swings, and the firm
achieved a continuity of employment for its work force that was
remarkable for the times. This aspect of the study is developed further
in the analysis of Hingleys' marketing techniques in chapter seven.
Government intervention before 1914
Intervention by government in the workings of the free market was a
developing feature during the period under review. In 1891 the House of
Commons passed the Fair Wages Resolution. This resolution required that
all men employed on Admiralty contracts should be paid in accordance
with wage lists promulgated by the department. In Hingleys' case, the
rule was advantageous as it specifically prevented under-cutting on
price when tendering. Also, as the Admiralty specifications for cables
and anchors were higher than for commercial work, the top men were
employed on this activity. Their rate of pay then set a top rate
against which the conventional descending differential rates of pay
could be fixed.
From the same era came the Factory Acts of 1891 and 1901. These Acts
moved from an initial concern over working hours and accidents into an
elaborate code affecting most aspects of working conditions and
occupational diseases. Further, they enabled the Home Office to devise
controls in the light of experience, with administrative orders being
used instead of new legislation.	 This delegation of power to the
37	 Sayers, A History of Economic Change, 96-99.
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executive was a novel and very important innovation in its day. It was
a procedural device that grew and grew as governments intervened more
and more in the market economy."
However, the classic example of intervention by government in the
workings of the free market, as against legislation of an enabling or
regulatory nature, was the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894. This
Act virtually froze freight rates until the passing of the Railways
Traffic Act of 1913. The Act of 1894 was in itself a reaction by
government to its perception of abuse by the owners in opting for the
maximum end of the freight rates schedule in 1893, by way of taking
advantage of Board of Trade regulations promulgated in 1891 and 1892."
As a result of the workings of the Railway and Canal Commission,
Hingleys had the advantage of steady freight costs, a factor of
considerable importance as it was the company's policy to ship its iron
for export through London ports only, and not through Liverpool. The
downside of this excessive regulation was the resentment of those
working in the railways system, especially over pay and trades union
representational rights in an industry that was tightly regulated.
Eventually, the Act of 1913 gave the railway owners the right to revise
freight rates upwards and to accommodate the wage demands of their
workers. The realisation, emphasised by a Board of Trade report of
1913, that the cost of living had increased 14 per cent over the
preceding seven years, made wage increases and industrial turmoil
inevitable."
38	 William Ashworth, An Economic History of England 1870-1938 (London
: Macmillan, 1960), 223.
Ibid., 124.
Phelps Brown, The Growth of British Industrial Relations, 331.
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A concluding example of government intervention in the free market
economy of the time is provided by reference to the coal mining
industry, an industry then relevant to the entire manufacturing process.
The long time aim of many coal workers to achieve an eight hour working
day came to fruition in 1908. Although the legislation was opposed by
most of the owners, and by the colliers in Durham and Northumberland, it
came into effect with immediate and controversial consequences. These
stemmed from the fact that miners were paid by the tonnage of coal
raised and the shorter working day resulted in lower production and thus
lower pay. Additionally, entrenched working practices had to change to
accommodate shorter shifts. Eventually, matters came to a head with the
strike by the entire Miners' Federation in February 1912 in search for a
minimum wage of 5/- per day for men and 2/- per day for boys. The
government's solution was to create district conciliation boards that
had two patent anomolies. The first was that no national minimum wage
was set. The second was that there was no compensating move to allow
the owners to recoup increased labour costs.'
This philosophy of creating conciliation machinery, that only addressed
the needs of the men, was carried to the point of absurdity during the
Great War from 1914 to 1918. During that conflict the doctrine was
developed that any stoppage in an essential industry, justified an
extension of the imposition of conciliation into the imposition of a
settlement that was acceptable to the men. It was after the War, and
1920, before a balance was restored by the Emergency Powers Act. This
Act set aside the doctrine of imposed settlements in disputes that were
arguably more political than industrial in nature.
91	 Ibid., 324.
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Some economic consequences of the Great War
For Sir George Hingley the National Insurance Act of 1911 marked the end
of the paternalism that was a feature of the Hingley management style.
This style was no longer a key factor in the way in which the works and
the many employees related to each other. With the advent of the Great
War in 1914 there followed in quick succession the Defence of the Realm
Act of 1914, and the Munitions of War Act of 1915. The effects of these
two Acts totally transformed the Hingley operations. In less than a
year an enterprise that was in the front rank of free market'
entrepreneurship was turned into one that was totally subservient to the
dictate of the state under the new command economy introduced by the
government in order to prosecute the war. Albert Vickers, from a much
grander position as a head of the Government's major defence supplier,
summed up government interference in the process of supply as eventually
becoming too pervasive to leave any margin for entrepreneurial
manoeuvre. 42
 The McKenna Tariffs had been introduced in 1914 to protect
industries of particular strategic importance, thus breaking the
doctrine of free trade that had been such an emotive issue in the 1900s.
Early in 1915 Local Armaments Committees had sprung up that raised the
spectre of workers' control of factories, while the Munitions of War Act
introduced the pass-book system to discourage the movement of labour."
For Hingleys this meant that the products it could make, for whom it
could make them, what it could pay the workforce, and indeed every facet
of its operations was subject to government approval and direction.
Scant regard was given to the excessive depreciation and running down of
plant.	 Licences to renew worn out equipment were often denied or
42	 Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers, 31.
43	 Alan S Milward, The Economic Effects of Two World Wars on Britain
(London : Macmillan, 1970).
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delayed, even where the absence of renewal affected the carrying out of
war work. A company that had prided itself for almost a century on
financing the replacement of plant and equipment out of revenue, found
itself caught in a vicious trap of being subjected to notionally
assessed excess profits tax on current earnings with plant replacement
allowances (if licenses could be obtained) being set at pre-war levels.
The advent of war in 1914 brought a sea change in economic and social
attitudes. The very serious tensions that existed in a free market
economy and the focus by the Liberal government on social fairness gave
way to the far more serious tensions of fighting a world war in which
the whole empire was involved. The Liberal government was replaced by a
Coalition government in 1915 and immediately introduced draconian levels
of taxation. In the Budget of November 1914 income tax was doubled to
2/6 in the pound. In the supplementary Budget of September 1915,
McKenna raised the top rate of income tax to 40 per cent. Super tax on
income over £8 000 per annum was increased; and an excess profits tax of
50 per cent became payable." The draconian tax increases were
indicative of things to come. At the outbreak of war in August 1914,
the Chancellor thought that Britain could finance a conflict of five
years' duration from the proceeds of its foreign investments alone. By
October 1915 the Anglo-French Commission had to raise a loan of US
dollars 500 million to finance the purchase of essential war supplies.
Immediately prior to the entry of the United States into the war in
1917, Britain's debts to that country ran to hundreds of millions of
pounds. Between 1917 and the Armistice of November 1918, Britain
borrowed a further £1 000 million for the necessities of life and war.
In the period from August 1914 to November 1918, Britain was transformed
from a creditor nation on a grand scale to a debtor nation on a vast
44	 Ashworth, An Economic History, 270.
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scale.° The Britain that the three generations of Hingleys had known
also passed away. At the personal level, this budget, and subsequent
budgets, had serious consequences for Sir George. Never highly paid
(his director's fee was £500 per annum) he began selling small parcels
of shares throughout the war to meet taxes. The very multiplicity of
minor shareholdings, referred to later, would appear to stem from the
disposals made by Sir George in order to meet taxation.
After the generalised impact of the Defence of the Realm Act of 1914,
the measure that had most impact for Hingleys was the Munitions of War
Act of 1915. Under the provisions of this Act the Hingley enterprise
was designated a 'Controlled Establishment'. As such the bulk of its
activities were directed by a government department. G R Rubin, in his
analysis of the purpose and the working of the Act, emphasises three
basic aims. The first and principal objective was to harness both
capital and labour for the war effort. The second was to reorganise
industry under collectivist principles with a policy of unitary
corporatism.	 In theory this was supposed to result in the employers
having control, but this did not prove to be the case. The third
objective was to promote industrial peace and discipline in the
factories and shipyards, and to minimise interruptions in the production
of war materials. This last objective was to be attained through five
provisions specifically relevant to labour. First, work stoppages were
declared illegal, and arbitration made compulsory. Second, there was to
be statutory wage regulation. Third, there was to be a defined system
of factory discipline. Fourth, all working rules, customs, or practices
that hindered the war effort were declared illegal. Fifth, turnover of
labour was discouraged by the imposition of agreed leaving certificates,
without which six weeks of unemployment was imposed."
Milward, Economic Effects of World Wars, 46.
46	 Rubin, War, Law, and Labour. Intro. ; 13-15.
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The impact of this Act on Sir George Hingley resulted in a partial
opting out of management in the early part of the War. His industrial
ethos was rooted in the voluntarist nature of industrial relations that
prevailed before 1914. This concept of voluntarism had as its
fundamental characteristic the settlement of terms and conditions of
employment without the interference of the state." At a stroke, in
1914, the highly prized employers' initiative over collective bargaining
was passed to the state." With its passing, a feature that Clegg and
others have seen as one of the most distinctive features of free
collective bargaining in the 1890s and 1900s was swept away. In
shipbuilding and its associated trades there was a spirit of antagonism
by the owners towards trades unions. The war, however, compelled joint
action and trades unions first appeared in the Hingley works after 1914.
A summary
The economic factors that could be comprehended and responded to by the
Hingley firm, in the period 1890 to 1920, were essentially five in
number. First, there was the birth of the military industrial complex
in which Hingleys' participation as a supplier of ships' cables and
anchors was central to its domestic marketing strategy. As will be
described in chapter four, Hingleys' fall from grace from Admiralty work
in 1904 was seen as a commercial disaster. An indication of the
importance of military and naval contracts to the British economy is
given in Table 3•4"
0	 Ibid., 7.
Lovell, Trade Unions 1875-1933, 50.
Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers, 123.
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Table 3.4 : Britain's market share of exports of warships and naval
ordnance, 1900-1914
EXPORTER VALUE IN STERLING PERCENTAGE MARKET
SHARE
Britain 35 872 960 63.2
France 5 320 000 9.4
Germany 4 343 000 7.6
Italy 5 130 750 9.0
United States 5 050 000 8.9
Austria 1 070 000 1.9
Second, there was the emergence of the new giant liners designed for the
North Atlantic runs. The significance of these ships for Hingleys was
that the firm was one of a select few capable of meeting the
specifications demanded for anchors and cables. Third, there was the
economic consequences of the Boer War with its drain on the nation's
resources. Fourth, there was the rapid social change that was a feature
of the period. New attitudes emerged that changed the nature of the
provisions for education, health, and social welfare. This, together
with the mass unionisation of many unskilled trades, led to the demise
of the benevolent paternalism practised by Hingleys among others.
Fifthly, there was the Great War during which the Hingley firm was a
controlled establishment or a privately owned, but government directed,
munitions factory.
However, throughout all the ups and downs of the period Hingleys' core
business remained intact, with the firm adapting to the economic factors
occasioned by each swing in business activity.
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PART TWO :	 A NARRATIVE OUTLINE
CHAPTER FOUR :	 N HINGLEY & SONS LIMITED 1890 - 1920; AN
OUTLINE OF TRADING ACTIVITY
The context in which Noah Hingley's firm achieved its hegemonic position
in the trade of ships' cables and anchors
As late as 1873 the firm of Noah Hingley and Sons warranted no more than
a brief reference in Samuel Griffiths's classic guide to the iron trade
in Britain as a maker of best cable iron. 1
 During the 1880s the firm
consolidated its position. The quantum leap in status and scale of
manufacture came in the following decade.
One very important element in the rise of Hingleys was the Sheffield
connection. Hingleys' principal overseas agents were all from Sheffield
: B K Morton in Australia; Scott Piercy in South Africa; and A K Rhoden
in the Orient and Japan. Hingleys' gifted engineer and designer, J E
Fletcher, was a Sheffield man and after they took over the manufacture
of the Halls Patent Anchor Company designs in 1888/9, all Hingleys'
anchor heads were cast by Charles Cammell of Sheffield. The root of
this close association appears to date back to the decision of John
Brown & Co to give up the manufacture of wrought iron in favour of steel
as early as 1859. Notwithstanding numerous later acquisitions in the
shipbuilding industry, John Brown found itself without a manufacturing
capacity for the very large diameter ships' cables and the enormous
anchors that were needed for the new breed of much larger ships laid
down in the 1890s. The new 'Atlas Steel and Spring Works' were opened
Samuel Griffiths, Griffiths' Guide to the Iron Trade of Great 
Britain (Newton Abbot : David & Charles, 1967 edition), 218.
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in 1856 and the company was incorporated with a capitalisation of El 000
000 in 1864. 2 The managing director, and later chairman, was John
Devonshire Ellis. He and his son Charles Ellis were later to develop
. strong business ties with George Benjamin Hingley. The newly
re-financed company went in for armour plate and by 1867 was reputed to
have provided the armour plates for three quarters of the iron clads in
the British Navy.2
Significantly, when John Brown decided in 1908 to go in for the
manufacture of ships' cables a company called the British Machine Made
Cable Company was formed in joint venture with Hingleys. This joint
venture represented the culmination of an accord between the two firms
under which a modest sized sub-contractor was able to enter the halls of
the great in the shipbuilding world by supplying the vital mooring and
anchoring equipment for the most famous vessels of the day.
The other Sheffield iron and steel firm that influenced and affected
Hingleys was the notable arms manufacturer Vickers. Vickers, Sons &
Company Limited had been incorporated in 1869 with a modest
capitalisation of £155 000. Its former agent and partner in New York,
the German, Ernst Benzon, was the first chairman of the company into
which had been subsumed the assets of the predecessor unincorporated
firm created in 1829. Benzon had been made a director of John Brown in
1864. In 1888 Vickers took the decision to move into armaments having,
noted as a sub-contractor, how established John Brown had become in this
field. 4 In 1897 the firm acquired The Naval Construction & Armaments
2	 Sir Allan Grant, Steel & Ships The History of John Brown's (London
: Michael Joseph, 1950), 22.
3	 Ibid., 21.
4	 J D Scott, Vickers A History (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1962), 20.
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Company Limited of Barrow-in-Furness, a company founded by Sir James
Ramsden and which specialised in naval construction. 5 It was the work
in Barrow that was of particular interest to the Hingleys, especially in
the manufacture of ships' cables and anchors to Admiralty
specifications.
Although not a Sheffield firm, the Armstrong Whitworth company had a
marked influence on Hingleys' fortunes, both as a naval fabricator and
because of the Lloyds British testing house at Low Walker. W G
Armstrong & Company was formed in the 1850s as a development of
Armstrong's first business venture, the Newcastle Carriage Company. It
was located at Elswick on the Tyne, a yard that was to feature
prominently in Hingleys' business dealings. 5 It became incorporated in
1883 with a nominal share capital of £2 million pounds and in the style
Sir W G Armstrong, Mitchell & Co Ltd, this share capital being increased
in 1895 to £3 million pounds. In 1897 it purchased the famous Whitworth
company, a name associated with excellence in engineering and became
part of the triumvirate in the military industrial complex along with
John Brown, and Vickers." Its north east operations were based on the
Armstrong yard at Elswick on the Tyne near Newcastle, and on the
Mitchell yard at Low Walker on the Wear near Sunderland. Hingleys' work
for these two yards provided some profit and a lot of pain, the latter
especially in the slump of 1908, a matter treated more fully later in
the text.
A point of particular significance for naval shipbuilding was that by
1890 a pattern had developed in the industry whereby the major
5	 Ibid., 23.
6	 Ibid., 25.
7	 Ibid., passim 25-46.
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constructors carried out British Navy work to Admiralty designs, whereas
foreign navy work was usually carried out to the contractors' own
designs. 8
 This led eventually, and possibly due to Admiralty
vacillations over its specifications, to the astonishing situation
between 1902 and 1904 in which Vickers and Armstrong Whitworth produced
state of the art warships completely independently of the Admiralty
while working for Chile. This new concept rendered the British battle
fleets obsolete virtually overnight as will be seen later in this
chapter. 8 These three firms of John Brown, Vickers, and Armstrong,
provided the base from which George Benjamin Hingley built his hegemonic
position in the supply of ships' cables and anchors to the navies
(military and mercantile) of the world.
Trading in the last years of Victoria's reign, 1890 - 1902
Trading in the early 1890s was very much a case of fighting for
survival. Reference to Table 3.2, page 3/20, will indicate the severity
of the slump in business activity. This was especially severe in
respect of Hingleys' markets in the Australian and New Zealand colonies.
There, the long standing depression had worsened into the acute
financial crisis of 1893. This crisis strained old loyalties between
Hingleys and the merchant houses it relied on for overseas distribution
to breaking point. As 'Ben' Hingley pointed out to B K Morton, his
agent in Melbourne, the network of merchants in Australasia that had
been carefully developed during his four visits to the area was on the
point of breaking up. George P Harris Scarfe & Co., of Melbourne, who
had been supplied exclusively since 1880 was now taking iron from R
Heath & Sons of Stoke. n
 In Sydney the merchant W S Friend & Co., was
8	 Ibid., 36.
9 Ibid., 53.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 26 April 1895, 40.
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no longer taking shoeing iron from Hingleys' London merchant F A
Edelston & Co. n
 Likewise, in Queensland, Smellie & Co. was also not
repeating orders. I2
 In all cases the issue was price, and Hingleys
decided not to supply at loss making prices. A major factor was that
cheaper iron was easier to work than Hingleys' iron, but it did not last
as long. Thus a combination of price and lazy farriers caused 'Ben'
Hingley in his first year as managing director to lose his premier
position in the local markets, especially when the loss of the New
Zealand government contracts was added to the problems in Australia.
1895 was a turning point in the ups and downs of industrial activity.
The index of industrial activity had stood at 107.5 in 1889 shortly
before the firm was incorporated. By 1893 it had fallen to 88.9, but
after 1895 it recovered to a new high of 104.4 in 1899. The reason for
this, as far as shipbuilding was concerned, lay in the naval re-armament
programmes that took place after 1895 following the perceived
unfriendliness of the Franco-Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean
in 1894, coupled with the return to power of the Conservatives in 1895.
Before the age of mass-communication the Hingleys would not have been
aware of the extent of politico/economic activity that was building up
in Europe. The firm concentrated on fending for itself. Thus, in 1895,
and by way of off-setting its loss of the lion's share of the Australian
market, the Hingley brothers addressed the overseas opportunities in
Brazil, Chile, Italy, and South Africa with great vigour. 'Ben'
Hingley's drive for the anchors and cables for two cruisers building for
Brazil at the Armstrong yard at Elswick on the Tyne provided a classic
demonstration of the Hingley trading style. Through his agent, Walter
Christiansen of Rio de Janeiro, he offered top quality cable at a
11	 Ibid., 21 May 1895, 65.
12	 Ibid., 26 June 1895, 82.
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commission of 5 per cent, a figure twice his normal rate of commission.
He added to this without any pretence of subtlety by telling
Christiansen : 'You doubtless have your friends and would be able to
arrange this matter by instructions given to the naval 'attaché in London
to advise Elswick to prefer N Hingley'."
'Ben' Hingley's spoiling tactics in the market for Italian navy work
were even more remarkable. They were also successful, resulting in
Hingleys' dominance of this market right up to the outbreak of war in
1914. In essence, Hingley convinced the Italian naval authorities that
as far as their new fleet was concerned, specification and reliability
were more important than rock bottom prices. Using the influence of
Captain Rocca, his agent in Spezia, he succeeded in eliminating all
second rate manufacturers from the tender lists. In this he was aided
by revelations over the dubious practice of certain second rate British
manufacturers of dumping unwanted or inferior cable on the Italian
market. Hingley wrote to Rocca : 'Have these other offers put on the
fire'.	 Thus, Hingley was able to concentrate the market in the hands
of N Hingley of Netherton, Henry Wood of Chester, and Brown Lenox of
Millwall. As Hingley and Wood acted in concert in Italy, that market
was virtually assured for years.
In South Africa, the extended visit in 1895 by H M Hingley resulted in
two fundamental problems being identified. The first was the distrust
in which agents were held by the mining companies. This probably
resulted from the transient nature of the population at that time, made
up as it was by tens of thousands of men from all over the globe
flocking to the gold fields of the Witwatersrand. The second was the
invariable practice of the merchants of stocking the lower grades of
13	 Ibid., 19 March 1895, 19.
14	 Ibid., 12 June 1895, 67.
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iron. H M Hingley determined to sell direct to the mining companies as
he stressed to a G B Poole of The Rand Mines Limited. The irons needed
for mining work were the superior irons such as Netherton Crown Best,
Netherton Crown Best Best, or Netherton Crown Special Best Best Loco
Iron. The merchants in Johannesburg only stocked Netherton Crown Iron,
the most basic of Hingleys' wrought iron.15
While the Hingley brothers were fighting to maintain market share for
their works in Netherton, much greater events were taking place on the
world stage. The pax britannica was under threat. The Navy League, a
populist pressure group that had been demanding action on the navy ever
since the manoeuvres of 1888 had demonstrated the shortcomings of the
navy, was vindicated by events. Mahon's studies of sea power in 1890
and 1892 showed the weaknesses of the British Navy. The Franco-Russian
alliance of 1894, the establishment of a Russian squadron in the
Mediterranean, and the growing sea power of Japan all threatened the
supremacy of Britain on the high seas. The Venezuelan dispute of 1895
that led to poor relations with the USA created a feeling of isolation.
Concern grew at the way in which the naval estimates leaped in size. At
the time of the Defence Acts of 1888-9, the highest level of annual
expenditure was less than £6 million. In 1895-6 this figure was set at
£18 823 000, rising to £21 823 000 in 1896-7. 16 As mentioned in chapter
three a whole new battle fleet was ordered. Seemingly overnight,
Hingleys found itself overwhelmed with orders for the last years of the
century. In addition to its normal lines of association with John
Brown, Vickers, and Armstrong, it was also called on to cope with direct
invitations to tender from all and every source involved in warship
construction.
15	 Ibid., : 25 July 1895, 94.
16	 Scott, Vickers, 46-47.
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No sooner had the overseas order book filled with work for Italy,
Brazil, and Chile, than orders came flooding in for British mercantile
marine work. 'Ben' Hingley was thus faced with the predicament of
having to refuse work from such valued customers as Cairds, Connells,
and Russell, all major Scottish constructors. The root cause of the
problem was that foreign navy work had filled his works until the autumn
of 1896 as Hingley advised Captain Hardie, his agent in Glasgow, in the
late autumn of 1895. It was at this point that 'Ben' Hingley made the
decision to offer only the Hall's patent anchor in future, and not one
of those in the Hingley range." This was a momentous decision as the
adoption of the Hall's design, as developed and improved during the next
ten years, was the decisive factor in establishing Hingleys as the
supreme anchor maker for ships that displaced more than 40 000 tons,
which were to dominate the passenger trade after 1905.
Hingleys' inability to accept all the work on offer, after several years
of thin orders, was due to the way in which the chain works were
structured. The workshops were geared separately to the production of
three classes of chain. The first category was small chain less than 2"
in diameter. The second was medium chain, being less that 3" in
diameter. The large chain was up to 6" in diameter. In the order of
things the large cable men would not work on medium size cables, as they
were used to working with double strikers. Thus an inability to cope
with orders could arise as it did in 1895. The absence of flexibility
in the production process resulted in orders having to be turned away,
as explained to Caird & Co., of Greenock.18
17	 WHC : Sec. 8 : DLB, 1 : 11 November 1895, 152.
18	 Ibid., : 9 November 1895, 151.
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Trading in the Edwardian era from 1902 - 1910
Trading during these years proved to be the most traumatic of the whole
period under review because of the extreme volatility of the market.
The short sharp slump of 1903 to 1904 following the end of the Boer War
was followed by the short sharp boom of 1905 to 1907. This in turn was
followed by the abject collapse in business activity that was a feature
of 1908 to 1909. The year 1909 was Sir George Hingley's own 'annus
horribilis'. Two of his most respected competitors failed in business,
several close business friends died, his own brother H M Hingley died,
and his mother went into her terminal decline. But, in 1910, there came
an even more dramatic upsurge in work that resulted in Hingleys
supplying the cables and anchors of many of the most famous ships and
liners in maritime history.
The extreme volatility in the market was exacerbated by new developments
in naval construction and by the arrival of the huge passenger liners,
events that occurred in parallel. In warship construction the most
dramatic development resulted from the official Admiralty policy of
encouraging British yards to design, construct and export to foreign
navies warships of all description. This policy was based on the
premise that it would keep the British yards in top form. However, the
policy as it worked out resulted in Vickers and Armstrongs producing
state-of-the-art battleships that rendered whole existing fleets
obsolete. In 1899 Sir William White of Armstrongs had been appointed
Director of Naval Construction. In this role he was grossly overworked
and his relations with the major constructors was frequently very
brittle. He accused them of showing preference to foreign navies and
being late on deliveries. 19	However, he had overlooked official
Admiralty policy whereby foreign work had been officially encouraged;
19	 Scott, Vickers, 47-50.
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and that vacillations over British orders was a direct cause of the
violent fluctuations in workloads that blighted the industry in this
period. Quarrels with the Admiralty filtered down to Hingleys' level as
will be seen later. Unfortunately, unlike the constructors who had a
decisive grip on Britain's shipbuilding capacity, Hingleys' quarrel left
them excluded from Admiralty anchor orders for ten years after 1904.
With passenger liners, the lead times, construction times, and
assessment of their impact on the market, resulted in wild fluctuations
in activity. The ten ships in the range of 30 000 to 52 000 (see the
plate that follows page 3/3) that were supplied with the Hall's anchor
during the 1900s, while being magnificent in their own right, had a
debilitating effect on the small constructors' market as fewer small
vessels were commissioned. Indeed, the shameful conditions that
resulted in the smaller chainmaking workshops in the Black Country in
the 1900s, were a direct consequence of the distortion of the market in
which the medium size chainmakers resorted to making small chains.
At the turn of the century, and in light of the German Navy Acts of 1898
and 1900, the major political influence on naval shipbuilding had been
the growth of the German Imperial Navy. As long ago as 1865 the King of
Prussia had had a trade treaty with Britain as part of his international
relations with France and Britain. 20
 In 1897 Britain decided not to
extend the current treaty and the origin of the large German navy can be
dated from that year. In 1902 Britain signed a treaty with Japan, and
she sealed the Anglo-French agreement in 1904. In 1904, in the wake of
the completion of the major reconstruction of the navy, the Channel
Fleet was re-created. It was during this period, from 1902-1904 that
Vickers and Armstrongs, independently of the Admiralty, pioneered the
concept of the Dreadnought battleship, a very high speed ship with very
20	 Ibid., 46.
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great hitting power. n This concept rendered the British fleets
obsolete and caused major disruption to the planning process. This may
well have been a major factor in the catastrophic slump of 1908. In
1909, however, both Vickers and Armstrong stated that after allowing a
lead time of three years (a key determinant) they could deliver
Dreadnoughts at the rate of one every six months.'
After the industrial recovery of 1910, there was strong activity in
shipbuilding both naval and mercantile right up to the outbreak of war
in 1914. The three major constructors, in whose wakes the Hingley firm
was able to sail commercially, took their activities overseas. In 1905
Vickers set up Vickers-Terni Societa Italiana ed Armamente at Spezia,
with a capital contribution of £86 625 out of a total capital of
£385 000. In 1906 Vickers in joint venture with Armstrongs acquired the
Whitehead Torpedo Works in Fiume (now Trieste), Hungary's outlet to the
Adriatic. In 1907 Vickers and Armstrongs in Joint Venture contributed
£375 000 each in the El 000 000 capitalisation of Japanese Steel
Works.' All these developments were part of a network of interests
closely shadowed by the Hingley firm. Although Hingleys made its own
way overseas, the identity of its interest with the activities of its
major principal constructors must have had its influence. The way in
which Hingleys achieved this is covered more fully in chapter eight
dealing with marketing. In 1908 Vickers, Armstrongs, and John Brown,
took a 24.5 per cent stake for £385 000 in La Sociedad Espanola de
Contruccion Naval, and subsequently obtained large contracts.
Ibid., 51-53.
Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 83-85.
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Hingleys' reaction to the slump of 1903 - 1904
During the short sharp slump of 1903 to 1904 when the index collapsed to
94.7, 'Ben' Hingley demonstrated his ability to temper the wind to the
shorn lamb by moving effortlessly from alliance to alliance literally to
suit the needs of the hour. Separate from the major alliances discussed
in chapter nine he ran an agreement with W L Byers of Sunderland to
corner what was left of the anchor market. Early in 1903 he had a
combination involving Hingleys, P Brown Lenox, H P Parkes, R Heath, and
the Waverley Iron Company, to arrange work among themselves. Only Henry
Wood of the desired grouping of six firms declined to join, possibly
because of differences over the Italian market. These adverse trends in
trading conditions pushed 'Ben' Hingley into a limited compact with H P
Parkes in the middle of 1904." This was a most unlikely pairing in
view of past animosities, but desperate times demanded desperate
measures. With the pick-up in business activity that came towards the
end of 1904, yet another grouping emerged that was distinctive in that
both H P Parkes, and Brown Lenox, were specifically excluded from it.
'Ben' Hingley and Henry Wood had got together, notwithstanding
differences in Italy, over a very large order for 500 tons of mooring
anchors. They decided that this order had to be treated on special
lines by only those firms competent to handle such work. Accordingly,
Hingley and H B Coltart of Henry Wood put together a group comprising
Hingleys, Henry Wood, Jno Green, George Hartshorne, and Samuel Taylor.25
This was, of course, a tight Black Country group with the exception of
Henry Wood who was from nearby Chester.
24	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 9 July 1904, 638.
25	 Ibid., 15 October 1904, 733.
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During these depressing two years there were two other factors that were
of great concern to 'Ben' Hingley. The first was the London shipping
ring that had a stranglehold on trade with the colonies. As Liverpool
was the principal port for America, so more and more of the eastern
trade centred on London. The London ring freight rates of 20/- per ton
to ship bar iron to Sydney were killing the trade. As 'Ben' Hingley
complained to B S Lloyd & Co, the London merchants, he felt that 15/-
was a more equitable rate.' Then, early in 1904, Hingley expressed his
feelings to John Rogerson, who provided his anchor heads, on the second
and far more important factor stating that: 'We have spent too much
money and exhausted the country through the dread of war'. 27 He was of
course speaking against the background of the enormous costs of the Boer
War and referring to the recurring threats of conflict between Britain
and France, France and Germany, Britain and Germany, that bedevilled
this period and the years that followed. Whilst these threats
undoubtedly created much ship construction work, the consequences for
the economy of so much public money being spent on defence, coupled with
the erratic consequences of boom and slump that were the corollaries of
naval planning, were very obvious to men like Hingley. As has been
mentioned earlier this was also the period that saw the many
amalgamations between the major constructors of warships as being the
only way to cope with the multitudinous specifications issued by
vacillating officials in the War Office and at the Admiralty.
Hingleys' quarrel with the Admiralty
During the sharp slump of 1903 to 1904, 'Ben' Hingley experienced the
misfortune of quarrelling with the Admiralty over the failure of anchors
on three British warships. This quarrel is treated in greater detail in
26	 Ibid., 9 September 1903, 345.
27	 WHC : Sec. 8 : DLB, 3 : 5 February 1904, 324.
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chapter five in the section dealing with the management style of the
Hingleys and in chapter nine dealing with relations with governments.
Suffice it to say at this stage that, but for the dramatic upsurge in
shipbuilding activity in 1905 to 1907, this quarrel could have had
disastrous consequences for the Hingley firm because of the loss of
Admiralty contracts it entailed. Fortunately, the Cunard and White Star
lines had a major shipbuilding programme in prospect and, as 'Ben'
Hingley stressed to Captain Hardie in the spring of 1904, his firm was
one of the very few in the world that were capable of making the 33/e.
cables that were required by Cunard. 28
 That Hingleys' problems with the
Admiralty at the end of 1904 had been pushed into the background was
shown by the euphoria that 'Ben' Hingley exhibited when writing to B J
Ackerley his agent in Liverpool. An order had been won for the RMS
Caronia outfits and Hingley's letter welled over with pride when
stressing that the cables and anchors were so large that they had been
entrusted to the celebrated Netherton Iron Works; and that the 31/2"
diameter cables weighing 100 tons were to be tested at the Lloyds test
house in Netherton, the largest and most powerful establishment of its
kind in the world. 29
 The over-confidence that gripped 'Ben' Hingley at
this time, may in some respects explain his astonishing mishandling of
the 1904 crisis over anchors supplied to the British Navy.
The short sharp boom of 1905 - 1907
These were the years during which 'Ben' Hingley's capabilities were
tested to the full. There was a lot of work in the industry, but it was
at very keen prices that required continual shifts in the various
manufacturing alliances to which he belonged. The move to new offices
in March of 1905 was overshadowed in May by the death of Sir Benjamin
28	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 17 May 1904, 570.
29	 Ibid., 2 December 1904, 772.
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Hingley. From his uncle, Sir George inherited a very onerous
responsibility for the Harts Hill Ironworks of Hingley & Smith. This
was a small un-marked bar enterprise that provided a living for Samuel
Hingley (the late Sir Benjamin's brother) and his family. This firm was
to cause Sir George a great deal of continuous commercial concern.
Coincident with this, the Lloyds British Testing Company became a major
time consuming business activity with a programme for rebuilding or
constructing new public test houses at Netherton, Tipton, Chester,
Cradley Heath, and Newcastle. 	 LBTC is given a fuller treatment in
chapter nine.
The boom years 1905-1907, when the index rose from 94.7 to 106.1, caused
Sir George to form groupings of friends and erstwhile enemies in order
to cope with the sheer volume of work on the market. Following informal
discussions on the Birmingham Exchange, Sir George sent out a circular
letter in January 1905 inviting virtually the entirety of the large
diameter side-welded cable manufacturing fraternity to meet as a body.0
The meeting took place on 26 June 1905 and the various firms met as The
Cable and Anchor Makers' Association in order to arrange matters to suit
their mutual interests. This grouping of ten firms comprised Hingleys,
Brown Lenox, H P Parkes, R Sykes, Jno Green, Jno Abbott, Henry Wood,
George Hartshorne, Samuel Taylor, and The Earl of Dudley's Round Oak
Steelworks. In addition, in February, Sir George entered into a
separate arrangement with Henry Wood that provided for a price-fixing
deal with an un-named third party covering the manufacture of anchors,
whereunder that third party undertook to give a pay-off of 1/- per cwt,
to be divided equally between Henry Wood and Hingleys. 31	The
30	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 17 January 1905, 803.
31	 Ibid., 17 February 1905, 831.
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quasi-cartel nature of these alliances is treated more fully in chapter
eight.
However, despite Sir George's efforts to arrange the 'market, prices for
wrought iron were still too low for comfort by the end of 1905. This
had been brought about by the ridiculously low prices being tendered by
the North Staffordshire ironmakers, but after reaching a general
agreement with R Heath of Stoke in September, prices were raised by 5/-
per ton in the following January." This was a very bold move at a time
when the domestic market was under considerable threat from imports of
Belgian, and to a lesser extent German, commercial iron. The key to
Hingley's move lay in his confidence in the total superiority of the top
class wrought iron produced in South Staffordshire. The whole matter of
Belgian and German imports, even to the extent of their re-export by
British merchants as British iron will be considered in chapter six,
. dealing with iron. The Cable and Anchor Makers' Association was never a
well disciplined body and Brown Lenox soon decided to go it alone.
However, Lenox's policy of pricing all work at very keen rates led Sir
George to take steps to get them back into the Association in the
interests of the trade as a whole."
The short period of upward industrial activity that began in 1905 ended
two years later, by which time the Conservatives had given way to a
Liberal administration following the election of January 1906. Sir
George was very doubtful as to the respective merits of tariff reform
and free trade and he expressed himself very forcefully at the time of
the general election, stressing that he had taken no part in political
affairs since 1895. He went on to say: 'If the working men by their
32	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 8 January 1906, 196.
33	 Ibid., 20 March 1907, 590.
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votes bring about a change in the system under which we have all
flourished reasonably well in this country during the last half century,
they must be prepared to take the inevitable consequences1.34
The 1900s was the era when the big ships were constructed that
completely changed the character of ocean travel. At the end of 1906
Sir George was in collaboration with the John Brown shipyard on the
Clyde over the specification and tender for a new Hamburg Amerika liner
some 447 feet long. 35
 This liner was over-shadowed six years later in
1912 by the SS Titanic which was 8881/2 feet long. In this period
Hingleys supplied the chain and anchor outfits for a whole fleet of
similar vessels.
Sir George, as the representative of Hingleys was now active in The
South Staffordshire Ironmakers' Association, The British Iron Trade
Association, and The Midland Iron & Steel Wages Board. The first body
was essentially an interest group made up of the leading cable makers.
The second was a lobbying group based in London. The third was the
means by which, and before the days of mass membership of trades unions,
industrial peace was achieved in the Black Country.
The abject collapse of business activity in general, and shipbuilding in
particular, has to be seen in the light of several converging
influences. Among these were Asquith's budget of 1907 that pared the
Defence Estimates, the confusion caused by the emergence of the
Dreadnought as the state-of-the-art warship, and the general dislocation
caused by the era of the big ships. These adverse influences were
further exacerbated by the suddenness of the recession in the USA.
Ibid., 10 January 1906, 199.
Ibid., 22 December 1906, 508.
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The collapse in business activity in 1908 and 1909
During this period business activity collapsed. The line on the graph
of industrial activity, as shown in Figure 3.1, collapsed from 106.1 in
1907 to 93.5 in 1908 in an almost vertical line. Early in 1908 the
Hingley brothers had to mount a private, and clandestine, rescue of H P
Parkes by taking debentures in lieu of debts owing to Harts Hill. By
mid year, Brown Lenox was in trouble and Hingleys was offered their
Pontypridd works. Sir George commissioned Alexander Smith (the same
consulting engineers who had valued the Noah Hingley works in 1899) to
value the Pontypridd establishment on a breaking-up basis." The value
put on the works was £20 000. 37
 The acquisition moved at a slow pace
because of a disagreement over the value of the plant, but eventually in
November the decision was taken by Brown Lenox to sell." The new
shareholders were notified by Sir George to Pinsent & Co, (a leading
firm of solicitors in Birmingham) as being G B Hingley, H M Hingley, G F
Simms, and C E Lloyd." Jno Abbott in Gateshead did not survive the
slump and in October 1909 Sir George had to decline an offer to take
over that firm as a going concern." Soon afterwards, Jno Abbott went
into liquidation, a fact noted with great sadness by Sir George when in
correspondence with H L Pattinson the director of the Newcastle test
house.41
Ibid., 25 July 1908, 979.
Ibid., 31 July 1908, 987.
WI-IC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 3 November 1908, 14.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 3 : 10 February 1909, 114.
Ibid., 15 October 1909, 293.
Ibid., 27 November 1909, 364.
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Thus Sir George, within two years of presiding over an association of
the country's leading cable makers and anchor smiths glutted with work
as a result of the concurrent naval programmes and the large passenger
liners, faced the debris of a ruined industry. One of his own two works
was closed down temporarily in 1909. The test houses in
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and Sunderland, faced closure and were kept open
only as a result of intense pressure from the Lloyds Register. Indeed,
the situation became so bad that the Lloyd's Register agreed in February
1909 to reduce their charges by 50 per cent in order to help over the
losses in the northern test houses."
Reference to Table 4.1 on the following page will demonstrate the scale
of the devastation in the shipbuilding industry that took place during
the catastrophic slump of 1908 and 1909. The full reality of the
business cycle, and its dramatic consequences for employment in the
industry, are shown in the unemployment figures for the north east
especially Tees and Hartlepool, Wear, and Tyne and Blyth. On Teeside
unemployment in shipbuilding rose from 12 per cent in 1907 to 40.5 per
cent in 1908. On the Wear the figures were 13 per cent in 1907, rising
to 46.9 per cent in 1908.
	 Among the casualties of this slump was
Hingleys' foremost collaborator in the north east, Jno Abbott of
Gateshead a leading chainmaker. In addition the test houses in the
north east were brought close to closure. As mentioned above, only the
action of Lloyd's Register in halving its fees saved the day. Table 4.1
is based on one drawn up by Humphrey Southall who in turn used material
contained in the London Gazette, 1903-1914." Particular note should be
taken of the consequences for the north east in 1908 and 1909.
42	 Ibid., 15 February 1909, 126.
43	 Humphrey R Southall 'The origins of the depressed areas
unemployment, growth, and regional economic structure in Britain
before 1914', Economic History Review 41 (2 1988) : 247.
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Hingleys, whose main work was for the yards on the Clyde, the Mersey,
and in Belfast, was not so badly affected as some although half capacity
working became necessary for a time. This table also confirms, or bears
out, Hingleys' experiences in the slump of 1903-1904, , the short boomlet
of 1905-1907, and the abject collapse of business in 1908 in the areas
where Hingleys' worked. These were mainly the Mersey, the Clyde, and
Belfast.
Table 4.1 : Shipbuilding unemployment 1902-1914
Mean annual unemployment
DISTRICT 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 191
2
1913
Thames & Medway 6.8 8.0 10.0 11.6 9.7 9.4 12.2 10.6 6.7 5.1 7.8 6.1
South Coast 2.9 4.9 4.5 7.9 5.3 3.0 3.8 6.5 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.8
Bristol Channel 19.1 16.0 18.6 20.1 16.2 15.2 17.5 21.5 17.3 14.5 14.0 11.1
Mersey 13.2 10.3 13.3 19.3 12.5 8.4 16.5 18.2 14.9 5.6 4.5 3.9
Humber 10.6 9.2 16.9 10.5 8.9 6.0 19.5 20.3 13.0 5.1 4.7 4.4
Tees & Hartlepool 14.5 16.5 17.9 11.6 9.3 12.0 40.5 30.1 25.0 5.5 5.1 3.4
Wear 10.5 18.7 12.8 8.1 3.3 13.0 46.9 37.8 25.7 5.9 4.5 2.8
Tyne & Blyth 8.2 15.0 14.0 11.6 4.9 9.4 28.2 28.3 22.6 5.0 3.6 4.0
Dundee, Leith & Aberdeen 6.0 17.3 23.7 16.0 8.7 10.0 28.8 35.5 25.7 6.0 4.4 4.6
Clyde 5.3 11.4 16.0 11.4 7.5 9.0 24.1 22.1 14.7 1.8 2.1 1.0
Belfast 1.9 4.5 13.1 11.0 5.7 4.5 11.2 18.3 4.1 0.6 1.3 0.8
Other Districts 3.3 5.6 7.5 9.0 7.2 7.4 11.6 14.2 8.6 2.2 1.6 1.6
On the labour front, the workforce had become very restless. As Sir
George advised G B Cobb, of the Contracts Department at the Admiralty,
no orders for navy cables had been placed for eighteen months." A few
weeks prior to this Sir George in one of his last letters to Jno Abbott,
before the latter's business failure, had confirmed that all the
employers were in favour of a 10 per cent reduction in wages. The men's
representatives had stated that they had no mandate to accept this and
for the first time since becoming managing director, Hingley faced the
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 19 November 1909, 109.
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very real spectre of a massive strike.° It was within this context
that Sir George and his co-directors thought that they had a solution to
present and future labour problems with the advent of the rash of
machine made cable capabilities that appeared mainly from Belgium.
Hingleys' ill-fated venture into this field is covered in greater detail
in chapter eight.
Barrows & Hall of the famous 'BBH' wrought iron had not survived the
slump of 1903 - 1904. Now H P Parkes and Brown Lenox were in deep
trouble. Jno Abbott had failed to survive and the LBTC had severe
financial problems. Yet nothing in the commercial misfortunes of the
day could have prepared Sir George for the personal tragedies that he
was to sustain in 1909. In a note that Sir George sent to William
Ellis, his long time business associate at John Brown & Co, in
Sheffield, Sir George expressed his feelings on the loss of his only
brother Henry Montagu Hingley who had died very suddenly on 30 September
1909 and on the death of George Hepburn the engineer and inventor who
had played such a major role in the development of the highly successful
Hall's patent anchors. He also commiserated on the death of J Thompson
of Ellis' own firm." Sir George's mother, Fanny Georgina Hingley, who
as the widow of Hezekiah Hingley had brought the family down from
Grassendale in Liverpool in 1865 when Sir George was fifteen years of
age, was infirm and totally blind. She died on 6 January 1910.
Fortunately for Sir George, Mrs Hingley's passing and all the other
deaths were pushed into the background by yet another dramatic upturn in
business activity. The difference now lay in the sustained character of
this upturn that was maintained right through to the end of the period
covered by this study.
45 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 1 September 1909, 99.
46	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 3 : 6 December 1909, 374.
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Trading in Peace and War, 1910 - 1918
Generally
The first decade of the reign of King George V was marked by industrial
strife on a scale never before experienced in Britain, agitation over
votes for women, the introduction of social welfare legislation that
effectively enshrined the intervention of the state in the affairs of
the King's subjects, and the ever pressing problems of Ireland. In
parallel with these domestic traumas, the political situation in Europe
was of growing and perpetual concern.
The early part of the reign was a period of great significance for
Hingleys. The firm had now long been associated with the supply of the
cables and anchors for many of the major ships of the world. It was
also at this time that Sir George gave up his autocratic style of
management in favour of a more professionally based board structure.
His efforts were such that a board of professional managers was created
that was to serve the firm well, especially in the years after his
death.
After the sudden collapse of the markets in 1908 and 1909, the upsurge
that came early in 1910 was equally dramatic. Having shut down one of
the works in 1909, Hingleys was suddenly faced with the prospects of
enormous amounts of work. The White Star's twin ships, the S S Olympic
and S S Titanic, came on to the order books in 1910, followed by
Cunard's S S Aquitania in 1911. The Germans, who were anxious not to be
left behind on the Atlantic, placed orders for ships for the
Hamburg-Amerika line. From 1912 onwards the Kaiser began work in
earnest on his new battle fleet, a move that caught the British
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authorities off-guard.	 Russia, Italy, and Spain, all came into the
market with demands for warships.
The commercial agreement with the German firm Borsig, aborted in
February 1911, came to life again in the middle of 1912. This agreement
covered both the German navy and mercantile work. In conjunction with
the alliance forged with Krupp in May 1911, the Borsig work created an
even closer commercial arrangement with the country that was to become a
mortal enemy only two years later. The nature of these alliances from
the 1870s onwards is given fuller treatment in chapter eight. In 1911 C
E Lloyd became the de facto Managing Director of the enterprise. While
taking care not to infringe on the preserves of G F Simms and C E
Howell, who ran the anchor and ironmaking facilities, Lloyd involved
himself in all aspects of the business. He took on the responsibility
for all the overseas interests that had previously been shared between
Sir George and H M Hingley. He became responsible for BMMC, HPAC, and
for Sir George's personal problems at the Harts Hill Ironworks. Acting
in support of Sir George, he took part in the resolution of the long
drawn out dispute with B K Morton over the agency in Australia. He
also, in 1913 and on his own initiative, began a marketing drive that
was to continue right through the first year of the war. This drive was
aimed at achieving a much wider agency representation. Whereas the
Hingley brothers had always made their appointments on the basis of a
personal knowledge of the agent, Lloyd's emphasis was on the use of any
professionally competent person or firm. It was at this time he joined
the newly formed British Engineers' Association, a body with eyes on the
markets in the new Republic of China. He began a campaign to re-shape
the firm's agencies in Liverpool and in London. He coupled this with
new ideas for Japan and Italy. Purely by chance, and as a result of
seeking assistance over the acquisition of a small holding of shares in
HPAC by an American, Lloyd made the acquaintance of W Carlile Wallace.
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Wallace was to become a serious operator for Hingleys after 1914 when
the war opened up an American market that previously had been closed to
outside competition by high tariffs.
In 1910 the bulk of Hingleys' overseas market share came from the German
alliances that had been fostered by H M Hingley and from the Italian
connection that had been carefully nurtured by 'Ben' Hingley. By 1911,
however, work for the Italian government became the cause of much
concern, a concern based on the chronic non-payment of bills that
haunted 'Ben' Hingley for the rest of his life. In 1912 the Kingdom of
Italy fought a short war against the Ottoman Empire, acquiring the North
African territories of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Acquisition of
colonial power status strained Italian finances while accentuating the
need for a modern fleet. Italy therefore embarked on a cynical policy
of buying but not paying. Hingleys was badly caught out by this policy,
with which the Italian navy department persisted right through to the
later years of the Great War. Sir George was adversely affected on two
fronts: first, his commercial judgement was put in doubt; second, he had
to face down his co-directors who eventually accused him of favouring
the non-paying Italian government at the expense of good payers at the
British Admiralty.
In the early months of 1914 Hingleys parted company with John Rogerson
of Wolsingham, Durham, who for many years had been a major supplier of
anchor head castings for the Hall's anchor. Rogerson's contract was
assigned to Krupp, thus cementing Hingleys' ever closer relationships
with German enterprise in shipbuilding. The outbreak of war in August
of that year brought a sudden end to a whole range of German commercial
collaborations that dated back to the time of Noah Hingley himself. It
also ended the often clandestine arrangements that H M Hingley had
negotiated for the firm with great success from 1897 onwards.
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The era of big ships and of warships
The particular revival of business activity that commenced early in 1910
with the index moving from 94.7 in 1909 to 108.5 by 1913 was dramatic
for the sheer volume of work that it created for Hingleys. In short
order the outfits for White Star's S S Olympic and the S S Titanic were
obtained. It was of interest to note that the principal references in
the files to these major contracts lie in the correspondence with W
Janke, the agent in Hamburg.° After a false start in 1910 and early
1911, the new commercial alliance with the German firm Borsig came into
being in mid 1912 and this led to a period of mutually advantageous
cooperation. The market in Germany divided into two distinct parts of
particular interest to Hingleys. The first was the drive by the Hamburg
Amerika line to put on vessels to challenge the British ships on the
lucrative North Atlantic run. This especially so as total British
hegemony on this run was now in prospect with the Cunard's S S Aquitania
coming into service to join the White Star vessels. Hingleys' growing
contacts with Borsig in Berlin led to additional work emerging through
their agents Schulz & Borchers for the Vulcan shipbuilding company in
Hamburg. 48 The big prize, however, was German navy work where Borsig
was particularly strong. By 1912, therefore, Hingleys had a very useful
spread of work: the highly prestigious grand liners for Britain; and the
well paid German mercantile and Imperial navy work.
In 1910 Sir George's interest in the battleship business in Italy had
been re-awakened, and early in 1911 he advised his agent Pietro Micheli
that he would extend a holiday in the south of France to take in Genoa
in pursuit of more navy work at	 Spezia."	 This was	 rather a
	 fateful
WHC : Sec. 8	 ; GBHPLB, 3	 :	 5 January 1910,
	 409.
WHC : Sec. 8	 ; DLB,	 5	 : 20 September 1911,
	 78.
WHC : Sec. 8	 ; GBHPLB, 3	 :	 16 January 1911,
	 828.
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visit for Sir George and was extended to encompass Rome that was now the
seat of decision taking for navy work. Unfortunately, Sir George found
himself in the last days of the Pietro Micheli agency with its
headquarters in Genoa. Admiral Micheli, the son of Pietro Micheli,
wanted to move the agency to Rome from where all government contracts
were placed. On the other hand the Genoa based office objected to this.
In the event Sir George opted for Micheli in Rome as he advised Rocca in
July." This resulted in much first class naval work being obtained.
To round out the abundance of work for Hingleys, J E Crookston, the
representative in Odessa, was successful in early 1912 in procuring the
outfits for four ships for the Russian Steam Navigation Company." The
interest of Sir George and C E Lloyd in Odessa was further stimulated by
Vicker's highly imaginative joint venture in 1913 with certain Russian
banks not only to build three new battleships for the Black Sea fleet,
but also to lay out new yards and ordnance works." Unfortunately, the
outbreak of war in 1914 frustrated this and all Hingleys' endeavours in
Russia.
Industrial strife in 1910 - 1914, as it affected Hingleys in particular
Contemporary industrial history shows that wage freezes and reductions
in times of depression always bring a bitter retribution when times
improve. The wage reductions of 1908 and 1909 resulted in massive
discontent once the effects of the upturn in industrial activity, that
came in 1910, began to work through.
Ibid., 7 July 1911, 930.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 5 : 23 May 1912, 405.
52	 Scott, Vickers, 85.
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By the end of 1911, the mood prevailing in the Midlands among employers
was caught by Sir George in a letter to J E Darbyshire the engineer
involved with the test houses and with the Hall's patent anchor work.
Sir George was widely acknowledged in the Black Country as a benevolent
paternalist. As with most paternalists, he had a hard edge as he
demonstrated when describing to Darbyshire the outcome of a trade
meeting held on 15 November 1911 to discuss the costs of iron, chains,
and anchors. In reporting the feeling of the meeting he stated:
'There is a feeling in the district we may be face to
face with labour troubles all round.., far better to
have them out and done with it. Everyone is saying
"let us put our house in order and fight it out" and
do not let the railway companies or anyone else give
way now, because the time had gone by for
conciliation, and the younger generation want a
lesson'"
If Sir George's sentiments were in any way reflective or representative
of the mood of the employers at large, it was little wonder that 1912
saw 50 000 troops on the streets at times to maintain law and order.
Hingleys, with its own coal mines and heavy dependence on the railways
for moving its iron goods, was at times quite badly affected. The
introduction of a minimum wage for miners and the relaxation of the
statutory limitation on rail freight costs that had been referred to
earlier, did bring industrial peace of a kind. However, having felt the
bit between its teeth instead of between its cheeks, labour was well
poised for the unexpected opportunities to unionise that proliferated
both then and following the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.
53	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4 : 14 November 1911, 67.
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Judith Vichniac, in her study of the iron and steel trades, comments on
the sheer multiplicity of unions that had emerged by the 1910s. In
addition to the elite unions such as The British Steel Smelters' Union
of 1886 and The National Association of Blastfurnacemen of 1889, there
were The Associated Iron & Steelworkers of Great Britain, The
Amalgamated Society of Steel and Iron Workers, The Tin and Sheet
Millmen's Association, The National Steelworkers' Associated Engineering
and Labour League, plus the tinplate and galvanising sections of The
Dockers' Union."
As to the consequences for Hingleys of the great unrest, in the early
months of 1912 C E Lloyd remained remarkably relaxed. In March, in
correspondence with an Edward Tailby, of Birmingham, he merely commented
that a railway strike had stopped movements of the firms' goods." In
April, however, he was not quite so relaxed when discussing the problem
with George Harradon of the Sefton Iron Works, in Liverpool. Hingleys
had been fortunate in being able to keep the chainmakers in work despite
the month-long rail strike." However, by October a very much gloomier
picture was painted by Sir George when endeavouring to salvage something
from the disruption. Hingleys was badly affected by the industrial
tumult and iron output for the year was down by 5 000 tons, or five
months of normal production. At the end of 1912, C E Lloyd when
attempting to excuse the late deliveries of iron to Harrison & Dixon
Ltd, of London, cited the continuing difficulties stemming from the
strike, especially the general congestion. 	 The London North West
Railway (LNWR) and the London Midland Scottish Railway (LMS) had a
54	 Judith Eisenberg Vichniac, The Management of Labour : The  British 
and French Iron & Steel Trade Industries. 1860-1918 (Greenwich,
Conn. : JAI Press Inc., 1990), 147.
55	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 5 : 12 March 1912, 346.
56	 Ibid., 3 April 1912, 372.
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working agreement that reduced competition, and The London North East
Railway (LNER) was on strike.57
The S S Titanic
During this period one event took place that guaranteed Hingleys a
permanent place in the economic and technological history of the Black
Country. This was the manufacture in 1911 of the enormous 1511
 ton
anchor for the S S Titanic.
The manufacture of the famous anchor took place at a time of strained
relations between Hingleys and HPAC and the event receives very little
attention in the company's files. However, the day on which the anchor
was transported from the Netherton works to the railway station at
Dudley Port is writ large in the folklore of the Black Country. The
anchor was drawn through the streets of Netherton on an enormous dray
pulled by 20 shire horses. The town of Dudley turned out 'en fete' and
the hauliers W A Roe, put on a spectacle, bringing in the press to cover
what was undoubtedly a quite remarkable event. The White Star shipping
line, owners of the S S Titanic and its anchor, was astonished and
annoyed by the press treatment received. Hingleys' records include very
few incoming letters, but uniquely there is one from W A Roe regretting
the annoyance caused to White Star by the widespread press coverage
given to the triumphant procession of the anchor from works to
railway." C E Lloyd when attempting to mollify his customer, Harland &
Wolff, expressed his regret that the press did not identify the 151/2
ton anchor as being destined for the S S Titanic or mentioning the White
Star line, and stating that the carrier had accepted the blame for
57	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 6 : 27 December 1912, 113.
58	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 17 June 1911, 468.
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instigating the press coverage." 	 A photograph of the procession
follows this page.
The last months of peace
The last months before the onset of the Great War were spent by Hingleys
in getting on with the work in hand. C E Lloyd failed in his attempts
to persuade Herren Rottman and Krause to make the long promised visit to
England to discuss the continuation of the provisional agreement with
Borsig. He did, however, continue with his plans to plant agents
anywhere and everywhere where wrought iron, cables, and anchors, could
be sold. He was probably as unprepared as anyone else for the scale of
the conflict that was to come.
Hingleys and the Great War
An overview
Sir George was stunned by the outbreak of war with Germany, but C E
Lloyd was galvanised into action. By the end of its first week he had
withdrawn all quotations and repeat orders thus protecting the firm's
financial position. His steadiness was a great source of support to Sir
George Hingley. Lloyd went on to direct the firm throughout the war of
1914 to 1918, the twenty years of peace, and during the Second World War
of 1939 to 1945.
Sir George Hingley, by contrast, was totally unprepared for the advent
of war in August 1914: he was sixty four years of age and had already
handed over day to day control of the business to his protege, Lloyd.
59	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 19 June 1911, 469.
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However, during the four years of the conflict he was required, as
chairman, to deal with the new phenomenon of ill-disciplined labour and
to try keep his works from being run into the ground by excessive
production demands not balanced by adequate expenditure on maintenance
and the renewal of plant. In addition, he personally shouldered the
burden of keeping the Lloyds British testing system in place, a burden
that contributed to his death in August 1918.
By 1914 Sir George was indeed contemplating semi-retirement. He lived
at a modest middle class level with his three sisters. He had status as
a former Sheriff of Worcester and he was well regarded by his work
force. Then, in the four years that followed the outbreak of the war in
1914, Sir George saw swept away the social order, the political order,
the industrial order, and the general fabric of life as he had known it.
Many of his prize commercial contracts were with Germany and all these
were lost. Of more fundamental impact was the way that the Noah Hingley
concept of benign paternalistic management came to an end.
Leaving aside Sir George's purely personal considerations, the most
dramatic consequence for Hingleys as the result of the outbreak of war
was the introduction of a form of government by decree in Britain,
supported by the bureaucracy of the new command economy. This concept
was foreign to anything ever experienced before by the Hingleys and the
country at large. Dressed up as the patriotic Defence of the Realm Act,
1914, that was passed in one short session, this legislation gave the
government of the day arbitrary powers never before experienced under
the post-restoration parliamentary system. In short order, Hingleys as
a firm was to all intents and purposes nationalised without compensation
under this act and under the Munitions of War Act, of October 1915,
under which the firm was declared a controlled establishment. After an
uneasy first year during which Sir George and C E Lloyd endeavoured to
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maintain business activities in Italy, in Japan, and in Australia, all
production during the last three years of the war was governed by and
subject to government dictate and decree. Hingleys' contracts were
decided for them, any overseas work was subjected to severe regulation,
and the workforce was no longer answerable solely to the management.
Hingleys' industrial plant and equipment was subjected to excessive use
and depreciation, without the compensation of the firm being able to
carry out replacements and repairs. Historically, Hingleys had always
renewed equipment out of revenue, but wartime regulations involving an
unsophisticated form of excess profits tax now worked against this.
Then, and even more annoying, vital replacements of equipment out of
capital were denied on the grounds that Hingleys was not a front line
activity. The fact that Hingleys serviced half the British fleet as a
sub-contractor was consistently ignored by Government. This was perhaps
deliberate, or part of the strange vendetta to which the firm was
subjected, possibly as a result of its former German associations or
simply through a lack of awareness of its role and contribution. A
major objective of this thesis is to give due recognition to the firm of
Noah Hingley. King of sub-contractors it may well have been for a
quarter of a century. Outside the trade it was hardly known as a name,
it being one of many firms that contributed to the completion of a ship.
However, Hingleys' claim for a place in history is enhanced by the fact
that even the grandest liner or the biggest dreadnought was only as safe
as the cables and anchors that secured it when at rest.
Mid-way through the war the new phenomenon of bureaucratic returns and
reports came as an added burden, with the time required to fill in forms
often threatening the maintenance of productive activity. That was
until H J Peart was brought in in 1916 to handle this excessively
demanding task. Despite all these lets and hindrances Hingleys never
failed to meet the demands imposed upon the firm. Early in the war its
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military reservists were encouraged to return to the colours without
delay; it allowed its men to enlist if they felt the call to volunteer;
it filled gaps in its workforce from among the Belgian refugees; it
coped with the exodus of its men to the munition factories; it worked
night shifts on non-traditional products; it paid in advance the
workforce's contributions to National Savings; its support of the war
effort was total.
In the final months of the war, both Sir George Hingley and William
Blakey Rumford, his assistant and colleague for 34 years, worn out and
exhausted, passed away. No member of the Hingley family was ever again
to manage the company founded by Noah Hingley.
The War Years
The war was expected to be over by Christmas 1914. Instead, the four
long years that followed placed demands for warlike 'materiel' that had
never before been experienced by British industry. Trench warfare by
its very nature used up enormous quantities of equipment and munitions
of all kinds. Initially Sir George found it very difficult to come to
terms with the new situations created by the war. As late as May 1914
he had chosen some 4" diameter cable under manufacture for German
vessels as his set piece display when entertaining Captain Bartlett of
the White Star line. The abrupt end of the German connection, drove him
into a shell. He buried himself in domestic minutiae and the affairs of
the Lloyds British Testing Company. By October 1915 the works, now a
Controlled Establishment, was subject to a priority order in favour of
Admiralty work and especially for anchors. After years of official
boycott of his anchors this was a happy change for Sir George as he
notified J B Richardson at the Pontypridd works."
60	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4 : 14 October 1915, 868.
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During the first year of the war a decision was taken by C E Lloyd that
resulted in an extraordinary development some half century later. By
1914 the major supplier of anchor heads for HPAC was the German firm of
Krupp. In order to secure a replacement source on the outbreak of war
C E Lloyd obtained the services of F H Lloyd & Co Ltd., of nearby
Wednesbury. After the Second World War the Hingley firm was acquired by
F H Lloyd, who retained C E Lloyd as its honorary chairman. In 1914 C E
Lloyd guaranteed the bank loan of £5 000 needed to adapt F H Lloyd's
works for its new role.°
The first year of the war also saw the complete breakdown of the genial
master and men relationship that had been enjoyed by three generations
of Hingleys. By May of 1915 the directors found themselves treating
with representatives from The Workers' Union or from The Midland
Puddlers' Union. As reported to the Chief Industrial Commissioner, some
men tried to choose when they would work and which of the Board of
Trade's new arbitration procedures it would follow.°
	 By June, Sir
George declared the situation over labour as being hopeless. In a
letter to his fellow director J S Trinham, who was recuperating in
Buxton from an illness, he complained that there was a flood of money in
the industry, extensive poaching of men was rife, and incentive bonuses
were demanded whether or not full shifts had been worked.°
In parallel with all the other upheavals in the first year of the war,
two subsidiary dramas took place off-stage. The first was the almost
bizarre dealings with the naval authorities of neutral Italy.	 The
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 7 : 21 October 1914, 217.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4 : 6 May 1915, 812.
Ibid., 15 June 1915, 834.
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second was the quite frenetic drive by C E Lloyd to extend the company's
representation across the world.
The Italian drama had one main plot and two sub-plots. The main plot
was an internal quarrel within the Michell agency that could have
wrecked Hingleys' representation in Italy. The sub-plots were the
cavalier way in which the Italian naval authorities regarded their
commercial debts; and the growing difficulty of continuing to service
Italian requirements at all.	 The internal quarrel resulted in the
Hingley board attempting to terminate the agency with Micheli. Sir
George, however, over-ruled the board and insisted on the agency being
continued on a day to day basis for the duration of the war." The
matter of the Italian government's commercial debts to Hingleys, that
stood at £13 862 in April 1915, was the cause of real dissension between
Sir George and his fellow directors as he complained to Michell."
Shortly afterwards Sir George advised Micheli that the work force was
proving very antagonistic towards working for a neutral country, as
Italy was at that time."
The second year of the war found Sir George in better spirits, but he
was often unwell. C E Lloyd was in control of daily activities and Sir
George devoted himself to the affairs of the LBTC and also to his new
role of rallying the ironmasters to fight the new breed of bureaucrats
created by wartime legislation. Fuller details of this work is given in
chapter nine dealing with relations with governments. Likewise, C E
Lloyd's efforts in developing new markets in Europe and in North America
are dealt with in chapter seven, dealing with marketing. Meantime,
coping with the demands of the various procurement departments remained
a high priority.
64	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 8 : 13 July 1915, 170.
65	 Ibid., 15 April 1915, 22.
66	 Ibid., : 30 April 1915, 39.
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The third and fourth years of the war found Hingleys battling on several
fronts to meet the incessant demands of the Admiralty and the army
procurement departments. Imposed production quotas had to be met
notwithstanding the debilitating effects on morale of the food rationing
resulting from the success of the German U Boat campaign, and of the
dreadful losses suffered by men of the Midlands county regiments at the
Dardanelles and on the Somme. Within the firm the directors reacted in
very different ways.	 H J Peart got on with the job of coping with
demands of the new bureaucracy. C E Lloyd concentrated on securing
market positions in America and in Japan. Sir George on the other hand
addressed his efforts to the problems of industrial anarchy, coupled
with the very real prospect of a complete breakdown of the system of
proper testing for cables, a discipline partly created by his
illustrious grandfather Noah Hingley.
His first concern lay with the sheer volume of inferior material that
was being dumped on the market. This placed intense moral pressure on
the superintendents to pass urgently required war supplies. Not only
was inferior material being submitted for testing but unfinished
inferior material was also being dumped at the LBTC yards to secure
irregular free storage. This problem had begun in the previous year as
Sir George had notified Andrew Scott at the Lloyd's Register.° It was
a problem that became more and more difficult to contain. Sir George's
second concern lay with the supply of anchor heads. During the war the
supply of anchor heads to the Hingley works depended on the efforts of
F H Lloyd, on a reinstated J Rogerson, on E Jopling of Sunderland, and
by August 1917 a new supplier R D Tennent of Coatbridge. Of the four,
only Jopling met the targets for delivery demanded by the Admiralty.
67	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4 : 29 May 1916, 982.
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The other three had woeful performance figures as Sir George advised
John Rogers at the Directorate of War Materials."
His third concern lay with the breakdown of discipline in the labour
market. By October 1917, and as the cable and anchor department
notified the Board in an urgent internal memo, such was the shortage of
any kind of labour the government had abandoned the system of clearance
certificates for anyone wishing to leave a controlled establishment."
As the firm complained to Col. Horne at the Ministry of Munitions, civil
servants were taking it upon themselves to grant wage increases without
reference to the employers. 70 In the same month The Chain Makers' and
Strikers' Association filed a wage demand for an increase of 20 per
cent. 71 In November Sir George capitulated to the men's demands in
order to prevent a mass exodus from his works, as he stated in his
petition for retrospective approval for his action from the Ministry of
Munitions 72
The firm of N Hingley & Sons Limited traded out the last year of the war
and the last months of Sir George's life as an exercise in balancing the
demands of the military and the navy with the demands of the workforce.
He now saw the future of LBTC, the result of pioneer work in the field
of testing by Noah Hingley himself and his son Benjamin, as part of the
apparatus of state and he endeavoured to effect its sale to the Lloyds
Register. The mood of desperate determination over the course of the
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 5 : 21 August 1917, 139.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 11 : 18 October 1917, 45.
70	 Ibid., 18 October 1917, 41.
Ibid., 16 October 1917, 44.
72	 Ibid., : 2 November 1917, 63.
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war was well summed up in his new year message to Admiral Michieli when
he said : 'We shall fight the war to the bitter end1.73
After the losses at Passchendaele in the summer of 1917, and in the
Kaiser's Battle of March 1918, Noah Hingleys' firm played a full part in
supplying material for the counter offensive that ended the war in
November 1918. In late 1917 the firm acquired the business of John
Bagnall & Sons of Wednesbury solely in order to create a new forge
capability." The continuing desperate shortage of labour was coped
with despite further calls from the army for the final offensive. Wage
demands in February 1918 for increases of 12.5 per cent were probably
the last negotiations handled by Sir George.
Sir George finally gave up active work in June 1918 and he died early in
August. His faithful aide, W B Rumford, died in December. C E Lloyd
took over as Chairman and served in that capacity until 1966 when the
firm was merged with that of F H Lloyd & Co Limited. C E Lloyd's most
significant act in the last months of the war was to accept that wrought
iron would have to give way to steel. He turned to his agent in
America, W Carlile Wallace, to carry out a technical appraisal of cast
steel as a reliable replacement for wrought iron. 75 He thus prepared
the firm for the era of steel. Sir George Hingley had, however,
fulfilled his prophetic words to B K Morton in 1901 that wrought iron
would see out his working lifetime."
Ibid., : 16 January 1918, 197.
74	 Ibid., : 5 January 1918, 190.
Ibid., : 8 August 1918, 479.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 10 January 1901, 70.
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A Summary
The principal feature of the period from 1890 to 1914 was the sheer
volatility of business activity general and the shipyard construction
programmes in particular. To the inherent problems brought about by the
violent swings in demand for new ships, were added the enormous
structural changes in the size of both freighters and passenger boats.
On top of this the endless vacillations by the British government over
its massive warship replacement programme led to increased frustrations
and eventually the emergence of a triumvirate of military-industrial
constructors. The mini-booms were as ferocious as the mini-slumps of
the period and containment of both varieties of economic situation was
effected by Hingleys' masterly use of trade combinations, especially in
times of boom.
An even more significant factor was Hingleys' great good fortune in
having the goodwill of the massive John Brown enterprise. This, in
addition to similar good fortune stemming from associations with Vickers
and Armstrong-Whitworth, ensured a significant niche for its products in
naval work. The John Brown connection, however, provided the way in for
the work on the leviathans of the seas for which the Hingley firm was
justly renowned.
'Ben' Hingley's quarrel with the Admiralty in 1904 over the repair costs
for three navy anchors was the major blight on an otherwise successful
twenty four years spent in maximising the firm's market share in good
times as well as in bad. During the whole of the twenty eight years
under review 'Ben' Hingley was at the centre from which the various arms
of the firm's endeavours radiated. However, over the years he changed
from being an egotistical person dedicated to centralising all control
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in himself, to being a chairman convinced of the virtues of broad
professional management. By his introduction of management by men
possessing skills other than iron founding, who could direct the affairs
of the firm far better than one person on his own, he ensured the future
of the enterprise for a further half century.
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PART THREE :
	 MANAGING THE FIRM
CHAPTER FIVE :
	 OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT
The rationale behind the incorporation of the family business in 1890
During the nineteenth century parliamentary legislation severed the link
between ownership and control. The legislation of 1844 established an
office for the registration of joint stock companies, those having
twenty five or more members or with large numbers of transferable
shares. The principle of general limited liability was established by
the Limited Liability Act of 1855. This enabled individual investors to
limit their commitment to a company to the nominal value of their
shares, thus safeguarding their personal fortunes. The establishment of
companies in the modern form was greatly extended by the Companies Act
of 1862. The Act of 1890 was essentially a tidying-up measure, the
broad principles covering the establishment and conduct of companies
having been established in the measures of 1855 and 1862. 1
 The aim of
the legislation was to make it easier for funds to be raised publicly
for undertakings, such as railways, that required very large capital
sums, and to enable this to be done without eating into scarce
parliamentary time.
However, and as P L Payne has demonstrated, as late as 1885 the majority
of manufacturing firms continued to be run as family businesses without
acquiring the apparent benefits stemming from incorporation. On the
other hand, an unexpected result of the 1862 legislation had been a
large number of private, closely held, companies taking the cloak of
incorporation, even though the private company, as such, was not
recognised in law until 1907.
	 Payne is firmly of the view that the
A H Manchester, Modern Legal History (London : Butterworths,
1980), 355-358.
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underlying motive for the incorporation of private companies was to
obtain limited liability while retaining the original management and
privacy of the past. Thus, the legislation had been put in place to
meet one perceived need, but had produced a vastly different result.'
Now this legislation of 1862 had preceded Noah Hingley's death in 1877
by 15 years and 1890 was 28 years after its enactment. Thus the firm
had had ample time to incorporate had it so wished. The reason,
therefore, for non-incorporation before 1890 would appear to lie
elsewhere. In 1890, and of much greater significance for Hingleys was
the passing of the Partnership Act of 1890. This Act has been described
as the milestone Act in partnership law in that era. 3 The reasons for
this will be given later. The key element was the confirmation of total
joint and several personal liability of all partners for the activities
of the partnership.
The Memorandum of Association in respect of the company incorporated as
N Hingley & Sons Limited is included in this study as appendix one.
Reference to clause 3(b) shows that, following the death of Noah
Hingley, Benjamin Hingley had personally carried on the business and
traded as N Hingley and Sons. However, in this enterprise he was
assisted by his two nephews, George Benjamin Hingley and Henry Montagu
Hingley.
When the shares were allotted in the new company in January 1891, the
equitable interests of the two brothers were capitalised by the
allotment of 1000 shares between them, while Benjamin Hingley's interest
was capitalised by the allotment of 1300 shares. The inference has been
drawn, therefore, that under the Noah Hingley Family Settlement referred
Payne, The Emergence of the Large Scale Company, 520.
Conversations in January 1993 with Dr Harry Smith, sometime
university lecturer in law.
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to earlier, the bulk of the equity in the famous ironworks had been
settled on his fourth and youngest son Benjamin and on the two sons of
his second son, Hezekiah; and that N Hingley and Sons had been a de
facto partnership, rather than a sole proprietorship; a form of trading
that had become subject to stringent regulations under the Partnership
Act of 1890.
The significance of these family settlements has been pointed up by
Lloyd Bonfield. Under a settlement the operation of primogeniture could
be circumvented and the settlor could determine for himself the priority
of succession to the patrimony and the distribution of the wealth it
produced. 4 Therefore, and referring to the family tree on page 1/12 it
can be seen that Noah Hingley's eldest son, Joseph, was effectively
excluded from a participation in the affairs of the ironworks. Noah's
second son, Hezekiah had died in 1865. His third son, Samuel, was
unsuited through marital tragedies and physical breakdowns for the
arduous task of being an iron master of substance. Noah's mantle,
therefore, fell on his fourth and youngest son Benjamin and on his
grandsons George Benjamin and Henry Montagu.
The Partnership Act of 1890 aimed in part to eliminate the abuses that
had arisen from partners, active or sleeping, endeavouring to distance
themselves from the consequences of the acts of their fellow partners.
Section 9 of the Act enshrined the principle of joint responsibility
among partners, and joint and several responsibility in Scotland, thus
making trading as a partnership the most onerous way of conducting a
business if there were no overriding reasons in favour of a partnership
as against a company. The Act itself, in its fifty sections, codified
the law in respect of this form of business association. A copy of the
Arrangement of Sections of the Act is attached as appendix two.
4	 Bonfield, 'Family Settlements', 341-354.
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For Benjamin Hingley, now 60 years of age and active as a Member of
Parliament, the partnership format must have been a less attractive way
of conducting the business than of opting for incorporation. His
nephews, George Benjamin and Henry Montagu were 40 and 35 respectively,
and were gradually taking over the running of the business. They quite
clearly had an equitable interest in the business virtually equal to his
own, and there was little or no merit in assuming all the new
responsibilities of partnership at an age when he could expect to be
taking a less active role. He therefore opted to sell the family firm
of N Hingley and Sons to the newly formed company of N Hingley & Sons
Limited.
In doing so, he exempted himself and his nephews from the rigours of the
new Partnership Act. At the same time he confirmed the provisions of
the Noah Hingley Family Settlement.
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The independent commercial valuation of N Hingley and Sons as at 30 June
1890
In preparation for the sale of the firm in 1890, the professional civil
engineer Alexander Smith, M Inst. C E, of Colmore Chambers, 3 Newhall
Street, Birmingham, carried out a detailed appraisal and calculation of
the business.5
Smith found a business in an extremely sound condition as at 1890, the
start of the period covered by this dissertation, and he valued the firm
as a going concern worth £173 825.3.0. His full Inventory and Valuation
is reproduced hereafter in the text. 5
 Accompanying the Valuation there
is a manuscript statement from Alfred Hilton Legge, the company
accountant, confirming profits for the twenty years to 31 December 1889
as being £223 650.10.3. As a simple average this amounted to
£11 182.10.3 per year, although in the final year they were actually
£14 199.15.8.7
The Inventory and Valuation provided a complete insight into the nature
and structure of the Hingley enterprise. Essentially the firm had three
classes of production : the first was the manufacture of its own pig
iron on which the quality of the firm's wrought iron depended; the
second was the manufacture of wrought iron, from which chains and
anchors were produced; and the third was the manufacture of chains and
anchors on which its world wide fame in the thirty years under review
was based. The firm's activities were balanced between these three
classes of production, with each class able to contribute independently
5	 The address was of particular interest to the author as he began
his own professional career in civil engineering in Colmore
Chambers in 1949.
6	 WHC : Sec. 3, Inventory & Valuation 1890.
Ibid.
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to the sales activities of the firm. In addition the firm had its own
collieries and support activities, making it largely self sufficient.
Of particular interest in the Valuation was the fact that the firm had
20 per cent of its equity in stocks and shares. Thus, the firm had its
products spread across three lines of sales potential, it controlled its
own support resources, and it had one fifth of its assets outside of the
business. It was thus well placed to cope with the financial crises of
the 1890s.
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Inventory and Valuation of the Netherton Iron Works, and Chain & Anchor Works, The Old Hill Iron Works, & Blast
Furnaces, The Old Hill Estate, & Collieries.
The Property of
Messrs N Hingley & Sons
30th June 1890
by
Alexander Smith, M Inst. C E
CoImore Chambers, 3 Newhall Street, Birmingham
Consulting Engineer & Valuer
Valued at £173 825.3.0
VALUATION SCHEDULE FIXED PLANT
AND
MACHINERY
BUILDING AND
LAND
LOOSE PLANT
AND TOOLS
CONVERTIBLE
STOCKS AND
SHARES
Netherton Iron and Chain and £ 29 102.17.0 £16 601.7.0 £4 822.18.9 £19 358.1.0
Anchor Works
Old Hill Iron Works £ 15 947.15.0 £ 7 129.0.0 £ 548.17.3 £ 5 659.2.0
Old Hill Furnaces £ 12 114.2.6 £ 4 372.10.0 £ 443.6.0 £ 3 622.7.6
Collieries, House Property, £ 2 147.4.0 £20 117.9.10 £5 117.4.6 £ 4 720.17.4
Agricultural & Building Land, Farms
& Stores
£ 59 311.18.6 £48 220.9.10 £10 932.6.6 £33 360.8.2
£151 825.3.0
Goodwill £ 22 000.0.0
£173 825.3.0
I am able to certify that:
The iron works are well arranged and substantially constructed; the Chain and Anchor Works are for the
most part newly erected, and are I believe superior to any others in the Kingdom; the Blast Furnaces are of the
most approved and modern construction, suited to the materials of the district; and the collieries producing about
100 000 tons per annum are a valuable adjunct to the works.
The whole of the departments are replete with every convenience, such as Railway and Canal
accommodation, Fittings, Shops and Foundries, Stables and Loose stock and Tools, for carrying on the several
important manufactures in which you are engaged. The fact of your raising your own mine, and producing a
proportion of the pig iron is of considerable advantage, and renders the property very complete and of exceptional
value.
I understand the Works have been mainly constructed out of Revenue, or the profits shown by the books
would have been much larger, and my valuation does not represent the outlay, but is considerably below the cost.'
5/7
The structure of the company at its formation
The transition to company status was effected under an Agreement dated 8
September 1890 made between Benjamin Hingley on the one part and Alfred
Hilton Legge, the company accountant, on the other part. Under the
agreement the new company was to purchase as a going concern the
business carried on by Benjamin Hingley under the style of N Hingley and
Sons since the death of Noah Hingley in 1877.
As is usual, the Memorandum of Association was widely drawn and allowed
the company to operate in any and all the areas covered by iron
manufacturing and coal mining, as well as in non-ferrous metals,
chemicals, etc. The authorised share capital was £250 000 in 5 000
shares of £50 each.
The composition of the original group of seven subscribers to the new
company identified the members of the family with an interest, however
small, in the family business. The allotment is shown in Table 5.1.
Included in the scheme of allotment were: the three sons of Noah namely
Joseph, Samuel, and Benjamin; Fanny Georgina, the widow of Noah's son
Hezekiah; Leah, the daughter of Noah; and George Benjamin and Henry
Montagu, the sons of Hezekiah and grandsons of Noah.8
WHC : Sec. 2, Memorandum and Articles of Association 1890.
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Table 5.1 : Shares on the Incorporation of N Hingley & Sons Limited
Author's Annotation
Benjamin Hingley of Hatherton Lodge, Cradley, Worcestershire, Iron
& Coal Master 10 Shares Son of Noah Hingley
George Benjamin Hingley of Haywood, Halesowen in the County of
Worcester, Iron & Coal Master
•
10 Shares
Grandson of Noah Hingley.
Son of Hezekiah Hingley
Henry Montagu Hingley of Haywood, Halesowen, in the County of
Worcester, Iron and Coal Master 10 Shares
Grandson of Noah Hingley.
Son of Hezekiah Hingley
Joseph Hingley of Linton House, Cradley, Worcestershire,
Gentleman 10 Shares Son of Noah Hingley
Samuel Hingley of Fair View, Cradley, Worcestershire,
Ironmaster 10 Shares Son of Noah Hingley
Leah Hingley of Hatherton Lodge, Cradley, Worcestershire,
Spinster 10 Shares Daughter of Noah Hingley
Fanny Georgina Hingley of Haywood, Halesowen, Worcestershire,
Widow 10 Shares Widow of Hezekiah Hingley
A more significant allotment of shares took place on the 7 January 1891
and firmly put the subsequent ownership of the new company (and thus the
family business) in the hands of Benjamin Hingley with 1300 shares, his
nephew George Benjamin Hingley with 600 shares, and his other nephew
Henry Montagu Hingley with 400 shares.' The full extent of the
allotments is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 : Overall allotment of shares following incorporation
16 September 1890 George Benjamin Hingley 1-10 10
Henry Montagu Hingley 11-20 10
Joseph Hingley 21-30 10
Samuel Hingley 31-40 10
Leah Hingley 41-50 10
Fanny Georgina Hingley 51-60 10
18 December 1890 Benjamin Hingley 61-70 10
7 January 1891 Benjamin Hingley 71-1270 1200
George Benjamin Hingley 1271-1870 600
Henry Montagu Hingley 1871-2270 400
Benjamin Hingley 2271-2370 100
9	 WHC : Sec. 2, Allotment Book 1890-1920.
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None of these shares was allotted for cash and they are thus seen as
representing the agreed equitable interest that each of the seven
individuals had in the firm of N Hingley & Sons as taken over by the new
company in 1890.
The consolidation of family holdings following the death of Sir Benjamin
Hingley in 1905
Although Benjamin Hingley remained an active Chairman until his death in
1905, the operating of the business devolved more and more on his two
nephews with George Benjamin Hingley assuming the leading role. This
troika of uncle and nephews controlled and managed the business until
1905. On the death of Sir Benjamin Hingley, both ownership and
management narrowed still further into the hands of the two nephews."
After his death, Sir Benjamin Hingley's shares, were re-allocated within
the family with the principal recipients being his nephews, George
Benjamin Hingley and Henry Montagu Hingley. Minor recipients were the
three daughters of his brother Hezekiah : Alice Linton Hingley, Lucy
Miller Hingley, and Emily Georgina Hingley. After the death of Sir
George Benjamin Hingley in 1918, these three spinsters became the
principal shareholders of the company, dying in 1924, 1942, and 1948
respectively.
On 1 August 1906 the first allotment of shares since 1891 took place,
bringing the total number of shares issued up to 4 000, out of the
authorised number of 5 000." This allotment is shown in Table 5.3.
10	 Ibid.
11	 Ibid.
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2371-3257Sir George Benjamin Hingley, Bt 887
Henry Montagu Hingley 7433 25 8-4000
Table 5.3 : Allotment of shares on 1 August 1906
Then on 3 December 1906 a Special Resolution, under the Companies Acts
1862 to 1900, was passed requiring any sale of shares to be in the first
instance in equal shares to George Benjamin Hingley and to Henry Montagu
Hingley, or the survivor. Also, if either of these two wished to sell,
they had first to offer the shares to the other. By the end of 1907,
Joseph Hingley, Samuel Hingley, Leah Hingley, and Fanny Georgina
Hingley, had disappeared from the List of Shareholders; the first three
by death, and Fanny Georgina by a disposition within the family.
Following the recognition of private limited liability companies in
1907, Hingleys' first official return of 20 November 1907 showed the
shareholders as given in Table 5•4•12
Table 5.4 : Shareholders at 20 November 1907
Shares Value Author's Annotation
Sir George Benjamin Hingley, Bt. 1974 £98 750 Son of Hezekiah
Hingley
Henry Montagu Hingley 1650 £82 500 Son of Hezekiah
Hingley
Harry Bertram Hingley 15 £	 750 Son of Samuel Hingley
Alice Linton Hingley 120 £ 6 000 Daughter of Hezekiah
Hingley
Emily Georgina Hingley 120 £ 6 000 Daughter of Hezekiah
Hingley
Lucy Miller Hingley 120 f 6 000 Daughter of Hezekiah
Hingley
William Shakespeare 1 £	 50 Solicitor
4 000
12	 WHC : Sec. 2, Transfer Deeds 1905-1948.
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Thus in 1907, almost exactly seventeen years after the formation of the
Company, the two sons and three daughters of Hezekiah Hingley (the
Liverpool connection) were effectively the owners of the enterprise.
Additionally, the two brothers at the ages of 57 years and 52 years
respectively were essentially the sole operators of the business
assisted only by the aged Alfred Hilton Legge and George Blakey Rumford.
This was an extremely dangerous position in which to be, especially as
Henry Montagu Hingley was in indifferent health and was to die in 1910.
The first loosening of total family ownership
At the end of 1907, George Frederick Simms was brought into the
business.	 As a shareholder, and as a director, he was to take an
increasing role in the management of the enterprise. In the first
significant allotment of shares outside of the family, G F Simms
received 400 shares on 31 December 1907."
G F Simms was a fellow chainmaker owning the neighbouring firm of George
Hartshorne & Co, Netherton. By merging his firm with Hingleys he
consolidated a long association that developed still further, especially
in the practical side of the foundry activities and in the making of
anchors. The bringing in of G F Simms as a shareholder and director was
followed on 30 January 1908 by that of Cyril Edward Lloyd as a
shareholder and director by the sale of 100 shares. 14
 These two
appointments had particular significance as they complemented the skills
and areas of influence of the two brothers. The directors' letter books
show quite clearly that George Benjamin Hingley was the principal
salesman in the firm, while his brother Henry Montagu Hingley was the
technical expert.
	 By 1908 Henry Montagu Hingley was in indifferent
13	 WHC : Sec. 2, Allotment Book 1890-1920.
14	 WHC : Sec. 2, Transfer Deeds 1905-1948, transfers 34-37.
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health and George Frederick Simms came in as a very skilled ironfounder.
Cyril Edward Lloyd , initially a civil engineer by training, came in to
assist the younger brother in Europe, in the general sales activities of
the business, and very soon he became the overall general manager.
At this same time, Sir George rewarded the faithful old retainer Alfred
Hilton Legge with 5 shares at a nominal price of 10/- each." He also
sold 60 shares to Edward Henry Smith, one of his senior managers who was
to become a director in 1911."
The shareholdings following the death of Henry Montagu Hingley in 1910
H M Hingley died at the relatively early age of 55 years. Sir George
Hingley, at 60 years of age, then became the owner of 2498 out of the
4400 shares issued and was virtually the sole proprietor. He did,
however, make three modest dispositions of shares on 29 September 1911,
followed by a further three on 2 October 1911. He transferred twenty
shares to George Cyril Edwards on his appointment as company
secretary." Five were transferred to Washington Van Wart Kell on his
appointment as Sir George's executor." Forty to A F Moore, a fellow
ironmaker." And two hundred to Colonel James Samuel Trinham. 2° Trinham
was a fellow ironmaster, who became a director with particular
responsibilities for personnel and administration. He was still alive
as a director during the Second World War and with Edwards he was in the
Ibid : transfer 31.
Ibid : transfers 32-33.
Ibid : transfer 54.
Ibid : transfer 55.
Ibid : transfer 56.
Ibid : transfer 50.
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first echelon of outside management expertise to be brought into the
firm. Sir George also transferred a further forty shares to C E
Lloyd. 21
 Twenty were transferred to E H Smith. 22
 And sixty to Charles
Edward Howel1. 23
 Like E H Smith, Howell was a senior manager in the
ironworks.
The pattern of shareholdings between 1908 and 1920
The Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908 called for a full list of all
shareholders and their holdings, together with a full listing of all
directors. Table 5.5 shows the ever increasing number of shareholders
between 1908 and 1920, distinguished by the total dominance of Sir
George with his 2267 shares in 1918. After his death and by 1919
minority holdings totalling 1797 shares constituted the significant
feature of the overall shares pattern.24
Ibid : transfer 51.
Ibid : transfer 52.
Ibid : transfer 53.
WHC : Sec. 2, Annual List of Shareholders.
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Table 5.5 : Shareholders and holdings per Form E of the annual Company
Returns
HOLDINGS
NAME 1908-9 1910 1911-14 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920
Sir George Hingley 1859 2498 2052 2447 2427 2407 2267 - -
Henry Montagu Hingley 1530 - - - - - - - -
Alice Linton Hingley 120 417 417 417 417 417 397 397 846
Emily Georgina Hingley 120 417 417 417 417 417 397 397 846
Lucy Miller Hingley 120 417 417 417 417 417 397 397 864
Harry Bertram Hingley 20 20 20 131 131 131 131 200 200
George Frederick Simms 400 400 400 420 420 420 420 520 520
Cyril Edward Lloyd 100 100 240 240 240 240 240 720 720
James Samuel Trinham 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Edward Henry Smith 80 80 80 100 100 - -
Charles Edward Howell 80 80 80 80 80 - -
Harry Johnson Peart 120 120 120 220 220
J C Forrest 60 160 160
E J Taylor 510 510
W F Taylor 295 295
G H Taylor 290 290
Richard Lowndes 30 30
Estate of Sir George 1347 -
Minorities 131 131 77 238 238 238 378 1797 1797
4400 4400 4400 5087 5187 5187 5187 7480 7480
In addition to C F Lloyd, J S Trinham, and G C Edwards, Harry Johnson
Peart was brought in during 1916 as a shareholder and director. As G C
Edwards was away at the War, Peart's major role was that of coping with
the mass of paperwork, reports, and returns, demanded by the Ministry of
Munitions of War that controlled the Hingley firm in all its activities.
After the death of Sir George in August 1918, his executors appointed JC
Forrest, another well known Black Country industrialist and mining
engineer, as their representative on the Board.
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During 1915 the authorised share capital in the company was increased to
£300 000 from its original 1890 figure of £250 000. The share capital
was further increased to £500 000 in 1919. At the same time E J Taylor,
W F Taylor, and G H Taylor, all with fellow iron manufacturers, E Baylie
& Co. Ltd., and Jno. Bradley Ltd., were brought in. 26
 The authorised
share capital remained at £500 000 until 1955 when it was increased
dramatically to £2 000 000.26
The changing pattern of directorships between 1907 and 1920
In 1907 the company had only two directors, Sir George Benjamin Hingley
and his brother Henry Montagu Hingley. In 1908 George Frederick Simms
became a director following the merger of George Hartshorne Ltd., with
Hingleys. In the same year Cyril Edward Lloyd was appointed a director
with the role of professional manager. In 1911 Edward Henry Smith and
Charles Edward Howell, both senior works managers in the firm, were
appointed as directors. In the same year Colonel James Samuel Trinham
was appointed a director with responsibilities for personnel. Then, in
1916, Harry Johnson Peart was appointed a director with the remit of
coping with the consequences of the new national bureaucracy created by
the war. In 1918 Jno. Charles Forrest, a man of great local standing,
was appointed a director to represent the executors of the late Sir
George Hingley.
	 The three Taylors were appointed directors in 1919
following the increase in the capitalisation of the company. They
together with Forrest completed a slow process, that had begun in 1908
with G F Simms, of drawing on a range of talent outside of the firm to
assist in its management.
	 By common consent, Cyril Edward Lloyd was
appointed Chairman of the company following Sir George's death." He
Ibid.
26 WHC : Sec. 2, Mem. & Arts. 1890, revised Mem. & Arts. 1955.
27	 WHC : Sec. 2, Annual Lists of Shareholders.
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was to retain this position permanently, albeit in an honorary style
towards the end of his life. To him fell the distinction of leading the
company for longer than Sir Benjamin and Sir George combined. He did
this with considerable distinction, helped in no small measure by the
fact that Sir George's massive holdings of shares had been so widely
distributed following his death, so that the next half century belonged
to the professional managers. A list of the directors in this period is
given in Table 5.6.2'
Table 5.6 : Directors of the Company 1908 — 1918 per Form E of the
annual Company Returns
1908-09 1910 1911-14 1915-17 1918
Sir George Hingley
H M Hingley
G F Simms
C E Lloyd
Sir George Hingley
G F Simms
C E Lloyd
Sir George Hingley
G F Simms
C E Lloyd
E H Smith
C E Howell
J S Trinham
Sir George Hingley
G F Simms
C E Lloyd
E H Smith
C E Howell
J S Trinham
H J Peart
C E Lloyd
J S Trinham
G F Simms
E H Smith
H J Peart
Harry Bertram
Hingley
J C Forrest
Note: Harry Bertram Hingley, the nominal manager of the Harts Hill ronworks under Sir George and C E Lloyd, was
presumably appointed to the Board as a gesture of family goodwill. J C Forrest was appointed by the executors of
Sir George's estate, with the full approval of the Board.
Form E for 1919 is of added interest as it includes, under the new
requirement, all the other directorships held by the members of the
Board. Harry Bertram Hingley is shown as a director of The Harts Hill
Iron Works, and of Cradley Heath Gas Co. C E Lloyd and G F Simms are
shown as directors of Lloyds British Testing Company. J S Trinham is
shown as a director of The Harts Hill Iron Works, and of British Iron
28	 Ibid.
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Manufacturers. E H Smith is shown as a director of the Coombes Wood
Colliery. H J Peart is shown as a director of Jno. Bagnall & Sons Ltd,
a wholly owned subsidiary. J C Forrest is shown as a director of Jno.
Bagnall & Sons Ltd, and also of the Coombes Wood 'Colliery. Richard
Lowndes and Edward John Taylor are shown as directors of E Baylie & Co
Ltd, and of Jno. Bradley Ltd.
As far as the family was concerned, Harry Benjamin Hingley had made his
career with the Harts Iron Works and was well into middle age as were
his cousins Alice Linton Hingley, Emily Georgina Hingley, and Lucy
Miller Hingley. The new era, then, belonged to Cyril Edward Lloyd who
became Chairman of the Company and who became a well known public figure
serving as Member of Parliament for the area for many years.
The other, non-trading, Hingley company
On 21 October 1901 The Netherton Iron, Chain, Cable, and Anchor Company
was incorporated with an authorised share capital of £10 000 in 1000
shares of £10 each. At incorporation there were seven shareholders
Sir Benjamin Hingley, Bt.; George Benjamin Hingley; Henry Montagu
Hingley; Harry Bertram Hingley; Alice Linton Hingley; Lucy Miller
Hingley; and Emily Georgina Hingley. All are described as living at
High Park, Droitwich, and each was allotted one share. 29 The Company
never traded, being formed solely to protect certain trade marks.
Alexander Smith in his valuation of 1890 refers to the Netherton Iron
Works,.., as being the property of Messrs N Hingley & Sons. Netherton
Iron was a trade description fiercely defended by Hingleys, as will be
shown in later parts of the study. Unfortunately, Netherton was a name
that had achieved the same currency that Vaseline and Hoover have
29	 WHC : Sec. 2, Mem. & Arts 1890, Mem. & Arts 1901 for NICCA filed
here.
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achieved in recent years, and many firms tried to pass off similar
wrought iron as being Netherton.
The management style of the Hingleys, with its gradual evolution from
autocracy to general management
The management style of N Hingley and Sons Limited at or about the time
of incorporation followed the usual pattern of the time, the 'gaffer'
and his close aides, his works managers, and his foremen. Benjamin
Hingley, the 'gaffer' and first chairman of the incorporated company,
had as his aides his nephews 'Ben' Hingley and H M Hingley. The day to
day operations in the collieries, at the furnaces, and in the workshops
was supervised by works managers and foremen. The Hingley firm had an
additional key feature, the continued presence of A H Legge from 1862 to
1910, and of W B Rumford from 1884 to 1918.
Legge, whose office title was that of company secretary, was also the
internal accountant and even more importantly he was the managing clerk.
There was no facet or feature of the business with which he was not
totally familiar. His key management tool was the weekly report of
production from every colliery, every furnace, and every chain shop.
Only fragments of his working papers survive, but these provide ample
evidence of the firm control that he exercised over the working
operation of the firm. This absence of business records has also been
noted by Le-Guillou who was doubtful if anything more than rudimentary
accounts existed in South Staffordshire before 1900.
	 Often, account
books were simply records of whatever nature the secretary thought
worthwhile. Often the facts and figures were kept on any scraps of
paper that were available." When 'Ben' Hingley formally took over as
managing director in 1895, following the serious illness of his uncle,
30	 Le-Guillou, Competition, South Staffordshire Iron & Steel, 222.
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he was able to depend on the excellence of Legge's production control
and costings. In parallel with Legge, Rumford acted nominally as
assistant company secretary, but it is evident from the letter books
that he was in reality the personal clerk to 'Ben' Hingley. He shadowed
Legge in his work and the two of them provided that vital ingredient
often missing in the management of sizeable operations : a reliable
knowledge of actual production achievements together with reliable
castings.
In the 1900s, benefiting from the relative excellence of the education
being received by the 'respectable' working classes, works managers
emerged as members of the white collar stratum of management. It is
possible that E H Smith and C E Howell both belonged to this stratum as
they emerged from the works and went on to represent the firm on
technical visits to Australia and to Canada. The conclusion that these
two men, who became directors only in 1911 after many years in
employment with the firm, came from the higher supervisory levels is
drawn in part from the fact that they never wrote letters at director
level. They did, however, perform the vital task of guaranteeing the
production of iron.
	 George Frederick Simms, the owner of George
Hartshorne & Co, was an ironmaster in his own right. His firm was
merged with Hingleys in 1907 so that he could bring his skills to
support H M Hingley the production director who was in very indifferent
health.
Hingleys' first move into professional management came in 1908 when Sir
George Hingley appointed the 32 year old C E Lloyd as his personal
shadow and assistant. After the death of H M Hingley in 1909 Lloyd soon
emerged as the de facto general manager of the enterprise. As a civil
engineer by training, he automatically drew on the technical iron making
skills of Simms, Smith, and Howell, in the running of the business.
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C E Lloyd had no background in trade. He was a member of the famous
banking family. He had attended a public school but was always
interested in being an industrialist. Indeed, after school he spent a
short time in the highly skilled artisan craft of pattern making. Lloyd
was joined by C E Edwards as company secretary in 1910 on the retirement
of A H Legge. Thus the Black Country iron works found itself moving in
the short space of three years from 1908 to 1911 to management by a
troika of three middle class professionals. The third member of this
middle class layer of professional management was James Samuel Trinham
who was brought in as a shareholder director in 1911 with specific
responsibilities for personnel and for interface with the new government
agencies arising from the National Insurance Act and the like. Trinham
was to work with Lloyd at the centre of the management team right up to
middle of the Second World War. The professional middle class grip on
the management of the firm was consolidated in 1916 by the appointment
of Harry Johnson Peart. Peart covered for Edwards who was an officer
away in the army for the whole of the war.
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Some regretable consequences of autocratic management, 1895-1908
'Ben' Hingley was, if nothing else, a human being with a deep sense of
responsibility for his widowed mother, his three spinster sisters, and
his brother, all of whom looked to him for the provision of a home. In
a working life of more than fifty years he scaled the heights as a Black
Country ironmaster. However, the archives reveal three major commercial
blunders during his period of stewardship that were to cause him long
lasting concern. The first of these was his unwise personal involvement
in the conduct of the firm's agency in Australia and New Zealand. The
second was his quite unnecessary quarrel with the Admiralty in 1904 that
resulted in the firm's anchors being blacklisted for ten years. The
third was his attempt in 1908 to introduce the manufacture of
machine-made cables without consultation with his workforce.
The business in Australia had been carefully nurtured by 'Ben' Hingley
during his four visits to the colonies there before 1890.
	 He had
established a network of merchants in the principal towns. These
merchants, either independently or through their head offices in London,
were the means by which a major part of Hingleys' exports of iron were
channelled. In or about 1893 the firm appointed a B K Morton, whose
family was in the iron trade in Sheffield, as its agent in Melbourne.
Morton's territory covered all the areas previously identified by 'Ben'
Hingley namely Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane in Australia; Auckland,
Wellington, Nelson, Christchurch, and Dunedin in New Zealand; India,
Burma, the Malay States, China, and Japan. His duties were to
supplement the activities of the firm's preferred merchants in these
locations by identifying import opportunities and obtaining orders.
In the normal order of things the work of Morton could have been quite
adequately supervised by A H Legge who was a master of the art of
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progress chasing. However, because of his deep personal involvement in
Australia, 'Ben' Hingley allowed Morton to achieve one of those classic
servant master relationships where the servant dominated the master.
Indeed, no other topic is recorded in more detail in the files than
Morton's demands on Hingley. 'Ben' Hingley missed numerous
opportunities to end the association with Morton even to the extent of
tolerating frequent absences in Canada. The result was that Hingleys'
affairs were often left in the hands of the office staff who did their
best, but were unequal in the task of fighting-off competition from
other British firms such as R Heath, Pearson & Knowles, and Shelton &
Co., in a field where Hingleys had once held fifty per cent of the
market share.
The commercial blunder made by 'Ben' Hingley was in failing to end the
firm's association with Morton when he was contractually and ethically
entitled to do so. The Australian economy was in recession after the
financial crisis of 1893 and by 1900 Morton had his sights firmly set on
Canada. By 1902 Morton advised Hingley of his wish to quit the
Australian agency, but Hingley more or less compelled him to stay.31
Then following an unauthorised absence of more than a year in 1902/3 in
the Orient - an area now covered by A K Rhoden as a new agency - Hingley
again exerted great moral pressure on Morton to return to Australia.32
As a result of his seeming indispensibility Morton felt able to flout
'Ben' Hingley's wishes at every turn. He absented himself in Canada
whenever he wished and he wrote a constant tirade of letters on any and
every subject where his own finances were concerned for years to come.
For 'Ben' Hingley this was a drain on his nervous energy at a time when
he was running the enterprise with minimal help. Then, inexplicably,
but no doubt under far more demanding pressures, the now Sir George
31	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 4 September 1902, 1.
32	 Ibid., 16 April 1903, 226.
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Hingley extended Morton's agency that had lapsed on 30 January 1908."
Eventually it fell to C E Lloyd in 1912 to bring Morton to order
contractually and financially. In that year the Australian agency of
B K Morton (Pty) Ltd., was formed on the basis of commercial realities
and not on the interaction of individual persons living continents
apart. Under a new local management the agency did extremely well. For
Sir George it was the end of twelve years of constant aggravation from
B K Morton.
The second commercial blunder was 'Ben' Hingley's quite unnecessary
quarrel with the Admiralty in 1904. Hingley was in his early 50s, an
age when men in business often assume a grandeur that can cloud
judgement. Sir Benjamin Hingley, his mentor and friend, was in the last
years of his life when 'Ben' Hingley reacted violently to the discovery
that all the anchor head castings for current admiralty orders had been
rejected as being probably unsound. For many years the manufacture and
sale of the Hall's patent anchor had been a personal burden that 'Ben'
Hingley found increasingly hard to bear. He was in an invidious
position as he needed the basic excellence of the Hall's design to build
a hegemonic position in the cable and anchor trade. As he advised
George Hepburn, the chairman of Halls Patent Anchor Company, he had been
placed in an intolerable position as a result of all current castings
being under sanction and with the castings' sub-contractor, Charles
Cammell of Sheffield, pressing for a complete re-appraisal of the design
for the anchor head.34
By the middle of 1904 repair work had proved necessary on four warships
that had been in service for some years, and extensive repair work was
in prospect for a further two warships. In addition, and as Hingley
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 27 July 1908, 961.
3.1	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 25 January 1904, 450.
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advised Hepburn, the navy was contemplating dismantling and drop testing
all its Hall's anchors." At the same time Hepburn was chastised by
Hingley who had discovered that both HPAC and Cammell had been aware of
a partial hollowness in the anchor head castings for several years.
Hingley was of the opinion that a crisis of confidence could ensue with
foreign navies and shipping companies taking fright if the Admiralty
excluded the Hall's anchors from its approved lists."
As it happened, the Admiralty at this stage did not appear to have had
punitive action in mind as far as the faulty anchors were concerned.
Indeed a rare personal intervention by Sir Benjamin Hingley, in writing
to the Director of Naval Contracts about the whole affair, undoubtedly
had his desired effect. 37
 The Director agreed to accept that hollow
spots in some but not all castings could not be explained or avoided.
He also suggested that Hingleys should meet the modest costs of £241.6.2
for the repair work so that the item could be eliminated from navy
costs. Inexplicably, however, 'Ben' Hingley declined to accept this
very modest charge and in a rather pompous letter to the Secretary of
the Admiralty he stated that Hingleys could not be held responsible for
defects in anchors that had given good service for many years." Here
'Ben' Hingley had completely overplayed his hand and his firm was
excluded from Admiralty anchor work until 1913 when the pressure of the
re-armament programme compelled its inclusion.
Fortunately, the economic climate of 1905 to 1907 enabled 'Ben' Hingley
to bounce back by re-designing the Hall's anchor in his own works in
35	 Ibid., : 15 June 1904, 599.
36	 Ibid., : 18 June 1904, 611.
37	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 29 July 1904, 361.
38	 Ibid., : 10 November 1904, 362.
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time to dominate the market created by the new era of large ocean liners
of 45 000 tons or more.
The third commercial blunder was Sir George Hingley's quite lamentable
failure in the area of labour relations, where he appeared to ignore his
workforce when setting-up the British Machine Made Cable Company in
1908. With nothing more than rumours to fuel his funk, Sir George
embarked on a joint venture with John Brown & Co Ltd., of Sheffield to
form BMMC as a means of maintaining his hegemonic position in the
manufacture of ships' cables in the face of new technology. The extent
of Sir George's concern is clearly illustrated in his letter to J B
Richardson at the Brown Lenox works in Pontypridd in May 1905. In this
letter he stated that the future looked bleak for all engaged in the
manufacture of hand made cables ; that nothing could stop the onward
progress of the machine made cable and that all the N Hingley plant
would become scrap, especially now that machine made cables were passing
the proving house tests without any problems." A short time later Sir
George complained to W H Ellis at John Brown that the latter's taking of
orders for Brazilian warships, on the basis of supplying machine made
cables, had destroyed Hingleys' personal connection of thirty years
standing with that country. 90
 In forming BMMC, however, he completely
alienated a workforce that had been 'Hingleys' men through and through
for more than seventy years. The company never did make a cable by
machine in the period under review and Hingley never did regain the full
trust of his men. Paradoxically, the orders for the cables for the SS
Titanic were obtained through John Brown in 1910 and the specification
was for machine made cables. In the event, Hingleys made them by hand
as the machines were not technically capable of doing the work.
39	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 30 May 1908, 934.
90	 Ibid., 4 June 1908, 937.
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A summary
The transition from family firm to private limited liability company in
1890 was effected with no discernable dissent within the family. The
centralisation of the share holdings into the hands of Benjamin Hingley,
and his nephew George Benjamin Hingley and Henry Montagu Hingley, would
seem therefore to have reflected the wishes of Noah Hingley under his
family settlement.
The concentration of ownership and authority in three of the Hingleys
continued until 1905. Thereafter, and following the death of Sir
Benjamin Hingley in 1905 and that of H M Hingley in 1909, 'Ben' Hingley,
while retaining the majority shareholding, relaxed his tight grip on the
instruments of power.
	 This began with the bringing in of George
Hartshorne, a neighbour and competitor, as a shareholder director in
1908. It was followed by the recruitment of G C Edwards as a
professional company secretary, then C E Lloyd as a professional
manager, and finally J S Trinham as a professional personnel manager.
Thus within three years the autocratic style of management was changed
to one of collective management by a board of directors. The promotion
of E H Smith and C E Howell, both being works managers, to the board of
directors further strengthened its technical base. This sharing of
responsibility ensured that no one man was put under the personal
strains endured by 'Ben' Hingley or had the personal responsibility that
allowed 'Ben' Hingley to err over for example, the B K Morton affair,
the quarrel with the Admiralty, and the costly fiasco of the British
Machine Made Cable Company.
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PART THREE
	
MANAGING THE FIRM
CHAPTER SIX	 WROUGHT IRON, CABLES, AND ANCHORS, AND TESTING
Generally
This chapter looks at the products on which Hingleys' fame and
reputation rested. These were wrought iron of the best kind
manufactured anywhere in the world; large diameter ships' cables, again
of the most superior class; and ships' anchors manufactured to the
design of the Halls Patent Anchor Company.
Noah Hingley and his fellow ironmakers had the great good fortune of
literally sitting on the basic raw materials needed for the production
of iron. Coal was readily available in the famous Ten Yard Seam or
Thick Coal that covered the area. Ironstone lay under the coal seams,
and limestone outcropped in the immediate vicinity.
Until the 1870s iron making was carried on without due regard to the
market. The result was that at any one time only a proportion of all
blast furnaces were actually working. In the Black Country, in 1840,
there were some 135 blast furnaces out of which only 116 were working.
In 1860 only 108 out of 181 furnaces were in blast. By 1879 only 44 out
of 140 furnaces were working. A similar situation obtained with the
puddling furnaces that produced wrought iron. In 1865 there were 2 702
puddling furnaces at work in the West Midlands. By 1913 this number had
been reduced to 661. The time from 1877, when Benjamin Hingley took
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over from his father, was the era of merchant furnace working with the
iron being produced to order only.'
D B Evans has shown that by 1870 South Staffordshire and North
Worcestershire had been outstripped in the production of pig iron by
Scotland, South Wales, Lancashire, and the North East of England. The
region remained, however, the biggest producer of bar and manufactured
iron. 2
 The emphasis placed by the Black Country manufacturers on bar
and manufactured iron enabled them to maintain a dominant position in
this section of the trade throughout the period under review.
Le-Guillou has highlighted the inroads made by the Belgians from the
late 1880s and the Germans from 1895 onwards into the wrought iron
markets traditionally supplied by the region. 3
	He also cites the
spirited stand made by five well known Black Country firms in
manufacturing the finest quality of marked bar wrought iron that enabled
them to dominate the market. These five firms are listed in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 : Black Country marked bar houses circa 1900
NAME BRAND
N Hingley, Netherton
Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Works
Bloomfield Ironworks, Tipton
J B Bagnall, Wednesbury
J Bradley, Stourbridge
Lion
L Crown WRO
Crown BBH
Crown J B Bagnall
Crown S C
The Victoria History of the Counties of England : Staffordshire 
Volume, s.v. 'Iron & Steel'.
2	 Evans, South Staffordshire Iron & Steel, 89.
3	 Le-Gillou, Competition : South Staffordshire Iron & Steel,
248-257.
Ibid., 24.
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The identification of Hingleys with the 'Lion' brand is interesting as
the Hingley files clearly indicate that its preferred style for ships'
cables was the 'Netherton Crown Special Best Best'. The 'Lion' brand
was acquired following the acquisition in the 1890s of the bankrupt, and
erstwhile famous New British Iron Company that dated back to 1833.5
Hingleys found the 'Lion' brand particularly useful in its domestic
marketing.
Iron versus steel
Iron in its various forms was the predominant ferrous metal until the
1880s. Then in 1886, world production of steel exceeded that of wrought
iron for the first time. The drawing ahead of steel is shown in Table
6.25.
Table 6.2 Specimen Production totals for wrought iron and steel in the
period 1885 to 1930
YEAR Wrought Iron (000 tons) Steel	 (000 tons)
Britain US Germany World
Total
Britain US Germany World
Total
1885 1910 1645 1420 7110 1890 1710 1200 6190
1890 1930 2590 1480 8560 3580 4280 2100 12280
1895 1150 2220 930 6480 3260 6110 3830 16650
1900 1160 2225 950 6760 4900 10190 6360 27830
1905 940 2095 830 5710 5810 20020 9510 44220
1910 1120 1780 350 4710 6370 26090 12890 59330
1913 1210 1720 210 4150 7660 31300 17320 75230
1920 590 1420 85 2310 9070 42130 8400 71120
1925 225 775 90 1210 7390 45390 12000 89080
1930 113 - 20 - 7330 40700 11360 93330
5	 Evans, South Stafffordshire Iron & Steel, 85.
6	 Burnham & Hoskins, Iron & Steel in Britain, 1870-1930, 26-27.
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The table shows the onward march of steel from 1870 to 1930, by which
date wrought iron no longer ranked as a world metal. The inability of
Britain to remain as a ranking producer of steel was matched however by
its continued domination of the wrought iron industry, notwithstanding
the international decline of that industry.
The year 1890 can be regarded as a watershed for steel in that the USA
had now become the leading producer of steel with 34.9 per cent of the
total world production. Britain on the other hand produced 29.2 per
cent of total world production in 1890. Fast developing Germany
produced 17.1 per cent of total world production in 1890. 7
 Between 1903
and 1913 the world production of steel trebled from 27 830 000 tons to
75 230 000 tons. Of the 1913 tonnage the US share was 41.6 per cent,
Germany's share was 23 per cent, while Britain's share was 10.2 per
cent. In 1920 out the world production of steel of 71 120 000 tons the
US produced 59.2 per cent, Germany produced 11.8 per cent having lost
the Saar, while Britain's share was 12.75 per cent. After 1925 even
France had outpaced Britain as a producer of steel and by 1930 out of a
world production of 93 330 000 tons Britain's share was 7.9 per cent.
Although Britain quite clearly lost out to the United States and Germany
after 1895, the fact remains that Britain's production of steel remained
remarkably consistent. This would seem to be in line with the
sentiments expressed in chapter two that British industry consistently
worked to the best level achievable.
Throughout the period under review Britain maintained its steady
position within the declining wrought iron industry. In 1890, Britain
produced 22.5 per cent of world production of wrought iron.
	 In 1910
7	 Ibid., 26-28.
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Britain still produced 24 per cent, and in 1920 some 25.5 per cent of
world production.	 Thus, during the whole period from 1880 to 1930
Britain steadfastly maintained a 20 to 25 per cent market share of all
wrought iron produced. This market share remained remarkably stable
bearing in mind the rise and fall of world production of wrought iron
from 7 670 000 tons in 1880, to 8 560 000 tons in 1890, then down to 1
210 000 tons in 1925, and less than 500 000 tons by 1930. Hingleys,
from its niche in the market for large diameter chains was producing 50
000 tons of wrought iron in 1910, a volume sufficient to maintain its
commanding role in this field.
The dramatic rise of steel production rested on two major developments
in the method of producing steel, one in Britain the other in the United
States. In Britain the basic Bessemer process of 1856, as developed by
the Thomas or Thomas-Gilchrist refinements of 1878, enabled phosphorous,
and part of the sulphur, silicon, manganese, and carbon, to be removed.
This was a great improvement on the original Bessemer process of 1856
that did not eliminate phosphorous, whereas the later process did. The
essence of the Thomas-Gilchrist method was that air was blown through
molten pig iron in a suitable vessel called the converter. The
significance of this technological breakthrough rested on the fact that
phosphoric ores were in greater supply world wide than non-phosphoric or
pure ores.8
Over in America the manufacture of steel was still in its infancy in
1850 with an annual production of some 6 079 tons. Pittsburgh, with its
vast resources of natural gas, was destined to become the major producer
of steel in the USA. Dependent at first on Sheffield, both for steel
Ibid., 24-24.
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imports and expertise in developing its oven industry, Pittsburgh
rapidly became the centre of the crucible steel industry in the USA.9
The actual breakthrough in America had been achieved through the Open
Hearth Process of 1867 in which oxidation and the removal of impurities
was achieved by heating with gas a bath of iron lying on the hearth of a
regenerative furnace known as the Siemen's furnace." Both these
methods allowed the large scale production of high quality steel for the
first time.
Fortunately for Hingleys, its major products depended on high grade
wrought iron and not on steel. Throughout the nineteenth century and
the early years of the twentieth century the quality of both iron and
steel depended largely on the eyes, ears, and instincts of the men in
the foundries. Eventually, and with the growth of steel technology in
the twentieth century, the inherent tensile strength of wrought iron was
matched by that of steel. In the period under review, however, top
grade wrought iron was the only metal appropriate for large scale ships'
cables and anchors.
The essential reasons why the Black Country opted for the continued
production of wrought iron in preference to steel
The essential reasons were partly cultural and partly pragmatic. In the
1860s, when there were 2 702 puddling furnaces at work in the Black
Country, the puddlers were the aristocrats of labour. The puddling
process is described on page 6/15 and was a two hour cycle during which
the titans of the labour force wielded their eight feet long paddles
9	 Tweedale, Sheffield Steel and America, 15.
10	 Burnham & Hoskins, Iron & Steel in Britain 1870-1930, 24.
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until that critical moment when the ore 'came to nature' and the balls
weighing 1 cwt. were removed physically for the process of hammering.
These men did not want to lose either their jobs or their positions of
status. Their loyalties were to wrought iron, especially as there was
little in the way of alternative employment.
	 This opposition was
maintained until the end of the century. Added to this was the
influence of Joseph Hall, the head of Barrows & Hall of Tipton, an
opinion former and leader. Before his death in 1862 he had hardened
opinion against the steel making process developed by Bessemer at
Woolwich in 1855." As Le-Guillou has pointed out, only two significant
enterprises were created in the last quarter of the 19th century for the
manufacture of steel in the Black Country. The first was Alfred
Hickman's Staffordshire Steel and Ingot Company formed in 1883 at the
northern, Wolverhampton, end of the Black Country, which survived right
through to nationalisation after the Second World War. This company
used Bessemer converters of 5 tons capacity at its inception, and it
introduced the open hearth steel process to the Black Country in 1887."
The second was the Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Steelworks Company Ltd.,
that was formed in 1892, failed in 1894, and was re-launched in 1897."
All the other some two dozen iron producers remained faithful to the
product they knew best : the finest wrought iron on the market.
The pragmatic reason for the Black Country's preference for the
manufacture of wrought iron instead of steel lay in the quality of ores
readily available. The Bessemer and Siemens Martin processes for
producing steel depended on an ore with a low phosphoric content. This
Le-Guillou, Competition : South Staffordshire Iron & Steel, 28.
Ibid., 91-92.
Medley, The Geography of Decline, 268.
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was not available locally. The issue of freight costs was also of
enormous significance in the 1880s and, as Med)oey has pointed out, the
Royal Commission on Depression in Trade and Industry highlighted the
capricious, excessive, and preferential nature of railway freight rates
at this time that mitigated against the importation from Spain to Sweden
of ore suitable for steelmaking. 14 The nature of these have been
identified by Le-Guillou as being 116 per cent higher for iron ore, 60
per cent higher for pig iron, 109 per cent higher for other iron, 98 per
cent higher for steel rails, than the rates obtaining in 1881 in the
United States or Germany.15
Thus, the Black Country stayed with wrought iron and the leading
producers achieved a hegemonic position in that industry that survived
into the 1920s.
The Black Country ironmaker in perspective
Le-Guillou has quoted P Temin's extremely accurate assessment of the
region's ironmasters in the late 19th century and the early 20th
century. Temin divided them into three categories, the first being the
pre-classical one, comprising men of outstanding technical ability, but
with limited organisational skills. This category included most of the
Black Country ironmasters. The second category was the classical one
comprising the capitalist entrepreneurs who combined technical ability
(as against inventiveness) with organisational skills and an
understanding of business. This was the category into which Hingleys
19	 Medley, The Geography of Decline, 137, quoting from the First
Report of the Royal Commission on Depression in Trade and
Industry, 1886, 112.
15	 Le Guillou, Competition : South Staffordshire Iron & Steel, 155.
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fitted. The third category was known as the Carnegie generation, being
men who were captains of business rather than captains of industry.
These men left the technical work to the hired technicians and concerned
themselves with industrial rationalisation and improved transportation
of the products 16 . C E Lloyd, on becoming Chairman of Hingleys in 1918,
was very much in this mould.
16	 Ibid., 37-38, quoting P Temin, The Relative Decline in the
British Steel Industry 1880-1913, in Industry in Two Systems 
Essays in honour of Alex Gerschenkron, H Rosovsky, ed., 1966.
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The essential historical differences between pig iron, cast iron,
wrought iron, and steel
The general scheme of iron and steel manufacture is shown in Figure 6.1.
Hingleys was only concerned with the manufacture of wrought iron.
Figure 6.1 : Iron and steel manufacture
Ore
Blast furnace
Pig iron
Remelting processes Conversion processes
Malleable	 Cast	 Steel	 Steel
castings	 steel
Pig iron was the basic iron produced by melting iron ore, limestone, and
coke, in a furnace. Furnaces in Britain were blast furnaces and in very
general terms a blast furnace had a shaft some 80 feet high and 20 feet
wide at its base. The furnace was filled from top to bottom through a
hopper with a continuous mix of the three basic constituents of ore,
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limestone, and coke. The mechanics of the operation involved the
introduction of very hot air (the blast) at the bottom of the shaft.
This blast of hot air ignited the coke and the resulting heat oxidised
the iron ore into pig iron. The limestone acted as a'
 flux that combined
with the other materials in the ore, and with the ash from the coke, to
form slag. The whole process depended on the self generated heat that
arose from the upwards rush of hot gas resulting from atmospheric
nitrogen originating from the blast, coupled with carbonic oxide from
the combustion of the coke.
It was a process that took up to fifteen hours and at the end there
resulted a layer of molten iron in the hearth at the bottom of the
shaft, with a completely separate layer (like water over oil) of slag
overlaying the iron. The molten iron and the slag were drawn off
through draw-off points in the collecting area. The iron so produced
was saturated with carbon (up to four percent) from its contact with the
coke, and was known as pig iron.
The pig iron was of little use in its raw state and further processing
was required. In very general terms there were two options open to the
ironmaker. The first was to produce cast iron by a remelting process.
The second was to produce wrought iron, or steel, by a conversion
process.
There were two main classes of cast iron : the first was grey or chilled
cast iron; the second was malleable cast iron. Chilled cast iron was
produced by remelting the pig iron and then hastening the cooling by
pouring it into cold moulds. This produced a hard albeit brittle
product. Malleable cast iron was produced by reheating the pig iron for
about a week, maintaining the temperature for several days, and then
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cooling gradually. This resulted in a more malleable iron because the
resulting minuteness of its graphite particles did not break up the
continuity of the mass as happened with chilled iron.
Wrought iron and ordinary steel were produced by a conversion process in
which carbon, phosphorus, and other impurities were removed from the pig
iron while it was in a remelted state.
	 In Hingleys' day there were
three methods of conversion in general use. First there was the
oxidisation of iron ore as in the puddling, or wrought iron process.
Second there was the oxidisation process effected by atmospheric air as
in the Bessemer process. Third there was the open hearth method using
a combination of heat and scrap steel. Reference to Figure 6.2 will
show the essential features of the three systems.
Figure 6.2 : The Puddling, Bessemer, and Open Hearth systems
The Puddling Process
chimney
..,:
X
.-7,7712PWnSOLF4g07:010,401a75$744'.7
	
"...,;
•••••':
.,1
/
c
sS7-1.-
ff'r'7,-,<--1.e." -,-''', 4, -\-
-_,
%: .	 a- V
.:g 4	 .4111rall :
n:,..."	 :. : ...,. _.	 ..p...1.......ag
s-zt. 4 -.	 VIEGM2Mr:.7	
..c: s .dr.
qi,......1.11.0..!
6/12
The Bessemer Process
The Open Hearth Process
Blowirt.3:
Converter in vertical
position
Toppin3:
Converter in 1-10,-;zontal
position
molten
Pi3
6/13
In the puddling or wrought iron process molten pig iron was converted
into wrought iron in the hearth or flat basin of a reverberatory
furnace. The furnace was lined with iron ore and iron oxide was stirred
into the molten mass by the puddlers, resulting in the oxidising out of
the carbon, silicon, and phosphorous impurities. The process is further
described a little later in the text.
In the Bessemer process molten pig iron was converted into steel by
having its carbon, silicon, manganese, phosphorous, and sulphur removed
by oxidisation. The process was carried out in a high retort capable of
holding up to 20 tons of pig iron. It was effected by forcing hot air
in very fine streams through the molten pig iron. The oxidisation of
the impurities created the heat that drove the process. The steel was
then poured off by tilting the retort that was mounted on trunnions.
The distinctive feature of the Bessemer process was that it was effected
by hot air alone.
In the open hearth method the pig iron was remelted in the hearth by
flames from an adjacent reverbatory furnace so that no further
carburation occurred. The oxidisation was effected by a combination of
two techniques. In the first the flames oxidised the carbon, silicon,
phosphorous, etc. In the second the introduction of scrap steel into
the hearth had the effect of diluting these excess minerals.
We now come to wrought iron, the material on which Hingleys'
international fame rested, under the appellation of Netherton Iron. As
a firm Hingleys remained faithful to the Cort process, a method
introduced by Henry Cort as early as 1784. The system was elegantly
simple in that in reworking the pig iron it removed the iron from direct
contact with the burning coal, thus eliminating recarburisation. The
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method required a reverbatory puddling furnace that had a working
chamber in which the pig iron was placed. Immediately adjacent was a
fire box from which flames played through apertures onto the pig iron.
While the mechanics of the exercise were simple, the actual puddling
process called for a high degree of skill coupled with extreme physical
attributes on the part of the workmen. Essentially, the molten pig iron
was converted into low carbon bearing iron, or wrought iron, by
oxidising out its carbon, silicon, phosphorous, and other impurities.
This was achieved by stirring iron oxide into the molten mass of pig
iron as it lay in a shallow layer in the hearth of the furnace. This
extremely laborious process resulted in the removal of carbon as a gas,
while the silicon and phosphorous became cinder or slag. The progressive
decarburisation resulted in the molten metal solidifying in pasty grains
through a process known in the trade as 'coming to nature'. The puddler
then welded these grains together with his rabble hook into balls of
about 80 pounds or more in weight. These iron balls were like sponges
with the pores filled with molten cinder. This cinder was removed,
first by hammering, then by rolling. The whole process was extremely
arduous and only fit men up to the age of about 40 years were capable of
coping with the physical demands of the job. The men involved were the
elite of the foundry force."
The process of rolling was the key to the final quality of the wrought
iron. Hingleys reheated and re-rolled up to three times to produce its
top quality Netherton Crown Special Best Best iron.
Cast steel was produced by a variation of the puddling process in which
the reheated pig iron was treated in small crucibles in order to remove
the cinder and slag.
17	 Encyclopedia Britannica, 13th ed., s.v. 'Iron and Steel'.
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The great merit of genuine wrought iron was its extreme durability and
resistance to rust as compared with steel. In addition, its enormous
tensile strength, stemming from the grain achieved in its manufacture,
made it ideal for the size of ships' cables manufactured by Hingleys in
a range from 2" to 6" in diameter.
Hingleys and its Netherton Iron
In a conscious policy decision 'Ben' Hingley continued the traditions
established by his grandfather and uncle in deciding that the future of
the firm lay in its adherence to wrought iron as its basic material.
By the 1890s the wrought iron produced in Netherton by the firm of N
Hingley & Sons Limited had become widely known, both at home and
overseas. However, the name Netherton came to be used by merchants to
describe any wrought iron that came from the Black Country and its
environs. Indeed, the widespread misuse of a name that was covered by
trademark registration caused quite serious problems for the Hingley
firm. In South Africa there was a particular problem in the gold fields
of the Witwatersrand over the sale of inferior unbranded iron as
Netherton Crown. This caused Henry Montagu Hingley to write to H F E
Pistorius of his Johannesburg merchants, E W Tarry & Co., supporting
Tarry's proposed newspaper advertisement exposing the sham, and
promising legal action: 8 This letter contains a short discourse by
Hingley on the essential characteristics of wrought iron, emphasising by
its exposure of the negative qualities of cheap iron the superior nature
of the genuine Netherton article, and states: 'Cheaper iron works more
easily than dearer, because the former is more porous and fuses due to
the presence of cinder... Dearer iron requires and will stand a good
18	 WHC : Sec, 8; DLB, 2 : 15 October 1897, 180.
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heating and does not deteriorate in working. Cheap, hard iron loses its
ductility. Netherton iron is not a difficult iron to work compared with
most of its class. One of its main benefits is that the finished
article is more reliable than those of cheaper iron. The purer the iron
the more regular the quality - nowhere in the United Kingdom is greater
attention paid to quality than at Hingleys'.
By the turn of the century, and under growing competition from the
United States, H M Hingley had to defend the unique nature of Netherton
wrought iron in a letter to Smellie & Co., one of his principal
merchants in London. 19
 This letter not only demonstrated Hingley's
command of the subject, it also provided an insight into the working
practices used in the Netherton works to produce its world famous
product. The essential features cited were: 'English pig iron is
defended against the US claims of superiority for its products... US
pig iron is irregular and difficult to work... In the UK the pig iron
is shingled or hammered to extract the dross, whereas in the US the
balls from the puddling furnaces are passed through squeezers that carry
forward a material that is porous and soft... Puddling produces what is
known as grain, each grain being a small molecule covered by oxide of
iron or cinder, and this is the flux that caused iron to weld... In the
UK, works sorted scrap iron is used to create a bottom over the furnace
plates. This produces clean iron and prevents adhesion to the furnace
plates... US iron is really soft steel or ingot iron - borne out by
difficulty of welding it... Steel making is a manipulation of cast
material throughout and not a conversion of cast or pig iron to wrought
iron and the creation of fibres... Iron resists corrosion longer than
steel'
19	 WHC : Sec, 8; DLB, 3 : 11 September 1900, 15.
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The extent of Hingleys' use of wrought iron
In August 1914, C E Lloyd in a letter to Leo A Gadd of New Jersey, USA,
and of Mexico City, provided the only definitive list in the files of
the sheer scope of Hingleys' activities outside of cable making and
anchor construction. In this letter Lloyd explained that Hingleys had
two main products: chains, cables, and anchors; and bar iron. It was
the bar iron trade that Lloyd was keen on extending to Mexico, as true
wrought iron was not made in the USA, and he went to some lengths to
extol the virtues of the British product. He stressed its superior
suitability for welding and for all forms of repair and smithy work, the
unique feature of wrought iron being its fibrous nature (whereas mild
steel is crystalline) giving it greater resistance to shocks and less
likely to snap. Further, wrought iron did not corrode as fast as steel
and tended to last three times as long.
Lloyd explained to Gadd the uses to which wrought iron could be put.
For railway work Hingleys supplied iron to the British companies GWR and
LNWR; and overseas to the railways of India, South America, South
Africa, and Australia. Ordinary quality iron was used for smithy work
and for construction. The higher qualities were used for locomotives,
couplings, drawbars, boiler stays, etc. The wrought iron underframes
for wagons and coaches were more expensive but vastly more durable than
steel. For mining work, Hingleys' wrought iron was used in well sinking
equipment and for trams, tubs, cages, and the like, in collieries and
mines in Britain, on the Rand in South Africa, in Mysore in India, and
in Broken Hill, Australia. For agricultural machinery, wrought iron was
the most used material in the world.2°
20	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 7 : 8 December 1914, 302.
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Lloyd went on to explain that Netherton Crown at £8.5.0 per ton free on
board the ship was the standard wrought iron for wagon building, smithy
work, and agricultural machinery. Netherton Crown Best at £9.5.0 per
ton was usual for engineering and shoeing. Netherton Crown Best Best at
£10.5.0 per ton was the best for heavy section requirements in railway
work and engineering, while Netherton Crown Best Best Best at £11.5.0
per ton was the iron for draw gear, boiler stays, and higher class work.
Levels of production and production costs
When correcting the proof of his brother's obituary in 1909, Sir George
made the observation that the works under H M Hingley was
producing 1 000 tons of wrought iron per week.' After allowing for
holidays and downtime this would seem to indicate general production
levels well in excess of 45 000 tons per year. This figure is borne out
by a note from H J Peart to R S Lowndes, of The South Staffordshire
Ironmasters' Association in 1917, giving Hingleys' output of finished
iron for the five years to 30 June 1914 as:22
	
30.6.10	 41 384 tons
	
30.6.11	 43 863 tons
	
30.6.12	 44 031 tons
	
30.6.13	 47 908 tons
	
30.6.14	 43 352 tons
21	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 3 : 25 October 1909, 40.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 11 : 19 November 1917, 95.
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Tonnages of this nature, priced out at £10 per ton, would indicate an
enterprise generating £440 000 per year from iron alone. Add to that
the value of anchors and the sale of coal and pig iron and an
undertaking turning over £600 000 per annum in the years immediately
before the war would appear likely. Hingleys had a wages bill of E6 000
per week or £300 000 for the working year according to a note from C E
Lloyd to Lloyds Bank in 1917." According to the analysis given below
in table 6.3 this would seem to give a turnover of some El 500 000 in
1918. 24
 This estimate is based on wages of £300 000 being approximately
one fifth of the overall costs.
23	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 10 : 16 February 1917, 131.
24	 Ibid., : 27 June 1918, 466.
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Table 6.3 : The cost of producing 'Netherton Crown' iron at June 1918
Cost of pig iron : E	 8. 3. 6 56.00
Wages : £	 3. 3. 3 21.60
Salaries : E 2. 4 .80
Ell. 9. 1 78.40
Other costs : E 2.19.10 98.90
E14. 8.11 90.90
Profit margin : E 3. 3 1.10
Sale price per ton: £14.12. 2 100.00
Part of Hingleys' production was sold to the trade and part was reserved
for its production of cables. The firm specialised in the manufacture
of large cables, those in the range of over 3" in diameter. This
required the works to be organised in departments producing small chain
of diameters less than 2", medium chain of diameters less than 3", and
the large chain of between 3" and 6" in diameter.25
The anchors manufactured by Hingleys and its principal competitors26
After 1900, the leviathans of the seas appeared. These enormous liners
of over 45 000 tons, all needed larger and more reliable anchors. Ten
25	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 9 November 1895, 151.
26	 Reference to appendix three containing the specifications attached
to the patents of the anchors described in the following text,
will explain the various parts of the anchors referred to in the
narrative.
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of these large liners are listed in the plate that follows page 3/3; and
the size of these liners can be gauged from the photograph of the
'Olympic' (twin ship to the 'Titanic') that follows this page.
Commercial demand was supplemented by the growth of the battle fleets of
Europe, Japan, and South America. Here again, with strategic thinking
being based on battleships and battle cruisers, the demand for large
anchors became the new phenomenon for the industry. Examples of the
weights involved were given to a Commander E P Statham of Arundel early
in 1907. There were the 81/2 ton models supplied in the mid 1900s by
Hingleys for White Star's S S Adriatic, and the 10 ton anchors supplied
for Cunard's S S Lusitania and S S Mauretania. The largest battleship
anchor at this time was 61/2 tons. The cables for Cunard's ships were
31/4" in diameter, whereas the largest navy cable was 211/16" in
diameter."
The ability to offer a complete outfit of large chains, cables, and
anchors was restricted to a handful of firms. Hingleys was one of
these, and full advantage was taken of the excellence of its cables and
anchors to obtain a significant market share. During the period under
review three anchors dominated the trade in Britain. The first was the
Hall's Patent Anchor, originally patented in 1886 and then improved and
re-patented in 1888, 1889, 1904, 1906, 1914, and 1917. The second was
the William Wasteneys Smith anchor, developed and patented in 1899 and
re-patented in 1904. The third was the William Lumsden Byers' anchor,
first patented in 1900 and re-patented in 1903.
Of the three anchor designers cited, only W L Byers was an actual
manufacturer of anchors and this enabled him to secure a large market
share, especially in the north east, from his base in Sunderland. W W
27	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 8 January 1907, 520.
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Smith was a civil and consulting engineer and, following the problems
that beset the Hall's anchor in 1904 his became the preferred design for
the Admiralty for many years. The original Hall's anchor was a joint
effort on the part of John Francis Hall, the manager of a steel works in
Sheffield, and of John Verity a professional engineer from Leeds.
Referring to the seven patents taken out for the Hall's patent anchor in
the period from 1886 to 1918, those of 1886, 1888, and 1889, were all
held jointly by Messrs Hall and Verity. The patent of 1904 was held
jointly, by the Halls Patent Anchor Company Limited of Sheffield and
George Hepburn, a consulting engineer in Liverpool. The patent of 1906,
the one taken out to rectify a fundamental flaw in the 1904 design, was
held jointly by Joseph Ernst Fletcher who was Hingley's own consulting
engineer and George Hepburn. Hepburn's name was only included in the
patent as a courtesy as the new patent was Hingleys' determined response
to the failures of certain castings in 1904 that caused so much anguish
for the firm. The patents of 1915 and 1917 were held jointly by N.
Hingley and Sons Limited and Joseph Ernst Fletcher.
Halls Patent Anchor Company Limited did not manufacture anchors as such.
Its sole purpose was to hold the patents and then to collect the
royalties stemming from the manufacture of the anchors. The association
with Hingleys began in 1891 with that firm entering into an agreement
with the patentees to manufacture their anchor on a sole manufacturing
basis. In 1892 Hall and Verity transferred the patents and their rights
to the Halls Patent Anchor Company Limited. Unfortunately, competitor
firms had no scruples about manufacturing the design that pre-dated
Hingleys' sole manufacturing agreement and constant efforts had to be
maintained both at home and abroad to prevent pirating, as Sir George
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pointed out to his solicitor, W Shakespeare, when giving a retrospect of
the firm's association with the Hall's anchor.28
The Hall's Latest Improved Patent Anchor of 1906 was the best of its
class, but it did not prevent owners and shipbuilders from specifying
the less expensive 1889 and 1904 models. Even a manufacturer as
sophisticated as Krupp had to be enlightened by C E Lloyd as late as
1911 as to the limitations of the 1889 design when dropped onto hard
ground. 29
	The commercial arrangement between HPAC and Hingleys
continued until 1912. By then Hall, Verity, and Hepburn, were long
since deceased and the firm was administered by accountants and
solicitors who had no knowledge of the commercial realities of the day.
C E Lloyd, having determined that his firm could no longer carry the
cost of the royalties in its selling prices, bought out HPAC at
valuation.
The early Hall's patents.n
Both John Francis Hall and John Verity were professional inventors. The
concept they patented in 1886 was very simple With the growth in the
size of ships there came a growing tendency for the mooring cables to
twist and break because of the enormous strains imposed upon them. The
cause of this was the fact that anchors were rigid and could not
compensate for the rolling action caused by the movement of the ship
28	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 2 May 1910, 125.
29	 WHC : Sec. 8; DLB. 5 : 29 August 1911, 42.
30	 All the patents under reference are held in bound format in the
Birmingham Central Library, Chamberlain Square, Birmingham B3 3HQ.
Photocopies of the relevant parts of the patent applications are
appended at the end of the dissertation. As the patents are bound
and may only be copied by Library staff the quality of copy is
variable.
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above. Hall and Verity's Patent No. 3461 dated 11 March 1886 set out to
simplify the construction of anchors by making them less liable to roll.
This was achieved by making the two arms (or flukes) of the head in one
piece, preferably from cast steel, with a trough formed in the inner
side of the crown. This trough received the two trunnions at the upper
end of the shank, the shank being retained in position by a bolt through
the head and trunnions. This arrangement allowed a radial movement of
the arms to any required angle without twisting the shank and cable. A
further refinement was the provision of projecting pieces on the outer
side of the head to give a tripping action that had the effect of
throwing over the arms of the anchor and instantly taking hold of the
ground as the anchor was dragged over it.
Under Patent No. 6918 dated 9 May 1888 two simple improvements were made
that reduced the tendency of an anchor to drag or roll. The first
improvement was that the trunnions were no longer made in one piece with
the shank. In order to achieve greater strength they were made from a
tube that was passed through the head of the shank and then sweated into
position. The second improvement was to extend the projecting pieces or
trippers for the full width of the arms in order to enhance the
throwing-over effect.
Patent No. 1353 dated 25 January 1889 aimed at a structural refinement
and provided for the trunnions to be held in position by transverse pins
as against a simple bolt.
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The later Hall's patents
Patent No. 8068 of 8 April 1904 was a development by HPAC and George
Hepburn. This patent addressed a growing problem arising from the
increased size of all classes of ships. Essentially, when the anchor
was dropped from these much higher ships it landed on its head on the
seabed with considerable force. This height can be seen from the
photograph of the S S Lusitania that follows this page. In so doing it
created a punching action through the shank onto the trunnions that
secured the shank to the head. This punching action could bend or even
shear the bolts that held the trunnions in the anchor head, thus leading
to total failure of the anchor. Hepburn's modification was to hold the
trunnions in position with iron or steel blocks. These in turn were
held in position with bolts. The effect of this was to eliminate
bending strain on the old style trunnion bolts, thus making the anchor
less liable to failure from this cause.
With this development Hingleys appeared well placed to compete with the
best that the other manufacturers had to offer. However, in the same
year, disaster struck when anchors that had been in service with the
British Admiralty began to fail. Although the actual numbers of anchors
involved was quite small, the resulting consequences were devastating
for Hingleys' relations with the Admiralty. The nub of the problem was
that certain anchor heads on being broken had been seen to be partially
hollow inside. Hingleys were baffled by this manufacturing phenomenon,
and 'Ben' Hingley was remarkably restrained when writing to George
Hepburn in June of that year. Indeed, he confined himself to observing
that he was disturbed to learn that both HPAC and Charles Cammell of
Sheffield, the manufacturers of the castings, had always been aware of
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the problem but had never advised Hingleys. n It should be noted that
the anchor head was the only part of the complete anchor that was made
from steel. The steel used was of the best quality and only
manufacturers of the calibre of Charles Cammell, ' James Rogerson, or
Krupp, were used for this important component.
In the wake of the debacle over what they had regarded as the state of
the art anchor, Hingleys took over the redesign of the Hall's patent
anchor. Fletcher, Hingleys' own engineer and formerly with Charles
Cammell, took on the task, knowing that no method of casting could
guarantee the elimination of voids within the body of the anchor head.
His solution was to re-think the mechanical construction of the anchor
so that a void in the casting was no longer critical. Fletcher's Patent
No. 29063 dated 20 December 1906 enshrined a radical departure from the
purely mechanical designs of earlier anchors. There were two key
features in Fletcher's solution. The first was the intentional creation
of voids in the anchor head where the shank was fixed to the trunnions.
The mathematics of voids in solid planes is now common knowledge, but
its application in 1906 was well ahead of its time. The second was the
placing of the fixing bolts (holding the trunnion blocks) in the plane
of the head itself.
	 These ingenious innovations took Fletcher some
eighteen months to devise. Unfortunately, the British Admiralty
remained unforgiving and Hingleys served a biblical penance of seven
years before being involved in the re-armament programmes of 1912
onwards.
Patent No. 15025 of 23 June 1914 and Patent No. 111960 of 14 March 1917
do not have a direct impact on the period under review, and are
31	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 18 June 1904, 611.
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mentioned here merely to take note of Fletcher's continuing work on
anchor design.
The Wasteneys Smith patents
William Wasteneys Smith, a civil and consulting . engineer from
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, had patented designs for stockless anchors under
Patent No. 552 of 1871, Patent No. 4281 of 1874, and Patent No. 3476 of
1885. The design covered by Patent No. 5938 of 18 March 1899 had as its
principal objective an increase in the stability of the anchor when in
the ground so as to ensure that it did not roll over. This was achieved
by arranging the trippers on the arms so that they were on the outer
edges. The result was that the trippers rested on the solid ground at a
wider distance apart than the arms. It was a simple, ingenious, and
very effective modification.
Patent No. 29413 of 31 December 1904 provided for a simple modification
of the earlier patent and was aimed at facilitating the stowing of the
anchor. This was achieved by curving inwards the outer portions of the
arms of the anchor, and by rounding off the corners of the trippers.
Smith's anchors found particular favour with the British Admiralty and
after Hingleys' problems of 1904, the Smith's anchors remained the
Admiralty's preferred choice until 1912.
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The W L Byers patents
William Lumsden Byers was an anchor manufacturer in Sunderland. His
Patent No. 6541 of 7 April 1900 introduced an ingenious solution to the
problem of ensuring the proper tripping of the heads of the anchors on
bottoming on the sea or river bed. Whereas the Hall and the Smith
anchor had the trippers in the same plane as the outer surface of the
head, Byers placed his trippers at an angle of 20 degrees to the outer
surface. This had the effect of throwing the anchor in a positive
direction, thus achieving a firm grip.
Three years later Byers took out Patent No. 18595 on 28 August 1903.
This patent addressed the problem of achieving better stowing of the
anchor in the hawse pipe. New forms of ship design had resulted in the
bows being in an almost vertical plane as can be seen from the
photograph of the S S Lusitania that follows page 6/26. The innovation
was aimed at assisting in bringing up the anchor and its arms parallel
to the sides of the ship. This was effected by removing the ends of the
anchor head. Additionally the fixing bolt through the head and shank
was prolonged to form projections outside the sides of the head. These
projections, together with the various areas and curved surfaces
achieved in the rounding process, had the effect of causing the whole
anchor to roll over smartly and to come up parallel with the ship's
plating.
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A summary of the anchor making capabilities of the three market leaders
Hingleys' main strengths lay in the market for large anchors for the
huge liners in the fleets run by Cunard, White Star, and Hamburg Amerika
for the north Atlantic crossings. Wasteneys Smith developed a near
monopoly of Admiralty work, while W L Byers held a commanding position
in the commercial work of the north east and of west Scotland. The
additional advantage that Hingleys had over its two main rivals, was its
commanding position in navy work for Italy and for Japan, and recently
for Germany.
The photographs that follow show:
O the conventional ship's anchor used by small boats
O the more sophisticated Hall's anchors [2]
O the enormous anchors used on the leviathans of the seas
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The testing of anchors by The Staffordshire Public Chain & Anchor
Testing Company set up in 1868 and later subsumed into the Lloyds
British Testing Company in 1900
Generally
There were two principal reasons why the firm of N Hingley was able to
maintain a leading international position in the supply of ships' chains
and cables. The first was the excellence of its wrought iron. The
second was its long time dedication to proper and dependable testing.
The origins of testing
Notwithstanding the later pre-eminence of the Black Country in cable
making, the earliest accepted proving house seems to have been set up in
Millwall, London, by the Brown Lenox company. Samuel Brown, a
lieutenant in the Royal Navy, had formed a partnership with his cousin,
Samuel Lenox, in 1806, to make iron cables as a substitute for the
traditional hemp ropes of the day. After successful sea tests in the
Caribbean they set up a works in Millwall in 1812 to manufacture iron
cables. In the same year Brown was persuaded by Lloyds of London to set
up a proving house for wrought iron cables. This move was destined to
establish Britain's reputation for providing high quality cables for the
next hundred years.32
So as not to incur the wrath of other regional historians, it is as well
to mention that the first recorded iron cables were made in North
Shields in 1808.	 Noah Hingley made his first cable for a Liverpool
32	 Ron Moss, 'William Bannister & Co, Chainmakers', Black Countryman
26 (Winter 1993) : 18-24.
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merchant in 1820. Then in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, because
of the ruinous price of imported hemp, iron cable soon superseded the
hempen article. Credit for the first proving house in the Black Country
belongs to either William Bannister & Co or to Noah Hingley acting with
Henry Pershouse Parkes.
William Bannister had set up an iron works in the Newtown area of
Cradley Heath in 1830, some two years after Noah Hingley had established
his chain works close to the corner of Providence Street and Newtown
Lane. The location of the two enterprises are shown on the Newtown area
map of 1884 included earlier in the text.
During demolition works in 1991 Ron Moss, a local historian, was allowed
access to the site of the old Bannister works (for many years occupied
by Stevens Bros Galvanising Works) where he detected the remains of a
testing house, including the concreted over channel used to lay out 15
fathoms (90 feet) of cable for testing together with remains of hearths
and other constructional details typical of a proving house such as
strengthened piers for the roof trusses used for lifting purposes.
As to the first accepted proving house in the Black Country to which all
ironworkers could sent their products, this honour belongs to The
Staffordshire Public Chain & Anchor Testing Company set up in 1864. The
test houses grew out of the Act of 1864 providing for the establishment
of public testing houses. Further Acts were passed in 1871 and 1874.
The prime movers in establishing the Black Country test houses were Noah
Hingley of Netherton, and Henry Pershouse Parkes of Tipton. The first
public proving house was opened in 1864 at Bloomfield in Tipton. The
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second one followed in Cradley Heath, Netherton, at the top of Primrose
However, the watershed in the public testing of all ships cables and
anchors for British ships came with the Anchors and Chain Cables Act of
1899 and resulted in the formation in 1900 of the Lloyds British Testing
Company Limited under the chairmanship of Sir Benjamin Hingley. This
Act provided for the testing of anchors and cables to the entire
satisfaction of the Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping.A
more detailed account of the work of LBTC as a quasi agent of the Board
of Trade is given in chapter nine dealing with relations with
Governments. A brief note is made here of the fact that the ethic of
public testing was a major part of the Hingley way of doing business.
As a result, the customers could always depend on a standard for the
iron, the cables, or the anchors that were supplied.
33	 Ibid.
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PART FOUR
	
MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT
CHAPTER SEVEN
	
MARKETING
Generally
During the period under review, the principal exporting nations Britain,
the United States, and Germany, each developed a distinctive method of
selling. Burnham and Hoskins have described the British method as being
based on the merchants at home and abroad. Germany developed the cartel
as its preferred method of controlling both production and sales, while
the United States developed vertical integration as its preferred mode.'
Each country's method was largely a result of the individual business
cultures of the time. In Britain, production and sales tended, at this
time, to be separate operations carried out independently of each other.
For the Germans, there was the compelling logic of the cartel especially
once the market, production, and sales had been concentrated in
restricted sources of control. The American method of vertical
integration stemmed from its isolationist policies. At the time it was
unique as the two-way process generated its own dynamics.
The British method of marketing can be seen as a natural development of
established trade routes. The colonies, as well as many other countries
in south east Asia and central and south America, had traditionally
produced raw materials that were shipped back to Britain. In return
Britain shipped out finished goods using the merchants based on the
major British and overseas ports. 	 Later, in line with the growing
sophistication of the colonial markets, or prompted by discoveries of
Burnham and Hoskins, Iron & Steel... 1870-1930, 40.
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gold or railway construction, dedicated agents were appointed by
manufacturing firms to identify and corner specialised areas of the
market for their principals back in Britain. Germany, not having a
colonial empire of major economic consequence and being relatively newly
unified into one state, developed the cartel as the principal force in
marketing. The cartel foreshadowed the developments of the 20th century
wherein the market became the servant of the producer and not the
consumer. For the Americans, with their preferred policy of isolation
and tariff protection, vertical integration became the major force in
marketing. This method, with its emphasis on integrating the line of
production from basic materials right through to sales, had the effect
of creating added value along the chain and of identifying selling
opportunities along the way.
In its early days, Hingleys depended almost entirely on general
merchants as the principal route for the marketing of its products.
Wrought iron was produced in the Black Country on a scale that could not
be absorbed by the local market. Merchants who traded overseas tended
to take the high quality or 'marked bar' products thus ensuring a
continuous market for the Hingley grades of wrought iron, cables, and
anchors. However, with the growth of the Empire and foreign trade,
Hingleys developed a style of marketing strategy that was based on a mix
of merchants and specialised agents, the latter being specifically
selected to identify selected markets.
For the industry and the times, the activities of the Hingley firm in
terms of marketing its products world wide were quite exceptional. As
Medley has pointed out in his study, Black Country ironmakers were
generally indifferent and apathetic towards overseas marketing. Indeed,
in spite of the trade associations that existed at home, there was
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little or no effort to extend cooperation to marketing the products
overseas. There was far too much dependence on agents who did not
necessarily supply key market intelligence to assist the development of
an appropriate range of products. Rather, there was an over-emphasis on
the lines that sold well and maximised commissions for the agents.
These lines tended to be the basic items such as sheet, plates, and bar
iron. This was in marked contrast to the Belgian and German firms who
underpinned their business by marketing strategies that identified a
consumer's total needs and matched the products to suie. Le-Guillou
has pointed out that whereas the Belgians and Germans had set up
agencies in the Black Country from the 1890s onwards, it was 1900 before
firms of the calibre of Stewarts & Lloyds had set up agencies in
Australasia, South Africa, and Canada.3
The Hingley method of marketing was in sharp contrast to the high
sophistication and ruthlessness shown by Joseph Chamberlain when he was
developing the screw empire of his family firm, Nettlefold and
Chamberlain.	 As early as the 1860s Chamberlain had mastered the
psychology of packaging and the art of discounting.
	 For the French,
Chamberlain wrapped his screws in blue paper; for the Scots, in green
paper, and so on. 4
 As Chamberlain was aiming solely at the wholesale
market, the simple ploy of colours produced dramatic results. Equally
successful was his mastery of discounting that had domestic and foreign
agents, together with middlemen of every ilk, streaming to his office in
Birmingham to place orders. His system of discounting was based on the
Medley, The Geography of Decline, 170-172.
Le-Guillou, Competition : South Staffordshire Iron and Steel,
225-226.
Peter T Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain, Entrepreneur in Politics 
(London : Yale University Press, 1994), 21.
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use of a pair of percentage discounts that dominated screw making for a
hundred years. The first was a wholesale discount of a percentage off
the full list price. This discount was rarely less than an astonishing
50 per cent. The second discount was for regular cash settlement of
accounts and was rarely less than 10 per cent. 5
 This enabled him to
sell hundreds of thousands of screws at prices about one tenth of those
ruling in the early 1800s. 6
 All this was achieved without detriment to
a workforce that enjoyed near perfect conditions for the day.' For the
Hingleys, apart from the distinctive trade marks, there was nothing so
sophisticated. In its place stood hard persistent endeavour in the task
of selling wrought iron, chain cables, and anchors, at a consistent
level year in year out. This endeavour was matched only by the need to
sell at a sensible price. This, in a market swamped with domestic and
foreign wrought iron, could only be achieved by producing the highest
quality of wrought iron that could be sold at the minimum prices set by
the South Staffordshire Marked Bar Association. Membership of, and a
leading role played in this Association was just one of the many facets
of the paradox that was the Hingley operation. The Association was in
effect a quasi-cartel in that it controlled the market. This was the
market in the very top quality of wrought iron. As a quasi-cartel the
market was the servant of the producer, but its key characteristic was
that the prices set were fair.
Much of the credit for the Hingley network of overseas selling outlets
must be given to 'Ben' Hingley himself. Although not referred to in any
great detail in the Hingley archives from 1890 onwards, the obituary
notices of August 1918 make it clear that before settling down in 1895
5	 Ibid., 21.
6	 Ibid., 20.
7	 Ibid., 22.
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as the resident managing director of the firm, 'Ben' Hingley made no
less than four long journeys by sea to India, the Far East, and the
Australian colonies. As a result of these visits, he established
personal relationships with merchants in Calcutta, Rangoon in Burma, and
in the Malay Straits Settlements, and with commercial undertakings in
Japan. His chief interest, however, lay in Australia and New Zealand,
both of which eventually took up far more of his time than the
exceedingly volatile trade warranted.
Peter Richardson and Jean-Jaques Van Helten have identified the key
locations of gold mining in the Empire after the phenomenal strikes in
Australia and New Zealand between 1851 and 1893. These were: Southern
Australia from 1851 to 1871, the famous twenty year boom; New Zealand in
the 1860s; Queensland in the 1870s; and Kalgoolie in 1893. Thereafter,
interest in gold mining focused on the famous deep levels of the
Witwatersrand in South Africa. 8
 During its heyday gold mining presented
a major outlet for wrought iron of all grades, and chains and cables of
all sizes.	 The market opportunities created much competition among
British firms. 'Ben' Hingley himself controlled the marketing efforts
in Australia and New Zealand, carrying on long after the commercial
returns justified the efforts. South Africa became the province of H M
Hingley, especially following the pre-dominance of deep level mining
after the 1890s. Due note is taken here of the extent of 'Ben'
Hingley's research into the market opportunities in India, the Far East,
and Australasia, before committing the firm to servicing a market in
which competition was very fierce.
8	 Peter Richardson and Jean-Jacques Van Helten 'The Development of
the South African Gold Mining Industry, 1895-1918', Economic 
History Review, 2nd Ser., 37 (3 1984) : 319-340.
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Stephen Nicholas has pointed out that in many cases the British
principals' knowledge of the Australian market was probably limited as
compared to that of the agent. 9
 This was not the case with 'Ben'
Hingley, notwithstanding the outstanding knowledge of B K Morton, the
son of a Sheffield ironmaster, who was Hingleys' long term agent in
Melbourne. As a result of his four visits to the Australian colonies,
'Ben' Hingley knew the market well. It was a market that depended on
gold mining and the railways. For forty years these activities provided
a useful outlet for the Hingley products. However, after the long
decline from the 1890s onwards, coupled with B K Morton's growing
disenchantment with Australia generally as the colonies progressed to
Dominion status on the back of near continuous depression for the iron
trade, 'Ben' Hingley gradually lost his personal grip on the Australian
market.
Meanwhile, and probably because of Hingley's personal knowledge of the
market, his relations with Morton were often strained especially when
Morton tended to upset Hingleys' traditional network of London/Australia
merchants with forays into unwise discounting. Virtually throughout
Hingleys' agency with B K Morton, the remuneration for Morton was based
on a commission on sales. As Nicholas has pointed out, this was both a
control and an incentive. As a control the commission system enabled
the principal to monitor the agent's performance as a seller of the
products.	 As an incentive, the commission system discouraged
opportunism. 1°	 Nicholas has also made the point that agents were
required to focus on the selling of the goods and on collecting payment.
9
10
Stephen Nicholas 'Agency Contracts, Institutional Modes, and the
Transition to Foreign Direct Investment by British Manufacturing
Multinationals before 1939', Journal of Economic History, 43 (3
1983) : 677.
Ibid., 678.
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It was the agents' role to 'push the sales' and not to sit back and wait
for orders." Waiting for orders was the role of the merchants. This
concept became a bone of contention between Hingleys and B K Morton,
with the latter's frequent absences in the Far East and Canada becoming
a growing source of tension between the parties.
Although Hingleys had to depend on merchants and agents to market its
wrought iron, ships' cables, and anchors, the firm must have been aware
of the effectiveness of the cartel system through its growing
associations with John Brown and Cammell, and Vickers. These firms
belonged to a cartel set up in 1894 by Hayward Harvey of New Jersey
under which the patents held by four Harvey companies were exploited by
a syndicate formed to control prices and to divide up international
orders by drawing lots. The syndicate, consisted of the principal
manufacturers of armour plate for warships in Britain, France, Germany,
and the United States. Its members were Bethlehem Steel and Carnegie
from the United States, Dillinger Heutten and Krupp from Germany,
Acieres de la Marne and Schneider & Chatillon from France, plus John
Brown with Cammell and Vickers from Britain. In 1901 Armstrongs joined
this cartel that functioned until 1911 when the Harvey patents expired,
and notwithstanding the withdrawal of the US firms in 1908. 12	In 1901
and 1902 Vickers entered into a licensing and patent sharing agreement
with two German firms.	 The first was with Deutsche Waffen und
Munitionsfabriken for the manufacture of guns.	 The second was with
Krupp for the manufacture of time and percussion fuses.13
Ibid., 680.
Scott, Vickers, 86-87.
Ibid., 87.
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Thus, there was an identity of interest and possibly an element of cross
fertilisation between John Brown and Vickers which firms were major
sources of work for Hingleys; and with Cammell who was a major supplier
of anchor heads to Hingleys; and from the parallel activities of all the
parties in Germany. In chapter eight particular attention is given to
Hingleys' commercial arrangements from 1895 to 1914 with Hochfelder
Walzwerk, Borsig, and Krupp. Whereas the major constructors referred to
were interested in ships,
	 armour plate and weaponry, Hingleys was
interested in ships' cables and anchors. Again, and in yet another
facet of the Hingley style the marketing policy and strategy in Germany
were based on the cartel concept of eliminating the opposition by
controlling the key product - in Hingleys' case their unbeatable cables
and their superior anchors.
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The Hingley method and style
N Hingley & Sons Limited traded in a highly competitive market economy.
With a workforce of some 3000 men and women, and collieries and
ironworks that needed to be kept working in order to maintain their life
expectancy and efficiency, the enterprise was essentially production
driven with a need to maintain turnover year by year. To achieve this
Hingley had agents based in strategic places all over the world and in
the United Kingdom, and it was on the efforts of these agents that the
well-being of the firm depended.
The original Hingley method of marketing was to build up a system of
autonomous agents each personally selected by one of the Hingleys and
each reporting directly to the Head Office. There were three major
areas of interest. The first was the home market in the United Kingdom.
The second was the long standing colonial market in Australia and South
Africa, with its derived activities in the Far East. The third was the
European markets that were targeted on the expanding navies of the
developing European states.
The products of the Hingley company were coal, pig iron, wrought iron,
chains, cables, and anchors. In the United Kingdom coal, pig iron,
wrought iron, and chains were sold by the usual combination of direct
sales and the use of merchants. The sale of cables and anchors was a
specialised operation that depended on the Hingleys themselves and their
strategically placed retired naval representatives. In the colonies,
where the principal market was in wrought iron and chains, sales were
effected by a combination of London merchants and key representatives in
the various countries.
	 Among the developing European states,
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principally Italy and Germany, the main market was in cables and
anchors. Sales were effected by the use of retired naval officers, by
the personal efforts of the Hingleys themselves, and by the appointment
of local representatives of high standing in the community.
The overall marketing strategy, as developed by the Hingleys, is here
demonstrated in a series of tables:
Table 7.1
Table 7.2
Table 7.3
Table 7.4
Table 7.5
: The London merchants who handled much of
Hingleys' products
: The principal agents in Britain
: The agents responsible for promoting the
Hall's patent anchor
: The agents in the colonies and the Far East
: The agents in other foreign countries
Until 1908, this remarkable network was managed almost entirely by 'Ben'
Hingley and his brother. Even after the recruitment of C E Lloyd as
general manager, the overall structure remained intact until the
outbreak of war in 1914. Fuller details of the appointments shown in
these tables are given in the following text."
14	 The names listed in the various tables that follow have been
abstracted from the various letter books.
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Table 7.1 : The London merchants who bought and sold on Hingleys'
products
NAME DATE OF APPOINTMENT
F A Edelston & Co
G P Harris Scarfe & Co
W Sandover & Co
Smellie & Co
E W Tarry & Co
Wood & Parker
All before 1890
Table 7.2 : The principal agents in Britain
NAME LOCATION DATE OF
APPOINTMENT
Capt. T G Hardie Glasgow and the shipyards on the 1895
Clyde
B J Ackerley Liverpool and the shipyards on
the Mersey and in Belfast
1897
A M Carlisle Harland & Wolff, Belfast 1897
Jno H Austin & Co London 1890s
William J Firth & Co London 1913
7/11
Table 7.3 : The agents responsible for promoting the Hall's Patent
Anchor
NAME LOCATION DATE OF APPOINTMENT
Capt. Robert Lynn Smart London 1898
J E Darbishire London 1905
Admiral Thomas McGill London 1911
Captain F C A Lyon London 1911
Capt. A W Symes London 1913
Table 7.4 : The agents in the colonies and the Far East
NAME LOCATION DATE OF APPOINTMENT
B K Morton
A K Rhoden
William Milne
Murray Walker
Scott S Piercy
Australia and Far East
India and Far East,
especially Japan
Durban, Natal
Cape Town
Johannesburg
Before 1895
1897
Before 1895
1903
1903
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Table 7.5 : The agents in other foreign countries
NAME LOCATION DATE OF APPOINTMENT
Major Domenica Rocca
Pietro Micheli
Admiral Alfredo Micheli
Franz Tecklenborg
Ruhe & Trelle
Arnold Von Bippen and W Janke
Schulz & Borchers
Kern Brothers
George Barrett
Ramon Aguirre
Colonel Fernandez
Juan Meniere
Felix de Urtiago
Langstaff Ehrenberg and Pollok
George Baker
S Bauer
Hertogs & Wuyts
Astrup & Son
Sjoholm & Svalander
Capt. J M James
Capt. Takayama
Dr T Matsuo
J G Crookston
A N Bronstein
Rose Innes Cox & Co
Hamson & Co
Spezia, Italy
Genoa and Rome
Rome & Genoa
Bremen
Bremen
Hamburg
Berlin
Rotterdam
Madrid
Madrid
Madrid
Madrid
Bilbao
Paris
Vienna
Vienna
Antwerp
Christiana, Norway
Gothenburg, Sweden
Tokyo
Tokyo
Yokohama
Odessa
Odessa
Valparaiso, Chile
Valparaiso
1888
1900s
1912
Before 1890
Before 1890
1895
Before 1900
Before 1910
1891
1896
1896
1912
1911
Before 1895
1908
1913
1903
1900s
1900s
Before 1895
1903
1900s
1900s
1906
Before 1900
1913
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Marketing in the United Kingdom
The marketing of coal, pig iron, wrought iron, and chains was effected
through the conventional means of direct sales and repeat orders either
with company buyers or merchants. In the case of ships' cables and high
profile anchors, a much more determined marketing strategy was called
for. Although Hingleys was the world leader in this field, the firm
faced intense competition from other cable makers and anchor makers.
The various strategies adopted, either to cooperate with or to shut out
these competitors, is given a fuller treatment in chapter eight.
The broad base, through which a regular portion of Hingleys' output was
put on the world market, was provided by the six London merchants
referred to in Table 7.1. As Hingleys preferred to ship through London
and not through Liverpool and Bristol, the direct involvement with the
London merchants on a day to day basis by the Hingley brothers had a
direct financial consequence for the London office. Indeed, matters
reached the proportions of an outright quarrel early in 1905 when
Hingleys had to remind and reiterate to Jno. Austin, the London agent,
that no commissions would come his way on goods handled by these six
merchants as they were regarded as being within the personal oversight
of the Hingley family. 15
 The six firms were the ones through which
Hingleys conducted its colonial and far eastern trade. The connections
were long standing and the accounts were only nominally attached to the
London office in order to give it an air of substance.
The London office itself comprised a modest arrangement of two rooms at
62 Gracechurch Street in the City of London. It was a 'good address'
for 'Ben' Hingley to have in London; and Jno H Austin & Co serviced the
15	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 31 January 1905, 386.
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offices in return for costs up to El 000 per annum, plus any commissions
that could be earned outside of the trade with the six designated London
merchants. Austin was never entirely happy with the arrangement and
earned his principal living elsewhere, hence the quarrel referred to
that took place early in 1905 when business was very slack. For all
practical purposes the work of the London office was carried out by
Messrs Sergeant and Leader, who were employees of Jno Austin. On their
passing through death or retirement, the London agency was transferred
in 1913 to William J Firth. His appointment was the subject of a very
formal appointment drawn up by G C Edwards, the company secretary.
Mindful of continual wrangles over the years with Jno Austin over
commissions, the formal contract with Firth was particularly specific on
the basis on which commissions would be paid.
In the shipbuilding areas in which Hingleys concentrated its marketing
efforts through the agents referred to in Table 7.2. B J Ackerley was
the agent based in Liverpool with the task of representing Hingleys'
interests on the Mersey and in Belfast. The shipyards on the Clyde and
in the north east of England were serviced by Capt. T G Hardie who was
based in Glasgow. The third and most unusual agent was the Rt. Hon. A M
Carlisle, who was actually a director of the Harland & Wolff
shipbuilding firm.
B J Ackerley was formally appointed in 1897 on the retirement of a Mr
Gilbertson. His brief was to identify work opportunities and to lobby
for the inclusion of Hingleys on the appropriate tender lists. His
letter of appointment confirmed his remuneration as being based on a
commission of 1 per cent on iron, chains, and anchors; and 2 per cent on
16	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 4 : 27 December 1913, 209.
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Special Best Best quality chain or cable. 17	Capt. T G Hardie was
formally appointed in 1895, his duties being very similar to those of
Gilbertson who was succeeded by Ackerley in Liverpool. As with
Ackerley, Hardie was required to work in very close association with
either 'Ben' Hingley or H M Hingley. His agency called for specific
efforts to 'push' the Hall's patent anchor, with a commission of 2.5 per
cent on sales:8 Details of the appointment of A M Carlisle have not
survived, but a quarterly commission statement in 1897 shows him to have
been receiving commissions of 2.5 per cent on the value of all outfits
(the complete package of cables and anchors) supplied to Harland &
Wolff. 19 This level of commission was the top rate paid anywhere by
Hingleys. Obviously it was a legitimate commercial practice of the day
to have an agent in the shipbuilder's office to represent the interests
of a supplier.
Marketing the Hall's patent anchor : see Table 7.3
In the early days of Hingleys' association with the Halls Patent Anchor
Co Ltd, the entire burden of marketing the product fell on 'Ben'
Hingley, as recounted at some length in the next chapter. HPAC
consistently declined to assist in the marketing of the anchor,
regarding its sole role as that of collecting royalties arising from the
sales of its invention. Accordingly, 'Ben' Hingley recruited a
Lieutenant (later Captain) Robert Lynn Smart in 1898 to act as a
'pusher' for the anchor, especially with the procurement department of
the British Admiralty, and as advised to HPAC. 2° In 1905 'Ben' Hingley
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 2 April 1897, 98.
113	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 18 December 1895, 170.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 16 April 1897, 105.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 21 October 1898, 306.
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recruited J E Darbishire, a consulting engineer based in Westminster, to
provide a technical input into what had become a very competitive
business." Lynn Smart was the first dedicated agent for the Hall's
anchor trade, and with Darbishire he was associated with the sale of the
product right through to the end of this study.
Following the formal acquisition of the HPAC by Hingleys in 1911, Sir
George Hingley appointed Admiral Thomas McGill to serve as chairman of
the board, following the removal of the company's registered office to
London. As discussed between G C Edwards, the company secretary, and
Capt. T G Hardie, McGill's first task was to get the Hall's anchor back
on the approved list for Admiralty tenders after an exclusion of some
seven years. 22
 To assist Admiral McGill, Capt. F C A Lyon of Kensington
was appointed in 1911. His unexpected death in 1913 led to the
appointment of Capt. A W Symes in his place. In his letter of
appointment from G C Edwards, Symes' brief was defined as acting as a
naval adviser in the London district in keeping the Netherton products
before potential customers." An intriguing feature of the retention of
these retired officers as 'pushers' for the Hall's patent anchor, was
the modesty of the annual fee they were happy to accept for their
services. In no case did this exceed £50 per annum.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1	 :	 29 March 1905, 888.
WHC
WHC
:
:
Sec.
Sec.
8
8
;
;
SLB,	 1	 :
SLB,	 3	 :
23 December 1910,
18 June 1913,
	 473.
301.
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Marketing in the Colonies : see Table 7.4
The colonies in this context refer to those in Australia and to those in
South Africa including the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State. Those in Australia were of particular interest to
George Benjamin Hingley who had visited there on four separate
occasions, while South Africa tended to be looked after by Henry Montagu
Hingley who had also visited there. Anecdotal evidence from Colonel
Weston suggests that John, one of Noah Hingley's sons by his first
marriage had emigrated to Australia, but the correspondence files do not
point to any business links in that direction.24
Both in Australia and in South Africa marketing activities were directed
at the mines and at the railways. The trade was essentially that of
wrought iron and the smaller diameter chains associated with mechanical
work. In promoting this trade no assistance was given by the British
Government. Indeed, as Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith recounts in his
history of the Board of Trade:
'During the last few years of the nineteenth century British traders who
were feeling the increasing pressure of foreign competition in British
Empire markets, complained strongly of the handicaps to which they were
subject through the absence of any official machinery for obtaining from
those markets commercial information comparable with that supplied to
their German and Belgian competitors... there was then a feeling voiced
by the Colonial Office, which subsequent experience has shown to be
unfounded, that the British Dominions (to use their modern title) would
resent the appointment by the Mother Country of permanent officers
stationed in their midst to promote the interest of United Kingdom
trade. Nothing therefore was done until the Colonial Conference of 1907
except to survey the principal Dominion markets by a series of temporary
commercial missions (South Africa 1903; Australia and New Zealand 1905;
and Canada, 1906). In 1907 all reason for timidity was swept away by
the adoption at the Colonial Conference of a resolution proposed by the
Prime Minister of New Zealand in favour of the representation of British
trade in the Dominions by permanent British Officers'.25
Colonel G P L Weston to five close relatives, 1 April 1952,
personal papers of Mr C P Harris.
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, GCB, The Board of Trade (London : G P
Putnam's Sons Ltd., 1928) p.76.
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Against this background of no assistance from the British Government the
Hingley firm marketed its products through the system it knew best
direct promotion of sales on the ground, supplemented by a dependable
group of merchants operating out of London.
The group of London merchants referred to earlier in Table 7.1 was
serviced by the two brothers independently of the efforts of the London
office. The efforts of these merchants were further supplemented in the
field by three principal agents: B K Morton in Melbourne, Victoria;
Scott S Piercy in Johannesburg in the Transvaal; and A K Rhoden who
operated the Yokohoma and Far East Agency. Rhoden is included in this
group as he was recruited by George Benjamin Hingley in Sheffield in
1897 to assist B K Morton especially in respect of opportunities in
China and Japan. Of the three, B K Morton was the senior in terms of
service, having been in post well before the letter files began in 1895.
A K Rhoden was the next to join, being appointed in 1897. Scott S
Piercy was recruited in 1903. All three were to survive the Hingley
brothers; and all were still in post in 1918. All were in some way or
other connected with Sheffield, a town with which the Hingleys had many
ties, especially in the manufacture of anchors.
B K Morton was connected with the family firm of B K Morton Limited of
Sheffield, but he spent much of his working life in Australasia, the Far
East, and in Canada. He was the Hingley agent for Australia and New
Zealand and he also covered the Far East visiting to India, the Malay
States, and Japan. The serious banking crisis of 1893 in Australia led
to Hingleys experiencing very hard times in that region as 'Ben' Hingley
discussed with Morton later in that year. 26
 Indeed, so serious was the
26	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 11 July 1895, 86.
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fall off in trade that Hingley decided to turn his attention to China,
Japan, the Straits Settlement, and British Columbia. To give effect to
this decision Hingley recruited A K Rhoden in 1897 to act as assistant
to B K Morton. Despite the poor state of trade, but perhaps due to
Hingleys' long standing connection with Australia going back to at least
1879, Hingleys offered Morton a very attractive financial incentive to
cover such a wide area. The terms were to be £120 per annum for up to
£3 000 of business, rising by £20 for every further £500 of business up
to a ceiling of £500." These were very generous terms for the state of
the trade (being 4 per cent on sales) and provided little or no profit
margin for Hingleys."
A K Rhoden, who had been appointed in 1897, quarrelled with Morton in
1902 over the question of money and felt that he had to look elsewhere
for his livelihood. This resulted in a rather cross exchange between
'Ben' Hingley and Morton, as a result of which Hingley appointed Rhoden
as an agent in his own right for the Far East." Hingley softened his
strictures somewhat by praising Morton's efforts in Australia, while
stressing that Morton did not really have the time to cover the Far
East.' In the same letter Hingley expressed his personal credo on
agents:
'This business.., is largely a personal one and we
make a practice of never appointing any agents unless
we have seen them personally, for I am a firm believer
in the question of personal sympathy and touch with
customers.'
27	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 21 September 1897, 171.
Ibid.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 24 December 1902, 97.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 16 April 1903, 226.
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South Africa was of particular interest to H M Hingley and he made a
visit there lasting several months in 1895. He followed this with a
marketing drive by letter, covering the rising market in Johannesburg
and the requirements of the Cape Government Railways. 	 He made a
determined sales pitch at the Cape Government Railways, first with an
approach to Mr J D Tilney in East London, and then to Mr J M Thornton in
Port Elizabeth. When writing to Tilney he stressed the volume of iron
being transported to the Rand via East London; and also mentioning Mr
William Milne who represented Hingleys in Durban." This was probably a
ploy to repeat Hingleys' accord with the Great Western Railway in
England, where the GWR got all Hingleys' freight in return for buying
loco iron. A similar letter went to Thornton."
The decision to appoint an agent in the Transvaal was taken by H M
Hingley during his visit in 1895 and he was counselled by his brother to
prepare the merchants for such an appointment as agents were not held in
high regard by the merchant classes in the Cape Colony, Natal, or in the
Transvaal." The actual implementation of the policy did not take place
until 1903, after the Boer War, when Scott S Piercy was appointed the
Hingley representative in Johannesburg. Piercy also seems to have had
connections with Sheffield as all his commission was paid into a bank
there. His office was in Commissioner Street, right in the mining
headquarters of the city. His appointment became effective on 1 July
1903, being covered by a formal agreement prepared in the preceding
May."	 Under the agreement Piercy was to cover the Transvaal, the
Orange River colony, Natal (except for government work), and Rhodesia.
WI-IC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 15 May 1896, 201.
Ibid., 15 May 1896, 203.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 12 April 1895, 36.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 21 May 1903, 274.
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His brief was to keep the Netherton brand of iron before the notice of
the mining engineers, and to work with the merchants in directing
consumer choice towards Netherton iron. For this work he was to receive
£200 per annum in respect of rent and travel, together with commission
of 1 per cent on sales of iron, rising to 2 per cent on the sale of
Netherton Crown Special Best Best iron and on Netherton Special Best
Best chains.
Marketing in Europe : generally : see Table 7.5
Europe, after the United Kingdom, was the area in which N Hingley & Sons
Limited maintained a very high profile in the sale of anchors and
cables. In general 'Ben' Hingley tended to look after Italy and Russia,
while Henry Montagu Hingley was responsible for Germany, Spain and the
Scandinavian countries. The whole focus of the marketing drive was on
the use of agents who could promote the company in a vigorous manner
while maintaining the diplomatic niceties. This vigorous manner was
defined succinctly in 1912 by G C Edwards, the company secretary, when
remonstrating with Kem Bros., their agents in Rotterdam. Kem were
seeking a revision of terms and Edwards advised them in a very pointed
letter that merely reporting on the success or otherwise of tenders was
not enough. With a pungency redolent of Sir George Hingley, Edwards
went on to state:
'My firm desires an active Agent who will use his
utmost efforts and influence, not only to secure
orders by arranging to quote the lowest price, but
also by endeavouring to influence Owners and Builders
to regard favourably the quality of the material
offered'.35
35	 WHC : Sec. 8 : SLB, 2 : 8 November 1912, 262.
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This statement summed up the marketing ethos of the Hingleys: sales in a
highly competitive market were to be pushed as close to the margin as
was commercially prudent and consistent with high quality. This
insistence on the integrity of the product was the hallmark of the
Hingley enterprise.
A table given in Collins New Academic Atlas of about 1900 is reproduced
here as Table 7.6. 36
 While in no way an official table, the countries
shown were all of particular significance to Hingleys, even the United
States after 1915.
Table 7.6 : Naval ships of the world, c 1900
NAME No of VESSELS ARMOUR PLATED OVER
4000 TONS
United Kingdom 573 78
France 444 49
Italy 288 19
Russia 254 25
Austria-Hungary 123 10
Turkey-in-Europe 103 7
Spain 95 8
Germany 87 15
United States 71 19
Japan 58 5
Argentine Republic 55 4
Chile 23 4
Brazil 18 3
With the exception of the United States, that had a closed market,
Hingleys sold cables and anchors to all the thirteen countries listed in
the table. Of particular importance was Italy, where because of the
appalling heat in which large diameter cable was produced, there was
little or no wrought iron manufacturing capacity of real importance.
Next came Germany, where the Kaiser was developing a large German Navy.
36	 William Collins, Sons, and Co., Ltd., Collins' New Academic Atlas 
(London and Glasgow, c.1900) p.96.
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In a review of Thomas A Kohut's recent book,
	 'Wilhelm II and the
Germans', Richard J Evans speculates that:
'Even the creation of the German Navy, his most
cherished project, and a direct challenge to British
naval hegemony, seems to have rested on a genuine
conviction on his part that it would secure British
approval and partnership rather than anxiety and
hostility. It was conceived by him as an attempt to
make Germany more like England...1"
37	 Richard J Evans, "Rendering unto the Kaiser", Times Literary 
Supplement, 10 July 1992, p.7.
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Marketing in Europe : Italy : see Table 7.5
The doyen of all agents in Europe in the period under review was Major
Domenica Rocca whose remit was to cover the naval base of Spezia some 70
miles east of Genoa on the Riviera di Levante. According to Sir George
Hingley's letter of appreciation to Rocca on his retirement in 1909,
Rocca had acted for the firm since 1888." At that time he was a
serving officer with a delightfully informal manner. Indeed the first
reference to him in the files is when 'Ben' Hingley acknowledged receipt
of a postcard on which Rocca had confirmed the submission of Hingleys'
tender for the Vittor Pisane and passing on an Admiral Morive's thoughts
on the Hall's patent anchors and with a mention of a Commander
Bigliale's views on current orders." Rocca's essential role was to be
aware of government orders and to lobby for the inclusion in the tender
specifications of a requirement that ships' cables were to be of
Hingleys' Netherton quality iron, and the anchors equal to those of the
Hall's design. It was this persistent lobbying for a minimum level of
quality that was the key to Rocca's role and to Hingleys' success in
Italy. After his retirement, Rocca was granted a pension equal to his
annual retainer by Sir George, and he was still in post acting as a
consultant at the time of Sir George's death in 1918.
Rocca was succeeded first by Pietro Micheli who died in 1912, and then
by Admiral Alfredo Micheli who was based in Rome with an office in
Genoa. C E Lloyd who was monitoring the Italian connection by 1912,
referred to the admiral in a letter to T & W Smith Ltd of Newcastle, as
a gentleman who lived in some style and who was an excellent agent for
38	 WHC : Sec. 8; GBHPLB, 3 : 11 November 1909, 341.
39	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 22 March 1895, 25.
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government work." Lobbying in Italy developed from an insistence on
minimum levels of quality, through to pressure to restrict the tender
list to the two or three firms capable of doing first class work. This
required the frustrating of the spurious propaganda put about by less
scrupulous firms in search of a share of the Italian market. By 1913
the Italian government was subject to so much lobbying that it forbade
army or navy officers, active or retired, from acting as agents.
However, as G C Edwards, the company secretary, noted with satisfaction
to Admiral Micheli, the latter had circumvented this rule by appointing
his manager, Mr Panzano, as the nominal Hingley agent." This ploy
satisfied all parties.
Marketing in Europe : Germany : see Table 7.5
Hingleys had traded with German firms since the days of Noah Hingley
himself, and representation was concentrated on Bremen, Hamburg, and
Berlin.
During the period under review, Bremen was served by two principal
agents. The first was Franz Tecklenborg who retired in 1897 and was
thanked by H M Hingley in a warm letter of appreciation for his long
association with the firm. 42 Tecklenborg was succeeded by the firm of
Ruhe and Trelle in an association that continued right up to the
outbreak of war in 1914.
40	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 2 : 14 May 1912, 454.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 4 : 5 December 1913, 178.
42	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 14 May 1897, 127.
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The agent in Hamburg was Arnold Von Bippen, whose appointment was
confirmed by A H Legge in 1895. 43
 He was assisted by W Janke who was
based in Bremen and whose appointment was confirmed by W B Rumford, the
assistant company secretary, in 1910." There was a tremendous rapport
between Janke and members of the Hingley firm, with Janke endeavouring
to maintain written contacts as late as 1915.
In Berlin the firm was represented by Schulz & Borchers with whom 'Ben'
Hingley shared many written dialogues over wage rates for government
work, as for example in 1901.45
The roles played by these three agents in Germany followed two clear
paths. The first was to feed back to Hingleys the economic intelligence
of what was in prospect for the growing Imperial Germany Navy and the
major commercial fleets. The second was to monitor the workings of the
collaborative agreements between Hingleys and the German firms of
Hochfelder Walzwerk, Borsig, and Krupp. All these agreements depended
on a strict adherence to the sharing of the market based on tonnage, a
topic covered in more detail in the next chapter.
Marketing in the rest of Europe : see Table 7.5
Although Italy and Germany provided Hingleys with the bulk of its market
share in Europe, there were well established agencies in Spain, France,
Austria - Hungary, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 21 November 1895, 158.
44 WI-IC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 1 : 20 June 1910, 112.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 16 October 1901, 142.
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The principal agent in Spain was based in Madrid with an eye on work for
the Spanish Government. George Barrett was appointed as agent in August
1891 according to a letter written to Ramon Aguirre who took over the
agency in 1896 on the death of Mr Barrett." At the same time, H M
Hingley had an overview arrangement of some kind with Colonel Fernandez
in Madrid to work in tandem with both Barrett and Aguirre. Spanish
government work must have been very attractive to Hingleys, as the firm
paid commissions of 5 per cent on cables ordered, and 2.5 per cent on
Halls' anchors, as confirmed to Fernandez.° These commissions were
double those being paid anywhere else in the world, and would appear to
indicate a very profitable line of business in Spain.
In later years the firm was represented by Felix de Urtiago, who was in
post in 1911 when G C Edwards was corresponding on commercial matters."
In 1914 Edwards referred in correspondence to commission levels of 1 per
cent on basic wrought iron, and 2.5 per cent on higher quality iron,
commissions more in line with the norm for the trade." Meantime, in
Madrid, Juan Meniere had succeeded Aguirre only to die in office in
1912. The death of Meniere was referred to by Edwards when writing to
the executors in 1913. 5° No further representation in Madrid appears to
have been made before the outbreak of the war of 1914. The role of all
the agents had been to obtain or influence orders for ships building
anywhere for Spain in the shipyards of Europe.
46	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 1 September 1896, 240.
Ibid., 1 September 1896, 241.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 2 : 20 July 1911, 106.
49	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 4 : 18 February 1914, 351.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 3 : 20 February 1913, 334.
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In France, government policy and its control of many manufacturers
effectively prevented any market penetration by Hingleys until the north
east of France was overrun by the Germans after 1914. Hingleys,
however, had a long term representation in Paris through the firm of
Longstaff Ehrenberg & Pollak, going back to the days of sailing ships.
Longstaffs' role for Hingleys was to assist in obtaining contracts for
foreign work being brokered through France. For example, in 1897,
Brazil had warships under construction at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, in
France, and in Germany. Hingleys was bidding for all this work through
Longstaffs in Paris."
Reference to Table 7.5 on page 7/13 will show the other agents in post
in Europe in the period from 1900 onwards. In Holland the agents were
Kern Brothers, whose date of appointment is not given in the files, but
probably paralleled the German connection with Von Bippen. In Belgium
the firm of Hertogs & Wuyts of Antwerp was appointed in 1903." Astrup
& Son in Christiana, Norway, had a long association with Hingleys
according to G C Edwards." In Sweden the agents were Sjoholm &
Svalander of Gothenburg, whose date of appointment is unclear.
Representation in Austria-Hungary was initially focused on Trieste, then
part of Austria, with a Worcestershire man George Baker acting for
Hingleys from before 1908. 5' Then, and only eight months before the
outbreak of war in 1914, S Bauer was formally appointed by G C Edwards
to procure contracts for the Austrian Navy in the Adriatic Sea.55
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 23 April 1897, 109.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 1 January 1903, 263.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 3 : 14 May 1913, 423.
54	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 9 March 1908, 458.
55	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 4 : 5 December 1913, 180.
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By reference to Table 7.5, it can be seen that Hingleys had an agent in
post in every significant maritime nation in Europe.
Marketing in the rest of the world : see Table 7.5
Notwithstanding the concentration of business with Europe and the
Colonies, Hingleys maintained long standing connections with Brazil,
Chile, Russia, and Japan. Brazil tended to handle its naval
requirements through a representative office in Paris, enabling
Longstaffs to play a major role in the bidding. During the last quarter
of the 19th century Hingleys was represented in Chile by the firm of
Rose Innes Cox & Co of Valparaiso. In correspondence with this firm
'Ben' Hingley mentioned Hingleys' involvement of thirty years with
Chilean requirements. 56 By 1913 the firm of Hamson & Co, also of
Valparaiso, had taken over the agency and were monitored by G C
Edwards.57
Of all the countries in the world, the one whose market 'Ben' Hingley
found most hard to penetrate, apart from the United States, was that of
Russia. Some success had been achieved by 1914, but the outbreak of war
frustrated what promised to be a useful prospect in St Petersburg. In
earlier years Hingley had concentrated his activities, as he had to, on
Odessa. This city in the Crimea was the official entrepot for Russia
and was founded by imperial fiat in 1798 with the specific role of being
the accepted point of trade with the outside world, especially for the
grain trade. 58
 In Odessa, 'Ben' Hingley's marketing ploy was to use a
56	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 25 May 1905, 907.
57	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; SLB, 3 : 28 March 1913, 363.
58	 Patricia Herlihy, Odessa : a history 1794-1914, Ukrainian Research
Institute Monograph Series (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University
Press, 1986), xvii & 411.
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merchant and an agent in tandem in order to push sales. The merchant
was J G Crookston who was required to cover business opportunities as
far away as St. Petersburg. In particular, Hingley used Crookston to
promote the sale of the Hall's patent anchor, even to the extent of
having Crookston arrange for the manufacture of the anchor in St.
Petersburg by a local steel works. The market for these anchors was
seen as lying with the Russian Imperial and merchant navies, with
royalties of 15 per cent to be shared between Hingleys, Halls, and
Crookston." The extent of this commercial arrangement is unclear from
the files, but the letter of September 1903 clearly indicates that
Crookston had a steel works lined up for the work and that a market
existed. No doubt the domestic political situation in Russia at the
time militated against a meaningful result, but the arrangement was
significant for the fact that Hingleys was prepared to sell the design
as against the product, which was its normal way of doing business. The
agent was A N Bronstein who was in post from at least 1906, according to
a letter from G C Edwards in 1913 enquiring about commissions paid
between September 1906 and September 1913." In the year 1913 Odessa
was still the place in which Hingleys could make real impact due to the
large number of ships using the Black Sea. Indeed, when discussing
tenders with Bronstein for the outfits for eight new steamers, Edwards
aired the possibility of a joint venture facility for cable making in
the Crimea.61
Last comes Japan, a country visited by 'Ben' Hingley during his world
travels
	 before	 settling
	 down	 as	 the	 resident
	 managing	 director
	 in
59 WHC	 :	 Sec.
	 8	 ;	 DLB,	 3	 : 9 September 1903, 293.
60
61
WHC	 :	 Sec.	 8	 ;	 SLB,	 4	 :
Ibid.,	 3 January 1914,
24 November 1913,
225.
165.
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England in or about 1895. The steady growth of the Japanese Imperial
Navy in the 1890s attracted his attention and he appointed Captain J M
James as his representative in Tokyo. Captain James was probably
appointed in 1896 on the evidence of a letter written in January 1897 in
which Hingley countered James's thoughts on a commission rate of 5 per
cent by suggesting 1 per cent on cables and anchors as being the norm,
and 2.5 per cent as generous. 62 Hingley's attention at the time was
focused on the prospect of orders for the outfits for several large
battleships.
Captain James was succeeded in 1903 by Captain Takayama who was
appointed on a five year contract to represent both Hingleys and the
Halls Patent Anchor Company. 63
 Takayama was succeeded by Dr T Matsuo,
who became a long time business associate of Hingleys and whose
commission payments from before 1914 and right through the Great War are
recorded in the Secretary's Letter Books.
The key to Hingley's successful participation in the Japanese market
undoubtedly lay in the appointment of A K Rhoden in 1902 as the resident
English agent in Japan, based in Yokohama. Rhoden was a steel man from
Sheffield who was appointed as assistant to B K Morton in 1897. In 1902
he split from Morton in a disagreement over money, but because of the
high regard in which he was held by 'Ben' Hingley he was made an agent
in his own right for the Far East. His initial independent four year
appointment was renewed in 1906 for a further three years at a fee of
£400 to £500 per annum." Rhoden's role in Japan was to provide the
technical appraisals and evaluations that enabled the Japanese agents to
62	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 6 January 1897, 46.
63	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 16 December 1903, 413.
64	 WI-IC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 24 March 1906, 287.
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procure work on Hingley specifications. He remained in Japan until the
end of the Great War in 1918.
C E Lloyd's drive for greater agency representation in the period from
August 1914 to October 1915
With the advent of war in August 1914 marketing became the province of
C E Lloyd. His extraordinary efforts to extend the firm's world wide
agency system were in marked contrast to the measured and carefully
considered way in which the Hingley brothers had formerly appointed
agents. Anticipating a short, sharp war followed by a trade war Lloyd
began a world wide drive in search of new markets. His subsequent
endeavours during the remainder of 1914 would seem to indicate that he
saw distinct trading possibilities in China following the overthrow of
the Ching dynasty by Sun Yat Sen in 1911. As will be shown later, he
saw the opening of the Panama Canal in 1915 as a marvellous opportunity
to trade with the west coast of North America generally. He also saw
the overthrow of the old order in Mexico in the 1910s as the opportunity
to break the stranglehold of the United States on trade in that region.
In short order, and even before the end of 1914, Lloyd had set in motion
a drive to increase or initiate sales representation in South America,
Canada, Mexico, Russia, France, and Australia. This was in parallel
with moves to strengthen the B J Ackerly agency in Liverpool, to add
strength to the Board of the Halls Patent Anchor Company, to enhance the
sales efficiency of Harts Hill Ironworks, Sir George's private company,
and to effect better representation in South Wales. South America was
Lloyd's first target and he had in mind the recovery of certain of
Hingleys' former markets with a drive focused on railway work, and
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especially the under-frames for wagons and couplings. In this
connection he opened discussions with T L Chubb for him to work out of
Hingleys' London office in Queen Victoria Street as an adviser to W J
Firth its manager. The contract envisaged an initial appointment of one
year at a fee of £100 per annum, plus commissions of 0.5 per cent on all
iron sold for £9 per ton or less in South America, rising to 1.5 per
cent on all iron sold at better than £9." Unfortunately, this scheme
foundered in October of the following year when Hingleys was taken over
by the government. Lloyd, therefore, had to cancel the arrangement with
Chubb."
C E Lloyd's efforts to include Mexico as a market were concentrated on
Leo A Gadd of New Jersey, USA, and Mexico City. In August 1914 Lloyd
approached Gadd with a view to the latter taking an agency in Mexico.
The offer made to Gadd provided for a commission arrangement of 1 per
cent on ordinary iron, and 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent on higher grade
iron.° Regrettably, the idea of extending to Mexico foundered on the
extreme political volatility of that country at that time, as Lloyd had
to advise Gadd in the following December."
So far two of Lloyd's overseas enthusiasms had proved incapable of
realisation, but he persevered with China and Russia. In respect of
China he joined The British Engineers' Association and steadily pursued
this connection throughout the war. The Russian agency of J G Crookston
in Odessa was by now moribund and fresh approaches were made, this time
65 WHC : Sec. 8 ; IDLE, 7 : 22 August 1914, 156.
66 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 8 : 4 October 1915, 300.
67 WHC : Sec. 8 ; IDLE, 7 : 26 August 1914, 168.
Ibid., 8 December 1914, 302.
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to the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce in Petrograd. Lloyd
corresponded there with His Excellency M Basile de Timiriazeff. This
exotically named person was the president of the Chamber and Lloyd set
out to impress him with the scope of Hingleys' activities in cables,
anchors, and wrought iron." Again, this connection was maintained
until the course of the war led to the downfall of the old order in
Russia.
Australia, perhaps the oldest of Hingleys major export markets, was of
particular concern to Lloyd. He was aware of American incursions into
that market, but he was particularly concerned about the possibility of
German penetration once the war was over. With this in mind he lobbied
the Director of the Commercial Intelligence branch in the Board of Trade
with a view to obtaining preferential treatment in Australia after the
war. This preference was sought for British exporters who had
maintained exports to Australia during the war.'
In November 1914 Lloyd approached Langstaff, Ehrenberg & Pollak,
Hingleys' long time agents in Paris, with a view to extending their
traditional activities among sailing ships into a countrywide sales
drive. n Within days of making the enquiry, Lloyd found it necessary to
instruct the London office to enquire of the London Chamber of Commerce
as to whether a firm with such German sounding names would remain
acceptable in France because of the xenophobia that had gripped Britain
over anything German. 72 As the war progressed these reservations were
overtaken by events and other agents were appointed.
69	 Ibid., 3 November 1914, 230.
Ibid., 23 December 1914, 331.
Ibid., 26 November 1914, 271.
72	 Ibid., 8 December 1914, 298.
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After the opening of the Panama Canal, C E Lloyd became very interested
in the Canadian market.	 He therefore dispatched William Benjamin
Rubery, formerly of H P Parkes, to Canada and the USA in September 1914.
This North American visit was a resounding success resulting in the
established agents, Drummond McCall of Montreal, being given a wider
brief, the appointment of F R Whipple to cover New Brunswick, the
appointment of Hugh Calderwood to cover Ontario, and most significant of
all the recruitment of W Carlile Wallace of New York as the agent for
the eastern United States. This latter appointment was a most fruitful
act of recruitment and Wallace developed into a very effective agent
right through the war.
Drummond McCall had a long established business in Montreal and Lloyd
now encouraged them to look wider to the Great Lakes and the
opportunities arising there as the new power house of American
industry. m F R Whipple of Whipple St, West St John, New Brunswick, was
appointed as agent of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island." Hugh
Calderwood of Barrie, Ontario was appointed in early February 1915 with
a brief to push cables and anchors for a commission of 5 per cent with
the strict proviso that he did not encroach on the preserves of Drummond
McCall. m W Carlile Wallace's appointment was in gestation somewhat
longer than the others. As Wallace was a foreigner, Lloyd decided to
check his references with J Howden & Co Ltd, of Glasgow. m He was also
unhappy about Wallace representing Hingleys from the front parlour of
his home. Wallace duly took a small office in respect of which Lloyd
Ibid., 4 February 1915, 413
Ibid., 21 December 1915, 328.
75	 Ibid., 4 February 1915, 422.
76	 Ibid., 4 February 1915, 348.
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granted an allowance of £25 per annum with effect from 1 April 1915."
The actual offer to Wallace was made in February 1915, and was
conditional on his taking a proper office. He was required to effect
representation in the US navy yards at Boston and Newport, and on Lake
Erie. Commission rates were to be 2.5 per cent on ordinary cable and
anchors; 5 per cent on high class chains, and cables and anchors where
he obtained the naming of Hingleys in the specifications; and 1 per cent
in the general, highly competitive market." The association with
Carlisle turned out to be highly successful as American navy cables were
of very indifferent quality. The success of Hingleys' cables in
America, as a result of the war, owed much to the great accord achieved
between Lloyd and Wallace.
Lloyd's first new domestic appointment of the war was that of John C
Penn of Penn & Co, Cardiff, with an agency to cover Cardiff and Newport
for cables and anchors." In October 1914 he grasped the nettle of the
lightweight representation in Liverpool by B J Ackerley by appointing
the Marine Engine Auto Control Co Ltd, of Liverpool, as assistant agents
to work in tandem with Ackerley. H
 Once this arrangement had settled
down, with Robert A Sydney in post, Lloyd formally advised Ackerley that
under the new scheme of things he wanted him to be styled manager and
not agent.°1
77	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 8 : 28 June 1915, 146.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 7 : 5 February 1915, 424.
79	 Ibid., 22 August 1914, 154.
Ibid., 30 October 1914, 225.
Ibid., 15 January 1915, 385.
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At the Halls Patent Anchor Company, Lloyd added to its profile with the
appointment of Captain P D Murray of Liverpool in September 1914." In
November, when commiserating with Murray over the loss of three
contracts to Byers, Lloyd mentioned the heavy orders received from the
Admiralty, and from the Italian government." December had barely
dawned before Lloyd was discussing with Murray the extraordinary rush in
the shipbuilding market. The firm was deluged with work and by the
sheer volume and pressure of Admiralty work that had taken it completely
unawares."
Such was this surge of work that Sir George felt sufficiently confident
to encourage H Bertram Hingley, his cousin at Harts Hill Ironworks, to
appoint a representative in London. Sir George was confident that
£9 000 of business could be done per annum, justifying a man at £300
plus 3 per cent commission."
The extraordinary drive by C E Lloyd to achieve greater agency
representation during this period is summmed-up and illustrated in Table
7.7.
Ibid., 7 September 1914, 182.
Ibid., 24 November 1914, 265.
Ibid., 2 December 1914, 282.
Ibid., 12 December 1914, 314.
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Table 7.7 : C E Lloyd's extraordinary drive between August 1914 and
October 1915 to achieve greater market penetration especially in the
Americas
NAME LOCATION MARKET DATE OF
APPOINTMENT
T L Chubb
L A Gadd
Russo-British Chamber of
Commerce
Drummond McCall
F R Whipple
H Calderwood
W Carlile Wallace
Penn & Co
The Marine Engine Auto
Control Co Ltd
Capt. P D Murray
S America generally
Mexico
Petrograd
Montreal
New Brunswick
Ontario
New York
Cardiff
Liverpool
Liverpool
Railway work
Wrought iron and Railway work
Cables, anchors, and wrought
iron
Wrought iron and railway work
Wrought iron and cables
Wrought iron and cables
Cables, anchors, and wrought
iron
Cables and anchors
Cables and anchors
Cables and anchors
August 1914
August 1914
November 1914
Before 1914
December 1914
February 1915
April 1915
August 1914
October 1914
September 1914
A comparison of the commissions earned by B K Morton in Australia, T
Matsuo in Tokyo, Scott Piercy in J'Burg, and W Carlile Wallace in New
York, goes some way towards demonstrating the successful penetration by
C E Lloyd of the US market during the Great War. Those commissions are
shown in Table 7.8
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Table 7.8 : Commissions paid in sterling pounds to certain overseas
agents, 1914-1918
AGENT 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
B K Morton 319 249 542 98 193
Scott Piercy 125 93 156 212 193
T Matsu° - - 285 174 360
W Carlile Wallace - - - 176 870
Source of information : the Secretary's Letter Books 4 and 5 covering
the quarterly payments to overseas agents.
C E Lloyd's incursion into the French market in 1917, coupled with other
activities in 1917 and 1918 aimed at the post war world
After many pre-war years of being excluded from France by the policies
of its government, Hingleys was now enjoying the new market that had
been created there by the war. P Isnard's agency had been renewed in
November 1916 and in early 1917 C E Lloyd approached The Welin Davit &
Engineering Co Ltd, in London, with a view to its selling top
specification work in France for vessels under construction there. A
commission of 2.5 per cent would be payable on the top classes of iron,
scaling down to 1.5 per cent or 1 per cent on ordinary qualities."
Lloyd advised Welins that the scope of work in mind was government
vessels of some 7 500 tons requiring 23/16" cables and anchors to a
value of £1 150 and mail boats with outfits to a value of £2 400." The
formal appointment followed in February and was for a period of one year
86	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 10 : 9 January 1917, 60.
87	 Ibid., 18 January 1917, 71
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from 1 January 1917 with a Mr Paul de Raine as the local representative.
The agency was required to target all passenger boats and cargo boats
over 5 000 tons.
	 The commercial susceptibilities of Langstaffs of
Paris, Marius Jullien of Marseilles, and Paul Isnard of Paris, were to
be respected."
Developments in the United States were also encouraging. During 1916
Sir George had renewed a connection going back some twenty years with
Bradlee & Co, of Philadelphia; and W Carlile Wallace was building such a
good portfolio of work that C E Lloyd suggested he employ sub-agents to
meet competition from other British firms who had heard of Hingleys'
successes." A further development also took place over the long
awaited possibilities on the west coast of North America. B J Ackerley
had put forward the name of Balfour Williamson & Co, as agents for the
west coast, only to be met by a guarded response from C E Lloyd on the
grounds that they were merchants." However, after three months of
negotiation on the precise mechanics of representation, Lloyd appointed
Balfours as agents on the basis of a merchant's commission or discount
of 2.5 per cent. K
 This development of the United States market, after
so many years of exclusion, was particularly pleasing for the whole
firm. G F Simms, who was in charge of cable and anchor production,
could not disguise his pleasure when discussing the American market with
Thomas Hardie of the agents in Glasgow. He commented particularly on
the fact that the United States was now looking to the United Kingdom
for cables and anchors as it was unable to produce ships' cables of
Ibid., 6 February 1917, 101.
Ibid., 13 April 1917, 237.
Ibid., 16 April 1917, 240.
Ibid., 26 July 1917, 447.
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acceptable quality. Indeed, the scale of business was such that Britain
was unable to progress through the test houses the quantity of cables
demanded by the massive growth in US ship construction.92
Regrettably, and notwithstanding the euphoria over developments in the
French and American markets, the Italian position remained a very sore
point in the firm. Sir George, when exchanging new year greetings with
Admiral Micheli, confided that his colleagues were of the opinion that
Sir George was more interested in his work for the Italian government
than in his work for the British Admiralty. This was a particularly
aggravating point as the Italian government would not settle its
debts." H J Peart was particularly aggressive on this matter a month
later when reminding Micheli that debts of £4 312.4.7 went back to June
1916."
In the Orient, a new agreement was made with Dr Matsuo in May 1917 to be
retroactive from 1 January 1917 for work in the very buoyant market in
Japan." This buoyancy was not without its problems as the British
authorities had temporarily prohibited exports to Japan notwithstanding
its status as an ally. This created a most unusual problem for H J
Peart over finance as he was forced to confide to the Hong Kong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation. Hingley's clients in Japan, in order to
take advantage of the currency markets, had deposited £8 000 in advance
of receiving ordered material that could not now be delivered." This
92	 Ibid., 14 July 1917, 406.
93	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 5 : 12 January 1917, 46.
94	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 10 : 14 February 1917, 116.
95	 Ibid., 18 May 1917, 305.
96	 Ibid., 12 June 1917, 345.
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put Hingleys in a situation that was, for them, unique! On the other
side of the coin, the decision by A K Rhoden to leave Japan on 31
October 1917 took C E Lloyd by surprise coming so soon after the offer
of a ten year contract. The move had an added piquancy as Rhoden had
accepted an offer from Sanderson Brothers & Newbould to join them in
their London office." The piquancy arose from the fact that Lloyd was
in negotiation with the very same firm over a new venture in South
America. In the event Rhoden agreed to extend his stay in Japan and by
agreement with Sandersons he saw out the war for Hingleys. Before the
end of the year Lloyd admitted defeat over Russia, having to advise B
Courtney & Co. Ltd., with whom he had been in negotiation that under the
circumstances prevailing there he could not contemplate doing
business." The emphasis then switched to South America with C E Lloyd
discussing with Hingleys' old Australian colleagues, T & W Smith of
Newcastle, the merits of joining forces with Sanderson Brothers &
Newbould, who were crucible steel makers in Sheffield, in a South
American venture."
In August 1917, and in a rare sombre mood, C E Lloyd speculated to R A
Sydney at the Liverpool agency as to whether agencies were needed any
more now that Industry was entirely in government hands. HO At this
stage of the war the very real burden of the government's insatiable
demands for tax revenues, coupled with the dead weight of ever
increasing ministerial bureaucracy, was having a damaging effect on the
morale of the management team. A case in point arose from the demands
97	 Ibid., 18 May 1917, 303.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 11 : 14 November 1917, 83.
99 Ibid., 15 November 1917, 89.
HO	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 10 : 1 August 1917, 457.
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placed on Hingleys, by the government, to sell forward for eighteen
months or two years virtually unlimited quantities of cable. As H J
Peart pointed out very forcefully to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue,
also in August, this meant holding large stocks of finished cable at the
works to meet the demands dictated by the successes of the German
U-Boats and by the fears of the government.
Notwithstanding the acute attack of self doubt that affected C E Lloyd
in August of 1917, he recovered his equilibrium later in the year and he
pressed on with every activity that offered a meaningful result for the
firm. During 1917 he had become convinced that the British Engineering
Association would be a key factor in post war marketing and he took
every opportunity to take space in its directories. The original focus
of the BEA on China had now broadened into a world wide sphere of
interest.
In France he renewed the agency agreement with Paul Isnard with effect
from 1 January 1918. Isnard's commissions were to be 3.75 per cent on
the first FF100 000 of business, and 5 per cent thereafter. By way of
assisting with monthly out goings, FF600 per month was to be paid on
account. 102
 The high level of incentive offered by Lloyd reflected his
interest in the continuing French market arising from the war.
In Japan, C E Lloyd effected a renewal of the pre-war agreements with
the Kobe Steel Works for the manufacture of Hall's anchors in Japan,
thus eliminating possible local competition. He effected a similar
renewal with the Osaka Chain Manufacturing Company in respect of ships
101	 Ibid., 10 August 1917, 473.
102	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 11 : 1 January 1918, 202.
101
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cables. Lloyd confirmed these renewal arrangements to The Hong Kong
Bank in Yokohama who were appointed to act for Hingleys in the
collection and onward remittance of the cash proceeds arising from these
two commercial alliances."'
In Spain, C F Simms began a dialogue in April 1918 with Felix de Urtiaga
on the possibility of setting up a local facility for the making of
small chain up to 1" diameter.'° 4 This possibility remained of
sufficient interest to warrant a Board's expression of intent once the
war was over. However as Simms had to caution, nothing could happen
before the end of hostilities as the export of funds was forbidden."5
C E Lloyd thus saw out the war with his marketing strategy in place for
the peace. He had agents in position in all the key markets of the
world, including America. The only void in his plan concerned Germany,
but in the peace that followed there was little scope for Germany to
enter the arena of major shipbuilding as it had in the 1900s.
103 Ibid., 8 May 1918,	 356.
104 Ibid., 18 April 1918,
	 316.
ns Ibid., 20 August 1918,
	 492.
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A summary
The Hingley method of marketing was developed into a sophisticated
operation during the period under review. This sophistication arose
from the ability of the Hingley brothers to tailor their methods to suit
the needs and demands of the individual markets being served. In the
United Kingdom the system devised was one of direct selling of anchors
and ships' cables to the ship constructors by agents placed in the key
shipbuilding areas. These agents must have been assisted in carrying
out their role by the intelligence gathered by the Hingley brothers
through the Sheffield connection of John Brown, Cammell, and Vickers.
This especially after these firms acquired major shipbuilding interests
on the Clyde, on the Mersey, and in Belfast.
	 General ironwork was
handled through the conventional merchanting channels.
Marketing in the Empire, and in other countries in the Far East and in
South America, was handled by a judicious mix of London agents, with
overseas connections, supplemented by dedicated agents located adjacent
to the markets. In most other countries marketing was effected through
dedicated agents who were chosen to match the culture of the country
concerned. Thus, in Spain, Italy, and Japan, the preferred agent was an
officer of some independent means. In Russia the preference imposed by
circumstances was the use of a merchant and agent acting in tandem. In
northern Europe generally the marketing strategy was based on a
collection of agents of reputation but limited initiative. The
exception to this, of course, was Germany. Here, Hingleys enjoyed the
services of several exceptional agents. Most notable were Von Bippen
and his colleague Janke whose roles were to monitor the quasi-cartel
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arrangements that Hingleys enjoyed with a succession of German firms
over ships' anchors and cables.
Thus, by the end of the Edwardian era, Hingleys had in place a system of
marketing that guaranteed that in all normal circumstances its entire
production could be sold at a fair price. The outbreak of war in 1914
was the catalyst that placed all marketing under the control of C E
Lloyd. It was he who constructed, in a few short months in 1914, the
basis for the new market opportunities in North America. In addition,
he rationalised all the marketing systems he had inherited to reflect
the new commercial realities of the time, and he brought the firm out of
the war with its marketing strategy in place for the peace.
For a firm of somewhat modest proportions its international eminence,
and its grasp of marketing as the senior partner of production was
remarkable for the times.
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cables. Lloyd confirmed these renewal arrangements to The Hong Kong
Bank in Yokohama who were appointed to act for Hingleys in the
collection and onward remittance of the cash proceeds arising from these
two commercial alliances.'"
In Spain, C F Simms began a dialogue in April 1918 with Felix de Urtiaga
on the possibility of setting up a local facility for the making of
small chain up to 1" diameter. 109
	This possibility remained of
sufficient interest to warrant a Board's expression of intent once the
war was over. However as Simms had to caution, nothing could happen
before the end of hostilities as the export of funds was forbidden.'"
C E Lloyd thus saw out the war with his marketing strategy in place for
the peace. He had agents in position in all the key markets of the
world, including America. The only void in his plan concerned Germany,
but in the peace that followed there was little scope for Germany to
enter the arena of major shipbuilding as it had in the 1900s.
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A summary
The Hingley method of marketing was developed into a sophisticated
operation during the period under review. This sophistication arose
from the ability of the Hingley brothers to tailor their methods to suit
the needs and demands of the individual markets being served. In the
United Kingdom the system devised was one of direct selling of anchors
and ships' cables to the ship constructors by agents placed in the key
shipbuilding areas. These agents must have been assisted in carrying
out their role by the intelligence gathered by the Hingley brothers
through the Sheffield connection of John Brown, Cammell, and Vickers.
This especially after these firms acquired major shipbuilding interests
on the Clyde, on the Mersey, and in Belfast.
	 General ironwork was
handled through the conventional merchanting channels.
Marketing in the Empire, and in other countries in the Far East and in
South America, was handled by a judicious mix of London agents, with
overseas connections, supplemented by dedicated agents located adjacent
to the markets. In most other countries marketing was effected through
dedicated agents who were chosen to match the culture of the country
concerned. Thus, in Spain, Italy, and Japan, the preferred agent was an
officer of some independent means. In Russia the preference imposed by
circumstances was the use of a merchant and agent acting in tandem. In
northern Europe generally the marketing strategy was based on a
collection of agents of reputation but limited initiative. The
exception to this, of course, was Germany. Here, Hingleys enjoyed the
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arrangements that Hingleys enjoyed with a succession of German firms
over ships' anchors and cables.
Thus, by the end of the Edwardian era, Hingleys had in place a system of
marketing that guaranteed that in all normal circumstances its entire
production could be sold at a fair price. The outbreak of war in 1914
was the catalyst that placed all marketing under the control of C E
Lloyd. It was he who constructed, in a few short months in 1914, the
basis for the new market opportunities in North America. In addition,
he rationalised all the marketing systems he had inherited to reflect
the new commercial realities of the time, and he brought the firm out of
the war with its marketing strategy in place for the peace.
For a firm of somewhat modest proportions its international eminence,
and its grasp of marketing as the senior partner of production was
remarkable for the times.
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PART FOUR : MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT
CHAPTER EIGHT	 RELATIONS WITH OTHER FIRMS, COMBINATIONS AND
QUASI-CARTELS
An overview
From 1890 to 1910 the Hingley firm developed strategies and tactics to
cope with the volatility of industrial demand that was such a feature of
the domestic market. Unlike certain of the major defence contractors
who were compelled to enter into mergers or amalgamations by the
vacillations of the procurement department of the Admiralty or by the
fluctuations in demand for merchant shipping, Hingleys was able to
maintain its independence. These mergers were needed in order to build a
capital base large enough to withstand the fluctuations and pressures of
the market. As mentioned in chapter two, the leading mergers in arms
and shipbuilding were between Vickers and Maxim in 1905 to give a
capitalisation of £7 440 000, between Armstrong & Whitworth in 1897 to
achieve £5 316 000, and between Cammell and Laird in 1903 to give £2 623
000. 1
 Hingleys, however, with its modest capitalisation of £250 000 in
1890, rising to £300 000 in 1915 was able to keep its independence and
achieve a hegemonic position in the cable and anchor trade by a series
of alliances that were altered and adapted to suit the times.
In essence the Hingley strategy was to enter into alliances or
combinations with other cable makers or anchor smiths in order to cope
with the mini-booms that were a feature of the period. At the tactical
level these combinations were varied, even to the extent of combining
Payne, The Emergence of the Large Scale Company, 539.
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with bitter rivals if circumstances warranted this action. Hingleys'
alliance with John Brown, which firm had a capitalisation of £2 947 000
in 1905, was very different from those with fellow cable makers. Here
the alliance, resulting in the joint venture company British Machine
Made Cable, was a frustrated endeavour to stay in a market that by the
late 1900s seemed to be on the verge of domination by machines.
Overseas, Hingleys had a long standing alliance with Henry Wood of
Chester that enabled the firm to dominate the significant Italian
market. Its classic overseas alliances were, however, with the German
firms of Hochfelder Walzwerk, Borsig, and Krupp. These alliances,
invariably clandestine in nature, were regarded by H M Hingley and Sir
George Hingley as the most significant of all their overseas adventures.
They resulted in Hingleys holding a dominant position in the cable and
anchor trade with Germany from 1895 right through to the outbreak of war
in August 1914.
The domestic alliances
The Chain Makers' Association, with its headquarters in Cradley Heath
adjacent to Netherton, had a membership of some twenty seven firms in
1916. Of these only fourteen were ranked as true cable makers on the
basis that they made cables of 11/4" in diameter and upwards. These
fourteen firms are shown in table 8.1 on page 8/4, and were referred to
in correspondence with the Lloyd's Register during the Great War. 2 In
the 1890s and 1900s the first seven firms shown in the table, being five
from the list of 1916 together with George Hartshorne who had merged
with his next door neighbour Hingleys in 1908, and Jno Abbott whose firm
2	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 9 : 24 March 1916, 112.
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had failed in 1909, were the ones from among whom Hingleys formed its
principal combinations between 1890 and 1910.
From time to time Hingleys included the four firms in the second group
in the table, but only when absolute need compelled this. H P Parkes
and Brown Lenox were regarded as unscrupulous competitors in the Italian
market, and R Heath was viewed with disfavour over its pricing and
quality standards in Australia. The seven firms in the third group were
never invited to join Hingleys in a formal trade alliance as far as can
be judged from the files, with the exception of Richard Sykes.
The last name in the table, W L Byers, was to all intents and purposes
one of Hingleys' major competitors in anchor making. However, after the
astonishing preference shown by the Admiralty for the Wasteneys Smith
anchor from 1905 onwards, Hingleys and Byers formed ad hoc alliances to
dominate the domestic market.
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Table 8.1 : Domestic chain makers and anchor smiths from among whom
Hingleys formed its domestic alliances
Name Location
N Hingley & Sons
George Hartshorne
Samuel Taylor & Sons
John Green
Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Steelworks
Jno Abbott
Henry Wood
H P Parkes
Brown Lenox
R Heath & Sons
Waverley Iron Company
N Bloomer & Sons
Fellows Bros
William Griffin & Sons
Jones & Lloyd
Richard Sykes & Son
Jos Wright
Woodhouse Bros
W L Byers
Netherton
Netherton
Brierley Hill
Old Hill
Brierley Hill
Gateshead
Chester
Tipton
Mil!wall & Pontypridd
Stoke-on-Trent
Coatbridge
Quarry Bank
Cradley Heath
Cradley Heath
Cradley
Cradley Heath
Tipton
Cradley Heath
Sunderland
The three alliances of 1895 to 1900, including the first grand alliance
of 1897
During the dramatic rise in industrial activity from 1895 to 1900,
Hingleys entered into no less than three alliances or combinations in
which the acceptability of the other participants changed to suit the
conditions of the trade. The first of these, as recorded in the files,
was an alliance formed with Henry Wood in 1896 and was aimed at
dominating the Italian market on the two principles of quality combined
with a fair price. A specific aim of the alliance was the elimination
of Brown Lenox and H P Parkes from the Italian market. 'Ben' Hingley
nurtured a particular animosity towards H P Parkes because of the
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latter's alleged reputation for attempting to dump chain that had been
rejected by the British Admiralty on the Italian market. This specific
accusation was made in June 1895 to Major Rocca, Hingleys' agent in
Spezia, in connection with the tenders for the Carlos Alberto warship.3
This animosity was exceptionally fierce, probably because Noah Hingley
and Henry Purshouse Parkes had formed the Staffordshire Public Chain and
Anchor Testing Company in 1868 to maintain the highest quality of chains
and cables in the Black Country. Two generations later, Noah Hingley's
firm still maintained the highest quality of product. The H P Parkes's
directors did not appear to be as high principled according to 'Ben'
Hingley.
The mechanics of the alliance between Hingleys and Henry Wood was very
simple in that the two firms agreed to take turns over the structuring
of their bids for Italian naval work. 'Ben' Hingley, when writing to
Major Rocca in January 1897 on the subject of the tenders for the
Puglia, outlined the Henry Wood method of tendering so as to beat Brown
Lenox. This involved the preparation of three quotations: the first was
the official one, the highest and the proper tender; the second was a
tender with a 1% discount off the anchors; the third was a tender with
1/- per cwt off the anchors and a 'good' reduction off the cables.' The
agent then had use options two and three if the official tender was not
sufficiently competitive to get the order.
The importance of the Italian navy work was confirmed by 'Ben' Hingley
to Major Rocca in December 1896 when expressing concern at the lack of
success with recent tenders. 5
 Early in 1897 Hingley wrote again to
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 12 June 1895, 67.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 13 January 1897, 51.
Ibid., 29 December 1896, 37.
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Rocca with the disturbing news that, whereas Henry Wood had put forward
two tenders for the Puglia, Brown Lenox had secretly submitted three
tenders. 8
 At this stage Hingley then pressed Rocca to play his trump
card: the Italian naval authorities were to be made fully aware that
their specification called for good quality chain, but that second class
chain was being put forward by Hingleys' competitors.' The second
alliance, also with Henry Wood, was for the British domestic market and
it worked in parallel with the arrangements covering Italy. Its
creation resulted directly from the sudden upturn in shipbuilding
activity that took place between 1895 and 1900.
The first of Hingleys' grand domestic alliances was formed in 1897 and
it was created specifically to cope with the sheer volume of work on the
market. No less than eight firms joined the combination as 'Ben'
Hingley liked to call it. The mechanics of the exercise were quite
simple in that the group aimed for the larger sizes of cables where
manufacturing capability was limited to a few firms. Contracts were
obtained by the submission of agreed bids and the work was shared out by
balancing the weights of orders over a period of time. The members of
the 1897 combination, as identified in a letter from 'Ben' Hingley to
Jno. Abbott, were N Hingley, George Hartshorne, Samuel Taylor, Jno
Green, and the Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Steelworks, all of the Black
Country; and Henry Wood of Chester together with Jno Abbott of
Gateshead. The eighth member, surprisingly from one point of view, was
H P Parkes.8
6 Ibid., 15 January 1897, 53.
Ibid., 20 January 1897, 58.
Ibid., 3 January 1898, 198.
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The second grand alliance of 1902
In 1902 the grand alliance of 1897 collapsed in the wake of a fall in
business activity from a peak of 104.4 in 1899 to 95.2 in 1903. In its
place Hingleys formed a more widely based alliance in which only three
of the earlier members were represented. These were N Hingley and H P
Parkes from the Black Country with Henry Wood from Chester. The new
members were R Heath & Sons from Stoke-on-Trent, The Waverley Iron
Company from Coatbridge, and Brown Lenox from Millwall and Pontypridd.9
This new alliance during the depressed years from 1902 to 1905 was
obviously created to cover most of the major manufacturing areas in
Britain. Its members were listed by 'Ben' Hingley in a letter to
Maclean Fyfe & Maclean, Scottish solicitors involved in problems over
trademarking in Rangoon. Of particular historical significance is the
fact that this combination included the three manufacturers of the most
celebrated wrought irons ever produced by the British trade. These were
Hingleys' wrought iron known as Netherton Crown Special Best Best, Henry
Wood's Snedshill Extra Best Best, and H P Parkes's BBH Special Best Best
through its recent acquisition of Bradley Barrow & Hall, also of
Tipton'°. Henry Wood was not happy with some of the company he was now
keeping and quickly left the combination. n
 The alliance itself had
broken up by 1903.
9	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 9 October 1902, 20.
Ibid., : 16 February 1903, 174.
Ibid., : 28 November 1902, 76.
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The mini-alliances of 1903 and 1904
With the collapse of the grand alliance of 1902 the Hingley firm entered
into three mini-alliances to cope with the aftermath of the depressed
conditions of 1903 to 1904. Two of these alliances were aimed at the
anchor trade and were the means by which Hingleys mitigated its loss of
anchor work for the Admiralty. The third alliance was aimed at ending
the traditional rivalry between the ironmakers of South and North
Staffordshire.
The first of the anchor trade alliances began in 1904 and was formalised
in February 1905. It was between N Hingley as the manufacturer of the
Hall's patent anchor, Henry Wood of Chester, and a third party whose
identity is not disclosed in the correspondence. This combination
provided for arranged tenders with the selected successful bidder paying
the other two firms a share of the profit." The second alliance was
with William Lumsden Byers the celebrated anchor designer from
Sunderland. It was aimed at the anchor market in the shipyards of the
north east of England and of Scotland. This alliance too was formed in
1904 with 'Ben' Hingley corresponding on a personal basis with W L Byers
with regard to arranging contracts with Armstrong Whitworth at the
Elswick yard in Newcastle." The alliance was very successful and, as
it was aimed at the general trade, 'Ben' Hingley was able to involve his
near neighbour George Hartshorne to cope with the sheer volume of work
obtained. 14
 This volume of work effectively offset the loss of navy
Ibid., : 17 February 1905, 831.
Ibid., : 15 June 1904, 595.
WI-IC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 28 August 1905, 10.
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work that is discussed elsewhere. The operational mode of the alliance
was for the markets to be targeted to be the Elswick yard in the north
east and the Vickers yard at Barrow. The tendering strategy as agreed
between Hingley and Byers was the simple one of using cover prices, with
the firms taking the contracts on a turn and turn about basis." Added
to this was the agreement under which Hingleys undertook not to quote
below a certain figure in the north east, with Byers reciprocating in
Scotland and Ireland. The minimum prices agreed were 20/- per cwt for
anchors delivered to shipbuilders in Scotland and Ireland ; and 15/-
per cwt for anchors delivered to shipbuilders in the north east." All
in all it was a most satisfactory alliance for Hingleys, but W L Byers
died in December 1906 and the alliance did not survive the catastrophic
collapse of the market in 1908. The accord between N Hingley, in the
Worcestershire enclave in South Staffordshire, and R Heath & Sons of
Stoke in North Staffordshire, was reached in September 1905. The
alliance was aimed at raising the price of iron by 5/- per ton and it
resulted in the prices of the two areas coming into harmony.° Under
the alliance, Hingleys and Heaths, who were strong rivals in Australia
and the Orient, were able to raise the prices of the North Staffordshire
iron and present a united front to the market."
The third and final grand alliance of 1904
With the upturn in industrial activity 'Ben' Hingley formed his third
and last grand alliance towards the end of 1904. This alliance was
larger than either of the preceding ones of 1897 and 1902, involving
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 8 July 1904, 634.
Ibid., 12 January 1905, 797.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 25 September 1905, 41.
Ibid., 8 January 1906, 197.
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some ten firms styling themselves The Cable and Anchor Makers'
Association according to a circular letter from Sir George to
prospective participants. 19
 Seven of the firms came from the Black
Country and were N Hingley, George Hartshorne, Samuel Taylor, John
Green, the Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Steelworks, H P Parkes, and a
newcomer R Sykes. The other three were Henry Wood of Chester, now back
in the fold, Jno Abbott of Gateshead and Brown Lenox of Millwall and
Pontypridd. This alliance did well during the short boom of 1906 and
1907 that ushered in the era of the really big ships. It disintegrated
completely in the business collapse of 1908. Of its members George
Hartshorne merged with N Hingley as a natural consequence of its joint
activities. H P Parkes was saved from collapse by financial assistance
from Hingleys, Jno Abbott collapsed into liquidation, and the Pontypridd
works of Brown Lenox were acquired by Hingleys. No further national
alliances were attempted by Hingleys, but greater reliance was placed on
assistance from within firms in the Black Country many of which in later
years were absorbed into the Hingley firm.
19	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 17 January 1905, 803.
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Hingleys' joint venture with John Brown, a major constructor, aimed at
providing cables by machine
The joint venture between John Brown & Co Ltd., capitalised at
£2 947 000, and N Hingley & Sons Limited, capitalised at £250 000, has
to be seen as one of the most unusual alliances of the period. It was
between a major constructor and a major supplier and it created a
company known as the British Machine Made Cable Co Ltd. It was a
company that in its short active life succeeded in raising more
questions than could be answered as to the commercial judgement of its
founders.
Interest in the possibility of producing cables by machine was shown by
Hingleys during the depressed period of 1903 and 1904. The growing
militancy of labour, coupled with increased labour costs, coincided with
news of dramatic developments in Belgium where machines had been
produced that could manufacture satisfactory ships' cables. The
interest of 'Ben' Hingley and H M Hingley was conveyed to L'Societe
Generale du Laminage Annulaire in Brussells at Easter 1904. 2' As the
name implies, Laminage Annulaire specialised in rolling machines that
provided ring shaped products. Laminage was also in negotiation with W
L Byers of Sunderland, from whom Hingley may well have heard of the
process and Hingleys and Byers made a joint approach to Laminage with a
view to taking a licence to use their Masion process. Byers was
interested in cable up to 25/16" diameter, while Hingley was interested
in 3", 4", and even 6" diameter cable. Within a month Hingleys realised
that the process was not one that would justify a joint venture with
Byers. 21
	The basic flaw at this stage was that under the Belgian
20	 Ibid., 2 April 1904, 508.
21	 Ibid., 13 May 1904, 566.
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process flat iron was reheated and converted in the machine to a round
section. This reheating had an adverse effect on the elasticity of the
cable. The traditional British method where the cable was made from
rolled iron bar ensured completion in one process.
Still intrigued by the possibilities of the machine process, Hingleys
then approached L'Homogene Societ6 Anonyme Internationale, also of
Brussells, for details of their machine. 22
 L'Homogene was also known to
John Brown from whom the point of contact may well have come. Hingleys
interest was further enhanced by the collapse of industrial activity in
1908, one of the consequences being to question the capability of the
industry to continue with the production of cables by hand. Thus, and
before the end of 1908, C E Lloyd who had also taken an enthusiastic
interest in the machine process wrote to L'Homogène confirming that a
joint venture company with a capitalisation of £100 000 was in the
process of formation with new works at Netherton. The new company,
BMMC, would manufacture cables using the Girlot process of L'Homogéne."
The way in which two highly respected firms such as N Hingley and John
Brown were able to put together a company that was fatally flawed from
inception almost beggars belief. L'Homogene was obviously put out by
the news that the joint venture with John Brown also planned to use the
Masion process of Laminage in addition to L'Homogêne's Girlot process.
H M Hingley had to write a very conciliatory letter to L'Homogene in
which he stated that the alliance with John Brown was not intended in
any way to downgrade the Girlot process of L'Homogene. Rather, and as
he had to point out, John Brown had been using Laminage's Masion process
22	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 4 July 1907, 432.
23	 WI-IC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 13 November 1908, 18.
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on a working basis for some time, whereas the Girlot process was still
in the proving stage. Both processes were to be used by the new
company, BMMC, but Hingley was of the opinion that the Girlot process of
L'Homogêne would provide the cheaper cable. He further thought that, as
John Brown were not cable makers as such, both processes, Girlot and
Masion, should be allowed to prove themselves in the market. 24
 In
actual fact, neither the Masion nor the Girlot processes had ever been
proved under British working conditions; and John Brown's experience in
its early use of the Masion machine had not been without problems. In
the event, notwithstanding the outstanding skills of J E Fletcher,
Hingleys' gifted designer, BMMC never did succeed in operating either
the Girlot or the Masion process to the potential claimed by the
inventors.
Quite what prompted the Hingley management to commit itself so
whole-heartedly of making cables by machine is not easy to determine.
Hingleys enjoyed the best of raw materials and the best of labour in a
process in which it was pre-eminent in the world. Undoubtedly, the
sheer trauma of the business collapse of 1908 must have distorted the
judgement of the Hingley team. It was probably the desire to be less
dependent on manual labour, coupled with the way in which rumour feeds
on rumour that caused to Sir George to panic in 1908 and to embrace
machine manufacture as the only way to continue in the cable making
business. In March, as he said to B J Ackerley, his agent in Liverpool,
he had been taken aback at not being asked to quote for three new
vessels for Holts and he surmised that the new fangled machine made
cables had something to do with this. 25
 Then, in the same month, after
29	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 22 November 1908, 26.
25	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 11 March 1908, 863.
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thirty years of supplying cables to the Brazilian government, Sir George
confessed himself completely 'bowled out' by that government's decision
to use an experimental method for cables when unburdening himself to
George Carter at the Armstrong Whitworth yard at Elswick." Before the
month was out, Sir George was either in a state of complete funk or he
was seeking to confuse his rival Brown Lenox, while engaged in
negotiations to acquire its plant at Pontypridd, when he made the
amazing statement that the future was so bleak for all engaged in the
manufacture of hand made cables that nothing could stop machine made
cables; and that the Hingley workshops would become scrap." The
ultimate irony lay in the fact that the very company that was
frightening the wits out of Sir George was none other than John Brown.
Notwithstanding Hingleys' close links with John Brown, that firm had
decided to break Hingleys' near monopoly of Brazilian government work
and was not even a recognised cable maker. As Sir George later told W H
Ellis at John Brown, the loss of the Brazilian order after 30 years of
supplying that government was a severe blow, notwithstanding the fact
that Hingleys had kept the anchor order. Sir George identified patent
machine made cables as the reason." Hingleys' total commitment to the
concept of machine made cables reached its peak when BMMC, through John
Brown, obtained the order in 1910 to supply the cables required by the
White Star line for the S S Titanic.
Hingleys and John Brown, having made peace and having set up a new works
in Netherton equipped with both the Girlot machine of L'Homogêne and the
Masion machine of Laminage, found that in the event they could not
26	 Ibid., 21 May 1908, 915.
27	 Ibid., 30 May 1908, 934.
Ibid., 4 June 1908, 937.
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produce acceptable cable in the sizes required. Very soon the whole
enterprise fell into disarray, not helped by the poor trading conditions
of the time. As Hingleys advised L'Homogéne, the main work-force
refused point blank to cooperate in the essential hand finishing that
was called for; and the labour employed in the BMMC works was unable to
cope with the running processes of the furnaces. 29
 When the two Belgian
firms discovered that they had very different Royalty agreements, with
L'Homogêne on a minimum royalty of £1 800 per annum and Laminage on
£2 250, relations with BMMC became extremely fraught. As Hingleys
stressed to John Brown, this state of affairs was exacerbated by the
fact that BMMC could not achieve even the minimum figures projected in
the original agreement.n
By the end of 1910 the short working life of BMMC was over. Contrary to
persistent rumours, the Admiralty declined to order machine made cables.
On this basis alone the Spanish government declined to accept such
cables for its three warships under construction at the Vickers yard, as
Hingleys advised John Brown. fl
 The Brazilian government followed suit
over its two ships under construction with Vickers and Armstrong
Whitworth. Even John Brown's coup, in obtaining the order for the
cables for the S S Titanic in 1910, came to naught. BMMC could not
manufacture the 33/8" diameter cables required and C E Lloyd took the
decision in January 1911 to effect the manufacture by conventional
means.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 5 August 1909, 84.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 3 : 19 March 1909, 151.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 16 June 1910, 158.
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Thus, the joint venture came to an end. Hingleys, as the owner of the
site on which the works had been erected, acquired John Brown's half
share of the equity. Hingleys notified its solicitor, W Shakespeare,
that C E Lloyd, G C Edwards, and W B Rumford, had become the new
directors in October 1911. 32
 The company then ceased trading. The
enterprise had lasted a little over three years and did not trade again
within the period covered by this study.
The alliances with the German firms of Hochfelder Walzwerk, Borsig, and
finally with Krupp
The German alliances began in 1895 with a clandestine arrangement
between Hingleys and Hochfelder Walzwerk. They were to continue in one
form or another right up to the outbreak of war in 1914. Commercially
the alliances were very significant in monetary terms for Hingleys. For
the German firms, their significance lay in the fact that they were
enabled to equip the rapidly expanding merchant marine and the Imperial
German Navy with first class outfits of cables and anchors. Even at a
time when Germany was overtaking Britain as an industrial nation, no
German firm had first class skills in the basic trade of wrought iron
manufacture and fabrication.
The German alliances are intriguing. During the period from 1890 to
1914 Hingleys was the pre-eminent manufacturer of world class ships'
cables and anchors. From 1904 to 1911 it was effectively black balled
by the British Admiralty, yet in spite of this it was able to maintain
its leading position with all the other major navies of the world both
merchant and fighting. This was especially so with the British merchant
32	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 5 : 4 October 1911, 92.
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marine, with most of the famous liners of the 1900s and 1910s being
equipped with Hingley cables and anchors.
The period from 1900 to 1914 was one of great strain between the
European powers, with constant threat of war. Espionage was a major
activity of all governments and in 1909 the British Government formed
the secret organisation known as MI5 in order to counter known
intelligence gathering by German agents in over sixty British ports.
During the Great War it transpired that the personal mail of senior
Hingley personnel was the subject of MI5 surveillance, and this posed
the question of how long had the firm been of particular interest to
Naval Intelligence and MI5, especially in view of the clandestine nature
of Hingleys' alliances with German firms. A search through War Office
and Admiralty files, at the Public Record Office, for the period 1900 to
1914 did not reveal any evidence that Hingleys was under any
surveillance, but it did reveal the scale of naval intelligence
penetration of the German merchant marine and the German Imperial Navy.
Examples of intelligence studies carried out between 1897 and 1909 are
given in Table 8.2 as hereunder:
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Table 8.2 : War Office and Admiralty intelligence studies in the period
1897-1909
YEAR DEPT. & CLASS FILE TOPIC
1897 WO 106/46 E2/3 Military operations against German East Africa
1902 WO 106/46 E214 The resources of Germany in the event of war with England
1904 WO 106/46 E2/5 A scheme for the capture of the German naval base of Kiaon-Chan in
China ; of strategic use for deep draught vessels
1904 WO 106/46 E212 An appraisal of the capabilities of the German war machine to mount
an invasion of England
1905 WO 106/46 E2/1 The threat of a naval war with Germany
1905 WO 106/46 E2/10 Plans for the sea invasion of Germany in alliance with France
1909 WO 106/47A Preparations for war with Germany
1900 ADM 231/34 620 The threat of war with France
1907 ADM 231/46 797 World wide naval alert and instructions for defence
1906 ADM 231/46 804 Details of all foreign warships, especially those of the German Imperial
Navy.	 These details included full specifications for hulls, armour,
fittings, arcs of fire of gun turrets, etc., etc
The Admiralty report 804 of 1906 showed British espionage and
intelligence gathering of quite awesome proportions. To assemble the
information given would have required penetration of the naval
architects' teams, of the suppliers, of the shipbuilders, of the
weapons' manufacturers, etc, etc, on a quite extraordinary scale. As to
where Hingleys fitted into all this will probably never be known. What
is certain is that Hingleys had an extraordinary rapport with the major
constructors for the German navy in the period from 1895 to 1914 that
stood in marked contrast to their well publicised quarrel with the
British Admiralty from 1904 to 1913. During the period when the firm
was under sanction from the Admiralty, it enjoyed its greatest
commercial and foreign triumphs with Germany. The question remains: was
Hingleys a major gatherer of intelligence for the Admiralty under the
guise of being the black sheep of the industry?	 Or, was Hingleys
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compromised in Admiralty eyes by the nature of its German alliances
during the politically sensitive 1900s?
The domestic alliances and combinations entered into by Hingleys all
pale into relative insignificance when compared to the alliances entered
into with the German firms of Hochfelder Walzwerk of Duisberg, A Borsig
of Berlin, and F Krupp of Armen. These alliances ran from 1895 right
through the outbreak of war in 1914. They were classic cases of
essentially fair arrangements under which the customer received a good
quality product at a price that left the manufacturer with an acceptable
margin. Such arrangements could not happen today as the various
regulatory bodies would clamp down on such price-fixing and
market-sharing arrangements. These schemes not only enabled Hingleys to
help develop German cable and anchor making capacity, they also provided
Hingleys with a reliable source of anchor heads for its domestic market.
At the outbreak of war in 1914 Hingleys was severely compromised by the
fact that a significant part of its anchor head supplies actually came
from Krupp. Both Cammell Laird, and Rogersons of Durham, Hingleys'
traditional British suppliers, had been discarded for reasons of price
and unreliable delivery.
The German alliances, commencing 1895
In 1895 Hingleys entered into an agreement with the German firm of
Hochfelder Walzwerk of Duisberg for the supply of cables and anchors.
This agreement was a major achievement on the part of Henry Montagu
Hingley, with 'Ben' Hingley stating to his brother that the work with
Hochfelder Walzwerk for Nord Deutsch Lloyd Flensberg, plus the British
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Government work at the Elswick shipyards on the Tyne, would make
Hingleys independent of all second class workv.
The Hochfelder agreement was in two parts, the intention being to run in
harness for an initial period of two years. The first part of the
agreement covered the supply of anchors and was a three way agreement
between N Hingley & Sons Limited, Halls Patent Anchor Company Limited,
and Hochfelder Walzwerk. The essentials of the agreement were contained
in the appendix to a letter written in August 1895 by 'Ben' Hingley to
his brother H M Hingley who was in Germany. 34 The appendix covered the
three essential features of the agreement: first that it was between the
three firms for anchors supplied to and for use only in Germany; second
that the intention was that there should be a division of the business
between Hochfelder and Hingley; and third was that Halls Patent Anchor
Company would supply Hingleys with the castings. That the agreement
between Hingleys and Hochfelder was of a clandestine nature was
confirmed by a very strict letter in September 1895 from H M Hingley to
his German agent Arnold Von Bippen in which he stressed the absolute
need to keep the agreement private. 35 In a further letter H M Hingley
stressed to Von Bippen that the agreement was for the two firms to work
together for two years and that prices had been 'arranged' for all
anchors. 36 An indication of the problem that was to dog this
arrangement, both in its initial two years and in the years afterwards,
was given in Hingley's letter to Herr Kupper of Hochfelder in November
1895. v This letter stressed the need to reinstate the provision in the
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 1 : 30 August 1895, 109.
Ibid., : 26 August 1895, 102.
Ibid., : 10 September 1895, 120.
Ibid., : 21 November 1895, 158.
Ibid., : 25 November 1895, 163.
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agreement expressly forbidding the re-export of the Hall's patent
improved anchors. Anchors were supplied only for use by German
shipowners and by the German Imperial Navy and were not to be
re-exported in general trade.
Whether from good business practice, or from foresight expensively
gained in foreign markets, N Hingley & Sons Limited put the arrangement
with Hochfelders on to the basis of a formal Contract on 20 December
1895, retrospective to 1 August 1895. The agreement was signed by
George Benjamin Hingley as Managing Director, and witnessed by W B
Rumford, and was effectively an arrangement for the price fixing of all
the German work that the two firms could obtain. Clauses 1 and 2 of the
agreement restricted the manufacture of anchors to the Hall's Improved
Patent Anchor design. 	 Clause 3 covered the commission and tendering
arrangements. Clause 4 covered work for the German Imperial Navy with
Hochfelders acting as the front. This clause was to create an
intriguing embarrassment some years later when the Imperial Navy sought
quotations direct from Hingleys, not being aware of the clandestine
arrangement between Hingleys and Hochfelders." Clause 6 of the
agreement stated quite baldly that the Object of the Agreement was the
division of profits on anchors delivered to Germany. This division was
to be one half of the difference between cost price and sale price; the
payment to be made by Hingley to Hochfelders every six months without
deduction of agency commissions or expenses. 	 An indication of an
expected profit of 5/- per cwt was included.
Ibid., : 20 December 1895, 177.
39	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 30 January 1902, 181.
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A further agreement was made on 20 December 1895. This too was for two
years and provided for the regular fixing from time to time of prices
for stud link cable for delivery to ships built in Germany. 40
 The
agreement, notwithstanding its quite candid motives in fixing market
prices, was remarkable for its blend of a high tone of business ethics
with commercial realism. Clause 1 stated that its objective was not to
force excessive prices from shipowners and shipbuilders, but in a proper
and wise manner to reduce hitherto keen competition between the two
firms. Clause 2 stated specifically that the agreement referred only to
cables of the highest quality, namely Hingleys' Netherton Crown Special
Best Best or the Hochfelder Walzwerk Best Best. Clause 3 provided for a
division in equal parts whenever Netherton iron was ordered, but where
Hochfelders took the contract. Clause 4 stated that it was essential
that orders were taken alternately by the two firms, unless a disparity
came about because of the weights involved in each order.
The clandestine agreement between Hingleys and Hochfelders was dogged
throughout its life by two irritating factors. The first was
Hochfelders' propensity for selling on the HPAE anchors especially to
the Dutch markets. Hochfelders consistently ignored, by various means,
Hingleys' insistence of November 1895 that the clause forbidding selling
on should be reinstated in the agreement. The second was the problem
over royalties and commissions. This was a problem not helped by a
remarkable piece of duplicity on the part of HPAC who had conceded a
royalty to Hochfelders on all outfits supplied to German ships
constructed in Britain without informing Hingleys. This matter was only
resolved many, many years later, in 1910, when C E Lloyd took over the
management of the German combinations.
40	 Ibid., : 20 December 1895, 181.
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The rupture in relations with Hochfelder Walzwerk
The agreement of 1 August 1895 between Hingleys and Hochfelders was for
a period of two years, but it was repeatedly renewed until the end of
1903 before running into acute problems. Along the way the problems
over royalties had been eased in 1899 at a meeting between H M Hingley
and Kupper of Hochfelders. Unfortunately, however, the matter of
selling on was a problem that defied resolution. Here it is perhaps
relevant to notice that both British and German manufacturers shared a
common belief that when HPAC improved its anchor design of 1886, as it
did in 1888 and 1889, then anyone else could make the original pattern
without restriction or royalty. This without doubt was the root of the
problem over selling on.
It is possible that 'Ben' Hingley weakened his firm's position by
seeming to condone Hochfelder's breach of contract in asking for a
commission on the goods that had been sold on. 41
 He should have
supported his brother's stand over no selling on, and by November 1903
the position was virtually lost. When A H Legge reported to HPAC on H
M Hingley's meeting with Kupper of Hochfelders in that month he stressed
the very serious implications for Hingleys and for Halls. It seemed
that Hochfelders had taken the stance that it had a free rein to make
the original anchor instead of the latest model; that it could supply
the obsolete model to the German navy; and that it could supply the
obsolete model to any market free from all royalties. 42 The paradox was
that while this dispute over obsolete anchors was taking place,
perfectly normal business relations existed on general commercial work.
91	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 26 August 1901, 128.
92	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 3 November 1903, 391.
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Indeed, in the previous year H M Hingley had personally thanked
Hochfelders for declining to tender in competition for work in Rotterdam
and for their help over German work, commenting specifically on the
friendship between the two firms.°
All three firms seemed to have contributed to the virtual disintegration
in 1904 of the 1895 agreement. 	 First, HPAC failed almost by wilful
neglect to maintain its patents in Germany, thus enabling Hochfelders to
take a stance probably correct in law, but flawed ethically. Second,
Hingleys and Hochfelders fell out over the working of the equalisation
of orders by weight for German work. Then, in complete disregard for
the Anchor Agreement that debarred Hochfelders from making or supplying
any anchor other than the improved anchor and from exporting this anchor
to any other country whether or not patents apply in these other
countries, Hingleys had positive proof that Hochfelders had supplied
anchors to Holste Brothers in Amsterdam as Hingleys confirmed to Von
Bippen."
Thereafter, what had been an exceptionally good commercial agreement
between firms sank quickly into unseemly bickering, and the firms of
Hingleys and Hochfelders drifted apart with 'Ben', now Sir George
Hingley, adopting a very bitter attitude towards the company with whom
he had maintained one of the most fruitful commercial arrangements of
the period.
Almost inevitably it fell to C E Lloyd to adopt a pragmatic stance when
it proved necessary to rebuild the relationship in 1910. He began by
43	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 20 September 1902, 244.
44	 Ibid., : 14 March 1904, 335.
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enlisting the support of W Janke who was Von Bippen's colleague in
Hamburg. A quite candid admission was made to Janke that Hingleys
needed to do a deal with Hochfelder in order to carry on trading in
Germany. The original agreement of 1895 had been between three parties.
Hingleys now considered that the agreement had lapsed. Hochfelder,
however, considered that its agreement with HPAC was still in place,
thus giving them the right to manufacture the latest improved anchor
design of 1906. Hingleys were taken aback by this as the 1906 anchor
design was essentially theirs. However, if the agreement had in fact
lapsed then Hingleys' right to sell anchors in Germany was in doubt.
This was relevant as, despite the fact that German navy work was now the
province of Hochfelders, the Hamburg Amerika work definitely remained
with Hingleys." C E Lloyd with his customary adroitness effected a
rapprochement with Hochfelders within three months. He did this by
freely admitting to the differences of some years back and suggesting
that while blame lay on both sides the past should be left behind."
A new 'Letter of Agreement' prepared by C E Lloyd and adopted in July
1910 contained three provisions.	 The first was that Hingleys should
take over all the rights and obligations of Hochfelder Walzwerk in
respect of the manufacture and sale of the Hall's patent anchors. The
second was that Hingleys should pay Hochfelders El 500 by way of
consideration. The third was that an undertaking would be given by
Hochfelders to abstain from competing in the stockless anchor trade in
Germany for ten years from 16 June 1910, except for small anchors for
the Rhine trade.°	 Thus, an agreement that had began in 1895 was
45	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 2 May 1910, 130.
46	 Ibid., : 6 June 1910, 151.
o	 Ibid., : 20 July 1910, 178.
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renegotiated on a basis that was acceptable to both sides after several
years of unpleasantness between 1905 and 1910.
Borsig
C E Lloyd, who had already established commercial relations with A
Borsig of Berlin over the matter of machine made cables using the Masion
process, subsequently turned his attentions to a formal agreement with
Borsig. The preamble to the accord of 19 October 1910 did not attempt
to emulate the high moral tone adopted in the 1895 agreement with
Hochfelder. Rather, it stated quite bluntly that the object of the
accord was the limitation of competition in high class cables for the
German market. Under the general details of the accord, each firm was
to be allotted a proportion of the work available in cable making. In
respect of anchors Borsig was to enter into a combination with Hingleys
to manufacture the 1906 Hall's patent anchor design in order to keep
patents alive, and also to obtain German navy work".
The fleshing out of the memorandum of accord was carried out by C E
Lloyd personally who had taken over the German interests in the wake of
H M Hingley's sudden death.	 The document was styled: 'The proposed
agreement between A Borsig and N Hingley in respect of high class
anchors and cables in Germany'. The document contained five points of
agreement. Of these, three were matters of specification; a fourth
detailed the way in which the market share obtained was to be divided
out; but the fifth, at a time when European re-armament was a major
issue, was quite remarkable.
	 This was a most specific requirement
48	 Ibid., : 2 November 1910, 205.
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that neither party was to divulge the existence of the agreement."
More than eighty years later one can only speculate just what MI5 may
have thought of this clandestine agreement that had as its commercial
objective a sharing of Germany's naval programme of expansion.
Reverting to the three matters dealing with specification, these
provided first for the cables to be manufactured using Netherton Crown
Special Best Best with Borsig at all times matching this standard.
Second, the cable sizes to be aimed for were 53mm (2 1/8") and 77mm (3
1/16") which incredibly and coincidentally were British navy sizes.
Third, the anchor was to be the 1906 Hall's patent anchor model. On the
division of market share, and in contemplation of a ten year agreement,
in years one and two Borsig would receive 25 per cent of the work and
Hingleys 75 per cent; in years three and four the proportions would be
35 per cent and 65 per cent; and in year five and after the proportions
would be 40 per cent and 60 per cent.H
Unfortunately, the agreement foundered initially on the time scale
involved and on the quality demanded for cables. Lloyd could not
contemplate participating in the market for ordinary cable as this was a
commercial jungle. Neither would the firm enter an accord for a period
of only two years as Borsig could then walk away with all Hingleys'
superior technology. Ten years was the minimum period needed for a
proper partnership. 51 Although the tentative agreement reached with
Borsig in 1910 had foundered over the period of time for which it was to
run, changed circumstances brought it to life again. Hamburg-Amerika
determined to compete with the White Star's S S Olympic and S S Titanic,
Ibid., : 18 November 1910, 226.
Ibid., 18 November 1910, 226.
Ibid., : 12 December 1910, 244.
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and Cunard's S S Aquitania. The Kaiser had ordered a new battle fleet
and it was all action in the shipyards again. Against this background C
E Lloyd forged the agreement of 1912.
When outlining his thoughts on the agreement to W Janke, the agent in
Hamburg, Lloyd expressed the view that there was enough German work for
both firms and that unnecessary competition would be mutually damaging.
Hingleys could always beat Borsig on price, but Borsig was the local
firm. Hingleys iron was superior, but in Germany Borsig's iron was seen
as being quite adequate. Accordingly, the agreement was focused on the
use of Netherton Special Best Best iron as against the Netherton Crown
Special Best Best; and arranged tenders were to be the tendering ploy.52
The Heads of Agreement provided for:
On every order taken by either side 3/- per 100
kilogram was to be paid into a common pool for
dividing up at the end of each year
Orders would be arranged so as to give a 50 : 50
division
The agreement was to commence with the two orders for
outfits from Blohm & Voss for Hamburg Amerika vessels,
and one outfit from Tecklenborg for the Kosmos line
Only the HPAC 1906 anchors were to be offered
Hingleys was now in the delightful position of negotiating from
strength, and Sir George was rather anxious that Lloyd should not give
too much away in his enthusiasm before the agreement was all signed and
sealed. He therefore counselled Janke to be careful not to give away
market share by being too open with Borsig.
	 Hingleys had already
52	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 6 : 5 September 1912, 10.
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achieved a remarkable penetration of the German market, especially with
Bremer Vulcan of Hamburg with whom they had orders for four outfits, and
with a further two in prospect. In order to jog memories Sir George
listed for Janke the current German orders for which Hingleys was
bidding:'
Bremer Vulcan 79mm (3 1/8")
A G Weser 79mm (3 1/8")
Blohm & Voss 81mm (3 3/16")
Reiherstag 79mm (3 1/8")
A G Weser 54mm (2 1/8")
Schichau 95mm (3 3/4")
at 28/- per cwt
at 28/- per cwt
at 28/9 per cwt
at 28/- per cwt
at 20/- per cwt
at 35/- per cwt
By January 1913, Lloyd was able to confirm to A Krause of Borsig that
the agreement was working well; and that he had no objection to Borsig
monopolising lines that had no attraction for Hingleys."
Thus, an agreement that began its life with only one year in prospect
before confirmation on 30 September 1913, ran on by mutual agreement
until the outbreak of war in August 1914.
The alliance with Krupp
Because of the problems in 1910/1911 with the Borsig negotiations C E
Lloyd found it necessary to form a German alliance of some form without
delay. The answer was found with the German firm of Krupp.
53	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 6 : 23 September 1912, 25.
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Thus in May 1911 Lloyd reached an accord with Krupp of Armen, under
which that firm was to manufacture the 1906 design of the Hall's patent
anchor in Germany with a view to being awarded 20 per cent of all German
orders. The draft Memorandum of Agreement was communicated to Janke in
May 1911. 55
 The signed Memorandum was in place by June 1911 and a
formal association began that carried on right up to the outbreak of war
in August 1914. By then Krupp had become the major supplier of anchor
heads for Hingleys' trade in Britain.
With commendable speed Krupp proceeded to give the agreement a forward
impetus and before the month was out the firm was enquiring after
details of the 151/2 ton anchor in fabrication for the S S Titanic. C E
Lloyd was compelled to stall by stating that the design details were
absolutely confidential and could not be divulged. Incredibly, however,
he did pass on similar designs for 14 and 15 ton anchors. 56
 These
designs must have been of exceptional commercial value to Krupp.
The Great War, beginning in August 1914 brought to an end the mutually
advantageous German alliances that had begun in 1895, first with
Hockfelder Walzwerk, then with Borsig, and finally with Krupp.
A summary of Hingleys relations with other firms
During the entirety of the period under review from 1890 to 1918,
Hingleys proved itself a master of the commercial technique of forming
alliances and combinations to suit the economic circumstances of the
day.
55	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 27 May 1911, 427.
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The 1896 alliance with Henry Wood & Co of Saltney, near Chester, was
conspicuously successful in dominating the Italian market and led
eventually to Hingleys' commanding presence there.
The major domestic alliances, such as the six firm combination in 1897,
as succeeded by the six firm combination of 1902, and as re-grouped in
the ten firm alliance of 1904, demonstrated Hingleys' ability to combine
with its natural commercial friends as well as with its natural
commercial enemies.
As with the highly successful Italian Combination of 1896 with Henry
Wood, Hingleys' alliance with W L Byers lasting from 1904 until 1906 was
highly effective in dominating the domestic markets on the Tyne and in
North West Lancashire. It also enabled Hingleys to survive what could
have been a difficult period after the firm was excluded from Admiralty
work.
Less happy was Hingleys' formal commercial alliance with John Brown & Co
in contrast to its normal role as a supplier. Here, and notwithstanding
the goodwill of the shipowners and shipbuilders, BMMC was not able to
make a commercial proposition of manufacturing ships' cables by machine.
This is seen as part of the industry's inability at the time to cross
the bridge from trades resting on artisan skill and ingenuity, to the
excellence of automated machine made manufacture.
Of all the alliances formed in this period the most extraordinary ones
have to be those between N Hingley & Sons Limited and the German firms
of Hochfelder Walzwerk, Borsig & Co, and Krupp. These alliances, almost
invariably of a clandestine nature, enabled Hingleys to dominate the
north European market for many years. At the same time it enabled the
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German firms to develop an industry in which it had only a minor role
until the 1900s. After that, and with the growth of the Imperial German
Navy and the German mercantile marine, much use was made of Hingleys'
capabilities and products. Whether these alliances were the channels
along which the extensive naval espionage of the time was conducted
remains undetermined.
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PART FOUR :	 MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT
CHAPTER NINE :	 RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS
Generally on procurement
Notwithstanding Hingley's standing as one of the leading cable makers
and anchor makers in the world, the firm was, after all, merely one
among many suppliers to ship owners, ship builders, and to government
procurement departments.'
Contacts with foreign government departments tended to be at a
subordinate level with relationships being handled by intermediaries who
were selected to suit the culture of the countries concerned. Pertinent
examples are seen as the relations with the government departments in
Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan. These relations are contrasted with
the tactics employed in the USA after 1915 when the tariff barriers were
breached by the demands of war.
In Italy, in Spain, and in Japan, relations with governments prior to
1914 were handled by using members of the officer class to deal with
their contemporaries in government. These officers were not required to
sell wares as the agents and merchants were required to do. Rather,
their role was to inculcate, within the members of their own class in
the procurement departments, an awareness of the excellence of Netherton
iron in its various grades, coupled with the superior qualities of the
Hall's patent anchor after the re-design of 1906. Thus the government
departments responsible for procuring vessels for their respective
See chapter 3, after page 3, for a list of major liners
supplied.
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navies were rarely in direct contact at tender stage with Hingley
personnel.
In Germany, direct relations with government departments were
specifically avoided because of the nature of the commercial
arrangements that Hingleys had with Hochfelder Walzwerk, Borsig, and
Krupp from 1897 onwards. At all times, Von Bippen and Janke, were
required to preserve the secret nature of the compacts entered into by
Hingleys for German projects. This resulted inevitably in the farcical
situation of 1902 (referred to in chapter eight) when the procurement
department of the German Imperial Navy invited Hingleys to tender for
the supply of cables and anchors, not being aware of the arrangements
over tendering that Hingleys had with Hochfelders.
The situation in the USA was very different from that obtaining
elsewhere in the world. Tariff barriers effectively kept Hingleys out
until 1915. Thereafter, W Carlile Wallace was commissioned to take his
bag and his Hingley catalogues and sell to the procurement offices in
the navy yards that mushroomed on the east coast of America. Direct
contact with government was accordingly at a minimum.
In Britain direct relations with government departments grew slowly
until the 1900s. Before then Hingleys' relations with government would
have been restricted to making application for inclusion in the
Admiralty list of approved suppliers, and to bidding in response to
Admiralty tenders. There was no possibility of replicating the position
obtaining in Italy where the efforts of Major Rocca ensured that
Hingleys was stated as the standard required in navy specifications. In
Britain, the Admiralty set the standards for cables, for anchors, and
for the men employed on its work both in respect of their skills and
their rates of pay. However, in 1914 the exigencies of war required
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Hingleys as a firm to develop a permanent relationship with the arms of
government. Principally this arose from the designation of the Hingley
firm as a Controlled Establishment in October 1915. Lesser causes
stemmed from the new bureaucratic processes coupled with the incidence
of new forms of wartime taxation. However, the first real change in
Hingleys' arm's length relationship with government came as a result of
the failure of anchors on certain naval ships in 1904. This brought the
firm into direct face to face contact with the heads of department
within the Admiralty. The matter of the ships' anchors that failed is
treated in greater detail in earlier chapters. However, and whatever
the merits or otherwise of 'Ben' Hingley's handling of this affair, the
ensuing rift with the Admiralty lasted from 1904 to 1913. The exclusion
of the Hingley firm from supplying anchors to the British Navy was
matched almost paradoxically by its rise to that of being the principal
supplier of extremely large anchors for most of the major Atlantic
liners of the period. It was also matched by the part played by
Hingleys in equipping the fleet of the German Imperial Navy, and of its
mercantile marine.
Generally on Hingleys' role in the testing of cables after the
legislation of 1899
The Anchors and Chain Cables Act of 1899 brought the long established
practice of testing under the control of the Board of Trade. Hingleys'
record on testing was of the highest order, The Staffordshire Public
Chain & Anchor Testing Company having been established in 1864 with Noah
Hingley as co-founder. Following the Act of 1899 this company was
subsumed into the new Lloyds British Testing Company formed in 1900.
LBTC, while in all respects a privately owned company, was effectively
an arm of the Board of Trade. For both Sir Benjamin Hingley and Sir
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George Hingley, the chairmanship of the company became an extremely
onerous burden. For Sir George it eventually became the hardest cross
he had to bear in his business life. Indeed, in his dying days in 1918
the conduct of the affairs of the LBTC eventually drove him to his
grave.
The fall from favour with the British Admiralty
On Christmas Eve 1903 'Ben' Hingley wrote to Charles Cammell with the
disturbing news that three castings for admiralty anchors had been
condemned by the inspector. One was found to be hollow and took two
quarts of water. 2
 This relatively minor problem was blown up out of all
proportion by the bizarre misunderstanding of the situation by 'Ben'
Hingley. It resulted in Hingleys being out of favour with the Admiralty
for more than ten years. As it was, the fault in the casting was
eliminated by Fletcher's re-design of 1906, but in a few acts of
unbelievable commercial stupidity Hingley prejudiced the firm's
relations with the British government for more than a decade. Why did
it get so out of hand? Hingley was a king among ironmasters. He was
the heir apparent in the leading firm of iron, cable, and anchor makers
in the world. He was also 53 years of age, a dangerous age for private
businessmen of substance. By then Hingley would expect to be right, or
to have got it right, in most things under his control. The firm was
known to be the leading exponent of quality control in the whole cable
making and anchor business and the realisation that his company appeared
technically incompetent came as a rude shock to 'Ben' Hingley. The
situation was not made any easier when he learned to his dismay that
both Hall and Verity always knew that the Cammell castings were not
2	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 1 : 24 December 1903, 425.
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completely solid. He reminded George Hepburn of this at the time when
relations with the Admiralty were going awry.3
Relations with the British Admiralty after the rift of 1904
By the middle of 1906, some eighteen months after Sir George Hingley
assumed he had straightened everything out with the Admiralty, it had
become obvious that the Hall's patent anchor had effectively been ruled
out of service with the British navy. Essentially, the Admiralty had
embarked on a policy of discrimination in favour of the excellent
Wasteneys Smith anchor, and there seemed to be little that the other
major manufacturers could do about it. If Hingleys actions in 1904 over
their faulty anchors had been bizarre and insensitive, and if the
Hingley files are to be believed, the Admiralty's actions in the years
from 1905 verged on the extraordinary.
Reference to figure 3.1, will show that industrial activity was on the
rise during the years 1905 and 1906 when the extent of the Admiralty's
sanctions against Hingleys became very public. This rise in business
activity softened the effects of the boycott on Hingleys' trade in
anchors during these particular years. However, at the end of 1905 Sir
George wrote to A W Sampson at The Fairfield Shipbuilding and
Engineering Co Ltd, at Govan, seeking his assistance over the matter of
the Admiralty's preference for the Wasteneys Smith anchor and the
effective blocking out of the Hall's anchor.' Then, early in the new
year when confirming quotations for cruisers being built at Govan,
Hingley stated that his bid was conditional on the Hall's anchors being
taken in preference to the Wasteneys Smith's anchors cited in the
3	 Ibid., 22 June 1904, 619.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 30 December 1905, 186.
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specification, a matter about which he intended to see Sir Euan
McGregor, the Director of Naval Contracts.5
Sir Euan seems to have been well disposed towards the Hingleys and even
undertook to arrange a meeting with the Controller at the Admiralty to
discuss the preference shown for the Wasteneys Smith anchor. Meantime,
Hingleys agreed with W L Byers, the other principal manufacturer, not to
tender for admiralty work where the Smith anchor was specified. 5
 The
meeting with the Controller on 14 February achieved nothing and Hingley
obviously came away very disgruntled. When reporting to Byers on the
meeting, Sir George raised the question of the monopoly being created in
favour of Wasteneys Smith and suggesting a formal complaint to the
Financial Secretary.' Sir George also raised the matter of monopoly
when writing to John Brown at Clydebank. 5 At this time the yards of
John Brown and Fairfields were constructing two cruisers for the British
navy and Hingleys reluctantly agreed to supply the Smith's design of
anchor at a loss on the contract. This led to a very sharp personal
exchange between Hingley and Wasteneys Smith, with Hingley challenging
Smith to supply the anchors at Hingleys' bid price or face exposure over
their much higher charges. 5 This matter of price eventually became a
very emotive issue with Hingleys formally notifying Edmund Robertson, at
the Admiralty, that the Controller's policy was standardisation gone
mad, with all natural competition having been abolished, and with the
government paying 20 per cent over and above the market rate for ships'
anchors."	 In July, after a spectacular outburst directed to the
Ibid., 11 January 1906, 202.
6	 Ibid., 25 January 1906, 223.
7	 Ibid., 15 February 1906, 251.
8	 Ibid., 21 February 1906, 257.
9	 Ibid., 24 March 1906, 289.
10	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 7 August 1906, 422.
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Secretary of the Admiralty, Hingley specifically requested George
Hepburn of HPAC to join him in a visit to the Admiralty to protest
against the monopoly prevailing in favour of the Wasteneys Smith
anchors, and in lobbying MPs, and in particular Edmund Robertson at the
Admiralty. "
 This outburst was contained in a four page letter to the
Secretary in which Sir George recited Hingleys' proud record in
supplying the navy for many years. He then focused on the two cruisers
being built at Govan and Clydebank in 1905, where accepted tenders were
set aside so that the Smith's anchor could prevail. Hingley was
particularly incensed that the Hall's close stowing anchor was no longer
acceptable. He expressed distaste over the way that the Hall's anchors
had been displaced on the new Royal Yacht, notwithstanding the
preference of the constructors. He expressed the view that the
unfortunate episode of the failed anchor castings, thought to have been
sorted out between the late Sir Benjamin Hingley and Sir Euan McGregor,
was still an issue in the light of the continuing proscription on the
Hall's anchors that had resulted in his firm being asked repeatedly to
supply other firms' anchors in tenders for ships' outfits. He then
threw discretion to the wind by accusing the admiralty of sending all
its orders in one direction at prices substantially higher than
Hingleys' prices, of ruling the Hall's anchor out of service, of
insisting that only the Smith's anchor had admiralty approval, and of
demeaning Hingleys' status with foreign governments who used the
Admiralty's approved lists as points of reference in making up tender
lists 12
The Secretary at the Admiralty seems to have been completely unmoved by
Sir George's outburst and early in 1907 the Admiralty issued tender
documents in which Crown privilege was specifically invoked in requiring
11	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 12 July 1906, 388.
12	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 10 July 1906, 416.
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tenderers to offer the Wasteneys Smith anchor in breach of normal patent
requirements. This action particularly annoyed Sir George as it was
common knowledge that Smith did not actually manufacture anchors. He
designed them, but the manufacturing was carried out by Spencer & Sons
of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Notwithstanding his irritation, Sir George
wrote personally to Wasteneys Smith pointing out the breach of patent by
the Crown and enquiring if Hingleys should tender. Sir George at this
time was desperate to obtain some navy work and he offered Smith an
'arrangement' with commissions based on agreed prices. n Smith rejected
the overtures from Sir George, who then charitably wished Smith well in
the hurly burly of bidding his own anchors against his competitors who
would be offering anchors that were legally pirated under government
edict."
Sir George's endeavours in 1911 to break down the Admiralty bar on his
anchors
In December 1910 Sir George approached a retired naval officer, Admiral
McGill, with a view to him taking an appointment to push the Hall's
anchor at the Admiralty. 15 In C E Lloyd's subsequent briefing of McGill
specific reference was made to the preference of the Admiralty for the
Wasteneys Smith anchor, but stating that of late orders had been given
for the Byers' design of anchor. McGill was asked if he was prepared to
approach Sir Philip Watts at the Admiralty to 'test the water' over the
Hall's anchor. 16 McGill recommended a very gentle approach, but early
in 1911 contacts were made with the Admiralty that Lloyd found
particularly encouraging. McGill was able to visit the Admiralty in
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 16 April 1907, 601.
Ibid., 24 April 1907, 605.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 3 : 3 December 1910, 789.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 9 January 1911, 258.
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January and this visit was referred to by Lloyd when enquiring if the
time was now ripe to follow up the possibility of Halls being allowed to
tender in six months' time." It so happened that mid-way through this
six months the Director of Navy Contracts had requested sizes of the
Hall's anchors for inclusion in the Admiralty tables. Lloyd wondered if
this was sheer coincidence or the new influence of Admiral McGill.n
The watershed in the long estrangement between Hingleys and the
Admiralty was finally reached in June 1911. McGill had visited Sir
Philip Watts at the Admiralty, and C E Lloyd when discussing McGill's
visit expressed his surprise at Sir Philip's comment that HPAC had
refused to take part in navy tests. As Hingleys had been endeavouring
to get a navy trial since November 1909 this came as a shock. But, the
news from McGill that left Lloyd completely perplexed was Sir Philip's
specific reference to the universal popularity of the Hall's anchors
with the mercantile marine as being one reason for its non-use by the
navy. 19 As the excellent Wasteneys Smith anchor more than met Admiralty
requirements, Sir Philip obviously considered that Hingleys' major share
of mercantile work more than compensated for the firm's exclusion from
government contracts.
This revelation from Sir Philip concerning the universal popularity of
the Hall's anchors among the owners of the merchant fleets seems to have
relaxed the long standing frustration at Hingleys. Indeed, when
discussing with McGill the merits or otherwise of an autumn campaign at
the Admiralty, C E Lloyd went as far as to wonder if they should accept
Sir Philip Watt's view that they were doing well enough commercially
17	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 4 : 8 May 1911, 392.
18	 Ibid., 22 March 1911, 336.
19	 Ibid., 17 June 1911, 436.
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without navy work. 2° However, the great arms race was getting under way
and the navies of the world were busy ordering warships. Hingleys
entered into this work with zest notwithstanding the troubled industrial
climate prevailing at the time. Among the projects out to tender were
battleships at Barrow for the Turkish navy, work for the India Office,
warships for Chile at Newcastle, work for the German navy, a cruiser for
Australia, and Argentinean destroyers at Krupp, together with general
work for the British navy. Hingleys had a middling success rate with
this array of work, but sufficient orders were obtained to keep the
works busy.
During 1912 C E Lloyd became painfully aware of a most disagreeable
feature of government procurement procedures. The India office, which
at the time was one of the great offices of state, introduced a tactic
of accepting a tender for cables and anchors and then requiring a
discount from the successful tenderer before signing the contract.
Lloyd was so taken aback by what he called 'this undignified request',
that he dispatched both McGill and Darbishire to the new purchasing
office at the Admiralty in search of verification. 21 This rather
doubtful tactic obviously became part of civil service thinking, the
writer having experienced the same treatment in the 1980s when verbally
accepted professional fee quotations were expected to be discounted by a
sum set by the ministry before written acceptance was given.
Although events in March 1911, when the Admiralty asked for sizes of
Hall's anchors for inclusion in its lists, had led Hingleys to believe
that the long embargo on its anchors was over, the firm still had great
difficulties in obtaining contracts. C E Lloyd was particularly
dismayed in June 1912 by his inability to obtain confirmation of orders
20	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 5 : 18 September 1911, 70.
21	 Ibid., 3 April 1912, 373.
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for two destroyers under construction by J S White & Co, of Cowes. He
asked Admiral McGill to visit Sir W E Smith at the Admiralty to discuss
the problem. 22 In the course of this discussion McGill discovered that
the Admiralty actually had an approved list of suppliers for each class
of vessel in service, and that access to these lists was very difficult
to obtain. The origin of this restriction possibly lay in the desire
for greater security. At a practical level for anchor makers, it made
approval before tendering, and approval before awarding of contracts, a
tedious process.
However, and by the middle of the summer of 1913, the Admiralty bias in
favour of the Wasteneys Smith anchor underwent a major change.
Virtually overnight, and as C E Lloyd advised Admiral McGill, all six
leading manufacturers were invited to take part in tests at
Portsmouth. n The six firms were: HPAC, Wasteneys Smith, Byers, Brown
Lenox, Martins, and Taylors. The trials and the evaluations of the
results were expected to take months to progress to completion. The
outbreak of war in 1914 made the trials somewhat irrelevant as all
sources of manufacturing capacity were soon pressed into war service.
Lobbying activities with the French and Italian authorities
One of Lloyd's imaginative moves in 1912, as the now effective head of
HPAC, was an attempt to overcome the French government's embargo on
foreign cables and anchors on navy ships. This he did by offering to
license French firms to manufacture the Hall's patent anchors. In
discussing this with Marius Jullien, the firm's agent in Marseilles, he
put forward two options. The first was to sell or lease patent rights
to the French navy, with the navy arranging the manufacturing side for
Ibid., 29 June 1912, 434.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 6 : 21 August, 1913, 355.
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its own requirements, while Hingleys concentrated on the mercantile
trade. The second option was for a French firm to take a licence to
manufacture anchors for both the navy and for the merchant fleets.24
These efforts came to naught mainly because the French Admiralty had its
own chain making factories. However, when these factories were lost to
the Germans after 1914 Hingleys was able to secure part of the market
that this loss created.
At the same time in 1912 when C E Lloyd was attempting to penetrate the
French government market, Sir George became very concerned about his
hold on the Italian market. For many years Hingleys' pre-eminence there
had stemmed from Major Rocca's success in ensuring that Italian naval
specifications stated that cables had to be fabricated from wrought iron
equal to Netherton iron, and that anchors had to be equal to the Hall's
patent anchor in design. It now appeared that a competitor firm had
pressed for the removal of these names from the specifications. Sir
George's response was to instruct Admiral Michell to offer his
government a ten year deal on the basis of an exclusive contract. 25
 The
outcome of this offer is not revealed in the files, but Hingleys went on
to secure most of the bigger Italian navy contracts.
The command economy that developed during the Great War of 1914 - 1918
During the first year of the war Hingleys as a firm was able to continue
as a privately managed company. However, after the battle of Loos in
1915 when the Western Front in northern France became a continuous line
of fortified trenches, the demands of the government for 'materiel'
culminated in the Munitions of War Act of October 1915. Under this Act
the firm of N Hingley & Sons Limited was declared a Controlled
24	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 5 : 22 January 1912, 255.
25	 Ibid., 26 January 1912, 271.
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Establishment. Under the powers of direction given by the Act, the
entirety of Hingleys' production had to be in accordance with orders
given it by the new Ministry for Munitions of War. At the same time,
however, the firm had to run itself as a private concern insofar as
plant, equipment, use of labour, use of capital, use of managerial
skills, etc, were concerned. As a result, for the remainder of the war,
Hingleys and fellow manufactures found themselves in continual conflict
with the new bureaucrats who were endeavouring to impose a command
economy upon private enterprises.
Within six months of the creation of the Ministry of Munitions of War
and the take-over of the Hingley firm as a Controlled Establishment a
state of open conflict existed between the ironmasters and the temporary
civil servants at the new ministry. Early in January 1916 Sir George
Hingley had presided over a large gathering of ironmasters at which a
resolution had been passed demanding that the government set more
realistic prices for the current controlled prices of all forms of iron.
As Sir George pointed out to W R Lysaght at the Ministry of Munitions,
even scrap iron was selling for £6.10.0 per ton and the vexed question
of a revision of government fixed prices for iron had to be addressed
with vigour.26
The officials at the ministry conceded the merits of an increase in the
prices of all grades of iron, but only if the ironmasters accepted an
inspection of their cost accounts for the last quarter of 1915 to
establish the true cost of the pig iron from which all other irons were
produced. Looking back from eighty years on, one has to wonder at the
furore that this requirement provoked. Nowadays all kinds of government
agencies have the statutory right to carry out audits of the books of
private concerns.
	 In 1916, however, it was adjudged to be quite
26	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4 : 11 January 1916, 924.
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outrageous conduct even by the normally pragmatic C E Lloyd. Lloyd took
an active part in the confrontation with the ministry officials and went
so far as to accuse the Director General of having reneged on agreements
that had been reached earlier with Sir George's deputation." This
dispute was one of the first of many that followed wherein, according to
the manufacturers, temporary civil servants would negotiate positions in
open consultations, only to have the conclusions altered by other
(possibly Treasury) officials before promulgation. This practice gave
rise to many of the bitter disputes over taxation, for example, that
were a feature of later years.
The meeting with the Director General in February 1916 must have been
explosive in nature. Sir George stated, as he reported to Clarence
Smith at T & W Smith Ltd of Newcastle, that the ironmasters would not
accept the dictates of civil servants, after which he led the deputation
as a body out of the meeting. 28 Following this disastrous meeting of
February 1916, relations with the Ministry deteriorated even further.
By July 1916, Sir George was in open conflict with L Llewellyn at the
Ministry on virtually every item on the agenda. He stated quite bluntly
to Llewellyn that prices had to go up by 1 August to £14 per ton for
ordinary bar iron and £15 per ton for marked bar iron. These figures
were supported by rises of 5/- per ton in the cost of pig iron,
resulting in rises of 10/- per ton for finished iron, plus the fact that
wages had risen by 15 per cent."
The early months of 1916 saw battle lines being drawn every bit as rigid
as the trenches that spread across northern France. Notwithstanding the
state of the war, with the drawn out Battle of the Somme in preparation
27	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 8 : 14 January 1916, 460.
28	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4 : 24 February 1916, 944.
29	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 9 : 26 July 1916, 328.
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or in progress, the imposition of government dictates had outraged the
manufacturers on whom the supply of munitions depended. 	 Almost
inevitably they decided to combine in order to present a united front to
the various government procurement agencies. By July 1916 Hingleys was
a member of The Birmingham & District Association for Controlled
Establishments as H J Peart, the director now responsible for
administration, advised The Midlands Employers' Federation. n The
specific role of this Association was to handle confrontations with
government departments. All disputes over prices paled into
insignificance, however, when compared with the bitterness that arose
between manufacturers and government over retrospective taxation,
especially when coupled with a near total lack of appreciation by
government agencies of the concept of depreciation. H J Peart, the
director charged with the task of coping with the mass of reports,
returns, tax computations, and the like that were required, led the
assault on a very doubtful aspect of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, of April
1916. In this he endeavoured to enlist the support of Austen
Chamberlain, the distinguished Birmingham MP, among others, when
addressing the problem to the Rt Hon J W Wilson, MP. The nub of his
complaint was that having accepted an excess profits tax under an
earlier Act that was based on profits over and above the firm's average
profits for the two years prior to 1914 plus a weighting of 20 per cent,
the government was now proposing to tax the 20 per cent weighting as
well .fl
This was a particularly vicious move as it had the effect of savagely
diminishing Hingleys' retained earnings. The firm, as was the custom of
the times, financed repairs and replacements out of revenue. Indeed,
Hingleys' capital base had remained virtually unchanged for years. A
30	 Ibid., 13 July 1916, 314.
31	 Ibid., 9 June 1916, 271.
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reduction in the level of retained earnings could only have a dramatic
effect on the financing of these essential repairs and replacements. In
the same month as the furore arose over retrospective taxation, matters
came to a head over depreciation allowances
The origins of the dispute were innocuous enough. In addition to its
normal requirements for chains, cables, and anchors, the Admiralty now
asked Hingleys to supply square link mooring chain. Sir George agreed
to do this pointing out that this would be wartime work with a limited
life and that he would require a write-off of 60 per cent in the first
year, and 15 per cent per annum thereafter, on the capital cost of the
new forge that would have to be laid down. 32 However, 0 H Smith the
official at the Ministry of Munitions later denied ever having agreed to
the write-off proposals. It was left to C E Lloyd to attempt a deal
based on a 50 per cent write-off in the first year, he having stressed
again that the forge would be of no use to Hingleys after the war as
excess capacity in the industry was widely expected.' In the event,
the deal eventually struck by H J Peart was for the elimination of an
annual depreciation factor in return from an ad hoc higher retention of
any profits arising from the operation of the forge. N This was
pragmatic stuff, but it was taxation policy being made on the hoof,
without any regard to either the Finance Act or to normal commercial
rules.
A further major irritant at this time between manufacturers and
government was government obduracy over the working of plant virtually
to the point of destruction. Hingleys' plant, that had been obsolete
and due for renewal at the outbreak of war in 1914, was on the verge of
Ibid., 3 June 1916, 260.
Ibid., 15 July 1916, 321.
Ibid., 14 August, 1916, 350.
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breakdown. However, the granting of any licences to purchase new
equipment was fiercely resisted by the Board of Trade. In October 1916,
with a crisis looming, C E Lloyd tackled the assistant secretary in the
Marine Department of the Board of Trade over the fact that earlier
applications to replace forges had been vetoed, but that his most recent
one for a smaller forge had to be approved if the production of cables
and anchors for the mercantile fleets was to continue. Absurdly, and
because Hingleys was not the main supplier of anchors for the British
Navy the Admiralty offered little in the way of support. However, what
the civil servants in the Admiralty and the Board of Trade had
overlooked was that Hingleys supplied more than half of the requirements
of the entire British mercantile marine, as Lloyd pointed out to them
very forcefully. 35 This argument had to be repeated again in full to
the Ministry of Munitions a month later, when it was stressed that
attempts to purchase a forge from Davy Brothers in Sheffield had been
vetoed on the ludicrous grounds that Hingleys only had Category 'B'
priority, it not being a major Admiralty supplier. 36 Common sense
prevailed and licences were issued when it was eventually realised by
the Ministry that more than half the fleet on charter to the Admiralty
was serviced by Hingleys.
The crisis over pig iron that emerged in 1916
One of the happier examples of cooperation between industry and commerce
arose due to the crisis over the supply of pig iron during the second
year of the war. Strangely, there is no reference of any kind in the
Hingley files to this crisis. This, notwithstanding the fact that the
firm was totally dependent on supplies of iron ore for the manufacture
of its own pig iron for its cables and anchors. Perhaps the reason for
35	 Ibid., 27 October 1916, 466.
36	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 10 : 24 November 1916, 6.
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this lies in the contrasting treatments received from Hingleys from the
various arms of government bureaucracy. Mention has been made of the
difficulties encountered over licences for replacement of plant, and of
punitive tax measures suffered. In contrast the measures taken to
overcome the pig iron crisis involved the government in quite
extraordinary acts of generosity with the tax payers' funds.
One of those involved in tackling the shortage of pig iron was Dr F H
Hatch whose job it was to procure iron ore. After the cessation of
hostilities he wrote-up his recollections of the endeavours of the
industry. At the outbreak of the war in August 1914, there were
enormous stocks of pig iron in Britain. These arose in part from the
large importations of German and Belgian pig iron in the early months of
1914. In consequence, consumption of pig iron did not exceed its
production until June 1916. By then an Iron Ore Supply Committee was
set up within the Ministry of Munitions to handle the allocation of all
hematite pig iron that was produced. In May 1917 this direction was
extended to basic pig iron. The committee set a programme for
constructing ten new blast furnaces and re-opening a further forty-one
existing furnaces. Monthly production targets were set for 19 050 tons
of hematite pig iron, giving an anticipated production of 1 900 000 tons
of pig iron per annum. This programme was subsequently expanded from
fifty-one blast furnaces to eighty-nine. This and target production of
3 500 000 tons of pig iron per annum never became achievable. The
programme involved a massive mobilisation of the country's earthmoving
equipment and the endeavours of the MacAlpine family in this respect are
mentioned inter alia in the text. By the end of 1916 some 1 600 German
prisoners of war were drafted into the quarries in order to excavate the
vast quantities of ore that were required. Unfortunately, the supplies
of hematite ore soon ran out and Britain was left dependent on the lean
phosphoric ironstone, the main British ore. This circumstance called
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for sweeping changes in plant and in the logistical arrangements
necessary to move the ores all over Britain."
So critical was the production of pig iron that by May 1917 it was
necessary to recall men from the army to operate the newly opened or
re-opened blast furnaces. The results achieved were quite spectacular
and in February 1917 the production of basic pig iron had reached 47 920
tons per week. By May 1918 it had reached 65 530 tons per week, with
the Midlands playing a notable part in the targets achieved. The final
German offensive of April 1918 resulted in the recall of most of the
furnacemen.
Of specific significance for the furnace owners was the declared
government policy of 1916 in its negotiations with the owners. In order
to guarantee full commitment, the government laid down two principal
objectives that were to govern the programme. The first was that the
owners would have modern plants at the end of the war, constructed at
pre-war costs. The second was that extensions and new constructions
would incorporate the very latest in design techniques so as to meet the
needs of the war and of the peace. Thus, in addition to very generous
financial provisions, the industry benefited from being able to produce
pig iron at commercial prices from the traditional British phosphoric
ores with their low iron content of 28 per cent, instead of relying on
imported hematite ore that gave 50 per cent.38
The retrospect by Dr Hatch also throws an interesting light on the
supposed superiority of US steel makers, as discussed in chapter two.
The Ministry of Munitions sent a delegation to the United States in June
1916 to buy shell steel. Its task was made extremely difficult by the
37	 F H Hatch, ' Ministry of Munitions and its influence on the Iron
and Steel Trade', The Iron and Coal Trades Review, (98 1919), 873.
38	 Ibid., (99 1919), 1, 35.
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realisation that the US works were built for large scale production of a
definite class of steel. All too often this was ordinary commercial
steel that was not suitable for shells. To produce the ferro-silicon
steel needed for shells caused problems that were not capable of speedy
resolution."
In the field of social legislation the most worrying matter for Hingleys
in 1916 was the possible extension of unemployment insurance to its
large workforce of 2 300. Here, and in tune with the culture of the
times, H J Peart, when writing to R Lowndes of the Ironmasters'
Association on the matter, was genuinely mystified as to why Hingleys'
workforce, that had never experienced unemployment, should be
included." This proposed incorporation of the Hingley workforce of
some 2 300 people into the national unemployment scheme had to be seen
as a very doubtful manoeuvre on the part of government. Not in its
recorded history had the Hingley workforce ever been laid off. Short
time working yes, but never unemployment. Forced incorporation at this
stage of the early development of the welfare state was seen as a
further taxation without directly related benefits.
Thus, early in 1917 H J Peart, the director now responsible for finance
and administration, was in at the birth of the new order that has grown
ever since in leaps and bounds. This is the system under which, in most
firms of any size, there are many employees who work effectively only
for the government as tax collectors, gatherers of statistics, etc.
These employees make no contribution to the commercial life of the
business as Peart felt compelled to protest in July 1917 to the
Controller of Mines at the Board of Trade. He further stressed that he
Ibid., (99 1919), 69.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 9 : 5 July 1916, 307.
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just did not have the staff to cope with the demands of preparing income
tax returns, of producing rolling reports of production levels achieved,
of calculating munitions levels, of producing excess profit
calculations, etc, that left less and less time for administering the
business 41
Thus, in the relatively short space of three years, relations with
government underwent a dramatic change. Involvement of government in
every facet of business life, through its social welfare and taxation
policies, became an unwelcome albeit accepted fact of life. For firms
such as Hingleys,	 that were determined to have a commercial future
after the war, the experience stood the company in good stead. Its
professional managers proved themselves in the most harrowing of
conditions, and they were able to conduct the company's affairs to the
satisfaction of its now numerous small shareholders, and to the wrought
iron trade in which it was to be one of the last survivors.
Lloyds British Testing Company as a quasi agent of the Board of Trade
The Anchors and Chain Cables Act of 1899 may be seen as the watershed in
the public testing of ships cables and anchors for British ships. The
Act was sponsored by the Board of Trade and it provided for testing to
the entire satisfaction of the Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign
Shipping. The object of the Act was to establish complete independence
of testing in Great Britain. The mechanics of the new testing
provisions were described in detail by Hingleys in a letter in 1902 to
Rudolph Rosentiel of Hamburg Amerika's technischer bureau. The test
houses had to be provided by and owned by the manufacturers, but the
general work force was paid by the Lloyd's Register which in turn
charged LBTC for the monies expended. The test house supervisors were,
41	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 10 : 12 July 1917, 375.
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however, appointed and paid by the Lloyd's Register, their salaries
being paid out of the fees received for testing. These fees were 1/-
per cwt for anchors; 1/6 to 3/6 per cwt for cables, the average being
2/6 per cwt.	 The Board of Trade had the absolute right to fix the
charges 42
One of the reasons for the Act of 1899 was the intense dissatisfaction
in the English trade at the action of the Lloyd's Register in licensing
foreign testing machines for the testing of cables and anchors for
foreign owned ships, while requiring British owners to use the more
rigorous public testing. With the coming of the Act, five of the
prominent public test houses in Britain decided to join together to form
the Lloyds British Testing Company. Accordingly, the two test houses in
the Black Country were joined by the test house companies in Chester,
Glasgow, and Newcastle. Specifically excluded from the arrangement were
the test house companies in Cardiff and in Sunderland, the operators of
these companies being in ill favour with the principals of the other
five test houses. The original subscribers of the LBTC as constituted
in 1900 were: Benjamin Hingley, George Benjamin Hingley, H P Parkes, T
P Jones, and Jno. Green, representing South Staffordshire; Thomas H
Dixon and Sir Thomas Frost representing Chester; Andrew McLean and
Charles Cammell representing Glasgow; and Hugh Lee Pattinson and
Lawrence W Adamson representing Newcastle-upon-Tyne.° Benjamin Hingley
was the chairman of LBTC from 1900 to 1905, and after his death he was
succeeded by George Benjamin Hingley, his nephew, who served until he
died in August 1918.
In the period between 1896 and 1899 when the sustained campaign of The
Chain, Cable, and Anchor Manufacturers' Association came to fruition,
42	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 23 January 1902, 177.
43	 Companies House, Cardiff.
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'Ben' Hingley became clearly identified as the activist who wanted to
break the monopoly enjoyed by the Lloyd's Register. This monopoly
allowed the Register to effectively control public testing in Britain,
while at the same time allowing the licensing of foreign testing
machines for the testing of cables and anchors for foreign owned ships.
Under the Act of 1899, the Board of Trade became the regulator in chief
to the satisfaction of the manufacturers, notwithstanding the fact that
the Lloyd's Register still retained the right of endorsement of the test
house certificates. A peculiar feature of this campaign for public
control was that public testing had no place in the political and
commercial culture of France and Germany It was necessary therefore
for 'Ben' Hingley to reach an accord with Bureau Veritas of France. An
agreement between 'Ben' Hingley and John Gravell of the Bureau in 1897
provided an acceptance of the British view that cables and anchors for
sea going ships should only be examined and tested at public proof
houses having an official licence." This agreement was further
buttressed later in the year in a formal agreement concluded with P L
Breslauer of the London office of Bureau Veritas and in which the Bureau
undertook to accept only those test certificates issued by the public
test houses." With regard to Germany H M Hingley was faced with a
somewhat more difficult situation. As Hingley stressed to Herr Lacisz
of Germanischer Lloyd in 1896, it was rather anomalous for that body to
accept private test house certificates for cables manufactured in
Germany while insisting on Lloyd's certificates for the same product
manufactured in Britain." Hingley stressed the need for Germanischer
Lloyd to have a system that matched that of the Lloyd's Register in
Britain. In this contention he was probably heavily influenced by the
clandestine commercial alliance he had with Hochfelder Walzwerk.
44	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 2 : 21 May 1897, 128.
95	 Ibid., 29 October 1897, 184.
46	 Ibid., 9 November 1896, 7.
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When the Act of 1899 came into effect the Board of Trade became the
issuer of licences for the public test houses and also set the scale of
charges. The Lloyd's Register were to be the legal testers and was the
body that appointed and paid the superintendents. The manufacturers had
to provide the test houses.
Sir Benjamin Hingley, who was dedicated to testing and quality, became
the first chairman of the Lloyds British Testing Company. Its original
test houses were at Netherton, Tipton, Chester, Glasgow, and
Newcastle-upon-Tyne. His nephew, 'Ben' Hingley, never quite shared his
uncle's enthusiasm for the LBTC. As he said to a Messrs. Lamb, Beal &
Son in 1901, he would have preferred the Board of Trade to have taken
responsibility for the test houses required by the Act.° This indeed
was an odd comment coming from a man who did not care for undue
interference in the free market. Many years later, when he was dying in
1918, Sir George Hingley endeavoured to sell the LBTC to the Lloyd's
Register. The public test houses had given magnificent service
throughout the War of 1914 to 1918, and Sir George had remained
steadfast in his earlier views of 1901 that this public service ought to
be run by some sort of public body. He was never happy over the fact
that the manufacturers had to carry the full burden of providing and
maintaining the test houses to the entire satisfaction of both the
Lloyd's Register and the Board of Trade.
With the establishment of the LBTC in 1900, and building on the rapport
that had already been established by his brother with Bureau Veritas, H
M Hingley took on the task of bringing the Germans into line over
testing. He began by expressing the hope to Captain von Eickstadt of
the Reiche Marine, Berlin, that his committee would recommend to
Germanischer Lloyd that it should abandon testing on private machines in
47	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 3 May 1901, 113.
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Britain in favour of using the public test houses licensed by the Board
of Trade.	 Hingley stressed that this move was essential in the
interests of quality and in achieving an equal footing when tendering.
By and large a mutually acceptable working agreement was reached between
LBTC and Germanischer Lloyd, and this held for some three years.
However the dramatic fall in industrial activity, that reached a low
point in 1904, put strains on the alliance. Early in 1904, H M Hingley
had to remonstrate with Germanischer Lloyd over its activities with the
Bute Test House in Cardiff, a house not in LBTC. The gist of Hingley's
complaint was that he had come across Bute test certificates that had
been signed by the Germanischer Lloyd surveyor in Newcastle without
having been present at the tests in Cardiff. If Germanischer Lloyd was
prepared to extend this facility to Bute, that had no comprehensive
agreement with them, Hingley argued that Germanischer Lloyd should
include all the LBTC test houses within the facility."
Coincident with the upturn in industrial activity in the short lived
boom of 1906 and 1907 LBTC was required to embark on a programme of
renewal and refurbishment for its five test houses. Sir Benjamin
Hingley died in 1905 and his nephew, now Sir George Hingley, took over
as chairman of LBTC. Sir George's endeavours to run a business to suit
the statutory requirements of the Board of Trade and the Lloyd's
Register, while returning an acceptable level of profit to those
carrying the financial costs of the operations, namely the principal
manufacturers, became the cross that was to be a burden for the rest of
his life.
After the Navy driven boomlet of 1906 and 1907, the severity of the
collapse in industrial activity that was a feature of 1908 and 1909 had
98	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 3 : 25 September 1900, 20.
99	 Ibid., 7 January 1904, 317.
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consequential and dramatic consequences for LBTC with its seven test
houses to feed. There was Sunderland on the river Wear, and the Low
Walker test house at Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The Black Country had test
houses in Cradley Heath, Netherton, and Tipton. Chester had the test
house at Saltney; and Scottish one was in Glasgow. Things were so bad
by May 1908 that Sir George was compelled to advise Peter Sampson at the
Board of Trade that the working expenses of the test houses had to be
reduced substantially." A temporary easing of the pressure in favour
of closing one of the north east test houses came with a gesture from
the Lloyd's Register in reducing its charges by a massive 50 per cent.
Sir George, when thanking Andrew Scott for this concession, hoped that
the reduction over the time span of 1 July 1908 to 31 December 1909
would save the day."
With the return of a steady increase in industrial activity that was to
last from 1910 to 1920, LBTC settled down to a more or less settled
routine notwithstanding a continuous level of commercial irritation
created by others. However, after a compact lasting for more than a
decade, private testing machines licensed by Bureau Veritas came back
into use in 1910 in breach of the agreement with LBTC." Then early in
1911 Sir George had to urge H L Pattinson, of the Newcastle test house,
to resist the efforts of the Tyne Commissioners to extend municipal
trading by building a test house at Howden to compete with Low Walker."
However, after the serious industrial troubles of 1911 and 1912 that are
covered elsewhere, trading for LBTC improved to such an extent that at
the end of 1912 Sir George proposed to Andrew Scott at Lloyd's Register
50	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 2 : 27 May 1908, 925.
WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 3 : 15 February 1909, 121.
52	 Ibid., 696.
Ibid., 854.
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British asbe on thebeing seen tothe product depended as much on it
test itself.
With the advent of
last phase of his
LBTC. The upsurge
war in August 1914 Sir George Hingley entered on the
intensely personal involvement with the affairs of
in navy work, that was a feature of the first year of
that the superintendents be paid a special bonus. He suggested £25 for
the senior men at Netherton and Tipton; £15 for Cradley Heath, Chester,
Glasgow, and Newcastle/Sunderland; and an increase of 5/- per week for
the assistant superintendents at Netherton and Tipton.54
Perhaps the unreal situation in which the last peacetime months were
spent was captured by Sir George's continuing pre-occupation with test
certificates. Late in 1913 he was much occupied in stressing to C F
Redman, at the Lloyd's Register, of the desirability of British test
certificates being clearly identified as such so as to distinguish them
from test certificates issued abroad by foreign test houses recognised
by Lloyd's. 55 It was a very real issue to him in that the integrity of
the war, led to each of the testing houses becoming particularly busy.
However, Sir George's main concern during the first year of the war was
to prevent private test houses from breaking into a cable testing market
that was governed by statutory public testing. Eventually, Sir George
was compelled to urge J Rogers, the Inspecting Officer at the Admiralty,
to issue direction orders so that cables had to be sent to the public
test houses only. 56 This was a matter that was to cause even greater
concern later in the war, when the losses at sea became so great that
ships were commissioned for service without the cables being tested at
all.
54 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4	 :	 17 December 1912,
	 407.
55 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB,	 5	 : 26 November 1913, 	 427.
56 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB,	 8	 : 22 September 1915,
	 274.
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During the second and third years of the war Sir George's main problems
in dealing with government lay in the conflicting demands of the various
departments of state. Driven by the sheer volume of orders for ships'
cables, every conceivable firm of chainmakers was taking government
orders. More and more inferior cable was being dumped at the public
test houses, with the inevitable result that the volume of successfully
tested cable was affected. Entreaties by Sir George to Andrew Scott at
the Lloyd's Register on the consequences of so much rubbish being
submitted for testing were very pointed." This was a problem thrown
into very sharp prominence with the National Service Act of 1916
bringing as it did the possibility of call-up for the test house
superintendents, the very men who were at the heart of the testing
process. Thus the problem of reconciling the conflicting demands of the
state fell increasingly on Sir George.
The fourth and last year of the war was one of growing frustration for
Sir George, as far as the LBTC was concerned, in this particular
relationship with a government department. The company had made quite
attractive profits of £119 279 in the five years to 31 December 1917, as
Sir George had mentioned to his auditors early in 1918." For Sir
George, however, the constant demands of the labour force that early in
1918 was insisting on increases in the order of 12.5 per cent, coupled
with the Admiralty's pressure for more men to be taken on for the work
of testing, coupled with the demands of the call-up, coupled with the
relaxing of the statutory requirements for cable testing, finally caused
him to decide that enough was enough.
Thus, in his last months Sir George set out to sell LBTC to the Lloyd's
Register, the very body whose monopoly he had set out to break in the
WI-IC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 4 : 29 May 1916, 982.
58	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 5 : 22 January 1918, 203.
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lobbying that led to the Act of 1899. By then he was a dying man. His
negotiations with Andrew Scott at the Lloyd's Register showed a quite
unnecessary obstinacy. For example he refused to provide Scott with
copies of the LBTC accounts unless there was a serious commitment to
purchase the company. 59 It is not entirely clear what he wanted to keep
confidential as in the correspondence with his auditors already referred
to he had confirmed quite attractive profits for the previous five
years. Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that Sir George
needed Scott's support to do away with the practice of discounts on
fees, in order to offset the heavy wage increases in prospect." The
fears about wage increases were well founded and in March Sir George had
to complain to W B Leech the Assistant Director of Shipyard Labour, that
'uncontrolled' firms could pay what they thought fit, whereas at LBTC he
was faced with his men refusing to work unless a wages increase of 12.5
per cent was made retroactive to 15 October 1917 and not 1 January
1918."
However, in the same month, March 1918, Sir George offered to sell LBTC
to the Lloyd's Register for the sum of £270 000. In his offer to Andrew
Scott he stressed that this was lower than his originally intended
figure and that he had valued the business as a going concern including
land, buildings, machinery, tools, and goodwill." Scott obviously
baulked at the figure, and Sir George sought to reassure him
particularly over the properties and machinery by stressing that the
Board of Trade's annual maintenance requirements guaranteed that those
were in good order." However, Scott being a member of a regulatory
59	 Ibid., 15 January 1918, 196.
a	 Ibid., 1 February 1918, 217.
a	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; DLB, 11 : 4 March 1918, 242.
a	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 5 : 6 March 1918, 243.
a	 Ibid., 2 May 1918, 268.
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body and not a businessman had no concept of goodwill as part of the
value of a going concern.	 Until the 1960s when acquisitions were
increasingly made as a means of asset stripping, goodwill was always an
item in the sale price of a profitable going concern. Most valuations
invariably consisted, therefore, of the true value of the fixed and cash
assets less debts, together with a valuation of goodwill. This could be
two or three times the annual profits, depending on the strength of
repeat business. Lloyd's Register obviously had difficulty over the
goodwill factor in Sir George's valuation.
After this Sir George threw in his hand. He admitted to J A Black, the
LBTC director in Glasgow, that he was not well and that he might accept
£260 000 for the testing company. More significantly he stated: 'I do
not think I am prepared to continue acting as Chairman under present
64conditions for much longer...
His final letter to Andrew Scott in June 1918 was remarkably brusque.
He informed Scott that the South Staffordshire committee of LBTC
strongly disapproved of any further increases in pay to the Lloyd
Register's superintendents who were already very well paid; that any
alterations in charges from the Board of Trade would have to be dealt
with later and then only by himself personally; and finally, he told
Scott that if either of these matters came up, he should say that the
chairman was away and was unwell and that he should delay any business
matters until September.65
Sir George Hingley wrote no more letters. He did go away; and on 19
August 1918 he died.
64	 Ibid., 3 May 1918, 271.
65	 WHC : Sec. 8 ; GBHPLB, 5 : 14 June 1918, 289.
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A summary
The transition of the Hingley firm from supplicant supplier to major
lobbyist and setter of international standards for ships' cables and
anchors, is seen as one of its major achievements during this period.
Without doubt, Hingleys' ability to persuade the governments of Italy,
Germany, Japan, and other maritime nations including eventually the USA,
through its agents, that cables made from the best Netherton iron and
anchors made to the HPAC design of 1906 were the best in the world, was
a crowning achievement of this period. It should be noted, however,
that Hingleys' excellence in these products stemmed directly from its
supplicant role with the British Admiralty. The admiralty
specifications compelled manufacturers to produce the very best. It was
thus on the back of this enforced excellence that Hingleys' hegemonic
position in the supply of cables and anchors to foreign governments was
mounted. Likewise the regulatory role of the Board of Trade in liaison
with the Lloyd's Register also had the effect of raising the quality of
Hingleys' domestic endeavours to the level that made the firm unbeatable
in the foreign market.
Regarding relationships with foreign governments, the Hingley brothers
proved to be particularly perceptive in identifying the officer class as
the route to influencing specifications, especially in Japan and Italy.
Evidence of any firm relationship with the German government has not
come to hand. What is certain, however, is that the enormously
successful and clandestine arrangements with major German firms, using
highly placed agents as monitors, effected a more than satisfactory
arm's length relationship with Germany.
As with all firms with a capability to manufacture the munitions of war,
Hingleys had a major problem in adapting to the sheer scale of
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government bureaucracy created after 1915. That it did cope,
notwithstanding continual reductions in its clerical personnel, is yet
another tribute to the professional management introduced by Sir George
and consolidated by C E Lloyd.
Of all relationships with governments, the longest was that brought
about by testing. Ever since the major role played by Noah Hingley in
setting up The Staffordshire Public Chain and Anchor Testing Company in
1864, the firm through the standards that it created had an influence on
the Board of Trade and the Lloyd's Register. The Anchors and Chain
Cables Act of 1899 that resulted in the formation of the Lloyds British
Testing Company as a quasi agent of the Board of Trade, ensured for Sir
Benjamin and for Sir George Hingley an intimate relationship with
government terminated only by their deaths.
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CONCLUSION
In my introduction I stated that the main thrust of my dissertation
would be to show that the firm of N Hingley & Sons Limited was an
industrial anachronism harnessed to a paradox. Hingleys was able to
maintain a hegemonic position in the shrinking market for high quality
wrought iron because it made a product - large diameter ships' cables
and large anchors - that could not be made as well in the steel that was
available at the time.
This is not to suppose that the Hingley management buried its corporate
head in the sand as far as technological development was concerned. In
1904 the brothers 'Ben' Hingley and H M Hingley made a serious approach
to the Belgian firm of L'Societe Generale du Laminage Annulaire on the
subject of the manufacture of ships' cables by machine. This was
followed in 1907 with an equally serious approach to a second Belgian
firm, L'Homogene Societe Anonyme Internationale. These approaches
eventually culminated in the formation in 1908 of the joint venture
company known as British Machine Made Cables Co Ltd., in which Hingleys
and John Brown invested jointly £100 000. The company was launched on
the expectations that the Masion process of Laminage and the Girlot
process of L'Homogene would enable it to take a commanding presence in
the supply of large diameter ships' cables. The venture failed on two
counts : the first was the inability of the machinery to produce the
larger sizes of cable to a performance standard acceptable to the trade.
The second was the total intransigence of the workforce that point blank
refused to carry out the vital finishing work on the machine made
cables. As was common for the time the machine made product could only
be brought into service if the vital man made shackles and the like were
to hand.	 Here a complete block on this work revealed an intriguing
c/1
facet of the relationship between masters and men in the Hingley works.
There, the basis for all working practice was the agreements reached in
the meetings of the Midland Iron & Steel Wages Board. These agreements
were aimed at mutual well being, with profits for the masters and good
pay for the men depending on the production by hand of wrought iron and
its products. At the time it was too soon for the men to give away
their privileged industrial way of life. Thus, and right through to the
death of Sir George Hingley in August 1918, the only real concessions to
mechanical progress in the works was the introduction of the famous
Nasmyth steam hammer in 1850 by Noah Hingley himself, together with the
efficient rolling machines that enabled the firm to produce such high
quality wrought iron. Even to the end of the Hingley era in 1918, the
firm's preferred process of producing wrought iron remained essentially
the puddling process designed by Henry Cort in 1784.
The paradox lay in the fact that notwithstanding the steady decline of
wrought iron as a world metal, and the great advances in metallurgy that
took place during the period under review, Hingleys' wrought iron
remained undisputedly the best material available for the manufacture of
large diameter ships' cables. I found it significant that only after
the outbreak of war in 1914 did the USA admit that its cables were
vastly inferior in quality to those made from wrought iron in Britain.
From 1915 onwards Hingleys, through its agent W Carlile Wallace, brought
home to the Americans the superiority of the British product
manufactured from wrought iron. This product was supplied in large
quantities, on a par with that of the equipping of our own ships, for
the duration of the Great War. The paradox here lay in the fact that the
US, by now the leading producer of steel in the world, could not at that
stage manufacture a satisfactory ship's cable. Significantly however,
within days of Sir George's death in 1918, C E Lloyd instructed Wallace
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to investigate the progress being made in America to produce a variety
of steel to match the essential characteristics of wrought iron.
It is possible that Lloyd's interest in the possibility of using steel
for the manufacture of ships' cables arose from reports on a method
under development in the United States. This involved the casting of
steel anchor chain in sand moulds, the interlinking being achieved in
the construction of the moulds and the subsequent pourings.1
In harnessing the efforts of the firm to the international demand for
its products, Hingleys always had several factors of major significance
in its favour. These were focused on the sheer good fortune of having
the works located in an area rich in coal, limestone, and the iron ore
that were so vital in production of wrought iron. Noah Hingley built on
this good fortune and he was able to leave to his son Benjamin, and his
grandsons G B Hingley and H M Hingley, a family firm that was easily
converted in 1890 into a soundly based corporate body. Thus the firm of
N Hingley & Sons Limited was able, through its inherent stability, to
act as the standard bearer for the trade throughout the period under
review.
Notwithstanding the relative calm in which the firm carried on its
business from Netherton, the country and industry at large was subjected
to much rapid social and economic change during the period under review.
After 1890 the organisation of unskilled labour effected changes in the
relationships and attitudes between labour and capital that resulted in
marked hostility for almost the next ninety years. Until the outbreak
of the Great War in 1914, Hingleys was largely shielded from industrial
1	 A E Crockett in the Proceedings of the Engineers' Society of
Western Pennsylvania (35 1919) 1-25 referred to in Journal of the 
Iron and Steel Institute, (99 1919) 659.
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strife due mainly to the workings of the Midland Iron & Steel Wages
Board that resulted in amity over pay.
Ideologically the long time nostrum that destitution was more likely to
be due to fecklessness or to the divine will was finally discarded as a
worthless concept of a man's state. In its place there developed an
ideological desire to improve the quality of the nation's basic asset of
people. After a last rearguard action in the 1890s by the do-ers of
good works, the early 1900s saw the state taking a greater role in the
physical care and feeding of school children. After the landmark
general election of 1906, the determination of central government to
involve itself in the affairs and situation of its least advantaged
citizens became part of the constitutional ethic. The culmination of
these endeavours came with the National Insurance Act of 1911 that
enshrined the concept that neither sickness nor unemployment should
necessarily result in destitution. Hingleys had a good record in mutual
welfare and, although paternalistic until the Great War, national
insurance plus the workings of the Wages Board ensured the firm one of
the happier places in the peace.
Economically the firm was as exposed as any other to market forces, but
due to the hegemonic status that it held in the trade it was able to
influence the fortunes of many out of all proportion to its own size and
position. This was demonstrated with great effect in the trading
combinations of 1897, 1902, and 1904, in which Hingleys brought together
the leading firms in the cable making trade to cope with the sheer scale
of demand created in the mini-booms of 1897 and 1904 and with the
depressed conditions of 1902. Other trading alliances enabled the firm
to corner the anchor market in Italy and in the northern areas of
England, and for almost ten years from 1904 to offset the banishment by
the Admiralty.
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In parallel with the formidable trading alliances created in Britain,
Hingleys ran the hugely successful trading partnerships with German
firms from 1895 right through to the outbreak of war in 1914. These
partnerships left a question that I have been unable to resolve : was
Hingleys' firm a major agent of espionage for the British Government in
Germany? Certainly, the amount of information on the Imperial Navy that
was in British hands in the 1900s must have come from a reliable source.
And again, was a dispute over less that £250 worth of repairs of
sufficient magnitude to have Hingleys barred by the Admiralty at a time
when the gathering of naval intelligence by a firm apparently out of
favour with its own government may well have been yet another of its
clandestine roles in Germany?
Hingleys enjoyed virtually continuous production in all its works, save
for a bad few months in 1909, throughout the whole of the period under
review. It followed, therefore, that its wares had to be sold, and the
firm developed a system of marketing that was highly effective. The
tables given in chapter seven demonstrate the spread of representation
across the entirety of the world where wrought iron, cables, and
anchors, could be used. Marketing strategy in Britain and the colonies
was based on a tight group of London merchants, whose efforts were
supplemented by their own branch operations in the colonies and by
Hingleys' own personally selected agents who were expected to work in
concert with the merchants. In Italy and Japan a different approach was
needed and Hingleys tapped into the culture of an officer class that
needed to supplement its basic income by commercial representation. In
Germany, a small number of highly placed agents was recruited to help
negotiate and then monitor the clandestine commercial alliances with
Hochfelder Walzwerk, Borsig, and Krupp. By painstaking attention to
detail, coupled with its ability to demonstrate the superiority of its
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products, the firm ensured that its wrought iron, cables, and anchors,
sold well in most of the developing colonies and in the maritime
countries of the world.
As to the products themselves, Hingleys set a world standard for all the
normal uses for wrought iron. Its bar iron, although not as easy to
work as cheaper brands, was unequalled for durability and tensile
strength. It had no difficulty in holding its market in mining, railway
construction, rolling stock construction, and general use. Likewise
with ships' cables, the firm was one of a very small number able to make
both large diameter and fine diameter cables per the Admiralty
specifications that called for accuracy to 1/16th of an inch. As such,
and coupled with the remarkable quality of its cables, the firm was able
to dominate market share whenever reliability was the key determinant.
Regarding anchors, the Hingley firm had been anchor smiths since 1848,
but with the coming of the big ships in the later part of the 19th
century it pooled its resources with the superior design capability
enjoyed by the Halls Patent Anchor Co. Ltd. The association between
inventor and anchor smith began with the manufacture of the Hall's
designs of 1888 and 1889, with the leap forward to major eminence with
the design of 1904. This latter design was the one containing the
critical fault that led to Hingleys taking over the design in 1906, a
move that resulted in Hingleys becoming the producer of the finest large
anchors anywhere in the world.
During the course of the dissertation I have endeavoured to demonstrate
how, during the period under review, Hingleys' relationships with its
own government in particular changed from a long arm's length
arrangement to an involvement with the agencies of government in every
facet of the firm's operations. In 1890 contact with government was
limited in the main to a deferential course of action aimed at ensuring
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the inclusion of the firm's cables and anchors on the navy list. This
changed dramatically after 1904 and the debacle of the failed anchor.
This resulted in Hingleys developing a determined lobbying approach that
had very little success. However, after 1912 when Hingleys had acquired
the Halls Patent Anchor Co Ltd., and had appointed a retired admiral as
its chairman, things did improve partly because of personalities and
very much due to the re-armament programme. It was, however, in the
field of social welfare that involvement with government became most
marked. Although Hingleys' workforce was largely excluded from the
workings of the labour exchanges and the old age pensions introduced in
1906, the National Insurance Act of 1911 changed forever the
relationship between employer and employee. With the State now taking
the lead role in the provision of unemployment pay and in the provision
of medical services, Hingleys as a paternalistic employer had its status
reduced to that of one of the many that were no longer the sole
providers for its workforce.
The Great War had the greatest effect, however, on relations with
government. After 1915 when the firm was declared to be a Controlled
Establishment, it was for all practical purposes merely a technical arm
of government. That it was able to cope with the demands of a command
economy, while having to operate as a capitalistic entity subject to the
new order of regulations, production targets, and taxation of many and
various kinds, was due in no small measure to the professional
management introduced by Sir George Hingley after 1908. Of all his
formidable achievements, the way in which he transformed his erstwhile
regime of the gaffer and two aides into a highly effective professional
board of directors must rank as one of his finest achievements,
especially as the transition was effected within three years. It was
the period during which G C Edwards was brought in as a professional
company secretary, C E Lloyd was appointed as the new managing director,
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and J S Trinham was brought in as a professional personnel director.
Under Sir George's firm hand these newcomers soon gelled with the
masters of the iron trade in the firm, namely G F Hartshorne who had
taken over from H M Hingley, and E H Smith and C E Howell the trusty
works managers.
The final paradox in the Hingley story has to concern Sir George
Hingley's early determination to concentrate the ownership of the
business in the hands of himself and his brother. After his death the
ownership became so widely spread that N Hingley & Sons Limited was
effectively a company wholly under the control of its professional
managers. In this it was among the earliest of British companies to
find itself in this position.
Finally, it is my hope that this story will guarantee a place in the
recorded history of the Black Country for the firm founded in 1820s by
Noah Hingley. A firm transformed by his son Benjamin into a private
company in 1890, and taken on to international hegemony in the trade of
ships' cables and anchors by his son Hezekiah's children, George
Benjamin Hingley and Henry Montagu Hingley. This was the firm, situated
on the side of a canal in Netherton that led the world in the production
of ships' cables and anchors. It had a concentration of excellence that
created a remarkable epitaph for the three generations of Hingleys who
headed the firm. As for the area from which the firm traded in 1920,
some 90 per cent of all chain manufactured in the British Isles came
from the Black Country. 2 The ships' cables and anchors on the
Mauritania, Lusitania, Bismarck, Imperator, Aquitania, Olympic, and
Titanic, were just some among many in the era of the big ships of the
1900s that were the products of N Hingley & Sons Limited, Netherton
Ironworks, Dudley, North Worcestershire, England.
2	 Moss, Chainmakers, 18-29.
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[53 & 54 Vim] Partnership Act, 1890.	 [cif. 39.]
CHAPTER 39.-
.	 .	 •
An Act to declare and amend the Law of Partner- A.D. 1890.
ship. •	 [14th August 1890.]	 —
B
E it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present •
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same,
as follows :—
Nature of Partnership.
.1.—(1) Partnership is 'the relation which subsists Definition of
between persons carrying on a business in common with partnership.
a view of profit.
(2) But the relation between members of any com-
pany or association which is—
(a) Registered as a company under the Companies 25 & 26 Viet.
, Act, 1862, or any other Act of Parliament for c. 89.
the time being in force and relating to the
registration of joint stock companies; cir
(b) Formed- or incorporated by or in pursuance of
any other Act of Parliament or letters patent,
or Royal Charter; or
(c) A company engaged in working mines within
and subject to the jurisdiction of the Stannaries :
is not a partnership within the meaning of this Act.
2. In determining whether a partnership does or
does not exist, regard shall be had to the following rules :
(1) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, joint pro-
perty, common property, or part ownership
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Partnership Act, 1890. [53 & 54 VICT.]
Seotion.
A.D. 1890. 24. Rules as to interests and duties of partners subject
to special agreement.
,25. Expulsion of partner.
26. Retirement from partnership at vein.
27. Where partnership for term is continued over,
continuance on old terms presumed.
28. Duty of partners to render accounts, &c.
29. Accountability of partners for private prate.
30. Duty of partner not to compete with firm.
31. Rights of assignee of share in partnership.
Dissolution of Partnership, and , its consequences.
32. Dissolution by expiration or notice.
33. Dissolution by bankruptcy,•death, or charge.
34. Dissolution by illegality of partnership.
35. Dissolution by the Court.
•36. Rightè . of persons dealing with firm - against ap-
parent members of firm. ,
37. Right of partners to notify dissolution.- , -	 • •
38. Continuing authOrity 'of partners for purposes of
winding up.	 •	 -	 •	 .
39. Rights of partners as to application of partnership
property.	 .	
`Ift... •40. Apportionment of premium where partnertip pre-
maturely dissolved. .
41; Rights *here partnership dissolved for fritn11--or
• misrepresentation. •
	 . - •
42. Right of outgoing partner in certain cases to shire
profits made after dissolution.: 	 ,
43. Retiring or deceased partner's share to be a debt.
44. Rule for distribution of assets On final settleMent
of accounts.
	 • r
'	 •
-
Supplemental.
45. Defmitions of " court " and "business."
46. Saving for rules of equity and common law..
47. Provision as to bankruptcy in Scotland.
48. Repeal.	 .
49. Commencement of Act.
•50. Short title. -
" Sciithinax.
•
APPENDIX TWO;
Memorandum of Association for N Hingley & Sons Limited
THE coHPANIES ACTS, 1862 Tr) 1890.
COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES-
fibcnioranbunt of association
OF
N. HINGLEY & SONS LIMITED.
1. The name of the Company is "N. HINGLEY AND SONS LIMITED."
2. The Registered Office of the Company will be situate in England.
3. The objects for which the Company is established are :—
(a) To adopt and carry into effect an agreement dated the eighth
day of September, 1890, and made between Benjamin
Hingley, of Hatherton Lodge, Cradley, in the Parish of
Halesowen, in the County of Worcester, Iron and Coal .
Master, of the one part, and Alfred Hilton Legge, Accountant
to the firm of N. Hingley and Sons, of the other part, for
the purchase of the lands and buildings, ironworks, blast
furnaces, collieries, mines, hereditaments, stock-in-trade,.
tools, implements, real and personal estate, goods, chattels,
book debts, credits and effects, trade marks, existing con-
tracts, and businesses of the firm of N. Hingley and Sons, as
specified in the said agreement, and to carry out the terms of
the said agreement either with or without modification.
(1)) To continue the businesses hitherto carried on by the said
Benjamin Hingley under the firm of N. Hingley and Sons,
and to enjoy and undertake all the existing rights and
liabilities relative thereto, and to make such additions
and modifications to and in such businesses as may from
time to time be deemed expedient.
(c) To carry on in any part of the world all or any of the following
trades or businesses, namely : Ironmasters, Colliery Proprie-
tors, Mine Owners, Miners, Manufacturers of Pig Iron and.
finished Iron of all kinds, Cables, Anchors, Chains, Sheets,
Plates, Rails, and of Iron and Steel in all their branches,
Iron, Steel, and General Merchants, Iron and Brass Founders,
Smelters, Chemical 11-nnilfanturer.s, Contractors, Engineers,
2Boiler Makers, Wheelwrights, Boatbuilders, the making and
repairing of all kinds of Wagons, Trucks, Carriages, and Carts,
Slag Dealers, Commission Agents, Manufacturers of Forgings,
Bricks, Tiles, Pipes, Coke, Patent Fuel, Gas, Lime Burners,
Farmers, Timber Merchants, and any other trade or business
which may be thought for the benefit of the Company to
carry on in connection with any of the trades above specified.
(d) To search for, get, raise, make merchantable, sell, purchase,
and deal in Coal, Coke, Charcoal, Timber, Ironstone, Lime-
stone, Iron, Steel, or any other minerals, metals, chemicals,
articles, materials, preparations and things, and to effect
any such purchases and sales on commission, or as Agents
or otherwise.
(e) 'To apply for, purchase, or otherwise acquire ari:Patents,
licenses and the like conferring an exclusive or non-exclusive
or limited right to use any invention which':May
capable of being used for any of the purposes of the
Company, or the acquisition of which may seem calculated
directly or indirectly to benefit the Company, and to use,
exercise, develop, grant licenses in respect of and otherwise
turn the same to account.
(I) To purchase or otherwise acquire and undertake all or any part
of the business, property, and liabilities of any person or
company carrying on any business which this Company is
authorised to carry on.
(g) To purchase, acquire, take on lease, construct, erect, equip,.
make, maintain, work, and use all or any of the following
matters or things, namely :—Blast Furnaces, Ironworks,
Chain, Cable and Anchor Works, Ironfoundries, Lime Works,
Boiler Works, and all other kind of works, houses, offices,
workshops, and other buildings, railways, tramways, canals,
quays, slip-ways, wharves, staiths, docks, shipping places,
gas works, water works, reservoirs, coke ovens, roads, tele-
graphs, telephones, and other works and appliances, steam-
ships and other vessels and machinery, rolling stock, tools,
and plant of all kinds necessary or convenient for the purposes
of the Company, or any of them, or calculated, directly or
indirectly, to advance the interests of the Company, and to
contribute to the expense of or aid in the acquisition, con-
struction, maintenance, improvement, development, Or
use of any such matters and things.
(h) To enter into partnership or into any arrangement for sharing
profits, union of interests, or co-operation with any person or
company carrying on or about to carry on any business
which this Company is authorised to carry on, or any
business or transaction capable of being conducted so as,
directly or indirectly, to benefit this Company, and to take
or otherwise acquire and hold shares or stock in or securities
of, and to subsidize or otherwise assist any such company,
and to sell, hold, re-issue with or without guarantee, or
otherwise deal with such shares, stock, or securities.
(i) Generally to purchase, take on lease or in exchange, hire or•
otherwise acquire any real or personal property, and any
rights or privileges which the Company may think necessary
or convenient with reference to any of its objects, and cap-
able of being conveniently dealt with in connection with any
of the Company's property or rights for the time being, and in
particular any land, buildings, easements, licenses, pa:tents,
machinery, plant, tools, implements, and stock-in-trade, and
to purchase, hire, construct, repair, and navigate boats for
the purposes of the Company.
(j) To establish, provide, maintain and support, or aid in or
contribute to the establishment, provision, maintenance and
support of any schools, buildings, hospitals, institutions,
associations, classes, or libraries for the benefit, either
altogether or in part, of persons employed by or having had
dealings with the Company, and of their families, servants,
and others, and to 'grant or continue any pensions or
allowances to any such persons and' their families and
relations, and to subscribe or guarantee money for charitable
or benevolent objects, or for any exhibition, or 'for any public
or useful objects, and to recompense or reward persons in the
employ of the Company for services rendered by them either
by the payment of money or by allotting Share to such persons
direct or to a Trustee or Trustees for their benefit upon
such terms and conditions as may be deemed expedient.
(k) To apply for, promote, support and obtain any Bill in or Act
of Parliament or Piovisional Order or other authorization
calculated to benefit the Company, or to advance any of its
objects, and to oppose any Bill or Provisional Order or
prolongation or extension of patent promoted or applied for
by any other person'. or Company.
(1) To promote, make, provide, acquire, lease, use, and dispose of
railways, canals, tramways, and other ways,. for the more
convenient access to any parts of or otherwise for the benefit
of any property of the Company, and to connect the same
with any railway,, tramway, port, .place, river, canal, or out-
let for traffic, and to disburse for or contribute to the expenses
4of promoting, making, providing, acquiring, working, or usi]
the same.
(m) To make and carry into effect arrangements with la,ndownel
railway companies, shipping companies, and owners, carriel
and other companies and persons, for transport from or
any parts or places of minerals, goods, or other articl
manufactured or sold by the Company, or required for tlic
operations.
(n) To promote any other Company for the purpose of acquirii
all or any of the property and liabilities of this Company, 1
for any other properties which may be thought to be for ti
benefit of this Company directly or indirectly.
(o) To lend money to such persons and on such terms as may see.
expedient, and in particular to customers and others havir
dealings with the Company, to guarantee the performance
contracts by any such persons, and to become sureties.
(p) To sell, improve, manage, develop, build upon, lease, Mortgag
dispose of,;turn to account, or otherwise deal with all or an
part of the real leasehold or personal properties of tl-
Company.
(q) To borrow any amount of money upon mortgage or raise mone
for all or any of the purposes of the Company in such manne
as may be deemed expedient, and in particular by the issu
of or upon debentures, bonds, bills, notes, or other obrig-
tions or securities of the Company, or by mortgage of a
or any part of the Company's property or assets, real an
personal, including its uncalled capital, or without any suc
security.
(r) To draw, accept, make, indorse, execute, and issue bills c
exchange, promissory notes, and other negotiable instrument:
(s) To sell, lease, and dispose of the whole or any part of th
undertaking of the Company, and the whole or any of th
property of the Company, for such consideration as th
Company may think fit, and in particular for Shares
debentures, or securities of any other Company, havin
objects altogether or in part similar to those of this Company
(t) To issue as fully paid up or partly paid up, or at or subject t
any premium or discount, any of the Shares of the Company
and to issue Guaranteed or Preference Shares or Stock.
To employ any of the funds of the Company in the purchase o
its own Shares, and to hold, sell, and dispose of any Share
so purchased according as the Company think fit, but not s(
as to constitute a reduction of the Capital within the meanin;
of "The Companies Act, 1867."
U(u) To establish and regulate in the United Kingdom or elsewhere
manufactories, works, agencies, and depots for the purposes
of the Company, and to enter into any contracts, agency, or
other agreements relating to the businesses which the
Company may for the time being carry on with any person
or persons, company or companies, which the Company may
consider conducive to the interest of or for the benefit of the
Company.
(v) To allot any Shares of the Company credited as fully or partly
paid up, as the whole or part of the purchase price for any
property purchased by the Company, or in pursuance of any
contract in connection with the Company's business.
(w) To pay all the expenses of and preliminary to and incidental
to the promotion, formation, establishment, and registration
of the Company, and all brokerage, discount, and other
expenses which may be deemed expedient for placing all or
any of the Company's Shares and Debentures or any other
obligations.
(x) To invest and deal With the moneys of the Company not
immediately required upon such securities and in. such
manner as may be from time to time determined.
(y) To do all or any of the above things in any part of the world,
and either as principals, agents, or otherwise, and either
alone or in conjunction with others, and either by or through
agents, or otherwise, and to procure the Company, to be
incorporated, registered, or recognised in any foreign country
or place, or in any British Colony.
(z) And generally to do all such things as are incidental or
conducive or auxiliary to the attainment of any of the above
objects.
4 : The liability of the members of the Company is limited.
5. The Capital of the Company is £250,000, divided into 5,000
Shares of £50 each, with power to decrease or increase, and Shares form-
ing the Capital of the Company (original or increased) may be divided
into different classes or consolidated into Stock, with such rights, prefer-
ences, priorities, and guarantees as between the respective holders thereof
as may be prescribed by any re4u1ations which may be made by the Com-
pany, and which shall for the time being be in force, and any Shares may
be issued at a premium, at par, or at a discount. Any part of the Capital
of the Company may be issued in Stock or in Shares, which shall be deemed
and credited as partly or fully paid up, or in Share Warrants to bearer,
and interest at a rate to be agreed upon between the Directors and the
Shareholder may be paid to any Shareholder on all amounts paid in advance
of calls, and on all amounts of uncalled capital paid in advance.
6WE, the several persons whose names and addresses are subscribed
are desirous of being formed into a Company in pursuance of this Memor-
andum of Association and we respectively,agree to take the number of
Shares in the Capital of the Company set opposite to our respective names.
NAME, ADDRESS, AND DESCRIPTION OF EACH SUBSCRIBER.
Number of Shari
taken by each
Subscriber.
Ten Shares
Ten Shares
Ten Shares
Ten Shares
Ten Shares
Ten Shares
BENJAMIN HINGLEY, of Hatherton Lodge, Cradley, Worcestershire,
Iron and Coal Master.
GEORGE BENJAMIN HINGLEY, of Haywood, Halesowen, in the
County of Worcester, Iron and Coal Master.
HENRY MONTAGU HINGLEY, of Haywood, Halesowen, in the
County of Worcester, Iron and Coal Master.
JOSEPH HINGLEY, of Linton House, Cradley, Worcestershire
Gentleman.
SAMUEL HINGLEY, of Fair View, Cladley, Worcestershire, Ironraaster.
LEAH HINGLEY, of Hatherton Lodge, Cradley, Worcestershire,
Spinster.
FANNY GEORGINA HINGLEY, of Hay	 wood, Halesowen, Worcester-
shire, Widow.
Ten Shares
Dated the 8th day of September, 1890.
Witness to the signatures of BENJAMIN HINGLEY, GEORGE BENJAMIN
HINGLEY, HENRY MONTAGU HINGLEY, and JOSEPH HINGLEY,
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, SOLICITOR,
83 Colmore Row, Birmingham.
Witness to the signatures of SAMUEL HINGLEY, LEAH HINGLEY, and
FANNY GEORGINA HINGLEY,
RICHARD AUGUSTUS EATON,
CLERK TO WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
83 Colmore Row. Birmingham,
SOLICITOR.
APPENDIX THREE:
Patents for anchors manufactured by:
0 Halls Patent Anchor Company
Date of Application, 11th Mar., 1886.
Complete Left, 11th Dec., 1886.
Complete Accepted, 11th Jan., 1887.
A.D. 1886, 11th MARCH. N° 3461.
. PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in the Construction of AnotorS.
We Joan FRANCIS HALL of Norbury, Sheffield, in the County of - York, Manzi:
of Steel Works, and JOHN VRRITY of Billing Bank, Bramley z near Leeds in ths --
County of York, Engineer, do hereby declare the nature of this invention to bias
follows :—	 •	 • " 1,
5 The objects of our invention are to simplify the construction of anolfors and firender--,..;
them more efficient and certain in their action, and less liable to roll over than /lemur,
tofore ; a common fault with some anchors, causing the cable to twist and "reek.
According to our invention we make the arms or flukes in one. piece, and at the , 4
crown or upper portion thereof a trough is provided for the reception of the trunnions, -
10 which are formed on the upper end of the shank and fit between two projecting park
within the trough. A bolt or pin being passed through the projecting pieces and..
trunnions, retains the shank in position between the arms or flukes, at the samniimei-'4--,2'.
allowing a radial movement of the arm to any required angle. 	 • '
The trunnions after being placed in position in the trough and secured there by.
15 means of the aforesaid bolt, are enclosed therein by a suitable cover. 	 • ‘-
In order to place the shank in position a hole is provided at the bottoni offht:,
trough through which the shank is passed where it is held by the hereinbefore
mentioned bolt.	
'In orderr to make the action of the anchor more certain we provide projecting . or t-
20 "tripping up" pieces on the crown or upper portion of the trough, these arms haviti*
the effect of throwing over the arms of the anchor into position for instantly. taking. -
hold of the ground as the anchor is dragged thereon. 	 .	 .
The stock bar is formed in two parts these are hinged onto the shank hi - a sui' *ta-lict
position, so that they can be turned down against the sides Of the shank in order,thatf-----1
25 such stock bar when closed against the aforesaid sides can be drawn up therewith into
the hawse pipe, or compactly stowed on deck or at the side of the ship.'
This arrangement of hinged stock bar is applicable to other anchors. -
•J. W HARDEgt,;:!,
-	 Agent. .
.s--;rn'elfqWr
[Price dd.]	 ritLWEI
-ikek'r-afi
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Hall 1. Verity's Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
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COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
- Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
.	 ,
'.We JOHN FILIN6IS HALL of Norbury Sheffield in the County of York, Manager
of Steel Works and JOHN VERITY of Billing Bank Bromley near Leeds in the County
of York, Engineer do hereby declare the nature of this invention and in what manner
• the same is to be performed to be particularly described and ascertained in and by the
' following statement:—
	 5
• The objects nf our invention are to simplify the construction of anchors and to
reader them more efficient and certain in their action, and less liable to drag or roll
- over than heretofore.
DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS.
17 Mg. I ia a flint elevation. Fig. 2 a side elevation. Fig. 3 a plan looking at the 10
) .Fige.4._5. 6. 7. 8. a. 10 and 11 are various views showing details of the same.
According to ear invention we make the two arms or flukes A in one piece, pre-.
lerably in. oast steel; and at the •crown or upper portion thereof is formed a trough B
•fee the reoeptiotx of the trunnions C which areformed on the upper end of the shank D
a
•
 nd whioh ft between two projecting parts E formed across the bottom of the 15
,iroegit B. •
bott r-tor pin being passed through the projecting parts E and trunnions C retain
•the shank D in position between the arms or flukes A, at the same time allowing of a
rdI Movement of th6 arms or flukes A to any required angle. •
- In order to place the Ant* I) in position a hole G is Provided through the bottom 20
•&the trough B:through which the shank I) is passed and afterwards held in position
•rth 'Awn In thwings by the hereinbefore mentioned bolt or pin F.,
The outer edges of the wags H of the trough B perform the duties of "trippers"
but in other to more completely perform this operation we form or provide on their
• edges the projeoting pieces J; by this arrangement the flukes or arms A of the anchor 25
tre instantly thrown into position for taking hold of the ground immediately the
- oncher commences to drag thereon.
We apply what is known as a " fisher " at IC for hooking up the anchor when
reqmre	 -
This anchor being without a crossbar can readily be drawn into the hawse pipe and 30
easily stowed.
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of our said invention
and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that what we claim is :—
let. The arrangement of arms or flukes A constructed in one piece, substantially as
herein set forth.
-
35
Complete
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Hall I. Verity's Improvements in the eonstruction4litichors.
• .
2nd. The arrangement and application of the walls H forming the trough B	 -
trunnions C of the shank D and the means employed for securing the ?same- tOgethei, .17
substantially as herein set forth.	 -
3rd. The application of the walls H of the trough B, and the projecting pieces,j1 .
5 for the purpose of " tripping " or throwing over the anchor into posit:Lon, substantially
as herein set forth.
4th. The combination of the various parts forming the anchor, substantially as and
for purposes herein set forth.
J. W. HARDING, • .
10	 For_ the 'Applicanku
• •	 .
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Date otApplication, 9th May, 1888
niPlate Specification Left, 9th Feb., 1889
Complete Specification Accepted, 9th Mar., 1889
•
A.D. 1888, 9th MAY. N° 6918.
PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
We, JOILN FRANOIN HALL of Norbury Sheffield, Manager of Steel Works, and JoHN
L
ulu of Billing Bank, Bramley near Leeds, Engineer, both in the County of York,
hereby -declare the nature of this invention, to be as follows :—
Our invention consists in certain improvements in anchors whereby they are
dared more efficient and certain in their action and less liable to drag or roll over
hitherto, and has reference to a patent granted to us dated 11th day of March
886, No. 3461.
According to our invention we Make the arms or flukes and horns or trippers in
e piece, such horns or trippers being arranged in front of the centre of the axis of
•crosshead.
The crosshead is hollowed out for the reception of trunnions of the -shank ; these
• 'ons are not made in one piece with the shank but consist of a tube
ough an eye or opening in the head of -the shank when such head is in a 
passed
heated
We
and when cold holds such trunnions firmly by shrinkage.
e extend or prolong , the trippers the full width of the flukes, these thereby
g the p	 of a stock bar.
crown uorr the crosshead is recessed to receive the trunnions of the shank, and
rounded or arched at suitable points in its length, also the extremities of such
wn are projected laterally therefrom, so that with these combined arrangements
anchor on being dropped overboard will fall into position immediately on reaching
around.
IL bolt or pin being passed through the arched or rounded pieces and trunnions
the shank in position between the arms or flukes, at the same time allowing a
movement of the shank and arms or flakes to any required extent.
Dated this 9th day of May 1888.
Pries 84]
Agent for the Applicants,
J. W. HARDING,
gc\\*1
IsV•) cf 4
t
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COMPLETE SPE CIF [CATION.
Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
We, JOHN FRANCIS HALL of Norbury, Pitsmoor, Sheffield, Manager of Steel
Works, and JOHN VERITY of Billing Bank, Bramley, near Leeds, Engineer, both in
the County of York, do hereby declare the nature of this invention, and in what
manner the same is to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in
and by the following statement :—
Our invention consists in certain improvements in anchors whereby they are
rendered more efficient and certain in their action and less liable to drag or roll over
than hitherto, and has reference to a Patent granted to us dated 11th day of March
1886 No. 3461.
In the accompanying drawings Fig. 1 is a front elevation. Fig. 2 a side elevation
and Fig. 3 a plan looking at the top of anchor, shewing our improvements.
According to our invention we make the arms or flukes A and horns or trippers.B
in one piece, such horns or trippers B being arranged in front of the centre of the
axis of the crosshead C.
The crosshead C is hollowed out for the reception of the trunnions D of the
shank E, these trunnions D are not made in one piece with the shank E, but-consist
of a tube passed through an eye or opening in the head of the shank E when such
head is in a heated state, and when cold holds such trunnions firmly by shrinkage.
We extend or prolong the trippers B the full width of the flukes A l
 these thereb.
serving the purpose of a stock bar.
	 •
The crown of the crosshead is recessed to receive the trunnions D of the bank
and is rounded or arched at suitable points F in its length, also the extremities
such crown are projected laterally therefrom, so that by these combined arrangemen
the anchor on being dropped overboard will fall into position immediately on reachin
the ground.	
.
A bolt or pin H being passed through the arched or rounded • pieces.
trunnions D retains the shank in position between the arms or flukes A., at the eit4
time allowing a radial movement of the shank E and arms,
 or flukes A to any requir
'	 `.	 .	 ;	 ••	 • c''extent.
Itaving now particularly described and ascertained e nature of our said 114
tion and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that. what
claim is :—
1st: The arrangement, construction and combination of flukes A with horni.
trippers B, such horns or trippers B being arranged in front of the centre of the
pf the crosshead C, substantially as and for purposes herein set forth. • ,
vAccljj
A.D. 1888.-N° 6918.
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COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
We, JOHN FRANCIS HALL of Norbury, Pitsmoor, Sheffield, Manager of Steel
Works, and JOHN VERITY of Billing Bank, Bramley, near Leeds, Engineer, both in
the County of York, do hereby declare the nature of this invention, and in what
manner the same is to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in
and by the following statement :—	 5
Our invention consists in certain improvements in anchors whereby they are
rendered more efficient and certain in their action and less liable to drag or roll over
than hitherto, and has reference to a Patent granted to us dated 11th day of March
1886 No. 3461.
In the accompanying drawings Fig. 1 is a front elevation. Fig. 2 a side elevation 10
and Fig. 3 a plan looking at the top of anchor, showing our improvements.
According to our invention we make the arms or flukes A and horns or trippers B
in one piece, such horns or trippers B being arranged in front of the centre of the
axis of the crosshead C.
The crosshead C is hollowed out for the reception of the trunnions D of the 11
shank E, these trunnions D are not made in one piece with the shank E, but consist
of a tube passed through an eye or opening in the head of the shank E when such
head is in a heated state, aud when cold holds such trunnions firmly by shrinkage.
We extend or prolong the trippers B the full width of the flukes A, these thereby
serving the purpose of a stock bar.
	
0
The crown of the crosshead is recessed to receive the trunnions D of the shank E,
and is rounded or arched at suitable points F in its length, also the extremities G d
such crown are projected laterally therefrom, so that by these combined arrangement'
the anchor on being dropped overboard will fall into position immediately on reaching
the ground.
A bolt or pin H being passed through the arched or rounded pieces F
trunnions D retains the shank in position between the arms or flukes A, at the same
time allowing a radial movement of the shank E and arms or flukes A. to any required
extent.
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of our said invea-
tion and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that what we
claim is :—
1st: The arrangement, construction and combination of flukes A with horns or
trippers B, such horns or trippers B being arranged in front of the centre of the az'.
of the crosshead C, substantially as and for purposes herein set forth.
A.D. 1888. MAY 9. N9 6918.
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N° 1353 A.D. 1889
Date of Application, 25th Jan., 1889
Complete Specification Left, 25th Oct., 1889—Accepted, 23rd Nov., 1889
PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
We, JOHN FRANCIS 1IAT.r, of Norbury, Pitsmoor, Sheffield, Manager of Steel
Works, and JOHN VRRITY of Billing Bank, Bromley near Leeds, Engineer, both in
the County of York, do hereby declare the nature of this invention to be as
follows :—
5 Our invention consists in certain improvements in anchors whereby they are
rendered more efficient and certain in their action, and less liable to drag or roll
' over than hitherto, and has reference to a patent granted to us dated 11th day of
March 1886 No. 3461.
According to our invention we make the arms or flukes and horns or trippers in
one piece, such horns or trippers being arranged in front of the centre of the axis of
the crosshead.
The crosshead is hollowed out for the reception of the trunnions . of the shank,
such trunnions consisting of a spindle passed through an eye or Opening in the
head, when such head is in a heated state, so that when cold it holds the trunnions
5 firmly by shrinkage.-
The trannions are held in position in the crosshead by transverse pins, at the same
fine allowing a radial movement of the shank and arms or flukes to any required
.extent. We extend or prolong the trippers the full width of the flukes they thereby
serving the purpose of a stock bar. The crown of the crosshead is recessed to receive
n the trunnions of the shank.
By the above combined arrangement of crosshead and trippers, the anchor on being
dropped overboard will fall into position immediately on reaching the ground. Other
parts of the anchor may be of the same description as those described in our aforesaid
patent.
15	 Dated this 25th day of January 1889.
COMPLETE SP ECIFICATION
Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
so We, JOHN FRANCIS HALL of Norbury Pitsmoor, Sheffield, Manager of Steel
Works, and JOHN VERITY of Billing Bank, Bromley near Leeds, Engineer, both in
the County of York, do hereby declare the nature of this invention, and in what
manner the same is to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in
and by the following statement :—
85 Our invention consists in certain improvements in anchors whereby they are rendered
more efficient and certain in their action, and less liable to drag or roll over than
hitherto.
Fig. 1 is a front elevation. Fig. 2 an end elevation, and Fig. 3 a plan looking
on the top shewing anchor constructed in accordance with our invention.
40 According to our invention we make the curved arms or flukes A, horns or
trippers B and crosshead C in one piece, such horns or trippers B being arranged in
front of the centre of the axis of the crosshead C, instead, of on the axis or behind it,
and by so doing more weight is thrown into the flukes A, causing them more readily
. to point downwards and dig into the ground than when such horns are central with
45 the axis or behind it, therefore by our arrangement the flukes are more certain in their
action. The crosshead C is hollowed out at D for the reception of the trunnions E of
the shank F, such trunnions E may be made in one piece with the shank F, or may
[Price 641
J. W. HARDING,
Agent for the Applicants.
2	 N° 1353.—A.D. 1889.
hail 1- Verity's Improvements in the Construction of Anchors.
consist of a spindle passed through an eye or opening G in the head EL when such
head is in a heated state, so that when cold it holds the trunnions E firmly by
shrinkage.
The trunnions E are held in position in the crosshead C by the transverse pins J,
at the same time allowin g
 radial movement of the shank F and curved arms or 5
flukes A to any required extent, by this arrangement whatever oxadization takes .
place, the trunnions E always work freely, and any accumulation of foreign
substances does not prevent the perfect and certain working of the flukes A. We
project the hereinbefore mentioned trippers B from the crosshead 0 the full width
of the curved arms or flukes A, these serving the purpose of a stock bar, and by being
projected the full width of the flukes A they are more effective in preventing the
"heeling over" of the anchor, this being a great feature, for, on the trippers greatly
depends the behaviour and success of the anchor.
By 	above combined arrangements the anchor on being dropped overboard
will "fall into position immediately on reaching the ground.	 15
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of our said-
invention and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that what we
claim is :—
1st. The combination of curved arms or flukes A with horns or trippers B and
crosshead C, substantially as and for purposes herein set forth. 	 20
2nd. The arrangement and application of trippers B provided in front of the centre .
of the crosshead C, substantially as and for purposes herein set forth.	 • ••
3rd. The combination of trunnions E with shank F, transverse pins J and crosshead C, -
substantially as and for purposes herein set forth. ,
4th. The arrangement construction and application of horns or trippers, pro jecting 25
the full width of the curved arms or flukes A, substantially as and for purposes
herein set forth.
5th. The combination with curved arms or flukes A, horns or trippers B, cross-
head 0, trunnions E, shank F, transverse pins J, all arranged substantially as and
for purposes herein set forth. 	 30
Dated this 25th day of October 1889.
London : Printed for Her Majesty's Stationery Office. by Darling & Sun, Ltd.-1889.
J. W H.A.815ING,
Agent for the Applicants.
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Date of Application, 8th Apr., 1904—Accep ted, 2nd June, 1904
COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in or cOnnected with Ships' Anchors.
We, HALL'S PATENT ANCUOR COMPANY, LIMITED, of 26 George Street, Sheffield,
in the County of York, Engineers, and GEORGE HEPI3tRN, of Redcross Chambers,
11 Redcross Street, Liverpool, in the County of Lancaster, Consulting Engineer,
do hereby declare the nature of this invention, and in what manner the same is
to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in and by the
following statement ;—
This invention has reference to ships' anchors of the type called " Stock-less
Anchors ", and it has primarily for its object to provide an improvement by which
anchors of this type as at present used, are not so liable to become broken in
use or deranged.
The invention is illustrated in the annexed drawings, in which Figure 1 is a
side elevation of. the anchor partly in section ; Figure 2 is a cross section; and
Figure 3 is a plan view of the anchor, viewed from below.
Figures 4 and 5 are sectional side elevation, and cross section, showing a
slight modification.
Referring to the drawings, 1 is the head portion of the anchor; 2 are the
flukes; and 3 is the stem. 4 are the trunnions on the stem which fit in the
hollow chamber or recess 5 in the head 1 of the anchor, and carry the head.
With regard to these trunnions, they are usually held in place by cross bolts
passing through the sides of the head, and close to the trunnions 4; and in
practice it is found that, frequently, when the anchor is lowered and drops on
to the bottom, especially when hard, these bolts bend or break by the jar and
weight of the shank, and in consequence the anchor fails in its action.
Now acdording to the present invention, this is obviated by providing, and
filling in the space 5 at each side where the trunnions 4 lie .
 with, iron or steel
blocks 6, the upper edges of which will come against and support and hold the
trunnions 4; while these blocks themselves are held in position by the bolts 7.
Hence there is no bending strain on the bolts, but only a shearing strain, when
the ancher drops on the bottom, thereby strengthening the anchor by strengthen-
ing the shank trunnion supports, and preventing mishaps or accidents due to
the anchor not acting when required.
In the modification shown in Figures 4 and 5, the blocks 6 are not held by
the bolts 7 passing through them, but are in dove-tail shape, and fit in dove-tail
recesaes at each side of the chamber 4, so that when placed in position, they
will take the thrust of the trunnions 4 when the anchor strikes the bottom; and
the bolts 6 hold these blocks in place in their dove-tail recesses, so that. they
cannot come out.
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of our said
invention, and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that what
We claim is
The herein described improvement in ships' anchors, namely, the employment
ithiii the recess of the hollow chamber 5, at each side of the head in which the
runnions 4 of the anchor stem lie, of blocks (3 fitting into such recesses, and
[Price 8d.J
\ FREE
t	 ni r
2	 No &8.—A.D. 1904.
improvements in or connected with Ships' Anchors.
supporting the lower side of the trunnions; and such blocks being held in place
by the bolts 7 passing through the sides of the head 1 of the anchor, and blocks 6
themselves, or on the outside of such blocks; for the purposes specified.
Dated this 6th., day of April, 1904.
CHEESBROUGH & ROYSTON, 5
Applicants' Patent Agents,
15 Water Street, Liverpool.
Redhill: Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Love & Malcomson, Ltd.-1904.
A.D. 1904. APRIL 8. N s 8068.
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COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in or connected with Ships' Anchors.
We, GEORGE HEPBURN, of Redcross Street, Liverpool, in the County of
Lancaster, Consulting Engineer, and JOSEPH EnNEsr FLETCHER, of Netherton
Iron Works, Dudley, in the County of Worcester, Engineer, do hereby declare
the nature of this invention, and in what manner the same is to be performed,
tii I particularly described and ascertained in and by the following state-
meta
Flais invention has reference to ships' anchors of the type called " stockless
" patent " anchors; and it has primarily for its objects and effects to provide
improvements as hereinafter described by which the weakening of the castings,
p• dur to the construction hitherto adopted, is obviated, and the strength generally
uf the whole casting of the head and flukes is rendereil arrp.t.r•
ERRATU M.
SPECIFICATION No. 29,063, A.D. 1906.
For the name of the second Applicant "Joseph Ernest Fletcher" as
printed read " Joseph Ernst Fletcher"
PATENT OFFICE,
3rd April, 1908.
.Inchor head with flukes combined, and the shank head in place; Figure 2 is
3n end view of same, partly in section; Figure 3 is a cross section through
the head or crown at the line A A in Figure 1; Figure 4 is a top plan view
	
L ' of the anchor.	 •
k Referring to the drawings, a is the crown of the head, b are the flukes, c
the shank, and d the trippers. e are the trunnions of the shank; f are the
iflurnals or sockets in which the trunnions rest, and A the blocks which hold
the trunnions, and so the shank, in place.
According to this invention, bolts or rivets i, which hold the blocks A in place,
he in the plane of the anchor head, and extend obliquely through these blocks
and the head, one end of said bolts or rivets coming in the angle between
the undersides of the trippers d, and the outside face of the flukes b; and
the other end on the outside of the blocks It within the cavity of the crown;
the blocks being chamfered off at right angles to the axis of the bolt or rivet •"ex!)
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COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in or connected with Ships' Anchors.
We, GEORGE HEPBURN, of Redcross Street, Liverpool,. in the County of
Lancaster, Consulting Engineer, and JOSEPH ERNEST FLETCHER, of Netherton
Iron Works, Dudley, in the County of Worcester, Engineer, do hereby declare
the nature of this invention, and in what manner the same is to be performed,
; 5 w he particularly described and ascertained in and by the, following state-
ment:—
This invention has reference to ships' anchors of the type called " stockless
patent " anchors; and it has primarily for its objects and effects to provide
improvements as hereinafter described by which the weakening of the castings,
.Itie to the construction hitherto adopted, is obviated, and the strength generally
of the whole casting of the head and flukes is rendered greater; and also
Annul castings are ensured, and so the wastage and expense due to unsound
rsistings of the head and fluke portion, which are sometimes produced, are
Aviated.
IL The particular type of " stockless " or "patent " anchor to which this inven-
'mit relates, is that in which the shank end which fits in the head of the
.italior, is provided with trunnions which fit and work in correspondingly formed
....•ket, provided in opposite sides of a cavity formed in the head, and in the
hiittoin of said cavity, and are held in, place in the head by blocks fitted into
 lie cavity and lie over, and hold in place, the trunnions, and are held in
•Live themselves by bolts or rivets.
Generally, anchors of this kind are provided with single webs extending down
!rola the crown to the ends, or to near the ends of the . tripping parts or wings,
from the outside faces of the flukes to the ends or near to the ends of The
25 trippers underneath: and the invention, as hereafter explained, has also refer-
.mee to these parts.
An anchor involving improvements according to this invention is illustrated
in the accompanying drawings, and it—the invention—will be described with
the aid of these drawings; the novel characteristics of it being set out or corn-
p
•
 ri,ed in the claiming clauses concluding the specification.
In the drawings. Figure 1 is an elevation, partly in section, showing the
Achor head with flukes combined, and the shank head in place; Figure 2 is
in end view of same, partly in section; Figure 3 is a cross .section through
the head or crown -at the line A A in Figure 1; Figure 4 is a top plan view
A of the anchor.
Referring to the drawings, a is the crown of the head, b are the flukes, e is
th,z shank, and d the trippers. e are the trunnions of the shank; f are the
journals or sockets in which the trunnions rest, and h the blocks which hold
the trunnions, and so the shank, in place.
• According to this invention, bolts or rivets i, which hold the blocks h in place,
lie in the plane of the anchor head, and extend obliquely through these blocks
and the head, one end of said bolts or rivets coming in the angle between
the undersides of the trippers d, and the outside face of the flukes 6; and
the other end on the outside of the blocks It within the cavity of the crown;
S the blocks being chamfered off at right angles to the axis of the bolt or rivet A*.°
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	 1hole in them at this part; and between the trippers d and the base of the1
flukes b (which are wide tapering parts, see Figure 2,) where they merge into
the head, two webs k are provided, one on either side, which give extra strength
to these portions of the anchor coupled with lightness; and the head or nutl
of the rivet or bolt i lies within the space or chamber formed by these webs k
between the trippers and the outside edge or face of the fluke bases.
Between the end faces of the cavity in the crown, next which the blocks h
lie, and the outer part of the crown through -which the block holding bolt or
rivet ends pass, a cored out cavity 1 is formetl; and the metal of the crown a
above this cavity, is carried down to the triPpers d in a plain flush surface.
On the inside edge Y or at the back of the crown near the parts A A, in casting
the head, the metal may be run into the mould, and the "feeding heads"
may be placed at these points; and this part being without webs, this can be
effected here in a sound manner, that is, without liability of the casting being
defective or weak, due to shrinkage or contraction; whereas in the casting
of these anchor heads at the usual points, namely -on the outside edge z of
one of the flukes, where a single web is usually employed, defective castingst
not infrequently result, due to such shrinkage or contraction at these points
of pouring or feeding. And this plain flush surface enables the " feeders".
to be easily cut off.	
.
The internal faces of the _crown cavity against which the outer faces of the
blocks h lie, are rabitted inwards or recessed, as shown, and the blocks are
made of such a size or shape as to fit into, and lie in these rabitted parts or
recesses when in place; and they are made, practically, in width, about equal
to the diameter of the trunnions e; and at their sides fit in between two
cheeks m formed on the inside of the crown cavity, which support them side-
ways, and at the bottoms of which the trunnion sockets or journals lie.
By arranging and disposing the block• holding bolts i in the manner and
position described, the casting of holes in the two outside walls of the crown a
to receive holding or fastening bolts or rivets passed transversely through the
crown, as is frequently done, is avoided ; and thereby the weakening of the
crown due thereto is obviated. And by constructing the anchor- as described,
whereby metal can be poured in casting the anchor and " fed " onto the back
of the crown in lieu of the fluke base that is by making it—the crown—flat
instead of being webbed the back section of the head is strengthened.
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of our said
invention, and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that
what we claim is:—
	
.
1. An anchor of the kind herein referred to wherein the shank is held by
bolts or rivets disposed in the plane of the anchor head, and extending obliquely
between the cavity thereof, in which the shank head lies, to a point outside
said head; substantially as described.
2. In an anchor of the kind herein referred to in which the 'bolts or rivets
employed for holding the shank head . fastening or holding blocks lie within
the plane of the anchor head, arranging and disposing the outer end of said
bolts or rivets in the angle between the underside of the trippers, and the
outside or face of the fluke base; as set forth.
3. In an anchor of the kind herein referred to, a cavity 1 provided in the
crown head at each end of the crown cavity, and at the closed lower end, di
hole below the trippers through which the shank
ends pass; as set forth. 	
holding bolt or rivet lowerc
4. In an anchor of the
	 kind herein referred to, the construction of tJ
•	 .
crown a with a flush plain surface extending from the upper part thereof to
the trippers' upper surface; as and for the purpose set forth. i5. In an anchor of the. kind herein referred to, the two -webs _ k dispos
crlong the outer edges of the tapering fluke base where said fluke merges in
N"	 190G.	 3
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the head, and extending up and joining at their upper parts the underside
of the trippers; as described and shown for the purpose specified.
6. The anchor having its parts mTanged, combined, and constructed as shown
in and set forth with reference to the drawings.
Dated this 17th day of December, 1906.
CHEESBROUGH & ROYSTON,
Applicants' Patent Agents,
15, Water Street, Liverpool.
Redhill: Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Love dc 3falcomson, Ltd.-1908.
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PIWVISI()NAL
Improvements in Ships' Stockless Anchors.
We. JOSEPH ER.NsT F LETCHER. of " ltaydon	 Itoad. Dudley, in the
County of Worcester. Engineer. and N. AND os Lrxi mu. of the
Netherton Ironworks, Dudley, in the Count y
 of Worcester. Ironmasters, do
hereby declare the nature of this invention to be as follows:—
This 'invention has reference to ships' anchors, and more particulailv to that
type which are called " Stockless or •• Patent •' anehors; that is to sav, a type
wherein the flukes are connected to the shank by a hinge the axis of which is
disposed at right angles to the shank, and the flukes move about this hinge.
and take an oblique position in relation to same; and it relates furthermore.
more particularly to cast anchors of thi, kind. which have a rib inure or less
centrally on the opposite sides of the fluke,, and the flukes hove at their ends.
a species of enlaiged tip or blade generally wider than the main portion of the
flukes.
In practice, it is found that the tip portions or blades of the flukes of
anchors of this kind frequently snap off somewhere about the centre between
the actual extremity of the tip portion and its base; and the primary object of the
invention is to obviate this defect simply, and without adding materially to
the weight of the anchor; and also to provide improvements by which the anchor
can be more easily secured or stowed and manipulated.
According to this invention, ribs on each side of the flukes are extended
down same to the actual extremity of the tip or blade portions, and right down
across same. These ribs are comparatively shallow, and at the lower end, taper
town; and in some cases, project slightly beyond the estionlitY ot the tips or
blades proper. By this, not only are the tip potions to hholes streopthened.
aid rendered proof against the wealnieN• inkuTed to, hut the rib. also -cave the
aurpose of causing the anchor to 10 , pre,sed outwards away lima the ,urface of
he ship when being weighed io the ordinary manner. when the lips come
IgaillSt the edges of the plates of the	 and -0 prevent	 lip, Or flue
uchor flukes getting under, and heint.! . conplit ihe-e projecting plate edges.
In some cases, the fluke tip or blade portions are rece,sed at each side at the
.entre; and thus, in such a case, the cross section of the fluke through the tip
ir blade portion, sa y near the centre. represents a relatively thin portion on earl'
dge; then a shallow rib or projeo ion at each side: then a groove at each side;
tad then at the centre, a projection cificsisling HI the otHreaid lil y-. which
xtend down on each side of the centre of the ileke IH the extremity HI the tip.
1.1d through the blade, and say the recessed portions on I .och side tit the cent.ial
wojections or ribs referred to. a hole	 provided, lot- the purpo,e ot em.roging
t by a hook or sling, and sliio , ing or securing the :melon to the deck. or as
deii liawsed on or in the ships' side: and these holes may be provided without
thoeriall y weakening the flukes. Instead of forming two holes. one on each
LPrice (d.3
Improceineitk. lit Ship.y . Stockle,ss :Inc/tors.
• Ifit' tit Ili(' 1 •IIP• 11111)11;11 t (` I Vc("":".ed, parts referred to, the ibs ma y be widenol
icr ho.-rd ict this part concerned. and a , 111U huh' Ird ,,ed 1 Ilr011pii lie. 1Videlicd
n l: bussed part.
Dated this 22ucl day of mice. 1914.
li, IL I ITX & Co.,	 5
..\.pplica	 A.0 en
Tower Building, Water Street. Liverpool, and
Douington House, Norfolk Stieet, London,
COMPLETE SPECIFICATIoN.
Improvements in Ships' Stockless Anchors.
"We. •osEPti Eitshr Ft.FrcitEa. Roydon lload, Dudley, in the
Count y
 of -Worcester, Engineer. and N. IltNoLEv AND So NS LIIIITED, of the
Netherton Ironworks, Dudley. in the County of Worcester, lronumsters, do
hereby declare the nature of this in-ention. and in what manner the same is
to be performed. to he particuidrlY described and ascertained in and by the 15
following statement:—
This inventiou has reference to 
	 cc lluliorN, and more particularly to that
type which are called " Stockless or " Patent anchors; that is to say, a type
wherein the flukes are connected to the shank bv a hinge the axis of which is
disposed at right angles to the shank, and the flukes move about this hinge. 20
and take an oblique position in relation to same; and it relates furthermore.
more particularly to cast Anchors of this kind, which have cc rib more or less
centrally on the opposite sides of the flukes, and the flukes have at their ends,
a species of enlarwed tip or blade generally wider than the main portico' of the
flukes. down which the ribs extend to the end. In some eases these central ribs 23
are projected beyond the tips of the flukes, in a species of angular horn on each
side of the terminal or end of the tip; these projections, however, being separate
and distinct front each other; and the object of this invention is to provide
improvements in or modifications of anchors of these kinds b y which the anchor
can be more easily stowed or secured and manipulated.
(inter this invention the rib on each side of the fluke, extends beyond i'..
and round it, so that the lib, join and are continuous and become one beyond
the tip. and this is illustrated in lice zwrootootivilig ill'awi11 ,..o s. in connection
with wic u Ii the invention will be described; die features via hued as novel under
it—the invention—being specified in the claiming clauses concluding the speciti- 33
cation.
In the drawing, Figure 1 is au end elevation of the anchor; Figure 2 a
side elevation: and Figure :; a cross section. at .\.1 Figure 2.
Referring to the drawings. a is the head of the anchor: & are the flukes:
e the tip or blade portions of it ; and (1 is a rib extending down each side of the 40
flukes b from the head portion a towards the tip portion e. These parts are all
formed in one, and are generall y
 made of CaNt Steel.
C e. t	 Shalikto WhiA • 11. t 110 'fillke IMO i011 isecu1Lei lby a hinge f shown in
clotted lines.
The ribs d ccli each side ol the flukes, are exlended down to and across the tip 45
or blade portions e, and to their actual extremities I icee ciii pOrliMis cu e
marked r.
As shown in the drowinp:-. . the lower portion of the ribs i taper down. and
project slightl y be yond the extremity (it the tip or blade portions e, where they
join awl become one, so that the ribs surroun, as it were, the extreme ends of
515,025.—A.1). 1914.
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the blades. BY this not 0111V are the tip or blade portions c strengthened but
the ribs i serve the purpose of causing the anchor to be pressed outwards away
from the surface of the ship when being weighed in the ordinary manner. when
the anchor tips come against the edges of the plates of the vessel; and so
5 prevents the tips of the anchor flukes getting under, and being caught by these
projecting plate edges.
The tip or blade portions r shown in the drawing are recessed at k. at the
centre, on each side of the ribs i and thus by this construction, the cross
section of the tip or blade portion r. sa y near the centre, transversely repre-
sents a relatively thin portion at each edge : then a shallow projectin g portion I
at each side; then a groove k and then at the centre, a projection consisting
of the rib I. which as stated extend down on each side of the blade or tip
portion r to their extremity. And through the blade or tip portion. ri::—
through each of the recessed portions Z. a hole 0 is provided. as shown at the
5 left hand side in Figure 2: or. a hole may be provided through the ribs i
shown on the right hand side of the figure. The hole or holes are tot the
purpose of engaging it by a hook or sling, and slinging or securing the anchor
to the deck, or as when hawsed on or in the ships side: and these holes may
be provided without materially weakening the flukes.
Where single holes o pass through the ribs i. these ribs are enlarged or
bossed out on these parts, so that their strength shall not be diminished.
Haying now particularl y described and ascertained the nature of our said
invention, and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that
what we claim is
5 1. In an anchor of the type herein referred to, the ribs i extending across
the tip or blade portion c of the flukes, and to a point beyond the actual extremi-
ties of said tip portions where the two ribs join up, and are continuous and
become one 'substantially as herein described and shown..
2. An anchor of the type herein referred to. having ribs extending down the
0 flukes of each side, and a hole or holes passed thiough the tip or blade portions;
substantially as herein. described.
Dated this 29th day of July, 1915.
E. B. BOYSTUN &
Applicants Patent Agents.
Tower Building, Water Street. Liverpool. and
Doni10ou House. Norfolk Street. London.
Redhill: Printed for His Majesty's ;Stationery (Alice, by Love & Maleonison, Ltd.-1915.
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PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in Ships' Anchors.
We, N. HINGLEY & SONS, LIMITED, of Netherton Iron Works, Dudley, in
the County of Worcester, Iron Masters, and JOSEPH ERNST FLETCHER, of
" Raydon," Himley Road, Dudley, in the County of Worcester, Engineer, do
hereby declare the nature of this invention to be as follows:—
5 This invention has reference to ships' anchors of the type more particularly
called " stockless " or " patent " anchors, S and it has for its object and effect
to provide a special form or construction of anchor of this kind.
The anchor according to this invention consists of the combination of an
anchor head with which the flukes are in one ; a spherical headed shank, the
10 head of which fits and works in a socket in a recess formed in the back or
outer end of the head ; removable shank head holding blocks in recesses at the
sides of said recess, and extending say from a plane in line with the axis of
the ball of the shank, to a point between this plane and the longitudinal
plane of the shank, and secured in said recesses in the head (which may be
15 narrower than that for the spherical head) and secured there by bolts, which
are passed diagonally down through the head say at an angle of between 300
and 600 from the general longitudinal plane of the shank ; and an elongated
aperture in the inner part of the head through which the shank passes of sub-
stantially the same width as—or only slightly larger than—the diameter of
20 the shank, which say is circular, and which thus serves to support the anchor
head and keep it in position as regards one direction.
Regarding the aperture or slot through which the shank passes, the walls
of its sides are so shaped and formed as to constitute supports and guides in
or for the movement of the head and flukes in their oscillation about the axis
25 of the shank head or	 ; and the end of the aperture or slot will form the
limit of angular movement of the head and flukes about the shank head or ball.
The head will have trippers at each end and side, such as are commonly used
in anchors of this character.
Dated this 15th clay of March, 1917.
30	 E. R. ROYSTON & Co.,
Applicants' Patent Agents,
Tower Building, Water Street, Liverpool, and
Donington House. Norfolk Street, London.
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PROVISION.A.L SPECIFICATION.
5 This invention has reference to ships' anchors of the type more particularly
called " stockless " or " patent " anchors, and it has for its object and effect
to provide a special form or construction of anchor of this kind.
• The anchor according to this invention consists of the combination of an
anchor head with which the flukes are in one ; a spherical headed shank, the
10 head of which fits and works in a socket in a recess formed in the back or
outer end of the head ; removable shank head holding blocks in recesses at the
sides of said recess, and extending say from a plane in line with the axis of
the ball of the shank, to a point between this plane and the longitudinal
plane of the shank, and secured in said recesses in the head (which may be
15 narrower than that for the spherical head) and secured there by bolts, which
are passed diagonally down through the head say at an angle of between 300
and 600 from the general longitudinal plane of the shank ; and an elongated
aperture in the inner part of the head through which the shank passes of sub-
stantially the same width as—or only slightly larger than—the diameter of
is circular, and which thus serves to support the anchor
ERRATUM.
SPECIFICATION No. 111,960:
Page 1, line 29, for "15th" read "13th."
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Improvements in Ships' Anchors.
We, N. HINGLEY & SONS, LIMITED, of Netherton Iron Works, Dudley, in
the County of Worcester, Iron Masters, and JOSEPH ERNST FLETCHER, of
" Raydon," Hiraley Road, Dudley, in the County of Worcester, Engineer, do
hereby declare the nature of this invention to be as follows:—
20 the shailk- which say
Improvements in Ships' Anchors.
We, N. IIINGLEy & SONS EINHTED, of Netherton Iron Works, Dudley, in
the County of Worcester, Iron Masters, and JOSEPH ERNST FLETCHER, of
" Ravdon," IIimlev Road, Dudley, in the County of Worcester, Engineer, do
hereby
 declare the nature of this invention, and in what inanner the same is
to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained, in and by the
following statement:—
This invention has reference to ships' anchors of the type more particularly
called " stockless " or " patent " anchors, in which the head and flukes are
in one piece, and they and the anchor shank lie in the same plane when these
two relatively movable parts are in the mid-position, and the head and flukes 10
are adapted to oscillate about a joint between the outer end of the shank and
the bead.
In some of such anchors the joint between the shank and the head has con-
sisted of a ball on the shank end fitting into a .corresponding spherically
formed socket in the head, the shank head being placed in position in the is
socket by passing it through the head from the back ; and the two part § are
held in position by blocks fitting in and fastened in the metal surrounding the
socket aperture.
In other cases, the joint or connectiOn of the shank end fluke head has been
by cylindrical trunnions on the shank end, fitting into corresponding recesses 20
or bearings in an aperture in the head, such trunnions being held in position
in the bearings by blocks similar to those above referred to, fitting into recesses
at each side of the aperture and outside the trunnions, and held in position by
–
diagonal bolts extending through them to a point in the space under the
ordinary stockless trippers of the anchor, and outside the flukes.
	 25
This invention consists of the following combination of parts, namely, an
anchor head and flukes having a semi-spherical socket in the bottom of a recess
formed in the head, a spherical headed shank, the head of which fits and works -
in the semi-spherical socket, and blocks fitting in rectangular recesses leading
in opposite directions out of the said recess, and having spherically formed 30
outer faces adapted to bear on the outer part of the spherical shank head, and
held in position in such recesses by diagonal bolts extending through same and
through the bead to a point under the trippers.
The anchor is illustrated in the annexed drawings, and the invention Will
be described with the aid of these drawings, in which Figure 1 is an elevation 35
half in section, Figure 2 a plan showing the end of the head, and Figure 3 is
an end elevation of the anchor.
The body of the anchor comprises the head 1 and flukes 2, and tripping
parts 3 which are in one as usual, and the shank 4 has a spherical head 5,
which fits and works in a socket 6 formed in the bottom of the recess 10, 40
formed in the back or outer end of the head as usual; and this shank head-is •
held in its socket 6 b y
 removable holding blocks 7 fitted in recesses at. the ends
of the recess 10, they being of smaller width than the centre portion of the
recess itself, which, as seen in Figure 2, is of just sufficient size to receive theji;
head 5 ; and the inner surfaces of the blocks are of spherical contour to corre- 45
spond with the spherical head 5, and are secured in position bvi bolts 8 which
Pass diagonally down through the head at an angle of between 30 and 60 degrees
from the general longitudinal plan of the shank, and the fastening nuts of
	 .
which lie in the recess formed by the underside of the trippers 3, the outside
smrface of the flukes 2, and the webs 9, which protect them,
	 • •	 50
5
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The upper surfaces of the blocks are inclined towards and lead on to the
surface of the head 5, so that the interior of the recess or chamber 10 will
always be washed through with water and be self cleansing.
The aperture 11 on the inner side of the head 1 is in width sufficient to
5 freely take the shank 4 as seen in Figure 1; and is extended on each of the
central positions for a certain distance to allow the body of the anchor to
move about the axis Of the head 5 angularly in relation to the general plane
of the anchor.
The limits of -movement in the case of the anchor shown are those repre-
10 sented by the radial lines 12, which represent the centre line of the head
taken down the flukes, when the anchor body is in each extreme position.
The parallel walls of the sides of the aperture 11 are so shaped and formed
as to constitute supports and guides in and for the movement of the head and
flukes in its oscillation about the axis of the spherical shank head 5, and the
15 ends of this aperture will form. the limits of angular movement of the head and
flukes about the shank head.
The end portions of the recesses 10 in which the blocks 7 fit, overhang at
the upper part at 13, and the blocks are correspondingly formed so that these
overhanging portions overhang the inner part of the blocks and serve to help
20 to hold them in position.
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of our said
invention, and in what manner the same is to be performed, we declare that
what we claim is:—
The " stockless " or " patent " anchor substantially as herein set forth.
25	 Dated this 13th day of September, 1917.
E. R. ROYSTON	 Co.,
Applicants' Patent Agents,
Tower Building, Water Street, Liverpool.
Redhill: Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Love & Maleomson, Ltd.-1918.
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APPENDIX THREE:
Patents for anchors manufactured by:
0	 William Wasteneys Smith
A .D. 189gN° 5938
Date of Application, 18th Mar., 1899
Complete Specification Left, 18th Dec., 1899—Accepted, 20th Jan., 1900
PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in Anchors.
I, WILLIAM WASTENEYS Slum, of 57 to 60, Sandhill, in the City and County
of Newcastle-on-Tyne, Civil and Consulting Engineer, do hereby declare the
nature of this invention to be as follows :—
My invention relates to anchors of the kind generally known as stockless anchors
5 for which Letters Patent have been granted to me No. 552 A.D. 1871 No. 4281
A.D. 1874 and No. 3476 A.D. 1885, and has for its principal object to increase
the stability of such anchors when in the ground and insure their not rolling over.
According to my invention I make, or arrange, the horns, or trippers, of such
anchors, so that they will bear on the solid ground at a wider distance apart than
10 the arms are apart ; the said horns, or trippers, being disposed behind the centre
of the axis upon which the arms, or the arms and crosshead, turn ; that is on the
side of the said axis opposite to that from which the shank of the anchor projects.
The crosshead may be made in one with, or be attached to, the shank, or it may be
made in one with, or he attached to, the arms, the stops for limiting the movement
13 of the arms being on the crosshead and -arms, or on the crosshead and shank.
When the crosshead is made in one with the shank, or is affixed thereto, the arms,
with the horns, or trippeTs, formed therewith, or secured thereto, as aforesaid,
may be secured to an axis passing through, and projecting from, each end of the
crosshead; and, when the crosshead is formed with, or secured to, the arms, the
20 shank may be secured in the crosshead by a short pin, or axis, the horns, or
trippers, in any case, being formed with, or secured to, the arms in such a position
as to lie behind the centre, or axis, on which the arms turn as aforesaid.
Dated this 18th day of March 1899.
JOHNSONS & -WILLCOX,
25	 47, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, W.C., Agents.
COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
Improvements in Anchors.
I, WILLIAM WASTENEYS Surrn, of 57 to 60, Sandhill, in the City and County
of Newcastle-on-Tyne, Civil and Consulting Engineer, do hereby declare the
39 nature of this invention and in what manner the same is to be performed to be
particularly described and ascertained in and by the following statement :—
My invention relates to anchors of the kind generally known as stockless
anchors for which Letters Patent have been granted to me No. 552 A.D. 1871,
No. 4281 A.D. 1874 and No. 3476 A.D. 1885, and has for its principal object to
[Price 8d.] gooNIINC-77
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increase the stability of such anchors when in the ground and insure their not
rolling over. I will describe my invention with reference to the accompanying
drawings.
According to my said invention I make, or arrange the horns, or trippers, d,
of such anchors so that they will bear on the solid ground outside of that disturbed 5
by the arms and at a wider distance apart than the arms C are apart; the said
horns or trippers, d, being disposed behind the centre of the axis upon which the
arms C, or the arms C and crosshead B, turn; that is, at the rear or base of the
arms and on the side of the said axis opposite to that from which the shank A
of the anchor projects. The crosshead B, may be made in one with, or be 10
attached to, the shank A, akshewn in plan in Figure 1, cross section in. Figure 2,
and side elevation in Figure 3; or it may be made in one with, or be attached to,
the arms C' as shewn in corresponding views in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7, the stops e,
• -- for limiting the movement of the arms, being formed by the projections on arms C
which come in contact with the crosshead B, in the former case, 15
and by the terminations of the slot in ; the crosshead B, which
come in contact with the shank A.. in the latter case.	 When
•the crosshead B, is made in one with the shank A, as in Figures 1, 2, and 3, or is
affixed thereto ; the arms C with the horns or trippers, d, formed therewith or
secured thereto, as aforesaid, may be secured by a pin or axis f, passing through, 20
and projecting from each end of the crosshead B, and, when the crosshead B, is
formed with, or secured to, the arms C as in Figures 4, 5 and 6, the shank A
may be secured in the crosshead by a short pin or axis f inserted in the recess
provided for it or by a longer pin passing entirely through both arms and cross-
head as in Figure 7 the horns or trippers d in any case, being formed with, or 25
secured to, the arms C in such a position as to lie behind the centre or axis, on
which the arms C, turn as aforesaid.
'Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of my inven-
tion and the manner in which the same is to be performed I declare that what I
claim is:—
	 30
1. The construction of anchors, of the kind referred to, so that the horns, or
trippers, lie behind the centre, or axis, on which the arms turn, and sothat the
said home or trippers, bear on the ground at a greater distance apart than the
distance of the arms apart ; substantially as hereinbefore described.
2. The construction of anchors as hereinbefore described and illustrated in 35
Figures 1, 2 and 3 of the accompanying drawings.
3. The construction of anchors as hereinbefore described and illustrated in
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the accompanying drawings.
Dated this 18th day of December 1899.
JOHNSONS & WILLCOX,
47, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, W.C., Agents.
Print& for Her Majesty's Stationery Office, by Malcomson lc Co., Ltd.-1900.
N° 29,413 A.D. 1904
Date of Application, 31st Dec., 1904
Complete Specification Left, 30th Sept., 1905—Accepted, 2nd Nov., 1905
PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
"Improvements in Anchors"
I, WILLIAM WASTENEYS Slum, of 57 to 60, Sandhill, in the City and County
of Newcastle-on-Tyne; Civil and Consulting Engineer, do hereby declare the
nature of this invention to be as follows ;—
My invention relates to anchors of the kind known as stockless anchors, and
5 especially to such anchors as are described in the Specification of Letters Patent
No. 5938 A.D. 1899 granted to me and it has for its object to improve the said
anchors so as to facilitate the stowing thereof.
According to my present improvement I curve inwards the outer portions of
the sides of the arms marked C in the drawings of the aforesaid specification,
10 and I also round off the corners of the horns of the trippers marked d in the
said drawings so that the anchor, as it comes up in contact with the side of
the ship is, owing to these curved and rounded off portions, always caused to
roll over on the flat and not come up edgewise or foul and the stowing of the
anchor in the ship's hawse pipe is thereby much facilitated.
15	 Dated this 31st. day of December 1904.
JOIINSONS & WILLCOX,
47, Lincolns Inn Fields, London, W.C.
Agents.
COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
20	 "Improvements in Anchors ".
I, WILLIAM WASTENEYS Smrrm, of 57 to 60, Sandhill, in the City and County
of Newcastle-on-Tyne, Civil and Consulting Engineer, do hereby declare the
nature of this invention and in what manner the same is to be performed, to be
particularly described and ascertained in and by the following statement:—
25 My invention relates to anchors of the kind known as stockless anchors, and
especially to such anchors as are described in the Specification of Letters Patent
No. 5938 A.D. 1899 granted to me, and it has for its object to improve the said
anchors so as to facilitate the stowing thereof.
According to my present invention I curve inwards the outer side edges of
30 the rear portions of the arms marked C in the drawings of the aforesaid specifi-
cation, which side edges of the rear portions extend beyond the sides of the
main, or fluke, portions of the said arms, and I also round off the corners of
the horns on the said rear portions, and constituting the trippers marked d,
in the drawings of the aforesaid specification, so that the anchor, as it comes
35 up in contact with the side of the ship, is, owing to these curved and rounded
off portions, caused to roll over on the flat should the anchor tend to come up
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edgewise and fouling will thus be prevented and the stowing of the ancheir in
the ship's hawse pipe be much facilitated.
In the accompanying drawing I have shewn in Figure 1 a cross-section corre-
sponding to Figure 2 of the drawings of the aforesaid Specification of Letters
Patent No. 5938 A.D. 1899, in which the arms are two separate parts each
keyed on 'a shaft, or spindle, which passes through the cross-head, and in
Figure 2 of the accompanying drawing I have shewn a .cross-section corre-
sponding to Figure 5 of the drawings of the aforesaid specification, in which
both the arms and the cross-head are integral; the said Figilres 1 and 2 of
the accompanying drawings illustrating the modifications in accordance with
my present invention, the aforesaid curvature of the side edges of the rear
portions of the arms being indicated at e, and the aforesaid rounding off of the
horns of the trippers d, as aforesaid, being indicated at d2. When the anchor,
in being raised, comes into contact with the side of the vessel, if it be not
already in position on the flat, it will roll over into that posttion in conse-
quence of. the aforesaid curvature of the side edges of the aforesaid portions of
the arms C, and the rounding off of the horns of the tri ppers and fouling will
he prevented and stowage in the hawse pipe will be much facilitated.
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of my said
invention and in what manner the same is to be performed, I declare that what
/ claim is:—
. In anchors of the kind referred to; the modifications in the formation of the
parts specified in the manner and for the purpose hereinbefore described and
illustrated in the accompanying drawings.
Dated this 30th day of September 1905.
jOHNSONS & WILLCOX,
47, Lincolns Inn Fields, London, W.C.
Agents.
Redhill: Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Love & Malcomeon, Lt..-1O5.
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APPENDIX THREE:
Patents for anchors manufactured by:
0	 William Lumsden Byers
A.D. 1900.N° 6541
Date of Application, 7th Apr., 1900 •
Complete Specification Left, 7th Jan., 1931—Accepted, 6th Apr., 1901
•
My invention has for its object improvements in the construction. of pivoted
5 anchors, and relates more particularly to the means employed to trip the- anchor
head and cause its flukes to " take " in the surface over which the anchor is let
go, but embraces also modifications in the construction of the anchor head and
method of pivoting the same to the shank. 	 14 „. • 14;
With the object of ensuring the proper tripping of the heads of pivoted-anchori;-,
lo whatever the nature of the surface in which the flukes of the latter are to become
embedded, I employ lateral projections or trips, as heretofore, but the outer- eua
or edge of these I provide with inclined wings, lips,, or flanges of considerable
area, extending backwards or away from the anchor flukes. These lips or •
flanges constitute flat surfaces inclined to the length of the tatchor flukes prefer-r_
15 ably at an angle of about 20 degrees, or so that if the lines formed by the sur-
faces were produced, they would meet the flukes of the anchor at a point about
one third of the entire length of the flukes from their points. When the lateral
projections or trips are unable to secure the necessary resistance to effect a proper
tripping, (especially in soft or muddy bottoms) these flat surface& wilheupport
20 or retard the sinking of the anchor head sufficiently to ens ible or cause the flukes
to assume their proper relative positions when the strain comes -on the anchoi.`
When desired such inclined surfaces may be formed independently of the
lateral projections or trips, or may be employed independently thereof, whilst
they may be strengthened by suitable webs at the back.
25 Further, in constructing pivoted anchor heads, instead of . providing hip Ca'
the cross head to enable the shank to be hinged thereto, I form a suitable-recess
in the centre Of the cross head to receive the end of the shank and keeure.the
latter by a pin or bolt passing completely through the cross head from end to ena:
This pin is secured in position by upsetting the projecting 'ends therearafter '
•30 collar has been placed on each of them.
The opening throuali the cross head is preferably enlarged between pointi;
near the recess for the end of the shank and the outer gr,A,1.. nf the cross head we
that the bolt may be more easily placed in position.
Dated this 5th day of April 1900:
• PROVISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
"Improvements in Pivoted Anchors"
I, WILLIAM LUMSDON B YERS of 11 Norfolk Street, Sunderland, in the County'
of Durham (Anchor Manufacturer), do hereby declare the nature of this ;liven;
tion to be as follows:—
35
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COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.
"Improvements in Pivoted Anchors"
•
I, *mum/. 	 Lummox Braas, of 11 Norfolk Street, 'Sunderland, in the County
Of Durham (Anchor Manufacturer), do hereby declare the nature of this invention
•and in what manner the same is to be performed, to be particularly described and
• ascertained in and by the following statement :—
, • My invention has for its object ithprovements in the construction of pivoted 5
• anchors, and relates more particularly to the means employed to trip the anchor
head and. , cause its flukes to " take " in the surface over which the anchor is let
- go, but embraces also modifications in the construction of the anchor head and
method of pivoting the same to the shank.
With the object of ensuring the proper tripping of the heads of pivoted anchors, 10
whatever the nature of the surface in which the flukes of the latter are to become
embedded, I employ lateral projections or trips, as heretofore, but the outer end
or edge of these I provide with inclined wihgs, lips, or flanges of considerable
area, extending backwards or away from the anchor flukes.
Further, in constructing pivoted, anchor heads, instead of providing lugs on 15
. the cross head to enable the shank to be hinged thereto, I form a suitable recess
in the centre of the cross head to receive the end of the shank and secure the
• , latter by a pin or bolt passing completely through the cross head from end to
end. This pin is secured in, position by upsetting the projecting ends thereof
-after a collar has been placed on each of them.	 20
The opening through the cross head is preferably enlarged between points near
the recess for the end of the shank and the outer ends of the cross head, so that
the bolt may be more easily placed in. position.
•, Ai1 anchor constructed according to my invention is shown in the accompanying
•drawings, of which Fig. 1 is a plan, Fig. 2 a front view, and Fig. 3 a side view, 25
partly in section.
The anchor head a is formed with the lateral projections or trips b, the upper
'faces of which form with that of the head a concave surface, divided iongitudinally
rby a strengthening web or ridge b', and transversely by webs or flanges b2. The
outer edges of illese trips are provided with wings, lips, or flanges c of consider- 3-0
able area extending backwards or away from the flukes d at an angle to the latter,
as, shown by dotted lines.
The lips or flanges constitute flat surfaces inclined to the length of the anchor
flukes, preferably at an angle of about 20 degrees, or so that if the lines formed
by the surfaces were produced, they would meet the flukes of the anchor at a point 35
about one third of the entire length of the flukes from their points. When the
lateral projections or trips are unable to secure the necessary resistance to effect
a-proper tripping, these flat surfaces will support or retard the sinking of the
anchor head (especially in soft or muddy bottoms) sufficiently to enable, or cause,
the flukes to assume their proper relative position when the strain comes on the 40
anchor.
When desired, such inclined surfaces may be formed independently of the
lateral projections, or trips, or may be employed independently thereof, whilst
they may be strengthened by suitable webs at the back.
The head a is provided with a central recess e,. the sides of which are elongated 4.5
• by webs or flanges b8, in which the end of the shank f is pivoted by a bolt g, pass-
ing entirely through the cross head a, the opening for the passage of this bolt
being enlarged at intervals, as shown in the sectional part of Fig. 2 to facilitate
the insertion, and said bolt being secured in position by a conically bored ring h
being passed over its end, and the latter then upset.
	 50
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Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of :my said
invention and in what manner the same is to be performed, I declare that what
I claim is
(1) A pivoted anchor provided with inclined lateral wings or lips such as c sib-
5 stantially as and tor the purpose described.
(2) A pivoted anchor provided with, inclined lateral wings or lips such as e
in combination with lateral projections or trips having curved upper surfaces
substantially as described.
(3) A pivoted anchor having the shank thereof pivoted in a recess in the cross
10 head thereof by a bolt passing entirely through the latter substantially as des-
cribed.
Dated this 7th day of Jany 1901.
CASTLE SMITH
Agent for the Applicant
Bed hill: Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office, by Malcomson & Co., Ltd. —1901.
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Date of Application, 28th Aug., 1903
Complete Specification Left, 20th May, 1904—Accepted, 23rd June, 1904
PRO VISIONAL SPECIFICATION.
•" Improvements in Anchors"
I, Wil.LiAm Lt usoos 11 yEns, Director of W. L. Byers and Company, Limited,
of 11 Norfolk Street, Sunderland, in the Count y of. Durham, Manufacturer, do
hereby declare the nature of this invention to be as follows:—
M y
 invention relates to cettain improvements in the construction of anchors
6 of the stockless type. It is designed to form an anchor of such configuration
that it shall always come up in a proper position to the hawse pipe, that is
to say, with the length of the anchor and both arms approximately parallel
with the side of the ship; *iind . this the more especially in respect of ships built
on very fine lines, in which ease the bows form au almost vertical plane, at a.
10 very acute angle to the central line of the ship.
	
,	 •
To carry
 my invention into effect, and for the end specified, the corners'
of the end's of the anchor-head are made of the form of a portion of an arc of
a circle. On each end of the head of the anchor is a projection, and' through
this projection the bolt is prolonged. The said projection forms the middle
I Ti portion of un arc drawn from the two sides of the casting, and the above
named corners of the end of the crosshead form parts of the same arc, the result
being that there is a space between the corners and the projection which would
not touch the ship's side. The projectioos cause the anchor to roll over smartly
on to the rounded corners, and these corners allow the anchor to completely
20 roll ovor, and come up with the length of the crosshead against, and parallel
to the ship's plating.
To further facilitate the turning of . the anchor in the hawse-pipe, I make the
shank with a round section. Arackets ma y be provided between the projections
and tho outside edge of the flukes to prevent the projections from fouling the
2.5 ship's keel.
Dated this :Nth day of August 1903 	
•
••	
CASTLE SNITil,
" Invention " Office, Mitre Court, Fleet Street, London, E.C.
Agent for the Applicant.
30	 compLET•: srEcinc.k.rius.
"Improvements in Anchors"
W si Lumsnos I1YEtts, -Director of W. L. Byers and Compan y, Limited,
of 11 Norfolk Street, Sunderland, in the Count y of Durham, Manufacturer, do
hereby dvelare the nature of this invention and in what manner the same is
[Price 8,1.]
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to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in and by the
following statement:
gy invention relates to certain improvements in the construction of anchors
of the stockless type. It isi esigned to form an anchor of such configuration
that it shall alwaysm	
ri
..coe ) in a proper position to the hawse pipe, that is 5
tr
to say, with the length of the anchor and both arms approximatel y parallel
with the side of the ship, and this the more especially in respect of ;hips built
on very tine lines, in which case the bows form an almost vertical plane, at a
very acute angle to the central 'perpendicular line of the ship.
In order that my invention may be the better understood I now proceed 10
to describe the same, with reference to the accompanying sheet of drawings,
regard being had to the figures and letters of reference marked theleupon, in
which:--
Fig. 1 shows a front elevation.
.,Fig. 2 shows a side elevation.	 15
' Fig. 3 shows a broken half view of Fig.,2 as seen from below.
. 10 carry my invention into effect, and for the end specified, the corners. A,
of the ends of the anchor head are..nrade of the form of a portion of arcs of a
circle. On each end of the .head of the anchor is a projection. B, and through
this projection the bolt, (', is prolonged. 1.111 said projection, B, and the 2(1
ends. of the bolts each form the middle portion of an arc drawn from the two
sides of the casting, and the above named corners, A, of the ends of the cross-
head form parts of the same arcs. The projections, B, cause the anchor to toll
over on to the rounded corners, A, A, and these corners, A, A, allow the
anchor to completely roll over, and come up with the length of the etosshead, 2.
1), against, and parallel to, the ship's plating. To furth:r facilitate the turn-
ing of the anchor in the hawse-pipe. I make the shall k round in section, E.
The shackle pin is at W.	 e -
Having now particularly described and ascertained the nature of in said
invention and in what manner the same is to be performed, I declare that what :i
I claim is:—
no construction of a ,stockless -artelt4 in such a manner as to come up in
proper position to the h iwse-pipe substantially as specified.
Dated this !IOUh day of May, 1904
CASTLE SMITH.
'Invention	 Office. Mit.'e Court, Fleet, Street, London, EA',
Agent for the Applicant.
Waal: Printed for Ills!vraiesty 's Stationers office, by Love ST italemson, Ltd.-100t.
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